Kursk submarine disaster

File:K-141 Kursk Russian submarine.jpg (Oscar II-class) submarine, twice the length of a 747 jumbo jet, and one of the largest submarines in the Russian Navy.]]

On the morning of 12 August 2000, Kursk was in the Barents Sea, participating in the "Summer-X" exercise, the first large-scale naval exercise planned by the Russian Navy in more than a decade, and also its first since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It consisted of 30 ships and three submarines.{{cite web |last=Potts |first=J.R. |title=K-141 Kursk Attack Submarine (1994) |publisher=MilitaryFactory.com |date=9 May 2013 |url=http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=K141-Kursk |access-date=3 February 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140220231704/http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=K141-Kursk |archive-date=20 February 2014}}

Kursk had recently won a citation for its excellent performance and been recognised as having the best submarine crew in the Northern Fleet.{{cite book |last=Brannon |first=Robert |title=Russian Civil-Military Relations |date=13 April 2009 |publisher=Ashgate Publishers |location=Farnham, England |isbn=978-0-7546-7591-4 |page=140 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oA9GsW_6H6AC |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160508152543/https://books.google.com/books?id=oA9GsW_6H6AC |archive-date=8 May 2016}} Although this was an exercise, Kursk loaded a full complement of conventional combat weapons. It was one of the few submarines authorised to carry a combat load at all times. This included 18 RPK-6 Vodopad/RPK-7 Veter (SS-N-16 "Stallion") antisubmarine missiles and 24 P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 "Shipwreck") cruise missiles, which were designed to defeat the best naval air defences.

Kursk had mythic standing. It was reputedly unsinkable and, it was claimed, could withstand a direct hit from a torpedo.{{cite news |title=What really happened to Russia's 'unsinkable' sub |newspaper=The Guardian |date=4 August 2001 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/05/kursk.russia |access-date=1 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203171047/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/05/kursk.russia |archive-date=3 February 2014}} The outer hull was constructed using {{cvt|8|mm|in|adj=on|1}} steel plate covered by up to {{cvt|80|mm|0}} of rubber, which minimised other submarines' or surface

vessels' ability to detect the submarine. The inner pressure hull was made of high-quality {{cvt|50|mm|in|adj=on|0}} steel plate. The two hulls were separated by a {{cvt|1|to|2|m|ft|adj=on|0}} gap. The inner hull was divided into nine water-tight compartments. The boat was {{convert|155|m|abbr=on}}, about as long as two jumbo jets.{{cite web |title=The True Story of the Russian Kursk Submarine Disaster |date=11 March 2022 |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a23494010/kursk-submarine-disaster/ |access-date=22 October 2021 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214155136/https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a23494010/kursk-submarine-disaster/ |archive-date=14 February 2022}}

At 08:51 local time, Kursk requested permission to conduct a torpedo training launch and received the response "{{lang|ru|Dobro}}" ("Good"). After considerable delay, the submarine was set to fire two dummy torpedoes at the {{sclass|Kirov|battlecruiser}} {{ship|Russian cruiser|Pyotr Velikiy||2}}. At 11:29 local time, the torpedo room crew loaded the first practice Type 65 "Kit" torpedo, (Russian: {{lang|ru|tolstushka}}, or "fat girl", because of its size), without a warhead, into Kursk{{'}}s number-4 torpedo tube on the starboard side. It was {{cvt|10.7|m|ft}} long and weighed {{cvt|5|t}}.

File:NOSAR Kursk sesmic readings.png

At 11:29:34 (07:29:34 GMT), seismic detectors at the Norwegian seismic array (NORSAR) and in other locations around the world recorded a seismic event of magnitude 1.5 on the Richter scale.{{cite web |title=Russian Submarine Kursk Catastrophe |date=11 October 2000 |url=http://www.yenra.com/russian-submarines/kursk/ |access-date=31 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141108160102/http://www.yenra.com/russian-submarines/kursk/ |archive-date=8 November 2014}} The location was fixed at coordinates {{coord|69|38|N|37|19|E|display=inline}}, north-east of Murmansk, approximately {{cvt|250|km}} from Norway, and {{cvt|80|km}} from the Kola Peninsula.{{cite web |location=Norway |publisher=Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority |year=2001 |title=The Kursk Accident |last1=Amundsen |first1=Ingar |last2=Lind |first2=Bjørn |last3=Reistad |first3=Ole |last4=Gussgaard |first4=Knut |last5=Iosjpe |first5=Mikhail |last6=Sickel |first6=Morten |url=http://www.nrpa.no/dav/3b3a226c34.pdf |access-date=3 February 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303191433/http://www.nrpa.no/dav/3b3a226c34.pdf |archive-date=3 March 2016}}

At 11:31:48, 2 minutes and 14 seconds after the first, a second event, measuring 4.2 on the Richter scale, or 250 times larger than the first, was registered on seismographs across northern Europe{{cite web |title=Seismic Testimony from the Kursk |author=Andrew Alden |work=About.com Education |url=http://geology.about.com/library/weekly/aa012801a.htm |access-date=10 October 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061018065306/http://geology.about.com/library/weekly/aa012801a.htm |archive-date=18 October 2006}} and was detected as far away as Alaska. The second explosion was equivalent to 2–3 tons of TNT.{{cite journal |title=The Nuclear Hazards of the Recovery of the Russian Federation Nuclear Powered Submarine Kursk |last1=Davidson |first1=Peter |last2=Jones |first2=Huw |last3=Large |first3=John H. |author-link3=John H. Large |publisher=Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers |journal=World Maritime Technology Conference, San Francisco |date=October 2003 |url=http://www.largeassociates.com/kurskpaper.pdf |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120206224817/http://www.largeassociates.com/kurskpaper.pdf |archive-date=6 February 2012}}

The seismic data showed that the explosion occurred at the same depth as the sea bed. The seismic event, triangulated at {{coord|69|36.99|N|37|34.50|E|display=inline}}, showed that in a little over 2 minutes the boat had moved about {{cvt|400|m}} from the site of the initial explosion. It was enough time for the submarine to sink to a depth of {{cvt|108|m|ft}} and remain on the sea floor for a short period.

The crew of the submarine Karelia detected the explosion, but the captain assumed that it was part of the exercise.{{cite news |last=Hoffman |first=David E. |title=Uncovering The Kursk Cover Up |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=23 February 2003 |url=http://sptimes.ru/story/9371?page=1 |access-date=4 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140308190201/http://sptimes.ru/story/9371?page=1 |archive-date=8 March 2014}} Aboard Pyotr Velikiy, the target of the practice launch, the crew detected a hydroacoustic signal characteristic of an underwater explosion and felt their hull shudder.{{cite web |last=Ryazantsev |first=Valery |title=The death of the Kursk |language=ru |url=http://www.avtonomka.org/vospominaniya/vitse-admiral-ryazantsev-valeriy-dmitrievich/45-glava-ix-spasatelnaya-operatsiya.html |access-date=12 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110613060146/http://www.avtonomka.org/vospominaniya/vitse-admiral-ryazantsev-valeriy-dmitrievich/45-glava-ix-spasatelnaya-operatsiya.html |archive-date=13 June 2011}} They reported the phenomenon to fleet headquarters but their report was ignored.

The schedule for Kursk to complete the practice torpedo firing expired at 13:30 without any contact from the sub. Accustomed to the frequent failure of communications equipment, Fleet Commander Admiral Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Popov, aboard Pyotr Velikiy, was not initially alarmed.{{rp|36}} The ship dispatched a helicopter to look for Kursk, but it did not find the sub on the surface; this was reported to Popov.{{cite web |title=Helicopter takes off from "Pyotr Velikiy" |website=ticketsofrussia.ru |url=http://www.ticketsofrussia.ru/kursk/graphics/990807675.html |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117023824/http://www.ticketsofrussia.ru/kursk/graphics/990807675.html |archive-date=17 November 2015}}

File:AS-28 Priz.png AS-28 Priz]]

The Northern Fleet duty officer notified the head of the fleet's search and rescue forces, Captain Alexander Teslenko, to stand by for orders. Teslenko's primary rescue ship was a 20-year-old former lumber carrier, Mikhail Rudnitsky, which had been converted to support submersible rescue operations. Teslenko notified the ship's captain to be ready to depart on one hour's notice. Berthed at the primary Northern Fleet base at Severomorsk,{{page needed|date=December 2024}} the ship was equipped with two AS-32 and AS-34 {{sclass|Priz|deep-submergence rescue vehicle}}s, a diving bell, underwater video cameras, lifting cranes, and other specialised gear,{{page needed|date=December 2024}} but it was not equipped with stabilisers that could keep the vessel in position during stormy weather and could lower its rescue vessels only in calm seas.{{cite book |last=Moore |first=Robert |title=A Time to Die: The Untold Story of the Kursk Tragedy |year=2002 |publisher=Three Rivers Press |location=New York |isbn=978-0-307-41969-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JAkGEHW0BOgC |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502154424/https://books.google.com/books?id=JAkGEHW0BOgC |archive-date=2 May 2016}}{{rp|72}} The Russian Navy had previously operated two {{sclass2|India|submarine|1}}s, each of which carried a pair of Poseidon-class DSRVs that could reach a depth of {{cvt|693|m|sigfig=3}}, but due to a lack of funds, the vessels had been held since 1994 in a Saint Petersburg yard for pending repairs.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{cite web |title=BS-257 Project 940 |language=ru |url=http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dss/940/BS-257/BS-257.htm |access-date=13 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130731072815/http://deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/dss/940/BS-257/BS-257.htm |archive-date=31 July 2013}}

At 17:00, an Ilyushin Il-38 aircraft was dispatched. The crew spent three hours searching for Kursk, without success.{{rp|74}} At 18:00, more than six hours after the initial explosion, Kursk failed to complete a scheduled communication check. The Northern Fleet command became concerned and tried to contact the boat. After repeated failures, at 18:30, they began a search-and-rescue operation, dispatching additional aircraft to locate the submarine, which again failed to locate the boat on the surface.{{cite news |last=Wines |first=Michael |title='None of Us Can Get Out' Kursk Sailor Wrote |newspaper=New York Times |date=27 October 2000 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/27/world/none-of-us-can-get-out-kursk-sailor-wrote.html |access-date=2 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140306134157/http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/27/world/none-of-us-can-get-out-kursk-sailor-wrote.html |archive-date=6 March 2014}} At 22:30, the Northern Fleet declared an emergency, and the exercise was stopped. Between 15 and 22 vessels of the Northern Fleet, including about 3,000 sailors, began searching for the submarine. The Mikhail Rudnitsky left port at 00:30.

The Russian Navy initially downplayed the incident. Late on Saturday night, 9 hours after the boat sank, Northern Fleet commander Admiral Popov ordered the first search for the submarine. Twelve hours after it sank, Popov informed the Kremlin, but Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev did not notify Putin until 07:00 Sunday morning. Sergeyev "did not recommend" that Putin visit the disaster site.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

On Sunday, after Popov already knew that Kursk was missing and presumed sunk, he briefed reporters on the progress of the naval exercise. He said the exercise had been a resounding success and spoke highly of the entire operation.{{rp|149}}{{cite book |last=Barany |first=Zoltan |title=Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military |year=2007 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton, New Jersey |isbn=978-1-4008-2804-3 |page=32 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OADs4vQy_W8C&pg=PA32 |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220401004004/https://books.google.com/books?id=OADs4vQy_W8C&pg=PA32 |archive-date=1 April 2022}}{{rp|23}}

Early on Sunday morning, 13 August, at the Vidyaevo Naval Base, rumours began to circulate among family members of Kursk{{'}}s crew that something was wrong. A telephone operator handled an unusual volume of calls and overheard that a submarine was in trouble and the boat's name. As the base was very small, news spread quickly. Wives and family members exchanged news, but information was scarce. Because Kursk was regarded as unsinkable, family members wished to discount the worst of the rumors. They hoped that Kursk was merely experiencing a temporary communication problem. The deputy base commander assured the women that the headquarters office was half empty and that the officers present were just "passing the time."{{rp|87}}

On the afternoon of the explosion, before the Kremlin had been informed of the submarine's sinking, U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Defense Secretary William Cohen were told that Kursk had sunk. Once officially informed, the British government, along with France, Germany, Israel, Italy, and Norway, offered help, and the United States offered the use of one of its two deep submergence rescue vehicles, but the Russian government refused all foreign assistance.{{cite web |title=Russian sub sinks with crew aboard |date=31 August 2003 |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/31/kursk.russia |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117031951/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/31/kursk.russia |archive-date=17 November 2015}} Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev told the American Embassy that the rescue was well under way.{{rp|152}} The Russian Navy told reporters that a rescue was imminent.

