Orange Revolution

Georgiy Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist and the founder of Ukrayinska Pravda (a newspaper well known for publicising the corruption or unethical conduct of Ukrainian politicians), was kidnapped and murdered in 2000. Persistent rumours suggested that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had ordered the killing.{{Cite web|date=2005-08-09|title=Suspected killers of journalist Georgy Gongadze named {{!}} Reporters without borders|url=https://rsf.org/en/news/suspected-killers-journalist-georgy-gongadze-named|access-date=2021-03-08|website=RSF|language=en|archive-date=15 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211015014830/https://rsf.org/en/news/suspected-killers-journalist-georgy-gongadze-named|url-status=live}}{{Cite news|last=Williams|first=Matthias|date=2016-03-22|title=Murdered journalist buried in Ukraine 16 years after beheading|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-gongadze-idUSKCN0WO2LH|access-date=2021-03-08|archive-date=15 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211015002917/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-gongadze-idUSKCN0WO2LH|url-status=live}} Gen. Oleksiy Pukach, a former police officer, was accused of the murder under the orders of a former minister who committed suicide in 2005. Pukach was arrested in 2010{{Cite news|date=2010-09-14|title=Georgiy Gongadze murder tied to late Ukrainian minister|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11297880|access-date=2021-03-08|archive-date=8 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308174719/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11297880|url-status=live}} and was sentenced to life in prison in 2013.{{Cite web|title=Kiev police chief jailed for Gongadze murder|url=https://www.ft.com/content/1e6fc7b0-6a29-11e2-a7d2-00144feab49a|access-date=2021-03-08|website=www.ft.com|archive-date=8 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308084323/https://www.ft.com/content/1e6fc7b0-6a29-11e2-a7d2-00144feab49a|url-status=live}}{{Cite web|date=2013-01-30|title=Ukrainian policeman gets life for murder of journalist|url=http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/jan/30/journalist-safety-ukraine|access-date=2021-03-08|website=The Guardian|language=en|archive-date=6 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201106225159/https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/jan/30/journalist-safety-ukraine|url-status=live}} The murder sparked a movement against Kuchma in 2000 that may be seen as the origin of the Orange Revolution in 2004. After two terms of presidency (1994–1999){{Cite web |title=Leonid Kuchma {{!}} Former President of Ukraine |url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leonid-Kuchma |access-date=2023-11-15 |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |language=en}} and the Cassette Scandal of 2000 that significantly damaged his image,{{Cite web |last= |date=2000-11-28 |title=Moroz says leaked audiotapes link Kuchma to Gongadze's disappearance - Nov. 28, 2000 |url=https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/moroz-says-leaked-audio-tapes-link-kucmha-to-gonga-6292.html |access-date=2023-11-15 |website=Kyiv Post}}{{Cite web |date=February 14, 2001 |title=Kuchmagate: Political Crisis in Ukraine? |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/02/14/kuchmagate-political-crisis-in-ukraine-event-274 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204233523/https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/02/14/kuchmagate-political-crisis-in-ukraine-event-274 |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 December 2019 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}} Kuchma decided not to run for a third term in the 2004 elections{{Cite news |last=Danilochkin |first=Sergei |date=2008-04-09 |title=Ukraine: Kuchma Cleared To Run For Third Term |language=en |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/1105441.html |access-date=2023-11-15}} and instead supported Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential race against Viktor Yushchenko of the Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc.{{Cite web |title=Orange revolution |url=https://www.uvm.edu/~jadickin/Orange%20revolution.html |access-date=2023-11-15 |website=University of Vermont}}{{Cite web |title=Presidential Election, 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004 |url=https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/eoms/presidential_2004 |access-date=2023-11-15 |website=OSCE |language=en}}

The state of Ukraine during the 2004 presidential election was considered to be in "ideal condition" for an outburst from the public. During this time, Ukrainians were impatient while waiting for the economic and political transformation.{{citation needed|date=February 2022}} Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Causes and Consequences] by Taras Kuzio, University of Ottawa (28 April 2005) The results of the election were thought to be fraudulent.{{Cite news |last=Finn |first=Peter |date=2004-11-23 |title=Widespread Vote Fraud Is Alleged In Ukraine |language=en-US |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/11/23/widespread-vote-fraud-is-alleged-in-ukraine/e4c76edb-7e7f-4e9c-83f6-fe2fe321eb28/ |access-date=2023-11-15 |issn=0190-8286}}

