Hwasong-14

{{External media|float=right|title=Images of the Hwasong-14|headerimage=|image1=[https://sohanews.sohacdn.com/2017/alalam-636351919892198979-25f-4x3-1501434533752.jpg The missile and its 8-axle TEL during the first test]|image2=[https://cdn-iladncp.nitrocdn.com/HqlEixensysOTCVgzDQPqXypWdYAZutW/assets/images/optimized/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/39b9e5175d3528251c59c52222df221e.Hwasong-14.jpg February 2018 military parade]|width=250px}}

The Hwasong-14 is likely a two-stage version of the Hwasong-12 first tested in May 2017. The second stage appears to have increased its range. The first stage engine appears very similar to the Hwasong-12. With a single liquid fuel engine, it has four vernier thrusters for stability and guidance.{{cite web|date=27 July 2017 | url =https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-14/ |title=Hwasong-14 (KN-20)|website=Missile Threat|publisher=CSIS| access-date=7 July 2017}}{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/|title=North Korea's ICBM: A New Missile and a New Era|author1=Ankit Panda|author2=Vipin Narang|date=7 July 2017|website=The Diplomat|accessdate=18 August 2017}} Based on images, the missile is estimated to be {{cvt|19.5|m|ft|abbr=on}} long and {{cvt|1.8|m|ft|abbr=on}} wide, and has a takeoff mass of {{cvt|31000-32000|kg|abbr=on}}.{{cite web|url=https://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Hwasong-14/index.htm|title=North Korean HS-14 ICBM|website=www.b14643.eu|access-date=2025-02-08}}

A detailed analysis by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists claims that the current variant of the Hwasong-14 may not even be capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear warhead to Anchorage, Alaska. But even if North Korea is now capable of fabricating a relatively light-weight, "miniaturized" atomic bomb that can survive the extreme reentry environments of long-range rocket delivery, it will, with certainty, not be able to deliver such an atomic bomb to the lower 48 states of the United States with the rocket tested on 3 July and 28 July.{{cite web|author1= Theodore A. Postol |author2=Markus Schiller|author3=Robert Schmucker|url=https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/north-koreas-not-quite-icbm-cant-hit-the-lower-48-states/|title=North Korea’s “not quite” ICBM can’t hit the lower 48 states|website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|date=11 August 2017|access-date=2025-02-08}}

A first-generation North Korean nuclear missile warhead is estimated to weigh {{cvt|500-600|kg|abbr=on}}. Calculations of the range of the Hwasong-14 carrying such a payload vary from {{cvt|6000-8000|km|abbr=on}}, enough to reach Anchorage and Honolulu, Hawaii, to as much as {{cvt|10000|km|abbr=on}}, enough to reach Seattle, Washington. However, it is claimed that the payload would need to be lighter at {{cvt|300-500|kg|abbr=on}} to be able to reach Western United States, especially Seattle. The July 2017 tests were conducted with a {{cvt|200|kg|abbr=on}} reentry vehicle, giving the missile its maximum range of {{cvt|10400|km|abbr=on}}, enough to reach New York City but not Washington D.C., although such a payload is much lighter than North Korea is believed to be capable of weaponizing.{{cite web|author=Michael Elleman|url=https://www.38north.org/2018/11/melleman112918/|title=North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: New Data Indicates Shorter Range Than Many Thought|website=38 North|date=29 November 2018|access-date=2025-06-17}}{{cite web|url=https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170705000500315|title=N. Korea likely to have operational ICBM capable of striking U.S. West Coast next year or two: U.S. expert|access-date=2025-02-08|date=5 July 2017|website=Yonhap News Agency}}{{cite web|date=13 July 2017|url=https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203611/north-koreas-icbm-hwasong-14/|title=North Korea's ICBM: Hwasong-14|website=Arms Control Wonk|accessdate=2025-02-08}}{{cite web|date=28 July 2017|url=https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/north-korean-icbm-appears-able-reach-major-us-cities|title=North Korean ICBM Appears Able to Reach Major US Cities|website=Union of Concerned Scientists|access-date=2025-02-08}}

Although the missile is mounted on a transporter erector launcher, it is launched from a detachable platform on a concrete pad. This could have several operational ramifications. It may increase the time required to launch the Hwasong-12, and limit the number of launch locations to pre-sited and pre-constructed launch pads.