At 04:50 on Sunday, 13 August, personnel aboard Pyotr Velikiy detected two anomalies on the seabed that might be the boat. At 09:00, Mikhail Rudnitsky arrived at the location. While setting anchor, its crew interpreted an acoustic sound as an SOS from the submarine, but soon concluded the noise had been produced by the anchor chain striking the anchor hole. At 11:30, Mikhail Rudnitsky prepared to lower the AS-34, which entered the water at 17:30. At 18:30, at a depth of {{cvt|100|m|sigfig=1}} and at a speed of {{cvt|2|knot|km/h}}, the AS-34 reported colliding with an object, and through a porthole, the crew saw the Kursk{{'}}s propeller and stern stabiliser. With the AS-34 damaged by the collision and forced to surface, the crew of Mikhail Rudnitsky began preparing the AS-32 for operation.

At 22:40, the AS-32 entered the water and began searching for Kursk. It failed to locate the submarine because it had been given an incorrect heading by personnel aboard Pyotr Velikiy. Crew aboard Mikhail Rudnitsky tried to contact Kursk and briefly thought they heard an acoustic SOS signal, but this was determined to be of biological origin. They reported the sounds to Pyotr Velikiy. The AS-32 returned to the surface at 01:00 on Monday morning, 14 August.

The salvage tug Nikolay Chiker (SB 131) arrived early in the rescue operation. Using deep-water camera equipment, it obtained the first images of the wrecked submarine, which showed severe damage from the sub's bow to its sail. Kursk was listing at a 25-degree angle and down 5–7 degrees by the bow.{{cite web |title=Russian Submarine SSGN Kursk Catastrophe |publisher=Russialink |date=August 2000 |url=http://www.russialink.org.uk/kursk/events.htm |access-date=30 January 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120204201948/http://www.russialink.org.uk/kursk/events.htm |archive-date=4 February 2012}} The bow had ploughed about {{cvt|22|m}} deep into the clay seabed, at a depth of {{cvt|108|m}}. The periscope was raised, indicating that the accident occurred when the submarine was at a depth of less than {{cvt|20|m}}.

The AS-34 was repaired and was launched at 05:00 on Monday. At 06:50, the AS-34 located Kursk and tried but failed to attach to the aft escape trunk over Kursk{{'}}s ninth compartment. Unable to create the vacuum seal necessary to attach to the escape trunk, its batteries were quickly depleted and the crew was forced to surface. No spare batteries were available, so the crew was forced to wait while the batteries were recharged. Meanwhile, winds increased, blowing {{cvt|10|–|12|m/s|knot}} to {{cvt|15|–|27|m/s|knot}}, and the waves rose to 3–4 points ({{cvt|4|–|8|ft|m|disp=semicolon}}), forcing the Russians to suspend rescue operations.

The first official announcement of the accident was made by the Russians on Monday, 14 August. They told the media that Kursk had had "minor technical difficulties" on Sunday. They stated that the submarine had "descended to the ocean floor", that they had established contact with the crew and were pumping air and power to the boat, and that "everyone on board is alive." The BBC reported that the Kursk crew "had been forced to ground" the submarine because it "[had] broken down during exercises," but rescue crews were "in radio contact with surface vessels."{{cite news |title=Russian nuclear sub crippled |newspaper=BBC News |date=14 August 2000 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/879706.stm |access-date=22 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140301215300/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/879706.stm |archive-date=1 March 2014}}

Senior officers in the Russian Navy offered a variety of explanations for the accident. Four days after Kursk sank, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief and Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov stated the accident had been caused by a serious collision. Vice-premier Ilya Klebanov said the submarine might have hit an old World War II mine. He also said that almost all of the sailors had died before the vessel hit bottom.{{cite news |last=Gentleman |first=Amelia |title=Dead sailor sheds light on Kursk tragedy |date=26 October 2000 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/27/kursk.russia |access-date=19 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227171204/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/27/kursk.russia |archive-date=27 February 2014}}

The Russian government convened a commission, chaired by Vice-Premier Ilya Klebanov, on 14 August, two days after Kursk sank. Nearly half of the commission members were officials with a stake in the outcome of the investigation. Independent investigators were not invited to take part, giving the appearance that the commission's findings might not be impartial.{{rp|32}}

Bad weather, {{cvt|3.7|m|adj=on}} waves, strong undersea currents, and limited visibility impaired the rescue crews' ability to conduct operations on Tuesday and Wednesday.{{cite news |author=Daniel Williams |title=Russian Sub Has 'Terrifying Hole' |newspaper=The Washington Post |page=A1 |via=NucNews |date=18 August 2000 |url=http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0008nn/000818nn.htm |access-date=31 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110101161935/http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0008nn/000818nn.htm |archive-date=1 January 2011}} On Tuesday Mikhail Rudnitsky lowered a diving bell twice, but could not connect to the sub. They also tried and failed to manoeuvre a remotely operated vehicle onto the rescue hatch.{{cite web |title=K-141 Kursk Accident |publisher=Global Security |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/k-141-kursk.htm |access-date=10 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222130941/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/k-141-kursk.htm |archive-date=22 February 2014}}

At 20:00 Tuesday, AS-34 was launched again, but was damaged when it struck a boom as it was being lowered into the sea. It was brought back aboard, repaired, and relaunched at 21:10. On Tuesday, 15 August, three days after the sinking, the crane ship PK-7500 arrived with the more manoeuvrable Project 18270 Bester-type DSRV (AC-36).{{cite web |title=Project 18270 Bester submarine rescue vehicle |publisher=Global Security |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/18270.htm |access-date=31 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140202181336/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/18270.htm |archive-date=2 February 2014}} The weather, though, prevented the PK-7500 from launching the DSRV. The rescue team decided to launch the submersible near the coast and tow it to the rescue site with a salvage tug.

On Wednesday, 16 August, at 00:20, AS-34 twice attempted to attach to the ninth compartment escape hatch, but failed. It surfaced, and as it was being lifted onto the deck of the mother ship, its propulsion system was seriously damaged. The crew of Mikhail Rudnitsky cannibalised the AS-32 to repair the AS-34. Rescue operations were suspended while the repairs were made. PK-7500 arrived from the coast where it had launched its DSRV. It repeatedly lowered the rescue vessel {{cvt|110|m}} to the submarine but it could not latch onto an escape hatch. One of the rescue capsules was damaged by the storm.{{cite web |last=Higgins |first=Christopher |title=Nuclear Submarine Disasters |year=2002 |publisher=Chelsea House Publishers |location=Philadelphia |url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/150370005/Nuclear-Submarine-Disasters |access-date=13 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140202182035/http://www.scribd.com/doc/150370005/Nuclear-Submarine-Disasters |archive-date=2 February 2014}}

On Thursday at 12:00, Popov reported to the general staff of the Navy that no explosion had occurred on the Kursk, that the sub was intact on the seafloor, and that an "external influence" might have caused a leak between the first and second compartments. On Thursday, the Russian DSRV made another attempt to reach the aft area of the submarine, but it could not create the vacuum seal necessary to attach to the escape trunk. The Russians' 32-hour response time was widely criticised.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

The rescue ship Altay attempted to attach a Kolokol diving bell to the sub,{{cite news |title=Death Watch |last=Jackson |first=James O. |date=28 August 2000 |url=http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056246,00.html |access-date=4 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140301173026/http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056246,00.html |archive-date=1 March 2014}} but failed. Russian Navy headquarters in Moscow told media that rescuers had heard tapping from within the boat's hull, spelling "SOS ... water", although the possibility of hearing tapping through the double hull was later discounted. Other reports said the sounds had been misinterpreted or were made up.

Rescue divers did not attempt to tap on the hull to signal potential survivors acoustically.{{cite web |last1=LaPenna |first1=Joshua J. |title=Surfacing Rescue Container Concept Design for Trident Submarines |date=June 2009 |url=http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/49873/463483612-MIT.pdf?sequence=2 |access-date=12 November 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117023737/http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/49873/463483612-MIT.pdf?sequence=2 |archive-date=17 November 2015}} However, video evidence seems to suggest otherwise, as it shows Norwegian divers tapping on the aft rescue hatch while the rescue part of the operation was still underway.{{cite web |title=SUBMARINE – Kursk Submarine Disaster |date=24 March 2017 |via=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jswR6UTZb_0 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211221/jswR6UTZb_0 |archive-date=2021-12-21}}{{cbignore}}

Fragments of both the outer and inner hulls were found nearby, including a piece of Kursk{{'}}s nose weighing {{cvt|5|t|ST}}, indicating a large explosion in the forward torpedo room.{{cite web |title=James Oberg's Pioneering Space |url=http://www.jamesoberg.com/122000russinfra_rus.html |access-date=10 October 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150523054727/http://www.jamesoberg.com/122000russinfra_rus.html |archive-date=23 May 2015}}[http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-53681048.html Russian navy salvage team recovers large fragment of Kursk{{'}}s bow] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103051432/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-53681048.html |date=3 November 2012}} Associated Press Worldstream

File:LR5 rescue vehicle is lowered into the water.JPEG]]

Private media and state-owned Russian newspapers criticised the Navy's refusal to accept international assistance. Five days after the accident on 17 August 2000, President Putin accepted the British and Norwegian governments' offer of assistance. Six teams of British and Norwegian divers arrived on Friday, 18 August. The Russian 328th Expeditionary rescue squad, part of the Navy's Office of Search and Rescue, also provided divers.{{cite web |script-title=ru:328-й готов к погружению! В Ломоносове, что близ Петербурга, расположен 328-й аварийно-спасательный отряд ВМФ |author=Людмила Безрукова |date=3 February 2001 |publisher=Труд |language=ru |url=http://tremis.ru/15/171 |access-date=14 November 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130417215006/http://tremis.ru/15/171 |archive-date=17 April 2013}} On 19 August at 20:00, the Norwegian ship Normand Pioneer arrived with the British rescue submarine LR5 on board, seven days after the disaster.

On Sunday 20 August, the Norwegians lowered a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) to the submarine. They found that the first {{cvt|18|m}} section of the boat was a mass of twisted metal and debris.

Russian Navy officials imposed specific constraints that restricted the Norwegian divers to work on the stern of the boat, specifically the escape hatch over compartment nine and an air-control valve connected to the rescue trunk. The Norwegian deep-sea divers protested against the restrictions, which they believed impeded their rescue operations.

When the divers attempted to open the air-control valve, it would not move. Russian experts told the divers that they must open the valve anticlockwise, or they would break it. The divers finally went against the experts' advice and tried turning it clockwise, which worked.{{cite news |last=Hoffman |first=David E. |title=Uncovering The Kursk Cover Up |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=23 February 2003 |url=http://sptimes.ru/story/9371?page=2 |access-date=4 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140308185729/http://sptimes.ru/story/9371?page=2 |archive-date=8 March 2014}}

The divers tried to use the arms of the ROV to open the hatch, but were unsuccessful until the morning of Monday, 21 August. They found the rescue trunk full of water. That morning, they used a custom tool to open the internal hatch of the rescue trunk, releasing a large volume of air from the ninth compartment. Divers lowered a video camera on a rod into the compartment and saw several bodies.

The salvage companies agreed that the Norwegian divers would cut the holes in the hull, but only Russian divers would enter the submarine. The Norwegian divers cut a hole in the hull of the eighth compartment to gain access,{{cite web |script-title=ru:Мужество: Ангелы» на «Курске |author=Владимир Пасякин |date=March 2003 |publisher=Братишка |language=ru |url=http://www.bratishka.ru/archiv/2003/3/2003_3_2.php |access-date=3 March 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130728192307/http://www.bratishka.ru/archiv/2003/3/2003_3_2.php |archive-date=28 July 2013}} using a cutting machine that shoots a high-velocity water-and-cutting-grit mix at a pressure of {{cvt|15000|psi|kPa|order=flip}}.{{cite web |last1=GRAHAM |first1=BILL |title=Parkville diver recalls opening underwater tomb of sunken Russian sub |work=The Kansas City Star |date=2 December 2000 |url=http://www.wreckhunter.net/Kursk2.htm |access-date=14 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117020249/http://www.wreckhunter.net/Kursk2.htm |archive-date=17 November 2015}} The Russian divers entered the wreck and opened a bulkhead hatch to compartment nine.{{cite news |title=More Bodies Found in Sub as Russians Mourn |date=30 October 2000 |agency=Associated Press |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-oct-30-mn-44252-story.html |access-date=11 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117032306/http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/30/news/mn-44252 |archive-date=17 November 2015}}

They found that dust and ash inside compartment nine severely restricted visibility. As they gradually worked their way inside the compartment and down two levels, Warrant Officer Sergei Shmygin found the remains of Captain-lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov. All the men had been badly burned. The divers cut additional holes in the hull over the third and fourth compartments. The Russian divers removed secret documents and eventually recovered a total of 12 bodies from the ninth compartment. This contradicted earlier statements made by senior Russian officials that all the submariners had died before the submarine hit the bottom. They also found the ship's log, but had to suspend work because of severe weather. The rescue teams conducted continuous radiation measurements inside and outside the submarine, but none of the readings exceeded normal ranges.