The Revolution empowered many Ukrainians to take to the streets and participate in the protests, some lasting as long as seventeen days. The protests did not have national participation, but mostly was joined by western and central Ukrainians. Ukraine gained independence in 1991 and it was the quest for that independence that supported the Orange Revolution. Ukrainians for the most part did not want to be too closely associated with the past history of the Soviet Union. The Austro-Hungarian roots in the eastern European geo-cultural area of Ukraine (formerly known as Poland-Lithuania) helped shape the modern-day Ukrainian national identity.{{Cite journal |last=Kuzio |first=Taras |date=2010 |title=Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609723 |journal=Communist and Post-Communist Studies |volume=43 |issue=3 |pages=285–296 |doi=10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.07.001 |jstor=48609723 |issn=0967-067X |access-date=4 November 2022 |archive-date=4 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221104134202/https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609723 |url-status=live }}

{{More citations needed section|date=November 2023}}

{{POV section|date=April 2024}}

The Ukrainian regime prior to the Orange Revolution sought to create a path for democratization. Ukraine was considered a "competitive authoritarian regime" that is transitioning hybrid regime, allowing for room to fully transition into a liberal democracy, with a market based economy.{{Cite web |last=Lane |first=David |title=The Orange Revolution: 'People's Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup? |url=https://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4760/39746_174023.pdf}} The Ukrainian electorate sought to elect a candidate to bring economic and political reforms. Yushchenko quickly established himself as the leading candidate in calling for these reforms.

After a clear lack of faith in the government had been instilled in the Ukrainian population, Yushchenko's role had never been more important{{peacock inline|date=April 2024}} to the revolution. Yushchenko was a charismatic candidate{{peacock inline|date=April 2024}} who showed no signs of being corrupt. Yushchenko was on the same level as his constituents{{according to whom|date=April 2024}} and presented his ideas in a "non-Soviet" way. Young Ukrainian voters were extremely important to the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. This new wave of younger people born in a post-Soviet Ukraine had different views of the main figures in Ukraine. They were exposed to a lot of negativity from Kuchmagate and therefore had very skewed visions about Kuchma and his ability to lead their country.

The abundance of younger people who participated showed an increasing sense of nationalism that was developing in the country. The Orange Revolution had enough popular impact that it interested people of all ages.BBC News. "Ukraine Country Profile." 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102303.stm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120609073220/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102303.stm |date=9 June 2012 }}. 2 December 2012; Encyclopædia Britannica. Kuchma's Presidency.; The Economist. "Catching Kuchma". 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18488564 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120501031232/http://www.economist.com/node/18488564 |date=1 May 2012 }}. 3 Dec 2012.; Konieczna, Joanna. "The Orange Revolution in Ukraine. An Attempt to Understand the Reasons." 2005. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2005-07-13/orange-revolution-ukraine-attempt-to-understand-reasons {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120902183541/http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2005-07-13/orange-revolution-ukraine-attempt-to-understand-reasons |date=2 September 2012 }}. 3 Dec 2012; Kuzio, Taras. Eight Necessary Factors for the Orange Revolution.; Kuzio, Taras. Five Contributing Factors.

{{see also|List of international presidential trips made by Vladimir Putin}}

In 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Ukraine numerous times.{{Cite news |last=Walsh |first=Nick Paton |date=2004-10-27 |title=Putin's Kiev visit 'timed to influence Ukraine poll' |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/27/ukraine.russia |access-date=2023-11-15 |issn=0261-3077}}{{Cite web |date=2004-05-08 |title=President Vladimir Putin laid a wreath at the Grave of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall in honour of Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War |url=http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/30897 |access-date=2023-11-15 |language=en}}

File:Портрет 3-го президента України Віктора Ющенка.jpeg, Yanukovych's antagonist]]

File:Viktor Yanukovych official portrait.jpg, Yushchenko's main opposition]]

