Internet outage

{{main|Internet censorship}}

A government internet blackout is the deliberate shut down of civilian internet access by a government for a small area or many large areas of its country. Such a shut down is typically used as a means of information control in a brief period of upheaval or transition. In autocracies, internet shutdowns have appeared especially in the context of contested elections and post-electoral violence.{{Cite journal |last1=Eichhorn |first1=Kristin |last2=Linhart |first2=Eric |date=2022-06-23 |title=Election-related internet-shutdowns in autocracies and hybrid regimes |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2022.2090950 |journal=Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=705–725 |doi=10.1080/17457289.2022.2090950 |s2cid=250001441 |issn=1745-7289|url-access=subscription }} It can impede the ability of protesters or insurgent forces to mobilize and organize. It also serves to prevent real-time information access for foreign people or entities. Reactions from leaders, journalists, observers and others in foreign countries can be delayed.

The temporary disconnection of civilian internet access by military forces is an important aspect of information warfare. This tactic is common today, and is often used in concert with a ground invasion by conventional forces. It could also be used in advance of an airstrike campaign.

Extreme weather events and natural disasters can lead to internet outages by either directly destroying local ICT infrastructure or indirectly damaging the local electricity grid. The Monash IP Observatory and KASPR Datahaus have tracked the impact of Hurricane Florence 2018,{{Cite web|title=The Monash IP Observatory - Hurricane Florence's impact on local internet|url=https://ip-observatory.org/observatory/hurricane-florence-2018|access-date=2021-09-03|website=IP Observatory|language=en|archive-date=2021-09-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210903014428/https://ip-observatory.org/observatory/hurricane-florence-2018|url-status=dead}} Cyclone Fani 2018,{{Cite web|title=Visualising Tropical Cyclone Fani's Path of Destruction in Real-Time|url=https://medium.com/insights-monash-university-ip-observatory/visualising-tropical-cyclone-fanis-path-of-destruction-in-real-time-b643cf9fd72c|access-date=2021-09-03|website=Medium|date=4 May 2019|language=en}} and Hurricane Laura in 2020.{{Cite web|title=Real-time Mapping of Hurricane Laura's Impact on Internet Infrastructure|url=https://medium.com/insights-monash-university-ip-observatory/real-time-mapping-of-hurricane-lauras-impact-on-internet-infrastructure-9584162885ab|access-date=2021-09-03|website=Medium|date=29 August 2020|language=en}}

Solar superstorms could cause large-scale global months-long Internet outages. Researchers have described potential mitigation measures and exceptions – such as user-powered mesh networks, related peer-to-peer applications and new protocols – and the robustness of the current Internet infrastructure.{{cite news |title=Computer scientist warns global internet is not prepared for a large solar storm |url=https://techxplore.com/news/2021-08-scientist-global-internet-large-solar.html |access-date=22 September 2021 |work=techxplore.com |language=en}}{{cite magazine |title=A Bad Solar Storm Could Cause an 'Internet Apocalypse' |url=https://www.wired.com/story/solar-storm-internet-apocalypse-undersea-cables/ |access-date=22 September 2021 |magazine=Wired}}{{cite book |last1=Jyothi |first1=Sangeetha Abdu |title=Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference |chapter=Solar superstorms: Planning for an internet apocalypse |date=9 August 2021 |pages=692–704 |doi=10.1145/3452296.3472916 |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery|isbn=9781450383837 |s2cid=236961660 }}

File:DDoS of Wiki.png attack in February 2020, showing an error message in place of website content]]

These attacks flood a website or network with traffic from multiple sources, overwhelming the server and making it unavailable to users.

These attacks target the infrastructure of the internet, specifically the routing systems that direct traffic between different networks. By manipulating or disrupting these systems, attackers can cause widespread outages.

Malicious software can infect and damage computer systems and networks, leading to internet outages.

A botnet is a network of compromised computers that are controlled by an attacker. These computers can be used to launch DDoS attacks, spread malware, or perform other malicious actions that can cause internet outages.

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used to route traffic on the internet. BGP hijacking is a form of cyber-attack where an attacker alters the routing information in BGP, causing internet traffic to be directed to the wrong place.

Floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters can damage internet infrastructure, causing outages.

Internet service providers (ISPs) rely on electricity to power their networks, so power failures can cause outages.

Accidents caused by human error, such as a construction crew cutting through a fiber-optic cable, can cause internet outages.

The failure of equipment such as servers, routers, and switches can cause internet outages.

Scheduled maintenance or unexpected repairs on the internet infrastructure can cause outages.