On 21 August, after the Norwegian divers confirmed that no one was alive in the ninth compartment, Russian Northern Fleet Chief of Staff Mikhail Motsak announced to the public that the Kursk was flooded and that all of its crewmembers had died. Admiral Popov, commander of the Northern Fleet, also addressed the public in a televised broadcast (at the end of which he removed his navy beret) and asked the Kursk family members for forgiveness: "...forgive me for not bringing back your boys."{{cite web |title=BBC News | EUROPE | Russia mourns Kursk crew |publisher=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/890921.stm |access-date=11 August 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180811194627/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/890921.stm |archive-date=11 August 2018}}{{cite web |title=Адмирал Попов просит прощения у родных экипажа АПЛ К-141 "Курск" – YouTube |date=6 September 2014 |language=ru |via=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EInh5OhPlYM |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211221/EInh5OhPlYM |archive-date=2021-12-21}}{{cbignore}}

Additional plans were made to continue to remove the bodies, but the Russian Navy could not agree on a contract with a foreign company. The families of those who died on the submarine protested that they did not want additional lives put at risk to bring up the dead.{{cite news |title=Kremlin attacked over Kursk recovery |publisher=BBC |date=18 October 2000 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/978192.stm |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117092839/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/978192.stm |archive-date=17 November 2015}} On 22 August, President Putin issued an executive order declaring 23 August a day of mourning. On 26 August, Putin awarded the title of the Hero of Russia posthumously to the submarine's commander, Gennady Lyachin, and the 117 crewmembers and specialists were posthumously awarded the Order of Courage.{{cite web |title=Remembering the Kursk nuclear-powered submarine disaster |publisher=TASS |url=https://tass.com/society/1188845 |access-date=2021-03-26 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210512024033/https://tass.com/society/1188845 |archive-date=12 May 2021}}

On Monday 14 August, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov stated the accident had been caused by a serious collision with a NATO submarine,Genzmer, Herbert; Kershner, Sybille; Schutz, Christian. Great Disasters. Queens Street house. p. 269. ISBN 9781445410968. but provided no evidence. Senior commanders of the Russian Navy repeated this claim for more than two years after the disaster. This explanation was popular among those who wished for continued poor relations between Russia and the West.

During the original exercise, the Russian Navy required each submarine stay within a specified area. This protocol was intended to eliminate the possibility of a collision and allow surface ships to detect the presence of a Western spy sub.

On 29 or 30 August 2000, an official government commission tasked with investigating the disaster announced that the sinking was likely caused by a "strong 'dynamic external impact' corresponding with the 'first event'", probably a collision with a WWII mine, a foreign submarine, or a large surface vessel. The commission claimed the exercise had been monitored by two American {{sclass|Los Angeles|submarine|0}} submarines—{{USS|Memphis|SSN-691|6}} and {{USS|Toledo|SSN-769|2}}—as well as the Royal Navy {{sclass|Swiftsure|submarine|1}} {{HMS|Splendid|S106|6}}. Russian sources said that when the exercise was cancelled due to the accident, these vessels put in at European ports.{{cite news |title=Russia Identifies U.S. Sub |work=The New York Times |date=31 August 2007 |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E7D61530F932A3575AC0A9669C8B63 |access-date=31 July 2007 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120712163121/http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E7D61530F932A3575AC0A9669C8B63 |archive-date=12 July 2012}}

File:Kurskvstoledo.png

United States Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen responded to Russian accusations of a collision with a submarine at a press conference in Tokyo on 22 September 2000.{{cite web |title=Cohen Press conference at the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo |work=defenselink.mil |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1821 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070416193239/http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1821 |archive-date=16 April 2007}}

{{blockquote|Q: Russians are suggesting that one of the possible reasons is a collision with a NATO or American submarine, they are asking to let them, well, have a look at a couple of United States submarines and the answer from the American side is no; so I ask, why not? And what is your own explanation of that particular accident. Thank you. – Reporter}}

{{blockquote|A: With respect to the Kursk, we had made it very clear that the United States, that our ships had no role in that terrible tragedy. We have communicated that, we believe that our word, indeed, has been categorical. I have received every assurance and I know that all our ships are operational and could not possibly have been involved in any kind of contact with the Russian submarine. So frankly, there is no need for inspections, since ours are completely operational, there was no contact whatsoever with the Kursk. I hope that the Russian authorities find out the cause of it. All I can do is speculate at this point, that there were internal blasts that led to the loss of that ship and the fine men aboard her.}}

While the official inquiry was underway, on 25 October 2000, Commander of the Northern Fleet Popov and his Chief of Staff Motsak were interviewed by the Spanish newspaper El Mundo. They repeated the theory that Kursk collided with a NATO submarine shadowing the exercise. Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov stated again on 25 October that he was 80% certain the accident was caused by a collision with a foreign submarine.{{rp|22}} Eleven collisions had occurred between submarines in the Barents Sea since 1967. The Russian Navy produced video footage of the wreck, claiming it proved a collision occurred.

On 5 November, a representative of the Northern Fleet general staff told the Russian NTV television station that the sinking was caused by a collision. Admiral Mikhail Motsak repeated this assertion on 17 November in an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia. Officials insisted that an American submarine was at fault for shadowing Kursk too closely. The Russian Navy produced satellite imagery of the U.S. submarine Memphis docked at a Norwegian naval base in Bergen just after the alleged collision, alleging Memphis had surfaced for repairs, but the authenticity of the photos was never proven.{{cite web |title=Фотографии субмарины Memphis, опубликованные в газете "Версия", сделаны в период с июля 1999 по октябрь 2000 года |language=ru |trans-title=Photos of submarine Memphis, published in the newspaper Versiya", made between July 1999 and October 2000 |publisher=NewsRU.com |date=22 November 2000 |url=http://www.newsru.com/world/22nov2000/version.html |access-date=17 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222045045/http://www.newsru.com/world/22nov2000/version.html |archive-date=22 February 2014}}

Geophysicists who analysed the seismic signals concluded and reported in February 2001 that the initial sound recorded was triggered by an explosion, not a collision.{{cite web |last=Reed |first=Christina |title=Sinking the Kursk |work=GeoTimes |publisher=American Geological Institute |date=February 2001 |url=http://www.geotimes.org/feb01/kursk.html |access-date=2 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140225033024/http://www.geotimes.org/feb01/kursk.html |archive-date=25 February 2014}} The seismic waveforms of the second event, known by then to be from the explosion of several torpedo warheads, also generated a high-frequency bubble signature characteristic of an underwater explosion of about 3–7 tons of TNT. When analysts compared the second event with the first, they concluded that the first event was also a torpedo explosion. Britain's Blacknest seismic monitoring station, which studies seismic signals generated by underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes,{{cite web |title=AWE Blacknest |url=http://www.blacknest.gov.uk/ |access-date=19 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140226153404/http://www.blacknest.gov.uk/ |archive-date=26 February 2014}} identified two distinct explosions. It determined that the two shockwaves perfectly matched and were consistent with torpedo explosions.

While rescue crews repeatedly failed to attach to the rescue trunk or contact potential survivors aboard the submarine, President Putin appeared on TV, enjoying a summer holiday at a Black Sea villa. His apparent indifference outraged many Russians, including the families Kursk's crew. Amelia Gentleman wrote in The Guardian:

{{blockquote|For President Vladimir Putin, the Kursk crisis was not merely a human tragedy, it was a personal PR catastrophe. Twenty-four hours after the submarine's disappearance, as Russian naval officials made bleak calculations about the chances of the 118 men on board, Putin was filmed enjoying himself, shirtsleeves rolled up, hosting a barbecue at his holiday villa on the Black Sea.}}

Russian media strongly criticised the government's response to and handling of the sinking.{{cite news |title=Kursk salvage team sets sail |newspaper=BBC News |date=6 July 2001 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/1425061.stm |access-date=31 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203071659/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/1425061.stm |archive-date=3 February 2014}} Images of angry family members demanding information or waiting anxiously at the dock for news were shown on media worldwide. Some relatives said they learned of the disaster only from the public media{{rp|108}} or from conflicting rumours circulating at the navy base.{{rp|87}} They complained they did not receive any information from the government on the status of the disaster or rescue efforts until Wednesday, five days after the sinking. Some could not determine whether their family members were aboard the sunken vessel. The government refused to release a list of the missing sailors even to the families of those aboard; a Pravda reporter paid an officer {{RUB|18,000|link=yes}} to get the list. Even then, the government tried to prohibit reporters from contacting family members.{{rp|37}}

The continued problems that the rescuers had in reaching potential survivors and ongoing conflicting information about the cause of the accident inflamed Russian public opinion. Media described the Russian government's response to the disaster as "technically inept" and their stories as "totally unreliable".

File:Vladimir Putin 22 August 2000-1.jpg

President Putin had been advised by the military from the start of the disaster that they had the situation under control and that he did not need to intervene. He was told that a strong possibility existed that a foreign vessel had caused the accident and that Russia should not accept help from foreign powers.{{rp|154}} Only four months into his tenure as president, Putin was highly criticised by the public and media for his decision to remain at a seaside resort, and his once highly favourable ratings dropped dramatically.{{cite news |title=Kursk closure leaves questions unanswered |publisher=BBC News |date=31 July 2002 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2164783.stm |access-date=1 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203093900/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2164783.stm |archive-date=3 February 2014}} The President's response appeared callous and the government's actions looked incompetent.

On Tuesday, 22 August, 10 days after the sinking, Putin met at the Vidyayevo naval base officers' club and cultural centre with about 400 to 600{{rp|154}}{{cite book |last=Truscott |first=Peter |title=Putin's Progress: A Biography of Russia's Enigmatic President, Vladimir Putin |year=2005 |publisher=Pocket Books |location=London |isbn=0-7434-9607-8 |edition=First |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2jzf8FsShUgC |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160503164332/https://books.google.com/books?id=2jzf8FsShUgC |archive-date=3 May 2016}}{{rp|105}} angry and grieving residents of the base and about 350 family members of the Kursk{{'}}s crew.{{rp|107}} The meeting was closed and access was tightly controlled. Two Russian journalists from Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Kommersant posing as family members witnessed distraught widows and mothers howling at Putin, demanding to know why they were receiving so much conflicting information and who was going to be punished for the deaths of their family members. They cried:{{rp|107}}

• Do you believe our men are still alive?
• Why have you murdered our lads?
• When would the bodies of the submariners be brought home?
• When will we get them back, dead or alive?
• Who are you going to punish for their deaths, and how?

The hostile, contentious meeting lasted for three to six hours.{{cite news |last=Steen |first=Michael |title=Russia mourns Kursk |newspaper=News24.com |date=8 July 2000 |url=http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Russia-mourns-Kursk-20000823 |access-date=13 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222220940/http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Russia-mourns-Kursk-20000823 |archive-date=22 February 2014}}

German television channel RTL provided the Russian national daily newspaper Kommersant with an unedited transcript.{{rp|155}} The transcript revealed that Putin told the families that Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kuroyedov had agreed to accept foreign assistance as soon as it was offered on Wednesday, 16 August, but was shouted down as soon as he offered this explanation. The family members knew from media reports that foreign assistance had been offered on Monday.{{rp|108}} Up to this point, family members had received {{RUB|1,000|link=yes}} (about US$37 in 2000) in compensation. Putin also offered the families additional compensation equivalent to ten years' salary, about US$7,000 at the time.{{rp|108}}{{cite news |title=Russia Mourns Loss of 118 Sailors |newspaper=ABC News |date=23 August 2000 |url=https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82823&page=1&singlePage=true |access-date=11 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140223232040/https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82823&page=1&singlePage=true |archive-date=23 February 2014}}

The Russian state channel RTR was the only news station granted access. Its severely edited broadcast of the meeting showed only Putin speaking, eliminating the many emotional and contentious encounters between the family members and the President. Its single TV camera fed a signal to a satellite truck on loan to RTR from the German television company RTL, and RTL recorded the entire event.{{rp|155}}{{cite news |last=Traynor |first=Ian |title=Putin aims Kursk fury at media |newspaper=The Guardian |date=24 August 2000 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/aug/25/kursk.russia2 |access-date=11 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140223012517/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/aug/25/kursk.russia2 |archive-date=23 February 2014}}

Nadezhda Tylik, mother of Kursk submariner Lt. Sergei Tylik, was extremely emotional and interrupted the meeting. She harangued Putin and Deputy Prime Minister Klebanov, accusing them of lying to the families. She told them, "You better shoot yourselves now! We won't let you live, bastards!"{{IMDb title|id=tt0378637|title=Raising of the Kursk}} When she would not be quiet, a nurse in civilian apparel behind her forcibly injected her through her clothing with a sedative. Tylik quickly lost the ability to speak and was carried out. Immediately after the injection, Tylik's husband said he had requested the nurse administer the drug "because she was prone to excessive emotions."{{cite news |title=I was not silenced, says Kursk mother |newspaper=Telegraph |date=27 August 2000 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1367868/I-was-not-silenced-says-Kursk-mother.html |access-date=9 October 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120217105512/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1367868/I-was-not-silenced-says-Kursk-mother.html |archive-date=17 February 2012}} Four months later, Tylik said that her husband had lied to the public about the injection and that he "did not ask for help." Instead, "The injection was done to shut my mouth. Immediately after it, I just lost the ability to speak and was carried out."