In late 2002, Viktor Yushchenko (Our Ukraine), Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist Party of Ukraine), Petro Symonenko (Communist Party of Ukraine) and Yulia Tymoshenko (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) issued a joint statement concerning "the beginning of a state revolution in Ukraine". The communists left the alliance: Symonenko opposed the idea of a single candidate from the alliance in the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004; but the other three parties remained allies[https://books.google.com/books?id=Wp7VKL4p7kQC&dq=Tymoshenko+Moroz+Presidential+candidate+2004&pg=PA117 Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160609215020/https://books.google.com/books?id=Wp7VKL4p7kQC&pg=PA117&dq=Tymoshenko+Moroz+Presidential+candidate+2004&client=firefox-a#v=onepage&q=Tymoshenko%20Moroz%20Presidential%20candidate%202004&f=false |date=9 June 2016 }} by Paul D'Anieri, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, {{ISBN|978-0-7656-1811-5}}, page 117 until July 2006.[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5169068.stm Ukraine coalition born in chaos] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171021131423/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5169068.stm |date=21 October 2017 }}, BBC News (11 July 2006) (In the autumn of 2001 both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko had broached the idea of setting up such a coalition.)

On 2 July 2004, Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc established the Force of the People, a coalition which aimed to stop "the destructive process that has, as a result of the incumbent authorities, become a characteristic for Ukraine" – at the time President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych were the "incumbent authorities" in Ukraine. The pact included a promise by Viktor Yushchenko to nominate Tymoshenko as Prime Minister if Yushchenko won the October 2004 presidential election.[https://books.google.com/books?id=X0PAQrsx-6YC&q=Force+of+the+people&pg=PA34 Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513091558/https://books.google.com/books?id=X0PAQrsx-6YC&pg=PA34&dq=Force+of+the+people+Tymoshenko&client=firefox-a#v=onepage&q=Force%20of%20the%20people&f=false |date=13 May 2016 }} by Anders Aslund and Michael A. McFaul, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, {{ISBN|978-0-87003-221-9}}

File:Orange ribbon.svg, a symbol of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution.{{cite web|last=Stanisławski|first=Wojciech|year=2005|title=The Orange Ribbon: A Calendar of the Political Crisis in Ukraine Autumn 2004|publisher=Centre for Eastern Studies|location=Warsaw|url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/105394/Pomaranczowa_kokarda_en.pdf|access-date=5 October 2022|archive-date=18 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220418190537/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/105394/Pomaranczowa_kokarda_en.pdf|url-status=live}} Ribbons are common symbols of non-violent protest.]]

The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine eventually featured two main candidates:

• sitting Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, largely supported by Leonid Kuchma (the outgoing President who had already served two terms in office from 1994 and was precluded from running himself due to the term limits under the constitution)
• the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the Our Ukraine faction in the Ukrainian parliament and a former Prime Minister (in office 1999–2001)

The election took place in a highly charged atmosphere, with the Yanukovych team and the outgoing president's administration using their control of the government and state apparatus for intimidation of Yushchenko and his supporters. In September 2004 Yushchenko suffered dioxin poisoning under mysterious circumstances. While he survived and returned to the campaign trail, the poisoning undermined his health and altered his appearance dramatically (his face remains disfigured by the consequences {{as of | 2017 | alt = to this day}}).

The two main candidates were neck and neck in the first-round vote held on 31 October 2004, winning 39.32% (Yanukovych) and 39.87% (Yushchenko) of the votes cast. The candidates who came third and fourth collected much less: Oleksandr Moroz of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and Petro Symonenko of the Communist Party of Ukraine received 5.82% and 4.97%, respectively. Since no candidate had won more than 50% of the cast ballots, Ukrainian law mandated a run-off vote between two leading candidates. After the announcement of the run-off, Oleksandr Moroz threw his support behind Viktor Yushchenko. The Progressive Socialist Party's Nataliya Vitrenko, who won 1.53% of the vote, endorsed Yanukovych, who hoped for Petro Symonenko's endorsement but did not receive it.Ukrainiустафа Найем, "[http://focus.in.ua/Default.aspx?p=article&id=11201 С Президентом на «вы»] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080312065037/http://focus.in.ua/Default.aspx?p=article&id=11201 |date=12 March 2008 }}", Фокус, 2 April 2007, №13

In the wake of the first round of the election, many complaints emerged regarding voting irregularities in favour of the government-supported Yanukovych. However, as it was clear that neither nominee was close enough to collect an outright majority in the first round, challenging the initial result would not have affected the outcome of the round. So the complaints were not actively pursued and both candidates concentrated on the upcoming run-off, scheduled for 21 November.