Inclement weather such as heavy snow, thunderstorm, and heavy rain can cause outages by damaging the infrastructure or making it difficult for maintenance crews to access and repair the network.

A variety of organizations measure internet shutdowns including the Open Observatory of Network Interference, Access Now, Freedom House, the Digital Society Project (using the V-Dem Institute methodology and infrastructure), the OpenNet Initiative, the University of Michigan's Censored Planet Observatory, the Internet Censorship Lab, and the Monash IP Observatory.{{cite arXiv|last1=Niaki|first1=Arian Akhavan|last2=Cho|first2=Shinyoung|last3=Weinberg|first3=Zachary|last4=Hoang|first4=Nguyen Phong|last5=Razaghpanah|first5=Abbas|last6=Christin|first6=Nicolas|last7=Gill|first7=Phillipa|date=2019-07-09|title=ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform|class=cs.CR|eprint=1907.04245|language=en}}{{Cite web|title=Freedom on the Net Research Methodology|url=https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-net/freedom-net-research-methodology|access-date=2021-05-27|website=Freedom House|language=en}}Mechkova, V., Daniel P., Brigitte S.,&Steven W. (2020). Digital Society Project Dataset v2.Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project http://digitalsocietyproject.org/{{Cite SSRN |last1=Coppedge|first1=Michael|last2=Gerring|first2=John|last3=Knutsen|first3=Carl Henrik|last4=Lindberg|first4=Staffan I.|last5=Teorell|first5=Jan|last6=Marquardt|first6=Kyle L.|last7=Medzihorsky|first7=Juraj|last8=Pemstein|first8=Daniel|last9=Pernes|first9=Josefine|last10=von Römer|first10=Johannes|last11=Stepanova|first11=Natalia|date=2019-04-01|title=V-Dem Methodology V9|language=en|ssrn=3441063}}{{Cite web|last1=Anthonio|first1=Felicia|last2=Cheng|first2=Sage|date=2021|title=Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP) Methodology|url=https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2021/02/Read-Me_-How-to-view-the-Access-Now-Internet-Shutdown-Tracker-Updated-Mar-2021.pdf}}{{Cite web|last1=Fletcher |first1=Terry|last2=Hayes-Birchler|first2= Andria|date=2020-07-30|title=Comparing Measures of Internet Censorship: Analyzing the Tradeoffs between Expert Analysis and Remote Measurement|url=https://zenodo.org/record/3967397|language=en|doi=10.5281/ZENODO.3967397}}{{Cite magazine|title=The draconian rise of internet shutdowns|url=https://www.wired.co.uk/article/internet-shutdowns|access-date=2021-09-03|magazine=Wired|language=en}} These organizations use a range of methods to detect shutdowns such as expert analysis, remote sensing, and remote sensing with oversight. Some of these organizations, such as Access Now, maintain active lists of internet shutdowns.{{Cite web|title=#KeepItOn: Fighting internet shutdowns around the world|url=https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/|access-date=2021-05-27|website=Access Now|language=en}}

Several organizations use expert analysis to identify internet shutdowns. Some, such as the Digital Society Project (DSP), send out surveys to experts around the world, and then aggregate the results into a single score. For internet shutdowns, the DSP asks "How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?" where answers range from "Extremely Often" to "Never or almost Never."{{Cite book|last1=Mechkova|first1=Valeriya|url=http://digitalsocietyproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DSP-Codebook-v3.pdf|title=Digital Society Survey Codebook|last2=Pemstein|first2=Daniel|last3=Seim|first3=Brigitte|last4=Wilson|first4=Steven|publisher=Digital Society Project|year=2021}} Freedom House's Freedom on the Net report also uses expert analysis to assess whether internet shutdowns have occurred, but instead of surveying multiple experts, Freedom House identifies and partners with a single expert to conduct an analysis. Freedom House asks the question "Does the government intentionally disrupt the internet or cellphone networks in response to political or social events, whether temporary or long term, localized or nationwide?" Generally expert analyses are more prone to false positives and fewer false negatives (i.e. identifying shutdowns that other sources cannot confirm), than remote sensing methods with manual oversight.