The whole scene was captured by the TV crew but was not televised within Russia. Foreign media, however, showed Tylik's forcible removal by officials.{{rp|36}}{{cite news |title=Kursk Relatives Make a Plea for Facts and Justice |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=23 February 2001 |url=http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=14499 |access-date=13 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025005207/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=14499 |archive-date=25 October 2007}} Tylik later criticised President Putin for refusing to "answer direct questions" at the meeting. "Maybe he did not know what to say, but we did not receive concrete answers to concrete questions," she said.{{cite news |last=Borisova |first=Yevgenia |title=Kursk Relatives Make a Plea for Facts and Justice |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=23 February 2001 |url=http://www.sptimesrussia.com/story/14499 |access-date=21 February 2011 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110519220025/http://www.sptimesrussia.com/story/14499 |archive-date=19 May 2011}}{{cite news |title=Sedated Kursk mother vows to fight on |publisher=CNN |date=25 August 2000 |url=http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.jab/ |access-date=9 October 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100917030420/http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.jab/ |archive-date=17 September 2010}} Tylik told The St. Petersburg Times that she would go to any lengths to learn the truth about the submarine disaster: "They told us lies the whole time, and even now we are unable to get any information".

Russians and observers in the West were shocked by the incident and feared that the public sedation of Tylik meant that the former Soviet Union was returning to Cold War-era methods of silencing dissent. Tylik said that her son had told her six days before the disaster that the submarine had {{"'}}death onboard', but he did not explain what he meant." She said, "I am sure that the commanders of the Northern Fleet knew that the torpedoes were not in order. Those who are guilty must be punished." Navy officials in Vidyayevo later confirmed to The Times and to The St. Petersburg Times that Tylik was given a sedative. "We've been giving sedatives to relatives since this began, and it is not such a big deal as you make it out to be in the West," said an officer who would not identify himself. "We are simply protecting the relatives from undue pain – it was for her own protection.""[https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-45894134.html What Will Putin Learn From Media Circus?]" {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150628170427/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-45894134.html |date=28 June 2015}}

Journalist Andrey Kolesnikov, who had been present at Putin's meeting with the families, described his experience in a 2015 documentary titled President. He said that when he watched Putin speak to them, "I honestly thought they would tear him apart. There was such a heavy atmosphere there, such a clot of hatred, and despair, and pain. I never felt anything like it anywhere in my entire life. All the questions were aimed at this single man."{{cite book |last=Hughes-Wilson |first=John |title=Eve of Destruction: The inside story of our dangerous nuclear world |date=2021 |publisher=John Blake Publishing |location=London, England |isbn=978-1-78946-337-8 |page=114 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4ib1DwAAQBAJ |access-date=18 May 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531100642/https://books.google.com/books?id=4ib1DwAAQBAJ |archive-date=31 May 2022}}

In response to the avalanche of criticism, Minister of Defence Sergeyev and senior commanders of the Navy and the Northern Fleet offered Putin their resignations, but he refused to accept them.{{rp|160}}

Putin lashed back at the press, which had been severely critical of his personal response and the entire government's handling of a national tragedy. During the meeting with the crew's relatives, he loudly blamed the oligarchs, who owned most of the country's non-government media, for the poor state of Russia's military. Putin told the family members, "There are people in television today who ... over the last 10 years destroyed the very army and fleet where people are dying now ... They stole money, they bought the media, and they're manipulating public opinion." When relatives asked why the government had waited so long before accepting foreign assistance, Putin said the media had lied. He shouted to the assembled families, "They're lying. They're lying. They're lying."{{cite news |last=Chazan |first=Guy |title=Putin Lambastes Russian Media Over Coverage of Submarine Disaster |newspaper=The Wall Street Journal |date=31 August 2000 |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB967663423759489499?dsk=y |access-date=13 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201102055159/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB967663423759489499?dsk=y |archive-date=2 November 2020}} Putin threatened to punish the media owners and counter their influence through alternative "honest and objective" media. He scornfully derided their ownership of property abroad. "They'd better sell their villas on the Mediterranean coast of France or Spain. Then they might have to explain why all this property is registered in false names under front law-firms. Perhaps we would ask them where they got the money."

In a speech to the Russian people the day after his meeting with the families, Putin continued his furious attack on the Russian media, accusing them of lying and discrediting the country. He said they were trying to "exploit this misfortune ... to gain political capital."

On the same day as Putin's broadcast, Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko, head of a special commission, announced that the families of the Kursk sailors would receive not only 10 years' salary, but also free housing in the Russian city of their choice, free college education for their children, and free counselling.{{rp|114}} With the addition of other donations received from across the world, the families received about US$35,000 in payments.{{rp|114}}

On 26 July 2002, almost two years later, the government commission and Russian Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov announced that the hydrogen peroxide fuel in the dummy torpedo inside the fourth torpedo launcher caused the initial explosion which sank Kursk.{{cite news |title=Final report blames fuel for Kursk disaster |publisher=BBC News |date=1 July 2002 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2078927.stm |access-date=1 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203094758/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2078927.stm |archive-date=3 February 2014}}

Ustinov released a 133-volume top-secret report in August 2002, two years after the disaster. The government published a four-page summary in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that revealed "stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy, obsolete and poorly maintained equipment", and "negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement". The report said the rescue operation was unjustifiably delayed.

The bulkhead between the first and second compartments was traversed by a circular {{cvt|47|cm|adj=on}} air conditioning duct. The bulkhead should have arrested the blast wave, but in keeping with common Russian submarine practice, the pressurised valve in the ventilation system that traversed the bulkhead was left open to minimise the change in pressure during a weapon's launch.{{cite book |editor-last=Underwood |editor-first=Lamar |title=The Greatest Submarine Stories Ever Told: Dive! Dive! Fourteen Unforgettable Stories from the Deep |year=2005 |publisher=Lyons Press |location=Guilford, Connecticut |isbn=978-1-59228-733-8 |pages=208–220 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J-OGk9iNFP8C |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160509152418/https://books.google.com/books?id=J-OGk9iNFP8C |archive-date=9 May 2016}} The initial blast set off a fire that was later estimated to have burned at {{cvt|2700|C}}.{{cite web |last=Faulconbridge |first=Guy |title=Nightmare at Sea |work=Moscow Times |date=3 December 2004 |url=http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/nightmare-at-sea/364880.html |access-date=22 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140228131040/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/arts_n_ideas/article/nightmare-at-sea/364880.html |archive-date=28 February 2014}} The government report concluded that the initial explosion and fire in the torpedo room compartment immediately killed all seven crew members within.

The open valve in the ventilation system allowed the huge blast wave and possibly fire and toxic smoke to enter the second and perhaps the third and fourth compartments. Although the sub was at periscope depth with its radio antennas extended, no one in the command post sent a distress signal or pressed a single button that would initiate an emergency ballast-tank blow and bring the submarine to the surface. All 36 men in the command post located in the second second compartment were immediately incapacitated by the blast wave and likely killed.

Two minutes and 14 seconds after the first explosion in the torpedo compartment, the fire caused a second explosion by detonating five to seven combat-ready torpedo warheads. Acoustic data from Pyotr Velikiy were later analysed and found to indicate the explosion of about seven torpedo warheads in rapid succession. The Type 65 "Kit" torpedo carries a large {{cvt|450|kg|adj=on}} warhead.

While the sub was submerged, 78 crew were normally assigned to the first four compartments and 49 to the rear five compartments.{{rp|3}} Although Kursk was designed to withstand external pressure of depths down to {{cvt|1000|m|ft}}, the second explosion tore a {{cvt|2|m2|sqft|adj=on}} hole in the hull, opening the first through fourth compartments to the sea. Water poured in at {{cvt|90000|L|cuft}} per second. The second explosion collapsed the first three compartments and all of the decks. In addition to the crew in those compartments, five officers from 7th SSGN Division Headquarters and two design engineers were on board to observe the performance of a new battery in the USET-80 torpedo, set to be launched second. Anyone who remained alive in those compartments was killed by the second explosion.

The government report confirmed that Kursk had been sunk by a torpedo explosion caused when high-test peroxide (HTP), a form of highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, leaked from cracks in the torpedo's casing.{{cite web |title=Type 65 Torpedo |publisher=Weaponsystems.net |url=http://weaponsystems.net/weapon.php?weapon=HH14%20-%20Type%2065 |access-date=6 February 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141111200606/http://weaponsystems.net/weapon.php?weapon=HH14%20-%20Type%2065 |archive-date=11 November 2014}}{{cite web |author=Tony DiGiulian |title=Russia / USSR Post-World War II Torpedoes |publisher=Navweaps.com |date=19 November 2008 |url=http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTRussian_post-WWII.htm |access-date=6 February 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130101073257/http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTRussian_post-WWII.htm |archive-date=1 January 2013}} The fuel in the torpedoes carried by Kursk was inexpensive and very powerful. Ordinarily, the oxygen combines with kerosene fuel in the torpedo engine to propel the missile at higher speeds for longer ranges than conventional torpedoes.{{rp|34}}

HTP is normally stable until it comes in contact with a catalyst. It then expands 5,000 times in volume extremely rapidly, acting as an oxidiser, generating large volumes of steam and oxygen.{{cite news |title=Russians blow up Kursk remnants |publisher=BBC News |date=9 September 2001 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2247421.stm |access-date=1 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203093522/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2247421.stm |archive-date=3 February 2014}} Torpedoes using HTP had been in use since the 1950s, but other navies stopped using them because of the danger inherent in their design. {{HMS|Sidon|P259|6}} sank in 1955, killing 13 sailors, when an experimental torpedo containing HTP exploded as it was being loaded.{{cite web |title=Britain Torpedoes since World War II |date=28 December 2013 |url=http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTBR_PostWWII.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091204081730/http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTBR_PostWWII.htm |archive-date=4 December 2009}}

Investigators concluded that the leaking HTP had catalytically decomposed when it came in contact with copper commonly found in the bronze and brass used to manufacture Kursk{{'}}s torpedo tubes. Once HTP begins decomposing, it is impossible to stop until the fuel is exhausted. The {{cvt|1000|kg}} of concentrated HTP ruptured the torpedo's {{cvt|500|kg}} kerosene fuel tank and caused an explosion equal to {{convert|100|–|250|kg|lb|abbr=on}} of TNT that registered 2.2 on the Richter scale on detectors hundreds of kilometres away.{{cite web |title=Horizon Special: What Sank the Kursk? |date=8 August 2001 |type=Transcript |publisher=BBC |url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/kursk_transcript.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020105131010/http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/kursk_transcript.shtml |archive-date=5 January 2002}}

Salvage crews located a piece of the number-four torpedo cover on the seabed {{cvt|50|m}} behind the main wreckage. Its position, distance, and direction relative to the rest of the submarine indicated that it was deposited there as a result of the first explosion in that tube.{{cite AV media |type=Video |title=Sinking of the Kursk (Russia's Nuclear Sub Nightmare) |series=Seconds from Disaster |volume=Season 3, Episode 3 |date=18 April 2006 |publisher=National Geographic Channel |url=http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/videos/kursk-sinking/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222140750/http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/videos/kursk-sinking/ |archive-date=22 December 2015}}

According to an article that briefly appeared on Thursday 17 August 2000 on the website of the official newspaper of the Russian Defence Ministry, Krasnaya Zvezda, Kursk had been refitted in 1998—four years after it was commissioned—to carry torpedoes fueled using the cheap HTP. The article reported that some specialists in the Russian Navy opposed use of the HTP-fueled torpedoes because they were volatile and dangerous. The story did not appear in the print edition on Friday 18 August. Instead, the article was replaced with another that speculated the submarine had collided with an "unidentified object". The change was likely due to political pressure.{{rp|23}} Vice-Premier Ilya Klebanov, chairman of the government commission investigating the disaster, had a vested interest in blaming the disaster on a collision with a NATO vessel. As head of the defence industries he had promoted use of the HTP torpedoes over safer, more-expensive silver-zinc battery-powered torpedoes in spite of objections from naval officers.{{rp|23}}

The government's final report found that the officers who had issued the order approving use of the HTP torpedoes did not have the authority to issue that order. The dummy torpedo was 10 years old and some of its parts had exceeded their service lives. Several sources said that one of the practice torpedoes had been dropped during transport, possibly leading to a crack in the casing, but that the weapon was put aboard the submarine anyway.{{rp|23}} The crane that would normally have been used to load the missiles was out of order, and another had to be brought in, delaying the loading process. This also made the possibility of removing a damaged torpedo more difficult.{{rp|23}}

Personnel who had loaded the practice torpedoes the day before the exercise noticed the rubber seals were leaking fuel and notified junior officers of the issue, who took no action because due to the exercise's importance to the Russian Navy. Though the leaks on the dummy torpedoes had been detected, the rubber seals were not inspected before the exercise.{{rp|35}} The crew was also supposed to follow a very strict procedure while preparing the practice HTP torpedo for firing.