Pora! activists were arrested in October 2004, but the release of many (reportedly on President Kuchma's personal order) gave growing confidence to the opposition.[https://books.google.com/books?id=BxOQKrCe7UUC&dq=Pinchuk+Akhmetov&pg=PA345 Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425095654/https://books.google.com/books?id=BxOQKrCe7UUC&pg=PA345&dq=Pinchuk+Akhmetov&hl=nl&ei=Tx-yS-DdHsnb-Qa08dy2Ag&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=Pinchuk%20Akhmetov&f=false |date=25 April 2016 }} edited by Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University Press, 2009, {{ISBN|978-0-19-955201-6}} (page 345)

Yushchenko's supporters originally adopted orange as the signifying colour of his election campaign. Later, the colour gave its name to an entire series of political labels, such as the Oranges (Pomaranchevi in Ukrainian) for his political camp and its supporters. At the time when the mass protests grew, and especially when they brought about political change in the country, the term Orange Revolution came to represent the entire series of events.

In view of the success of using colour as a symbol to mobilise supporters, the Yanukovych camp chose blue for themselves.

File:Ukraine Presidential Oct 2004 Vote (Yushchenko).png|Viktor Yushchenko (first round) – percentage of total national vote

File:Ukraine Presidential Oct 2004 Vote (Yanukovych).png|Viktor Yanukovych (first round) – percentage of total national vote

File:Ukraine Presidential Nov 2004 Vote (Yushchenko).png|Viktor Yushchenko (second round) – percentage of total national vote

File:Ukraine Presidential Nov 2004 Vote (Yanukovych).png|Viktor Yanukovych (second round) – percentage of total national vote

File:Militsiya and orange flowers, Kiev.jpg

Protests began on the eve of the second round of voting, as the official count differed markedly from exit poll results which gave Yushchenko up to an 11% lead, while official results gave the election win to Yanukovych by 3%. While Yanukovych supporters have claimed that Yushchenko's connections to the Ukrainian media explain this disparity, the Yushchenko team publicised evidence of many incidents of electoral fraud in favour of the government-backed Yanukovych, witnessed by many local and foreign observers. These accusations were reinforced by similar allegations, though at a lesser scale, during the first presidential run of 31 October. {{Citation needed|date=December 2008}}

The Yushchenko campaign publicly called for protest on the dawn of election day, 21 November 2004, when allegations of fraud began to spread in the form of leaflets printed and distributed by the 'Democratic Initiatives' foundation, announcing that Yushchenko had won – on the basis of its exit poll. Beginning on 22 November 2004, massive protests{{#tag:ref|On 6 November 2013 Pora! had organised the first tent camp in Kyiv.[https://www.academia.edu/218897/Ukraine_2004_Informal_Networks_Transformation_of_Social_Capital_and_Coloured_Revolutions Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Coloured Revolutions] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170515150220/http://www.academia.edu/218897/Ukraine_2004_Informal_Networks_Transformation_of_Social_Capital_and_Coloured_Revolutions |date=15 May 2017 }} by Abel Polese, Routledge (1 June 2009)||group=nb}} started in cities across Ukraine. The largest, in Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), attracted an estimated 500,000 participants,Veronica Khokhlova, [https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30A1FFE395A0C758EDDA80994DC404482 New Kids On the Bloc] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121106070544/https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30A1FFE395A0C758EDDA80994DC404482 |date=6 November 2012 }}, The New York Times, 26 November 2004 who on 23 November 2004 peacefully marched in front of the headquarters of the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, many wearing orange or carrying orange flags, the colour of Yushchenko's campaign coalition. One of the most prominent activists of that time was Paraska Korolyuk, subsequently bestowed with the Order of Princess Olga. From 22 November Pora! undertook the management of the protests in Kyiv until the end of the demonstration.