Michael Elleman of IISS and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists both claim that available evidence clearly indicates that the engine is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines for the R-36 missile,{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/north-koreas-new-high-performance-missile-engines-likely-werent-made-in-russia-or-ukraine/|title=North Korea's New High-Performance Missile Engines Likely Weren't Made in Russia or Ukraine|author=Ankit Panda|website=The Diplomat|date=2017-08-16|accessdate=18 August 2017}} and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14, which is capable of producing a thrust of {{cvt|470|kN|tf|abbr=on}}.

According to Michael Elleman, an unknown number of RD-250 engines were probably acquired through illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Hwasong-10 and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred in 2015–2017.{{Cite web | date=23 August 2017|author=Dan Drollette Jr.|url=https://thebulletin.org/2017/08/the-secret-to-north-koreas-icbm-success/| title=The secret to North Korea's ICBM success|website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|access-date=2025-02-08}} Ukraine rejected this theory claiming it was "most likely provoked by Russian secret services to cover their own crimes."{{cite web|url=https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-denies-north-korean-missile-components-state-owned/story?id=49206153|title=Ukraine denies North Korean missile components came from state-owned factory|date=15 August 2017|website=ABC News|accessdate=18 August 2017}} Other US experts have questioned whether the evidence for Elleman's theory is strong enough to back up his claims.{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/north-korean-missiles-probably-engines-sourced-from-russia-or-ukraine-icbm|title=North Korea attack on Guam could 'quickly escalate into war' – James Mattis|first=Julian|last=Borger|date=15 August 2017|accessdate=18 August 2017|newspaper=The Guardian}} Engine maker Yuzhnoye Design Office denied that the engines were supplied to North Korea by Ukraine.{{cite web|url=http://www.yuzhnoye.com/en/press-center/news/news-copy_225.html|title=Denial of the article “The secret of the North Korea’s ICBM success” by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the article “North Korea’s Missile Success is linked to Ukrainian Plant, investigators say” by The New York Times|website=Yuzhnoye|accessdate=18 August 2017|archive-date=18 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170818125951/http://www.yuzhnoye.com/en/press-center/news/news-copy_225.html|url-status=dead}}

In August 2017, the State Space Agency of Ukraine claimed that the rocket engine used during 28 July 2017 North Korea's missile test was RD-250 made at a Ukrainian factory, but solely for use in Tsyklon space rockets supplied to Russia. The space agency chief said that according to Ukrainian information, “Russia today has between 7 and 20 of the Tsyklon rockets...They have these engines, they have the documentation. They can supply these engines from the finished rockets to whoever they want”.{{cite web|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/16/business/tech/kiev-space-chief-engines-used-north-korea-rockets-made-russia-china-also-fuel-tech/|title=Kiev space chief: Engines used in North Korea rockets made for Russia but China also had fuel tech|date=16 August 2017|accessdate=18 August 2017|website=The Japan Times|archive-date=18 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170818132457/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/16/business/tech/kiev-space-chief-engines-used-north-korea-rockets-made-russia-china-also-fuel-tech/|url-status=dead}} The agency also claimed that a total of 223 Tsyklon-2 and Tsyklon-3 rockets were supplied to Russia.{{cite web|author=Elizabeth Shim|date=2017-08-16|url=https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/08/16/Ukraines-space-agency-North-Korea-engine-identical-to-ours/7411502884931/|title=Ukraine's space agency: North Korea engine identical to ours|accessdate=18 August 2017|website=UPI News}} Furthermore, he stated that North Korea cannot produce the fuel for the RD-250 (N₂O₄ and UDMH), and that it must have been produced either in China or in Ukraine.

According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea received 20 to 40 RD-251 engines from Russia in 2016.{{cite web|url=https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/353827-european-banks-are-key-to-north-koreas-advance-in-missile/|title=European banks are key to North Korea's advance in missile technology|author=Bart Marcois|website=The Hill|date=4 October 2017|access-date=2025-02-08}}

Arms expert Jeffrey Lewis claimed that the second stage of Hwasong-14 is similar to the upper stages designed for the Iranian space launch vehicles.{{Cite web|author1=Tsuyoshi Nagasawa|author2=Takayuki Tanaka|date=2017-09-26 | url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/North-Korea-crisis/Could-Iran-be-behind-North-Korea-s-nuclear-missile-advances |title = Could Iran be behind North Korea's nuclear, missile advances?|access-date=2025-02-08|website=Nikkei Asia}} According to German expert Norbert Brügge, the second stage engine has a thrust of {{cvt|40.6|kN|tf|abbr=on}}.