Maintenance records revealed that the 65-76 "Kit" practice torpedo carried by Kursk came from a batch of 10 manufactured in 1990, six of which were rejected due to faulty welding. An investigation revealed that because the torpedoes were not intended to carry warheads, the welds had not been inspected as carefully as welds on torpedoes carrying warheads. When salvage crews recovered the remains of the torpedo and the launch tube, analyses found both bore signs of distortion and heat damage consistent with an explosion near the middle of the torpedo, very close to an essential welded joint. The official conclusion of the commission was that a faulty weld caused the explosion.

In case of emergency, personnel in the rear compartments were instructed to move forward to the third compartment along with those in the forward compartments and enter a detachable rescue capsule in the sail (or conning tower), which could evacuate the entire crew.{{cite news |title=Divers Enter Third Compartment of Sunken Russian Submarine |newspaper=People's Daily |date=3 November 2000 |url=http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/03/eng20001103_54249.html |access-date=2 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140622132731/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/03/eng20001103_54249.html |archive-date=22 June 2014}} Alternatively, there was also an escape trunk in the first compartment, but the explosion and fire rendered its use impossible.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{cite web |title=Nuclear-powered K-141 Kursk submarine layout (project 949-A) |author=Nikolay Korolyoff |language=ru |url=http://kursk.strana.ru/media/interactive/kursk03ang.html |access-date=1 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040103204640/http://kursk.strana.ru/media/interactive/kursk03ang.html |archive-date=3 January 2004}} The rescue capsule in the third compartment was inaccessible, even if it was still usable.

The fifth compartment contained two OK-650 reactors. These nuclear reactors were built to withstand larger forces than other interior bulkheads. Like the exterior hull, these bulkheads were designed to withstand pressure to depths of {{cvt|1000|m|ft}}. The reactors were additionally encased in {{cvt|13|cm|in}} of steel and resiliently mounted to absorb shocks in excess of 50 g. The bulkheads of the fifth compartment withstood both explosions, allowing the two reactors to shut down automatically and prevent a nuclear meltdown and widespread contamination of the sea.

The fifth compartment, in addition to the reactors, contained equipment that automatically recorded the operating activity of the vessel. Twenty-two recordings were analysed by specialists from the Saint Petersburg Center of Speech Technologies. They discovered the system had been turned off the day of the disaster, in violation of procedure.{{cite web |last1=Андреев |first1=Дорофей |title=На "Курске" обнаружена еще одна предсмертная записка |language=ru |url=http://kursk.strana.ru/details/1004457168.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040225084556/http://kursk.strana.ru/details/1004457168.html |archive-date=25 February 2004}}

Kursk was equipped with an emergency rescue buoy on top of compartment seven designed to automatically deploy upon detecting a variety of emergency conditions, including fire or a rapid pressure change. It was intended to float to the surface and send a signal, helping rescuers locate the stricken vessel. Some reports claimed the buoy, after repeatedly malfunctioning, had been welded in place. These reports were confirmed after investigators learned Kursk had been deployed to the Mediterranean during the summer of 1999 to monitor the U.S. fleet responding to the Kosovo War. Russian Navy officers, fearing that the buoy might accidentally deploy and reveal the submarine's position to the U.S. fleet, had ordered the buoy be intentionally disabled. The rescue buoy remained inoperative during the disaster.

Despite the many lapses in procedures and equipment, Ustinov said no charges would be filed because the disaster was caused by a technical malfunction and blame could not be placed on specific individuals. He said that all of the sailors had died within eight hours and none of them could have been rescued in the time available. At a news conference announcing the end of the official inquiry, he absolved the torpedo's manufacturer of any fault. "Those who designed the torpedo couldn't foresee the possibility of its explosion." He also said there was no evidence that the torpedo had been damaged when it was loaded onto Kursk.{{cite news |title=Kursk Enquiry Ends, No Charges Made |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=30 July 2002 |url=http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=7719 |access-date=22 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130928075915/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=7719 |archive-date=28 September 2013}}

When Ustinov closed the criminal case without filing charges,{{Citation needed|date=November 2020}} family members were angry. Retired Russian Navy Captain Vladimir Mityayev, who lost a son on Kursk, said "To me, this is a clear case of negligence." In the end, no one was blamed for the disaster and no one was held responsible.{{rp|34}}

While the official government commission blamed the explosion on a faulty weld in the practice torpedo, Vice Admiral Valery Ryazantsev cited inadequate training, poor maintenance, and incomplete inspections that caused the crew to mishandle the weapon. The internal tube door was designed to be three times as strong as the external torpedo door, so that any explosion inside the tube would be directed out into the sea. Salvage crews found the internal tube hatch cover embedded in the bulkhead separating the first and second compartments, {{cvt|12|m}} from the tube. This led investigators to conclude that the internal door likely was not fully closed when the explosion occurred.

The electrical connectors between the torpedoes and the internal tube door were known to be unreliable, often forcing torpedo crews to open and reclose the door in order to clean the connection and make good electrical contact. Kursk{{'}}s crew had not fired a torpedo in three years, and that torpedo was a much simpler battery-powered type.{{cite web |last=Милашина |first=Елена |script-title=ru:Как погиб Курск |date=15 July 2010 |language=ru |url=http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/2187.html |access-date=14 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903170930/http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/2187.html |archive-date=3 September 2014}} The crew had to complete specific maintenance steps on a regular basis and before firing a torpedo. This included cleaning the torpedo tube of lubricants, metal shavings, and dust that accumulate during long periods of inactivity.{{cite web |last=Ryazantsev |first=Valery |script-title=ru:Глава VII. Гибель 'Курска': как это было |trans-title=Chapter VII: The death of the Kursk: How it happened |language=ru |url=http://avtonomka.org/vospominaniya/vitse-admiral-ryazantsev-valeriy-dmitrievich/43-glava-vii-gibel-kurska-kak-eto-bilo.html |access-date=12 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120181513/http://avtonomka.org/vospominaniya/vitse-admiral-ryazantsev-valeriy-dmitrievich/43-glava-vii-gibel-kurska-kak-eto-bilo.html |archive-date=20 November 2011}}{{cite web |script-title=ru:Как погиб Курск |year=2010 |language=ru |url=http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/089/00.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927184318/http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/089/00.html |archive-date=27 September 2011}}

After the disaster, investigators recovered a partially burned copy of the safety instructions for loading HTP torpedoes, but the instructions were for a significantly different type of torpedo and failed to include essential steps for testing an air valve. The 7th Division, 1st Submarine Flotilla never inspected the Kursk{{'}}s crew's qualifications and readiness to fire HTP torpedoes. Kursk{{'}}s crew had no prior experience with and had not been trained in handling or firing HTP-powered torpedoes. Ryazantsev believed that due to their inexperience and lack of training, compounded by incomplete inspections and oversight, and because Kursk{{'}}s crew followed faulty instructions when loading the practice torpedo, they set off a chain of events that led to the explosion.{{rp|35}} Ryazantsev asserted that signatures on the records documenting that the sailors had been trained in handling and firing HTP torpedoes had been faked. He stated that the warhead fuzes on combat torpedoes 1, 3, 5, and 6 were set off when the first compartment collapsed after striking the sea bottom.

The Komsomolskaya Pravda tabloid published a report in June 2001 that senior officers in the Russian Navy had engaged in an elaborate deception to cover the actual cause of the disaster. This referred to statements that the boat's captain, Gennady Lyachin, had sent a message to headquarters immediately prior to the explosion, "We have a malfunctioning torpedo. Request permission to fire it," though it is unlikely that, as captain of the vessel, he would have needed to request permission under such circumstances.

The Russian Navy was later criticised as misrepresenting facts and misleading the public.{{rp|148}} The navy feared that if the submarine were revealed to have blown up because of crew incompetence, Russia's status as a great power would be in doubt.{{rp|22}} Their response was compared to the Soviet style of cover-up and stonewalling like that of the Chernobyl disaster.{{rp|148}} Minister of Defence Sergeyev said in interviews on 21 August 2000 that he had never refused any foreign help.{{rp|148}}

The Guardian wrote in a 2002 review of two books, Kursk, Russia's Lost Pride and A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster:

{{blockquote|The hopelessly flawed rescue attempt, hampered by badly designed and decrepit equipment, illustrated the fatal decline of Russia's military power. The navy's callous approach to the families of the missing men was reminiscent of an earlier Soviet insensitivity to individual misery. The lies and incompetent cover-up attempts launched by both the navy and the government were resurrected from a pre-Glasnost era. The wildly contradictory conspiracy theories about what caused the catastrophe said more about a naval high command in turmoil, fumbling for a scapegoat, than about the accident itself.[https://www.theguardian.com/submarine/story/0,7369,791741,00.html Review: Kursk and A Time to Die |Special reports] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812192849/https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/aug/24/highereducation.kursk |date=12 August 2022}}, The Guardian, Saturday 24 August 2002}}

While most experts agreed a torpedo explosion occurred, they disagreed on the cause. Many Russians did not believe that Kursk could be so easily sunk. The tragedy spawned a number of conspiracy theories. One theory offered was an explosion located in the high-pressure air tanks used to blow the ballast tanks, located near the torpedo tubes.{{cite web |title=The Kursk Accident |publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey |date=12 August 2000 |url=http://cns.miis.edu/reports/kursk.htm |access-date=13 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222161310/http://cns.miis.edu/reports/kursk.htm |archive-date=22 February 2014}} Mainstream publications like Der Spiegel, Berliner Zeitung, and the Sunday Times claimed to possess documentation proving the submarine was struck by a missile fired by Pyotr Velikiy.{{rp|33}} This was the largest naval exercise that the Russian Navy had conducted in more than a decade, which increased the probability of a friendly fire incident. Other theories included Chechen espionage, human error, sabotage, and that Kursk was testing a new top-secret torpedo, Shkval (Squall), capable of speeds in excess of {{cvt|200|knot|km/h}}.{{cite web |title=VA-111 Shkval Torpedo |work=militaryperiscope.com |url=http://www.militaryperiscope.com/mdb-smpl/weapons/minetorp/torpedo/w0004768.shtml |access-date=1 December 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110714094200/http://www.militaryperiscope.com/mdb-smpl/weapons/minetorp/torpedo/w0004768.shtml |archive-date=14 July 2011}} Another theory was that USS Memphis had fired a torpedo at Kursk.{{cite web |title=La Stampa: "Курск" взорвали подлодки США, но Путин и Клинтон договорились и скрыли правду |trans-title=La Stampa: The "Kursk" was blown up by U.S. subs, but Putin and Clinton made an agreement and hid the truth |language=ru |publisher=Newsru.com |date=21 December 2004 |url=http://www.newsru.com/world/21dec2004/kursk_shok.html |access-date=15 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130303124507/http://newsru.com/world/21dec2004/kursk_shok.html |archive-date=3 March 2013}}

The director of the {{ill|Gidropribor Research Institute|ru|Гидроприбор}} that designed the torpedo, Stanislav Proshkin, challenged the conclusion of the government's official report. He argued the weapon could explode only after an external event, such as a fire. He said that routine tests during manufacture include dropping the torpedo from a height of {{cvt|10|m}}, suggesting drops cannot incur damage that would cause an explosion.{{cite web |script-title=ru:Разрабочики торпеды считают причиной взрыва внешнее воздействие |publisher="Вести" интернет-газета |language=ru |url=http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=7581&tid=4889 |access-date=22 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140526211027/http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=7581&tid=4889 |archive-date=26 May 2014}} He also said Kursk was designed with two autonomous, independent control systems that would have detected a rise in temperature while the torpedo was stored on the racks. The sub was equipped with a special drain system that could rapidly drain HTP-fuel from a torpedo into the sea. If a temperature rise were detected in the torpedo tube, the torpedo would have automatically been ejected into the sea. In addition, any fire in the torpedo compartment would have triggered a powerful fire-extinguishing system that would have dumped "tons of water" on the fire.