The local councils in Kyiv, Lviv,Kamil Tchorek, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article395652.ece Protest grows in western city] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110629121745/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article395652.ece |date=29 June 2011 }}, The Times, 26 November 2004 and several other cities passed, with the wide popular support of their constituency, a largely symbolic refusal to accept the legitimacy of the official election results, and Yushchenko took a symbolic presidential oath.[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4198957.stm Yushchenko takes reins in Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061117085303/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4198957.stm |date=17 November 2006 }}. BBC NEWS. 23 January 2005. URL Retrieved 17 November 2006 This "oath" taken by Yushchenko in half-empty parliament chambers, lacking the quorum as only the Yushchenko-leaning factions were present, could not have any legal effect. But it was an important symbolic gesture meant to demonstrate the resolve of the Yushchenko campaign not to accept the compromised election results. In response, Yushchenko's opponents denounced him for taking an illegitimate oath, and even some of his moderate supporters were ambivalent about this act, while a more radical side of the Yushchenko camp demanded him to act even more decisively. Some observers argued that this symbolic presidential oath might have been useful to the Yushchenko camp should events have taken a more confrontational route.{{Citation needed|date=February 2007}} In such a scenario, this "presidential oath" Yushchenko took could be used to lend legitimacy to the claim that he, rather than his rival who tried to gain the presidency through alleged fraud, was a true commander-in-chief authorised to give orders to the military and security agencies.

At the same time, local officials in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the stronghold of Viktor Yanukovych, started a series of actions alluding to the possibility of the breakup of Ukraine or an extra-constitutional federalisation of the country, should their candidate's claimed victory not be recognised. Demonstrations of public support for Yanukovych were held throughout Eastern Ukraine and some of his supporters arrived in Kyiv. In Kyiv the pro-Yanukovych demonstrators were far outnumbered by Yushchenko supporters, whose ranks were continuously swelled by new arrivals from many regions of Ukraine. The scale of the demonstrations in Kyiv was unprecedented. By many estimates, on some days they drew up to one million people to the streets, in freezing weather.USAID Report [http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/democracy_rising.pdf Democracy Rising (PDF)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060301173926/http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/democracy_rising.pdf |date=1 March 2006 }}

In total 18.4% of Ukrainians have claimed to have taken part in the Orange Revolution (across Ukraine).

{{More citations needed section|date=November 2023}}

{{Politics of Ukraine}}

Although Yushchenko entered into negotiations with outgoing President Kuchma in an effort to peacefully resolve the situation, the negotiations broke up on 24 November 2004. Yanukovych was officially certified as the victor by the Central Election Commission, which itself was allegedly involved in falsification of electoral results by withholding the information it was receiving from local districts and running a parallel illegal computer server to manipulate the results. The next morning after the certification took place, Yushchenko spoke to supporters in Kyiv, urging them to begin a series of mass protests, general strikes and sit-ins with the intent of crippling the government and forcing it to concede defeat.

In view of the threat of illegitimate government acceding to power, Yushchenko's camp announced the creation of the Committee of National Salvation which declared a nationwide political strike.

On 1 December 2004, the Verkhovna Rada passed a resolution that strongly condemned pro-separatist and federalisation actions, and passed a non-confidence vote in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, a decision Prime Minister Yanukovych refused to recognise. By the Constitution of Ukraine, the non-confidence vote mandated the government's resignation, but the parliament had no means to enforce a resignation without the co-operation of Prime Minister Yanukovych and outgoing President Kuchma.

On 3 December 2004, Ukraine's Supreme Court finally broke the political deadlock. The court decided that due to the scale of the electoral fraud it became impossible to establish the election results. Therefore, it invalidated the official results that would have given Yanukovych the presidency. As a resolution, the court ordered a revote of the run-off to be held on 26 December 2004.Supreme Court of Ukraine decision regarding the annulment of 21 November vote. [http://www.skubi.net/ukraine/findings.html Full text in Ukrainian] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070212181051/http://www.skubi.net/ukraine/findings.html |date=12 February 2007 }} and [http://www.skubi.net/ukraine/findings.html Summary in English] This decision was seen as a victory for the Yushchenko camp while Yanukovych and his supporters favoured a rerun of the entire election rather than just the run-off, as a second-best option if Yanukovych was not awarded the presidency. On 8 December 2004 the parliament amended laws to provide a legal framework for the new round of elections. The parliament also approved the changes to the Constitution, implementing a political reform backed by outgoing President Kuchma as a part of a political compromise between the acting authorities and opposition.