Other organizations use various remote sensing techniques to identify shutdowns. Some organizations, such as the Open Observatory of Network Interference, the Internet Censorship Lab and the Monash IP-Observatory use automated remote sensing methods to detect internet shutdowns.{{Cite web|title=OONI Explorer - Open Data on Internet Censorship Worldwide|url=https://explorer.ooni.org/|access-date=2021-05-27|website=explorer.ooni.org|language=en}}{{Cite web|title=The Monash IP Observatory|url=https://ip-observatory.org/about|access-date=2021-09-03|website=IP Observatory|language=en}} The Open Observatory of Network Interference uses software installed on computers of volunteers around the world to detect shutdowns. However these methods are prone to false positives, false negatives, and various technical challenges.{{Cite journal |last1=Yadav |first1=Tarun Kumar |last2=Chakravarty |first2=Sambuddho |date=2018-04-18 |title=Trends and patterns of internet censorship in india |url=https://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/668 |journal=IIIT-Delhi Institutional Repository |language=en-US}}{{Cite journal|last=Weinberg|first=Zachary|date=2018|title=Toward Automated Worldwide Monitoring of Network-level Censorship|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331045547|journal=Carnegie Mellon University}}{{Cite journal|last1=Pearce|first1=Paul|last2=Ensafi|first2=Roya|last3=Li|first3=Frank|last4=Feamster|first4=Nick|last5=Paxson|first5=Vern|date=2018|title=Toward Continual Measurement of Global Network-Level Censorship|url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8283433|journal=IEEE Security & Privacy|volume=16|issue=1|pages=24–33|doi=10.1109/MSP.2018.1331018|s2cid=3285319|issn=1540-7993|url-access=subscription}}

In order to address these concerns, some organizations have implemented various methods of oversight. Organizations such as Access Now and the OpenNet Initiative use such methods. Access Now uses technological methods to detect shutdowns, but then confirms those shutdowns using news reports, reports from local activists, official government statements, and statements from ISPs. The OpenNet Initiative has volunteers install software on their computers to check websites from access points around the world, then confirms those results with manual observations.{{cite web|last1=Faris|first1= R. |last2= Villeneuve|first2= N. |year=2008|title= Measuring Global Internet Filtering in R. Deibert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski, & J. Zittrain, (Eds.), Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, Cambridge: MIT Press|url=http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/Deibert_02_Ch01_005-028.pdf|website=OpenNet Initiative}} These methods are prone to more false negatives and fewer false positives (i.e. all shutdowns that these sources identify can be confirmed by other sources) than expert analyses.

A comparatively new method for detecting internet shutdowns is remote sensing with automated oversight. These methods have been praised as more ethical and efficient as they do not endanger in-country volunteers.VanderSloot, B., McDonald, A., Scott, W., Halderman, J.A., & Ensafi, R. (2018). Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer Censorship. In Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium.Hoang, P. N., Doreen, S., Polychronakis, M., (2019). Measuring I2P Censorship at a Global Scale. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet.Raman, R. S., Stoll, A., Dalek, J., Ramesh, R. Scott, W., & Ensafi, R. (2020). Measuring the Deployment of Network Censorship Filters at Global Scale. Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2020. However these methods have yet to produce regular datasets.

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{{See also|Internet censorship#Internet shutdowns}}

Internet outages can be prevented by a more resilient, decentralized Internet architecture.{{cite web|last1=Hiner|first1=Jason|title=Takeaways from Egypt: Kill the kill switch and decentralize the Internet|url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/takeaways-from-egypt-kill-the-kill-switch-and-decentralize-the-internet/|website=ZDNet|access-date=19 February 2017|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170220092735/http://www.zdnet.com/article/takeaways-from-egypt-kill-the-kill-switch-and-decentralize-the-internet/|archive-date=20 February 2017|url-status=live}}

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Modern society, especially in developed countries, depends heavily on the Internet not just for communication. There have been some measures taken and possibilities exist for managing and countering a large-scale Internet outage.{{citation needed|date=February 2017}}

{{See also|Emergency communication system|Radio}}

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{{columns-list|

• {{annotated link|BGP hijacking}}
• {{annotated link|Communications blackout}}
• {{annotated link|Cyberwarfare}}
• {{annotated link|Cyberweapon}}
• {{section link|Decentralization|Centralization and redecentralization of the Internet}}
• {{annotated link|Critical Internet infrastructure}}
• {{annotated link|Critical infrastructure protection}}
• {{annotated link|DDoS}}
• {{annotated link|Internet backbone}}
• {{annotated link|Internet censorship in the Arab Spring}}
• {{annotated link|Internet kill switch}}
• {{annotated link|Just-in-time blocking}}
• {{annotated link|Malware}}
• {{annotated link|Network congestion}}
• {{annotated link|Power outage}}
• {{annotated link|Protests against SOPA and PIPA}}

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{{reflist|30em}}

• [https://www.ted.com/talks/danny_hillis_the_internet_could_crash_we_need_a_plan_b The Internet could crash. We need a Plan B], TED talk by Danny Hillis
• [http://redecentralize.org/ Redecentralize.org]

Category:Internet architecture

Category:Cyberwarfare

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