The Russian government committed to raising the wreck and recovering the crew's remains in a US$65-million salvage operation.{{cite news |title=Kursk reaches harbour |publisher=BBC News |date=10 October 2001 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1591392.stm |access-date=19 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227064235/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1591392.stm |archive-date=27 February 2014}} They contracted with Dutch marine salvage companies Smit International and Mammoet to raise Kursk from the sea floor. It became the largest salvage operation of its type ever accomplished.{{cite web |title=International Salvage Team Brings Home the Kursk Submarine Using a Simulation Developed in Simulink |type=pdf |publisher=The MathWorks |date=2003 |url=http://www.mathworks.com/tagteam/12884_91071v00_KURSK_US.qxd.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140402004405/http://www.mathworks.com/tagteam/12884_91071v00_KURSK_US.qxd.pdf |archive-date=2 April 2014}} The salvage operation was extremely dangerous because of the risk of radiation from the reactor. Only seven of the submarine's 24 torpedoes were accounted for.

Salvage divers first detached the bow from the rest of the vessel because it might have contained unexploded torpedo warheads and because it could break off and destabilise the lifting.{{cite news |title=Large fragment of Kursk sub recovered |newspaper=The Russia Journal |date=16 June 2002 |url=http://www.russiajournal.com/node/8634 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110613145702/http://www.russiajournal.com/node/8634 |archive-date=13 June 2011}} The divers installed two large hydraulic suction anchors into the seabed and attached a high-strength tungsten carbide abrasive cable saw that was pulled back and forth over the bow between the anchors. Ten days were needed to detach the bow.{{cite web |author=Trent Schindler |series=Scientific American Frontiers |title=Raising Sunken Ships |publisher=PBS |url=https://www.pbs.org/saf/1305/features/ship.htm |access-date=10 October 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924151631/http://www.pbs.org/saf/1305/features/ship.htm |archive-date=24 September 2015}}

After the bow was cut free, the salvage crews raised several smaller pieces of wreckage. This included a piece of a torpedo tube weighing about a ton, which was analysed to determine if the explosion occurred inside or outside the tube. They salvaged a high-pressure compressed-air cylinder weighing about half a ton,{{cite news |title=Part of Kursk's Bow Lifted From Sea |agency=Associated Press |newspaper=The New York Times |date=17 June 2002 |via=NucNews |url=http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0206nn/020617nn.htm |access-date=31 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210131913/http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2002nn/0206nn/020617nn.htm |archive-date=10 February 2012}} to learn more about the nature of the explosion. They also raised a part of the cylindrical section of the hard frame and part of the left forward spherical partition, to determine the intensity and temperature of the fire in the forward compartment. Finally, they brought up a fragment of the sonar system dome.{{cite web |title=The Kursk Mystery Has Been Solved |date=20 June 2002 |work=CDI Russia Weekly |volume=211 |publisher=Center for Defense Information |location=Washington D.C. |url=http://www.cdi.org/russia/211-11.cfm |access-date=14 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030627002128/http://www.cdi.org/russia/211-11.cfm |archive-date=27 June 2003 |quote=On June 29, the Government Commission into the Submarine Sinking Will Present a Report on the Examination and Its Results. However, It is Already Known That the Submarine Was Destroyed by the Detonation of a 650-Millimeter Torpedo on Board}}

File:Съёмочная группа киностудии «Корона Фильм».jpeg

Mammoet converted the {{cvt|24000|LT|t|order=flip|adj=on}}, {{cvt|130|m|adj=on}} long, Giant 4 semisubmersible deck barge to carry the sub. The ship was designed to carry huge loads on its deck, but Kursk would ride beneath the ship. Giant 4 had to be completely modified to retrieve and carry the sub underneath. To raise the remainder of the wreck, the salvage team planned an extremely complex operation that required them to design and build custom lifting equipment and employ new technologies. They wrote custom software that would automatically compensate for the effects of wave motion in the rough Barents Sea, which could sever the cables suspending the sub beneath the barge.{{cite AV media |title=Raising the Kursk - SMIT Salvage |date=2017-06-09 |last=SMIT Salvage {{!}} Towage |via=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQJ6IMREvz8 |access-date=2024-05-28}}

Divers cut a large hole in the barge's hull to allow room for the submarine's sail. Workers fitted the hull of Giant 4 with large saddles shaped to fit Kursk{{'}}s outer hull. They cut holes through the barge to allow 26 hoisting cables to pass through. The team manufactured 26 giant cable reels to hold the more than {{cvt|200|km}} of cable intended to raise the boat. The giant cable reels fed 26 huge hydraulic strand jacks, each mounted on a computer-controlled, pressurised pneumatic heave compensator powered by nitrogen gas that automatically adjusted for sea waves. Giant 4 was held in position over the submarine by an eight-point mooring system from four twin-drum winches on the main deck.{{cite web |title=Feature Focus: Offshore Innovations: Raising the Kursk |work=Mechanical Engineering Magazine |via=ASME Digital Collection |url=http://memagazineselect.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/mobile/article.aspx?articleid=2686600 |access-date=4 November 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181105012521/http://memagazineselect.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/mobile/article.aspx?articleid=2686600 |archive-date=5 November 2018}}

The dive support vessel DSND Mayo was equipped with dive chambers to accommodate the dive teams. They worked in six-hour shifts, and when they were not in the water, the divers remained in the saturation chambers for the entire 28 day operation.{{cite news |title=How Scots played key role in raising the Kursk |publisher=The Scotsman |date=6 October 2004 |url=http://www.scotsman.com/news/how-scots-played-key-role-in-raising-the-kursk-1-557407 |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117014640/http://www.scotsman.com/news/how-scots-played-key-role-in-raising-the-kursk-1-557407 |archive-date=17 November 2015}} The divers used hydraulic abrasive water jets to cut 26 holes through the outer and inner hulls. The salvage divers mounted custom guidance rings around the holes in the sub and lowered guide cables to each through the holes in Giant 4. The team then used the four guide cables to lower a custom-made giant gripper similar to a toggle bolt, custom designed to fit each hole, before manoeuvring the cables through the guidance ring.{{IMDb title|id=tt0378637|title=The Raising of the Kursk}}

The crew lowered 26 groups of hoisting cables, each able to lift 900 tons, to the submarine and attached them to the grippers. The strand jacks lifted the 26 hoisting cables and slowly raised Kursk until it was beneath Giant 4. On 8 October 2001, 14 months after the disaster, and only five months after the contract had been awarded to them, the salvage team raised the remainder of the vessel in a 15-hour operation.{{citation needed|date=August 2022}}

Once the sub was raised and joined to the barge, it was carried back under the barge to the Russian Navy's Roslyakovo Shipyard in Murmansk. Once there, two giant, custom-manufactured pontoons were floated under Giant 4 to lift the barge {{cvt|20 |m}} to allow it to enter a floating dry dock with Kursk attached underneath. Once in dry dock, the pontoons were pumped full of more air, lifting Giant 4 and allowing crews to remove the lifting cables and detach Kursk.

The Russians initially intended to raise the bow from the sea floor—possibly containing undetonated torpedoes—but then decided it was too risky.{{cite web |last1=Шигин |first1=Владимир |title=Ну а если случится такое – по отсекам пройдет ураган? |language=ru |date=10 October 2002 |website=strana.ru |url=http://kursk.strana.ru:80/details/1003332506.html |access-date=20 February 2020 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031009204541/http://kursk.strana.ru/details/1003332506.html |archive-date=9 October 2003}} Some analysts theorised the Russians may also have wanted to prevent foreign countries from accessing the debris, which had been classified as state secrets. They decided to destroy what was left of the bow where it lay and blew up the remnants in September 2002.

Twenty-four men were assigned to compartments six through nine toward the rear of the boat.{{cite news |title=Russia Publishes "Kursk" Sailor's Death Note |newspaper=People's Daily |location=China |date=3 November 2000 |url=http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/03/eng20001103_54278.html |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140723071432/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/03/eng20001103_54278.html |archive-date=23 July 2014}} Of that number, 23 survived the two blasts and gathered in the small ninth compartment, which had an escape hatch. Captain-lieutenant Dmitri Kolesnikov, head of the turbine unit in the seventh department, and one of the three officers of his rank who survived the first explosion, apparently took charge.{{cite news |last1=Cockburn |first1=Patrick |title=A note scribbled in the dark that proves 23 of these men survived the explosion on the 'Kursk' |work=The Independent |date=22 September 2011 |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/a-note-scribbled-in-the-dark-that-proves-23-of-these-men-survived-the-explosion-on-the-kursk-635384.html |access-date=14 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117033735/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/a-note-scribbled-in-the-dark-that-proves-23-of-these-men-survived-the-explosion-on-the-kursk-635384.html |archive-date=17 November 2015}} Emergency lighting was normally powered by batteries located in the first compartment which had been destroyed in the explosion, but the ninth compartment contained a number of independent emergency lights which apparently worked.

Kolesnikov wrote two notes,{{page needed|date=December 2024}} parts of which were released by Vice-Admiral Motsak to the media for the first time on 27 October 2000. The first, written at 13:15, 1 hour and 45 minutes after the second explosion, contained a private note to his family, and on the reverse, information on their situation and the names of those in the ninth compartment. The handwriting appears normal, indicating the sailors still had some light.

{{blockquote|It's 13:15. All personnel from section six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine, 23 people are here. We feel bad, weakened by carbon dioxide ... Pressure is increasing in the compartment. If we head for the surface we won't survive the compression. We won't last more than a day. ... All personnel from sections six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine. We have made the decision because none of us can escape.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{cite news |last=Aris |first=Ben |title=Doomed sailor's letter from the Kursk |newspaper=The Telegraph |date=27 October 2000 |df=dmy-all |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/1372059/Doomed-sailors-letter-from-the-Kursk.html |access-date=12 March 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140420201754/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/1372059/Doomed-sailors-letter-from-the-Kursk.html |archive-date=20 April 2014}}}}

Kolesnikov wrote the second note at 15:15. His writing was extremely difficult to read.