In November 2009 Yanukovych stated that although his victory in the election was "taken away", he gave up this victory in order to avoid bloodshed. "I didn't want mothers to lose their children and wives their husbands. I didn't want dead bodies from Kyiv to flow down the Dnipro. I didn't want to assume power through bloodshed."[http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/26340/ Yanukovych says presidential election scenario of 2004 won't be repeated in 2010] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121116221809/http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/26340/ |date=16 November 2012 }}, Interfax-Ukraine (27 November 2009)

{{multiple image | direction = horizontal | total_width= 350 | header = | footer = | image1 = Ukraine Presidential Dec 2004 Vote (Yushchenko).png | alt1 = aaa | caption1 =Viktor Yushchenko (Final round) – percentage of total national vote | image2 = Ukraine Presidential Dec 2004 Vote (Yanukovych).png | alt2 =bbb | caption2 = Viktor Yanukovych (Final round) – percentage of total national vote }}

The 26 December revote was held under intense scrutiny by local and international observers. The preliminary results, announced by the Central Election Commission on 18 December, gave Yushchenko and Yanukovych 51.99% and 44.20% of the total vote, which represented a change in the vote by +5.39% to Yushchenko and −5.27% from Yanukovych respectively when compared to the November poll."Results of Voting in Ukraine Presidential Elections 2004", [http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e Central Election Commission of Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080820080505/http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e |date=20 August 2008 }}. URL Retrieved 12 September 2006 The Yanukovych team attempted to mount a fierce legal challenge to the election results using both the Ukrainian courts and the Election Commission complaint procedures. However, all their complaints were dismissed as without merit by both the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the Central Election Commission."[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4061253.stm Timeline: Battle for Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060628044618/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4061253.stm |date=28 June 2006 }}". BBC NEWS, 23 January 2005. URL Retrieved 12 September 2006 On 10 January 2005 the Election Commission officially declared Yushchenko as the winner of the presidential election with the final results falling within 0.01% of the preliminary ones. This Election Commission announcement[http://www.cvk.gov.ua/postanovy/2005/p0015_2005.htm Official CEC announcement of results as of 10 January 2005] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050312021855/http://www.cvk.gov.ua/postanovy/2005/p0015_2005.htm |date=12 March 2005 }}, Central Election Commission. URL Retrieved 12 September 2006 {{in lang|uk}} cleared the way for Yushchenko's inauguration as the President of Ukraine. The official ceremony took place in the Verkhovna Rada building on 23 January 2005 and was followed by the "public inauguration" of the newly sworn President at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in front of hundreds of thousands of his supporters.Finn, Peter. "[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30051-2005Jan23.html In a Final Triumph, Ukrainian Sworn In] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170708011129/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30051-2005Jan23.html |date=8 July 2017 }}". Washington Post, 24 January 2005. URL Retrieved 12 September 2006 This event brought the Ukrainian Orange Revolution to its peaceful conclusion.Ukraine: A History [https://books.google.com/books?id=ktyM07I9HXwC&dq=23+january+Orange+Revolution+to+its+peaceful+conclusion.&pg=PT602 4th Edition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160426204356/https://books.google.com/books?id=ktyM07I9HXwC&pg=PT602&lpg=PT602&dq=23+january+Orange+Revolution+to+its+peaceful+conclusion.&source=bl&ots=y5UbC2YMV7&sig=vPH11TDPiIe5Zy_LQhC3VlJvFjs&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=g0A5UcLvNoHcOaK9gfgM&ved=0CEQQ6AEwAw |date=26 April 2016 }} by Orest Subtelny, University of Toronto Press, 2009, {{ISBN|1442609915}}

According to one version of events recounted by The New York Times,C. J. Chivers, [https://web.archive.org/web/20070324070317/http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0913FF395C0C748DDDA80894DD404482 BACK CHANNELS: A Crackdown Averted; How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path], The New York Times, 17 January 2005. Ukrainian security agencies played an unusual role in the Orange Revolution, with a KGB successor agency in the former Soviet state providing qualified support to the political opposition. As per the paper report, on 28 November 2004 over 10,000 MVS (Internal Ministry) troops were mobilised to put down the protests in Independence Square in Kyiv by the order of their commander, Lt. Gen. Sergei Popkov.For question on ultimate source of orders and mobilisation details see Lehrke, Jesse Paul. The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988–2005. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge (2013), 188–89. The SBU (Security Service of Ukraine, a successor to the KGB in Ukraine) warned opposition leaders of the crackdown. Oleksander Galaka, head of GUR (military intelligence) made calls to "prevent bloodshed". Col. Gen. Ihor Smeshko (SBU chief) and Maj. Gen. Vitaly Romanchenko (military counter-intelligence chief) both claimed to have warned Popkov to pull back his troops, which he did, preventing bloodshed.