{{see also|Hwasong-13}}

In 2012 and 2015, North Korea displayed two versions of Hwasong-13. However, the Hwasong-13 project was apparently cancelled.{{cite web|url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-08/|title=Hwasong-13 (KN-08, KN-14)|website=Missile Threat|date=8 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-08}}

In early 2017, during his New Year's speech, Kim Jong Un announced that North Korea was in the final stages of testing its ICBM.{{cite web|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kim-jong-un-hints-north-korea-test-intercontinental-ballistic-missle/|title= Kim Jong Un hints at North Korea test of intercontinental ballistic missile|publisher=CBS News|date= 2017-01-01|accessdate=2025-02-09}}

In March and June 2017, North Korea was suspected to test Hwasong-14's engine twice.

The first publicly announced flight test was on 4 July 2017, to coincide with the US Independence Day celebrations. This flight had a claimed range of {{convert|933|km|mile}} eastwards into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) and reached an altitude of {{convert|2802|km|abbr=on}} during a 39-minute flight.{{Cite web|title=North Korea Finally Tests an ICBM|author=John Schilling|website=38 North|date=5 July 2017|url=http://www.38north.org/2017/07/jschilling070517/|access-date=2025-02-08}}

This range was deliberately shortened, to avoid encroaching on other nations' territory, by 'lofting' the missile: firing it on a trajectory that was inefficiently high, rather than optimised for range. This allows the missile's performance to be tested and demonstrated, without requiring a huge test range.

A prediction for the possible range, following an optimum trajectory, has been given at {{convert|6700|km|abbr=on}}{{cite web|author=David Wright|url=https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/north-korea-appears-to-launch-missile-with-6700-km-range/|title=North Korea Appears to Launch Missile with 6,700 km Range|date=3 July 2017|website=Union of Concerned Scientists|access-date=2025-02-08}} or as much as {{convert|10,400|km|abbr=on}} not taking into account the Earth’s rotation. If true, then this brings the U.S. states of Alaska and Hawaii within the missile's range.

Preparations for a second test flight were detected by US intelligence as early as 20 July. On 28 July, the missile was fired at 11:41 p.m local time, the first time which a night time launch was carried out.{{cite web|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1261474/pentagon-spokesman-comments-on-north-korean-missile-launch/|title=Pentagon Spokesman Comments on North Korean Missile Launch|date=28 July 2017|publisher=United States Department of Defense|access-date=2025-02-08}}{{cite web|url=https://www.inverse.com/article/34804-north-korea-missile-test-night-launch|author=Jack Crosbie|title=Why North Korea's Night Missile Launch Was So Unusual|date=28 July 2017|website=Inverse|access-date=2025-02-08}} The missile was fired at a lofted trajectory with apogee of {{convert|3,700|km|mi|abbr=on}}, landing {{convert|998|km|mi|abbr=on}} away with a total flight time of approximately 47 minutes.

Based on the data from the test flight, if the missile were fired at the optimal efficient trajectory, it is predicted that the maximum effective range would exceed {{convert|10,000|km|mi|abbr=on}}. If factoring in the rotation of the Earth, which may provide a range boost when travelling eastward, the Hwasong-14’s coverage area would include the US West Coast, Chicago, and possibly even New York, but only with a substantially reduced payload.{{cite web|author=John Schilling|date=1 August 2017|url=http://www.38north.org/2017/08/jschilling080117/|title=What Next for North Korea's ICBM?|website=38 North|accessdate=12 August 2017}}

{{See also|2017 North Korean missile tests}}

File:Kim Jong-un's order for first test of Hwasong 14.jpg|Kim Jong Un's order for the first test flight

File:Kim Jong-un's order for second test of Hwasong 14.jpg|Kim's order for the second test

File:Trajectories of Hwasong-14.svg|Very high angle{{cite web|author=John Schilling |title=What is True and Not True About North Korea's Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation |date=July 10, 2017 |publisher=38 North |quote=As was noted at the time, the Hwasong-14 was launched on a very high angle "lofted" trajectory to avoid overflying Japan, ... |url=https://www.38north.org/2017/07/jschilling071017/|access-date=2025-02-08}} lofted trajectories of Hwasong-14, along with Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17

• Hwasong-12
• Hwasong-15

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{{DPRK missiles}}

Category:Intercontinental ballistic missiles of North Korea

Category:Military equipment introduced in the 2010s