{{blockquote|It's dark here to write, but I'll try by feel. It seems like there are no chances, 10–20%. Let's hope that at least someone will read this. Here's the list of personnel from the other sections, who are now in the ninth and will attempt to get out. Regards to everybody, no need to despair. Kolesnikov.{{cite web |title=Marks 12 Years Since Submarine K-141 Kursk Tragedy, Captain Kolesnikov Letter |date=August 2012 |df=dmy-all |url=http://interestingaboutrussia.blogspot.com/2012/08/russia-marks-12-years-since-submarine-k.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227030451/http://interestingaboutrussia.blogspot.com/2012/08/russia-marks-12-years-since-submarine-k.html |archive-date=27 February 2014}}}}

The newspaper Izvestia reported on 26 February 2001 that another note, written by Lt. Cmdr. Rashid Aryapov, had been recovered during the initial rescue operation.{{rp|22}} Aryapov held a senior position in the sixth compartment. The note was written on the page of a detective novel and wrapped in plastic. It was found in a pocket of his clothing after his body was recovered.{{cite news |last=Wines |first=Michael |title=Russian Sub's Officer Wrote of Torpedo Blast, Izvestia Says |date=27 February 2001 |work=New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/27/world/russian-sub-s-officer-wrote-of-torpedo-blast-izvestia-says.html |access-date=19 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140310205312/http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/27/world/russian-sub-s-officer-wrote-of-torpedo-blast-izvestia-says.html |archive-date=10 March 2014}}

Izvestia quoted unidentified naval officers who claimed that Aryapov wrote that the explosion was caused by "faults in the torpedo compartment, namely, the explosion of a torpedo on which the Kursk had to carry out tests". Izvestia also stated that Aryapov wrote that as a result of the explosions, the submarine was tossed violently about, and many crew members were injured by equipment that tore loose as a result.{{cite news |title=Report: Note found on Kursk points to torpedo |newspaper=USA Today |date=19 June 2001 |url=http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2001-02-26-kursk.htm |access-date=4 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715110239/http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2001-02-26-kursk.htm |archive-date=15 July 2014}} To the Russian public, it appeared that the Russian Navy was covering up its inability to rescue the trapped sailors.{{cite book |last=Satter |first=David |title=Darkness at Dawn: the Rise of the Russian Criminal State |pages=21–22 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven, Connecticut |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-300-10591-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i-t6jle71ToC |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502152737/https://books.google.com/books?id=i-t6jle71ToC |archive-date=2 May 2016}}

Analysis of the wreck could not determine whether the escape hatch was workable from the inside. Analysts theorise that the men may have rejected risking the escape hatch even if it were operable, and would have preferred to wait for a submarine rescue ship to attach itself to the hatch. The sub was relatively close to shore and in the middle of a large naval exercise. The sailors had every reason to believe rescuers would arrive quickly.{{rp|90–92}} Using the escape trunk was risky. The sailors were in a compartment that was initially at surface atmosphere pressure, so they did not risk decompression sickness (the bends) if they used the rescue hoods to ascend to the surface, but would not have survived long in the extremely cold Arctic water. Water was slowly seeping into the ninth compartment, increasing the internal pressure and thus the risk of decompression sickness and death when they ascended to the surface. In addition, some were likely seriously injured, making escape difficult.{{rp|88–92}}

When the nuclear reactors automatically shut down, the air purification system would have shut down, emergency power would be limited, and the crew would soon experience falling temperatures and complete darkness.{{rp|88–92}}

Considerable debate arose over how long the sailors in the ninth compartment had survived. Russian military officers initially gave conflicting accounts, that survivors could have lived up to a week within the sub, but those who died would have been killed very quickly. The Dutch recovery team reported that they thought the men in the least-affected ninth compartment might have survived for two to three hours, but the level of carbon dioxide in the compartment exceeded that which people can produce in a closed space. Divers found ash and dust inside the compartment when they first opened that hatch, evidence of a fire, but this fire was separate from that caused by the exploding torpedo.{{rp|143–145}}

Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov, evidently the senior officer in the compartment, wrote a final note at 15:15 in the dark, giving evidence that he was alive at least four hours after the explosion.{{cite web |title=Kursk Submarine Tragedy: Too Many Questions Left Ten Years After |publisher=English Pravda |location=Russia |date=12 August 2010 |df=dmy-all |url=http://english.pravda.ru/history/12-08-2010/114581-kursk_submarine-0/ |access-date=6 February 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121005122210/http://english.pravda.ru/history/12-08-2010/114581-kursk_submarine-0/ |archive-date=5 October 2012}} Vice Admiral Vladislav Ilyin, first deputy chief of the Russian Navy's staff and head of the Kursk Naval Incident Cell, concluded that the survivors had lived up to three days.{{rp|143–145}} However, other notes recovered in the ninth compartment were written no later than 6 hours and 17 minutes after the sinking.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

In any event, the Russian rescue teams were poorly equipped and badly organised, while foreign teams and equipment were far away and not given permission to assist.{{rp|143–145}} It is unlikely Russian or foreign specialists could have arrived and reached the sub in time to rescue any survivors.[http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/cia-kursk.pdf Russia's Kursk Disaster: Reactions and Implications ] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170707215339/http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/cia-kursk.pdf |date=7 July 2017}} Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Office of Transnational Issues, 7 December 2000

While waiting for the boat to be brought to shore, a team of military doctors set up a temporary forensic laboratory at the military hospital in Severomorsk. After Giant 4 was floated out of the drydock, the drydock was drained, exposing Kursk's hull. Salvage teams cut into the compartments to drain the interior. Ordnance teams removed the missiles from outside the hull. On 23 October, two investigators and two navy commanders were the first to enter the hull. The next day, 24 October, eight teams of investigators and operational experts began analysing the debris found inside the boat and recovering and identifying remains of the crew. Working from a database of personal identification details, including the crew members' features, dental X-rays, birth marks, and tattoos, the doctors examined the bodies as they were brought to the laboratory.{{cite web |last1=Есютин |first1=Иван |title=Следствие надеется найти "черный ящик" АПЛ "Курск" |date=2001 |url=http://kursk.strana.ru:80/details/1003857225.html |access-date=23 May 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040310200158/http://kursk.strana.ru/details/1003857225.html |archive-date=10 March 2004}}

Salvage team members found a large number of potassium superoxide chemical cartridges, used to absorb {{CO2}} and generate oxygen to enable survival, in the ninth compartment. Autopsies of the crew recovered from the ninth compartment showed that three men suffered from thermal and chemical burns. Researchers concluded Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov and two others had attempted to recharge the oxygen-generation system when they accidentally dropped one of the superoxide cartridges into the seawater slowly filling the compartment.{{rp|143–145}} When the cartridge came in contact with the oily water, it triggered a chemical explosion and flash fire.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{cite web |last1=Шигина |first1=Владимира |title=Тайна девятого отсека |date=2001 |language=ru |url=http://kursk.strana.ru:80/details/999075418.html |access-date=22 May 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040225083558/http://kursk.strana.ru/details/999075418.html |archive-date=25 February 2004}} Kolesnikov's abdomen was burned by acid, exposing the internal organs, and the flesh on his head and neck was removed by the explosion.{{rp|143}}

The investigation showed that some men temporarily survived this fire by plunging under water, as fire marks on the bulkheads indicated the water was at waist level at the time, but the flash fire consumed all remaining oxygen, so the men still alive after the flash explosion quickly asphyxiated. Water continued to seep into the compartment, and by the time rescue divers opened the compartment, only a small air pocket containing just 7% oxygen remained.{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Bodies recovered from the ninth compartment were relatively easy to identify. Those recovered from the third, fourth, and fifth compartments were badly damaged by the explosion.{{cite web |title=Последнее письмо с "Курска" |date=20 November 2001 |website=kommersant.ru |url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/294411 |access-date=22 May 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180523100521/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/294411 |archive-date=23 May 2018}} Forensic examination of two of the reactor control room casualties found in compartment four showed extensive skeletal injuries, which indicated that they had sustained an explosive force over 50 g. These shocks would have immediately incapacitated or killed the operators. One sailor's body was found embedded in the ceiling of the second compartment. The bodies of three crewmen were completely destroyed by the blast and fire, and nothing of their remains could be identified or recovered.

The sinking of the ship, the pride of their submarine fleet, was a devastating blow to the Russian military. Kursk{{'}}s participation in the exercise had been intended to demonstrate Russia's place as an important player on the international stage, but the country's inept handling of the crisis instead exposed its weak political decision-making ability and the decline of its military.{{cite news |title=Nightmare at Sea |newspaper=St. Petersburg Times |date=10 December 2004 |url=http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=2294 |access-date=13 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100823214350/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=2294 |archive-date=23 August 2010}}

A year later, Putin commented on his response, "I probably should have returned to Moscow, but nothing would have changed. I had the same level of communication both in Sochi and in Moscow, but from a PR point of view, I could have demonstrated some special eagerness to return."{{cite news |last=Dalziel |first=Stephen |title=Spectre of Kursk haunts Putin |work=BBC News |date=12 August 2001 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1487112.stm |access-date=8 August 2007 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090115100835/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1487112.stm |archive-date=15 January 2009}}

Once the human remains had been removed and the hull had been thoroughly investigated, the remainder of the ship was transported to Sayda Bay on the northern Kayla Peninsula. The two nuclear reactors were defuelled and the ship was cut up for scrap.

Finally recognising the hazard of the HTP torpedoes, the Russian Navy ordered all of them removed from service.{{cite news |title=Kursk torpedo removed from service |work=The Russian Journal |date=17 February 2002 |url=http://russiajournal.com/node/8141 |access-date=5 February 2014 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222034245/http://russiajournal.com/node/8141 |archive-date=22 February 2014}}

Putin accepted the resignation of Igor Sergeyev from his position as minister of defence on 28 March 2001 and made him his assistant on strategic stability. He replaced him with Sergei Ivanov, who had previously been secretary of the Security Council of Russia. The position of minister of defence had always been filled by a professional member of the military. Ivanov had retired from the military in 2000, so his appointment as minister of defence while a civilian shocked the Russian military.{{cite news |newspaper=The Washington Post |last=Finn |first=Peter |title=Russian Leader Expands Powers of a Possible Successor |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021501526_pf.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018114031/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021501526_pf.html |archive-date=18 October 2017}}{{cite web |title=the Russia Index |url=http://www.ufg.com/pr/press_kit/ufg_russia_index_2006_en.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060619094628/http://www.ufg.com/pr/press_kit/ufg_russia_index_2006_en.pdf |archive-date=19 June 2006}}

On 1 December 2001, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov presented a preliminary report to Putin. Ustinov wrote that the entire exercise had been "poorly organized" and that the probe had revealed "serious violations by both Northern Fleet chiefs and the Kursk crew." Shortly afterward, Putin transferred the Northern Fleet commander, Vyacheslav Popov, and his chief of staff, Admiral Mikhail Motsak. As is common in such circumstances, both soon obtained jobs elsewhere in the government. Popov became a representative for Murmansk Oblast in the Federation Council, and Motsak became deputy presidential envoy for the North-Western Federal District.{{cite book |editor1-first=Anne C. |editor1-last=Aldis |editor2-first=Roger N. |editor2-last=McDermott |title=Russian Military Reform, 1992–2002 |year=2004 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-135-75468-6 |page=34}} Popov and Motsak had championed the story that the accident had been caused by a collision with a NATO submarine. When Putin dismissed them, he made a point of repudiating the collision theory.{{rp|163}} In another example of a lateral transfer, deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov had been an outspoken advocate of the theory that the Kursk had collided with a foreign submarine. He had also been in charge of the rescue operation and follow-up inquiry. In February 2002, Putin removed him from his position as deputy prime minister and made him minister of industry, science, and technology.

Putin dismissed the Northern Fleet's submarine commander, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev,{{rp|162}} and in total removed 12 high-ranking officers in charge of the Northern Fleet. Paradoxically, he said their dismissal had nothing to do with the Kursk disaster, but that they had been responsible for "serious flaws in the organizations of the service." However, all 12 had been involved with the exercise, the rescue operations, or the submarine itself.{{rp|34}} All were transferred to equal positions elsewhere in the government or in the business sector.

As a result of the disaster, Russia began participating in NATO search-and-rescue exercises in 2011, the first time any Russian submarine took part in a NATO-led exercise.{{cite press release |title=Russian Federation Navy Fully Integrated in Nato Submarine Rescue Exercise Bold Monarch |work=Exercise Bold Monarch 2011 |publisher=Allied Maritime Command Headquarters Northwood (NATO) |date=7 June 2011 |url=http://www.manw.nato.int/boldmonarch2011/pdfs%20Bold%20Monarch/BM%2011%20Press%20Release%2007%20june%202011%20Russian%20Federation%20Navy%20fully%20integrated%20in%20NATO%20Exercise%20Bold%20Monarch.pdf |access-date=3 March 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130306060315/http://www.manw.nato.int/boldmonarch2011/pdfs%20Bold%20Monarch/BM%2011%20Press%20Release%2007%20june%202011%20Russian%20Federation%20Navy%20fully%20integrated%20in%20NATO%20Exercise%20Bold%20Monarch.pdf |archive-date=6 March 2013}} The Russian Navy also increased the number of deep-sea divers trained each year from 18–20 to 40–45.{{cite web |last=Фомишенко (Fomishenko) |first=Роман (Roman) |script-title=ru:Если в океане беда ... |language=ru |trans-title=When there's distress in the ocean ... |publisher=Красная Звезда (Krasnaya Zvezda) |location=Russia |date=25 March 2007 |url=http://old.redstar.ru/2007/04/25_04/3_08.html |access-date=3 March 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130831222804/http://old.redstar.ru/2007/04/25_04/3_08.html |archive-date=31 August 2013}}

President Putin signed a decree awarding the Order of Courage to the entire crew, and the title Hero of the Russian Federation to the submarine's captain, Gennady Lyachin.{{cite web |title=Defense Dossier: Drowning Reality of Kursk |last1=Felgenhauer |first1=Pavel |work=CDI Russia Weekly |date=1 September 2000 |publisher=Center for Defense Information |location=Washington D.C. |url=http://www.cdi.org/russia/117.html |access-date=7 August 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030302162445/http://www.cdi.org/russia/117.html |archive-date=2 March 2003}}