In addition to the desire to avoid bloodshed, the New York Times article suggests that siloviki, as the security officers are often called in the countries of the former Soviet Union, were motivated by personal aversion to the possibility of having to serve President Yanukovych, who was in his youth convicted of robbery and assault and had alleged connection with corrupt businessmen, especially if he were to ascend to the presidency by fraud. The personal feelings of Gen. Smeshko towards Yanukovych may also have played a role. Additional evidence of Yushchenko's popularity and at least partial support among the SBU officers is shown by the fact that several embarrassing proofs of electoral fraud, including incriminating wiretap recordings of conversations among the Yanukovych campaign and government officials discussing how to rig the election, were provided to the Yushchenko camp.{{cite web |url=http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/november/24/4.shtml |title=How Yanukovych Forged the Elections. Headquarters' Telephone Talks Intercepted |access-date=2014-04-07 |url-status= dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051223004354/http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/archive/2004/november/24/4.shtml |archive-date=23 December 2005 |df=dmy-all }}, Ukrainska Pravda, 24 November 2004. These conversations were likely recorded and provided to the opposition by sympathisers in the Ukrainian Security Services.

According to Abel Polese, Kuchma was concerned about its reputation in the West; because of a lack of natural resources to finance his regime he had to show a commitment to democracy in order to be targeted for Western financial assistance.[https://www.academia.edu/1068864/Russia_the_US_the_Others_and_the_101_Things_to_Do_to_Win_a_Colour_Revolution_Reflections_on_Georgia_and_Ukraine Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)Revolution”: Reflections on Georgia and Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200708223932/https://www.academia.edu/1068864/Russia_the_US_the_Others_and_the_101_Things_to_Do_to_Win_a_Colour_Revolution_Reflections_on_Georgia_and_Ukraine |date=8 July 2020 }} by Abel Polese, Routledge (26 October 2011)

In February 2004, an editorial "A Chestnut Revolution" appeared in The Wall Street Journal, the author of which wrote that "Ukraine offers the best chance to build on the Georgian success in popular democracy — as long as the West and the democratic opposition play their cards right".{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107645635194826171|title=A Chestnut Revolution|access-date=2024-11-16|work=The Wall Street Journal|date=2004-02-11}} The note also says that the United States has already spent $2 billion to support a "free and independent" Ukraine and it would be better if this money went to support Kuchma's democratic rivals, whose actions are inspired by Georgia and Serbia.

Adrian Karatnycky, a senior researcher at Freedom House, who was born in New York into a family of Ukrainian immigrants, has repeatedly traveled to Ukraine to meet with representatives of public groups, figures of the country's political elite, as well as people from Viktor Yushchenko's team.{{cite news|url=https://www.aei.org/articles/our-man-at-ukraines-orange-revolution/|title=Our Man at Ukraine's Orange Revolution|access-date=2024-11-16|work=American Enterprise Institute|date=2004-12-02|first=Meghan|last=Clyne}} When opposition candidate Yushchenko visited New York, Karatnycky acted as a connector, organizing meetings with American associations, such as the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. A year before the elections, Karatnycky, together with NDI and Freedom House, gathered 1,023 observers from Central and Eastern Europe, who organized the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations. Karatnycky himself took a direct part as an observer during the second round of the presidential elections and witnessed violations.

In August 2004, he took part in a training camp for Ukrainian activists; according to him, "Croatians, Romanians, Slovakians, and Serbians – leaders of the group that led civic opposition to Milošević – taught Ukrainian kids how to ‘control the temperature’ of protesting crowds". Democratic activists were trained on how to resist government pressure, as well as establish communication with the public and the police. Karatnycky also served as president of Freedom House from 1996 to 2003 and executive director from 1993 to 1996, and in this position helped create a network of centers and public organizations in Ukraine engaged in monitoring the media and elections. On November 30, 2004, at the very beginning of the protests, Karatnycky stated in his speech at the Knickerbocker Club: "I think the ‘orange revolution’ will win this time, and I can’t conceive of a set of circumstances under which Yushchenko won’t be president of the country".