File:Kursk Memorial (18993375164) crop.jpg

Outside the port city of Severodvinsk where the submarine was built, a large granite slab was erected on the sand dunes. It is engraved, "This sorrowful stone is set in memory of the crew of the nuclear submarine Kursk, who tragically died on 12 August 2000, while on military duty."{{cite book |last=Burleson |first=Clyde |title=Kursk Down! The Shocking True Story of the Sinking of a Russian Submarine |year=2002 |publisher=Warner Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0-446-55456-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FnrIoD0kGfoC |access-date=25 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160510180436/https://books.google.com/books?id=FnrIoD0kGfoC |archive-date=10 May 2016}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}} Other memorials were built in Moscow,{{cite news |title=Russia Marks 10th Anniversary of 'Kursk' Disaster |newspaper=Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty |date=8 December 2010 |url=http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Marks_10th_Anniversary_Of_Kursk_Disaster_/2125933.html |access-date=20 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227165018/http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Marks_10th_Anniversary_Of_Kursk_Disaster_/2125933.html |archive-date=27 February 2014}} Sevastopol, Nizhny Novgorod, Severomorsk, and St. Petersburg's Serafimovskoe Cemetery.{{cite web |title=Serafimovskoe Cemetery |website=saint-petersburg.com |url=http://www.saint-petersburg.com/cemeteries/serafimovskoe-cemetery/ |access-date=12 August 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200220141255/http://www.saint-petersburg.com/cemeteries/serafimovskoe-cemetery/ |archive-date=20 February 2020}} The city of Kursk, after which the vessel was named, erected a memorial made from fragments of its hull.{{cite book |last1=Truscott |first1=Peter |title=Kursk: Russia's Lost Pride |year=2003 |publisher=Pocket |location=London |isbn=978-0-684-02089-1 |page=192 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i1Sfa5rozuYC&pg=PA192 |access-date=13 November 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160511062740/https://books.google.com/books?id=i1Sfa5rozuYC&pg=PA192 |archive-date=11 May 2016}}

On 17 March 2009, journalist Tatyana Abramova from the newspaper Murmanskiy Vestnik found Kursk{{'}}s sail in the yard of a scrap metal dealer. It had been left there after several years of negotiations failed to raise the estimated €22,000 needed for a memorial. The discovery sparked an outcry among citizens in Murmansk and they demanded the sail be turned into a memorial to the men who died.{{cite news |last=Savodnik |first=Peter |title=Remembering the Kursk in Murmansk |newspaper=Time |date=9 July 2009 |url=http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908066,00.html |access-date=11 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140301182417/http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908066,00.html |archive-date=1 March 2014}} After considerable difficulty, the memorial was finally completed and dedicated 26 July 2009, Russia's Navy Day. It was placed on the observation deck of the Church of the Saviour on Water in Murmansk, the submarine's home port and location of the Vidyayevo naval base. It is among a memorial to sailors who perished during peacetime{{cite news |title="Kursk" sail put in place |date=18 June 2009 |url=https://barentsobserver.com/en/node/18512 |access-date=12 August 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220403032119/https://barentsobserver.com/en/node/18512 |archive-date=3 April 2022}} and lists the names of the crew.

On 31 July 2012, divers representing the relatives of Kursk{{'}}s crew and the Northern Fleet command placed a {{cvt|2|m}}-tall Orthodox Cross on the floor of the Barents Sea at the site of the disaster.{{cite web |title=Cross in Commemoration of Wrecked Kursk Crew Placed on Seabed |website=pravmir.com |url=https://www.pravmir.com/cross-in-commemoration-of-wrecked-kursk-crew-placed-on-seabed/ |access-date=28 March 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211019114036/https://www.pravmir.com/cross-in-commemoration-of-wrecked-kursk-crew-placed-on-seabed/ |archive-date=19 October 2021}}

• A Time to Die (2002, {{ISBN|0609610007}}), an investigative book on the events, was written by journalist Robert Moore.{{cite news |title=Review: Kursk and A Time to Die |work=The Guardian |date=24 August 2002 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/aug/24/highereducation.kursk |access-date=14 March 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160314190740/http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/aug/24/highereducation.kursk |archive-date=14 March 2016}}
• Kursk: Putin's First Crisis and the Russian Navy's Darkest Hour (2018, {{ISBN|978-1473558373}}), retitled reprint of Robert Moore's A Time to Die.
• Cry From the Deep: The Sinking of the Kursk, the Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test (2004, {{ISBN|0-06-621171-9}}), an investigative book on the events, written by journalist Ramsey Flynn.
• The incident served as partial inspiration for the song "Six Days at the Bottom of the Ocean" by Explosions in the Sky, on their 2003 album, The Earth Is Not a Cold Dead Place.{{cite web |title=Explosions In The Sky on The Wilderness and not being the band it used to be |date=5 April 2016 |work=The A.V. Club |last=Anthony |first=David |url=https://www.avclub.com/explosions-in-the-sky-on-the-wilderness-and-not-being-t-1798245966 |access-date=27 July 2020 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200727211910/https://music.avclub.com/explosions-in-the-sky-on-the-wilderness-and-not-being-t-1798245966 |archive-date=27 July 2020}}
• The track "The Kursk" found on the album Drinking Songs by singer-songwriter Matt Elliott is based upon the incident.{{cite web |title=Matt Elliott: Drinking Songs Album Review |date=11 January 2006 |work=Pitchfork |last=Murphy |first=Matthew |url=https://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/2755-drinking-songs/ |access-date=28 August 2023 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230530174130/https://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/2755-drinking-songs/ |archive-date=30 May 2023}}
• The folk song "Barren the Sea", by Sequoya on their 2007 album "Sleep and Dream of Fire" was inspired by the incident.{{cite web |title=Album Review: Sequoya – Sleep and Dream of Fire |date=27 February 2008 |url=https://paperbacknovel.com/music/album-review-sequoya-sleep-and-dream-of-fire |access-date=18 July 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220718224708/https://paperbacknovel.com/music/album-review-sequoya-sleep-and-dream-of-fire/ |archive-date=18 July 2022}}{{cite web |title=Barren the Sea |date=27 October 2015 |publisher=CDBaby |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnfcvcUb71g |access-date=19 November 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191106093627/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnfcvcUb71g&gl=US&hl=en |archive-date=6 November 2019}}
• The song "Captain Kolesnikov" on the album Прекрасная любовь by Yuri Shevchuk and DDT is about the disaster and the letter recovered from Kolesnikov.{{cite web |title=Капитан Колесников – ДДТ |date=2 July 2015 |publisher=Reproduktor.net |website=Reproduktor |url=https://reproduktor.net/ddt/kapitan-kolesnikov/ |access-date=7 June 2024}}
• Kursk: A Submarine in Troubled Waters, in French: Koursk, un sous-marin en eaux troubles is a 2005 French documentary film directed by Jean-Michel Carré and produced by France 2.
• The incident was the subject of an episode of the documentary series Seconds From Disaster.{{cite web |title=Russia's Nuclear Sub Nightmare |date= |website=IMDb |url=https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0967836/ |access-date=12 August 2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170209180858/http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0967836/ |archive-date=9 February 2017}}
• Kursk, a 2009 play by the British playwright Bryony Lavery, was inspired by the disaster.{{cite web |title=Kursk is unmissable |date=30 March 2010 |work=Evening Standard |last=Mountford |first=Fiona |url=http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/theatre/review-23820207-kursk-is-unmissable.do |access-date=25 April 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100409072731/http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/theatre/review-23820207-kursk-is-unmissable.do |archive-date=9 April 2010}}{{cite web |title=Kursk at the Young Vic, SE1 |date=31 March 2010 |work=The Times |last=Marlowe |first=Sam |url=http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/stage/theatre/article7081528.ece |access-date=24 April 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110615085939/http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/stage/theatre/article7081528.ece |archive-date=15 June 2011}}{{cite web |title=Kursk |date=31 March 2010 |work=The Guardian |last=Gardner |first=Lyn |url=https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2010/mar/31/kursk-review |access-date=25 April 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130909170724/http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2010/mar/31/kursk-review |archive-date=9 September 2013}}
• Kursk, a 2018 film directed by Thomas Vinterberg and starring Colin Firth and Matthias Schoenaerts, was based on Robert Moore's book A Time to Die.{{cite news |title=Matthias Schoenaerts talks about his next projects at Elle Style Awards 2016 |publisher=YouTube |date=24 February 2016 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-kBVB_pqgk |access-date=27 February 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180125074104/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-kBVB_pqgk |archive-date=25 January 2018}}{{cite news |title=Matthias Schoenaerts werkt opnieuw samen met Thomas Vinterberg |publisher=Vertigoweb.be |language=nl |date=26 February 2016 |url=http://vertigoweb.be/matthias-schoenaerts-werkt-opnieuw-samen-met-thomas-vinterberg/ |access-date=27 February 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304213949/http://vertigoweb.be/matthias-schoenaerts-werkt-opnieuw-samen-met-thomas-vinterberg/ |archive-date=4 March 2016}}{{cite news |title=Matthias Schoenaerts Starring in Submarine Disaster Movie 'Kursk' |publisher=Variety |date=2 March 2016 |url=https://variety.com/2016/film/news/matthias-schoenarts-submarine-disaster-movie-kursk-1201720931/ |access-date=2 March 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303102124/http://variety.com/2016/film/news/matthias-schoenarts-submarine-disaster-movie-kursk-1201720931/ |archive-date=3 March 2016}} It included the meeting where Tylik was sedated and removed. (The film was re-released in 2019 as [https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/the_command The Command]).
• An Ordinary Execution (2007, {{ISBN|978-2070776528}}), a book by French writer Marc Dugain revolves partly around the Kursk events.

• {{annotated link|August curse}}
• {{annotated link|HMS Sidon (P259)|HMS Sidon}}
• {{annotated link|Sinking of the Moskva|Sinking of the Moskva}} during the Russo-Ukrainian War
• {{annotated link|Sinking of PNS Ghazi|Sinking of PNS Ghazi}}
• KRI Nanggala (402) – Indonesian Navy
• {{annotated link|USS Scorpion (SSN-589)|USS Scorpion}}
• {{annotated link|List of submarine incidents since 2000}}
• {{annotated link|List of sunken nuclear submarines}}

{{Reflist|30em}}

• {{cite book |author=Robert Moore |year=2002 |title=A Time To Die: The Kursk Disaster |publisher=Bantam Books |isbn=0-553-81385-4}}
• Barany, Zoltan (2004). [https://www.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00131.x The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin's Russia]. Government and Opposition 39.3, 476–503.
• Truscott, Peter (2004): The Kursk Goes Down – pp. 154–182 of Putin's Progress, Pocket Books, London, {{ISBN|0-7434-9607-8}}
• [https://nonproliferation.org/the-kursk-accident/ Timeline of Kursk Disaster]
• Simons, Greg (2012): Communicating Tragedy and Values Through the Mass Media During Crises: The Lessons of Submarine Accidents in Russia in Porfiriev, Boris & Simons, Greg (editors), Crises in Russia: Contemporary Management Policy and Practice from a Historical Perspective, Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 139–174.

• [http://www.newsru.com/russia/18Aug2000/list.html List of personnel by compartment] (Russian)
• [http://www.gazeta.ru/komanda.shtml List and pictures of crew members] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924131333/http://www.gazeta.ru/komanda.shtml |date=24 September 2015}} (Russian)
• [http://www.newsru.com/dossier/215.html News about the Kursk sinking] (Russian)
• [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/2000/russian_sub/default.stm In-depth coverage by the BBC]
• [https://englishrussia.com/2007/04/16/the-remains-of-kursk-submarine/ English Russia – The Remains of the Kursk Submarine], photographs of the recovered wreck

{{2000 shipwrecks}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Kursk submarine disaster}}

Category:High-test peroxide

Category:Industrial fires and explosions in Russia

Category:Marine salvage operations

Category:Maritime incidents in 2000

Category:Maritime incidents in Russia

Category:Military scandals

Category:Non-combat internal explosions on warships

Category:Russian submarine accidents

Category:Scandals in Russia

Category:Submarines lost with all hands

Category:Vladimir Putin

Category:2000 disasters in Russia

Category:2000 in military history

Category:2000 industrial disasters

Category:August 2000 in Russia

hu:Kurszk (elsüllyedt orosz atom-tengeralattjáró)