In the two years before the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the United States spent $65 million "to aid political organizations in Ukraine, paying to bring opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko to meet U.S. leaders and helping to underwrite exit polls indicating he won a disputed runoff election."Attention Deficit Democracy, James Bovard, page 65 State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher said that the U.S. money was not going to help a particular candidate, but to institutions that are necessary for free elections. Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute also funded civic groups that counted votes and announced exit poll results.{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa|title=US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev|access-date=2024-11-16|work=The Guardian|date=2004-11-26|first=Traynor|last=Ian}} In late November 2004, Senator Richard Lugar arrived in Kyiv as a representative of President George W. Bush and delivered a message to President Leonid Kuchma: "you play a central role in ensuring that Ukraine’s election is democratic and free of fraud and manipulation. A tarnished election, however, will lead us to review our relations with Ukraine."The Color Revolutions, Lincoln A. Mitchell, page 88-89

Throughout the demonstrations, Ukraine's emerging Internet usage (facilitated by news sites that began to disseminate the Kuchma tapes) was an integral part of the orange revolutionary process. It has even been suggested that the Orange Revolution was the first example of an Internet-organised mass protest.McFaul, Michael. "Transitions from Postcommunism." Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): p. 12. Analysts believe that the Internet and mobile phones allowed an alternative media to flourish that was not subject to self-censorship or overt control by President Kuchma and his allies and pro-democracy activists (such as Pora!) were able to use mobile phones and the Internet to coordinate election monitoring and mass protests.Goldstein, Joshua. (2007) The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Berkman Center Research Publication. Pg 14Kalil, Thomas. (2008) Harnessing the Mobile Revolution. The New Policy Institute. p. 14

{{More citations needed section|date=November 2023}}

{{Update section|date=December 2015}}

As part of the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian constitution was changed to shift powers from the presidency to the parliament. This was Oleksandr Moroz's price for his decisive role in winning Yushchenko the presidency. The Communists also supported these measures. These came into effect in 2006 during which Yanukovych's Party of Regions won the parliamentary election, creating a coalition government with the Socialists and the Communists under his leadership. As a result, President Viktor Yushchenko had to deal with a powerful Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych who had control of many important portfolios. His premiership ended in late 2007 after Yushchenko had succeeded in his months-long attempt to dissolve parliament. After the election, Yanukovych's party again was the largest, but Tymoshenko's finished far ahead of Yushchenko's for second place. The Orange parties won a very narrow majority, permitting a new government under Tymoshenko, but Yushchenko's political decline continued to his poor showing in the 2010 presidential election.

On 1 October 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine overturned the 2004 amendments, considering them unconstitutional.[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/84619/ Update: Return to 1996 Constitution strengthens president, raises legal questions] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101003120442/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/84619/ |date=3 October 2010 }}, Kyiv Post (1 October 2010)

A Circuit administrative court in Kyiv forbade mass actions at Maidan Nezalezhnosti from 9 January 2010 to 5 February 2010. The Mayor's office had requested this in order to avoid "nonstandard situations" during the aftermath of the 2010 presidential election. Apparently (in particular) the Party of Regions, All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" and Svoboda had applied for a permit to demonstrate there.[http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-356613.html Court forbade Maydan after first tour of election] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813153812/http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-356613.html |date=13 August 2011 }}, UNIAN (13 January 2010) Incumbent President Viktor Yushchenko got a dismal 5.45% of votes during the election.{{in lang|uk}}[http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp2010/wp320pt00_t001f01=700pt001f01=700pplace=1.html Central Election Commission Candidate Results] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100121012542/http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vp2010/wp320pt00_t001f01%3D700pt001f01%3D700pplace%3D1.html |date=21 January 2010 }}, CEC Ukraine (19 January 2010)

"Ukraine is a European democratic country", said Yushchenko in a sort of political will at the polling station. "It is a free nation and free people."[http://www.europarussia.com/posts/755 Ukraine. Farewell to the Orange Revolution] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100207134255/http://www.europarussia.com/posts/755 |date=7 February 2010 }}, EuropaRussia (19 January 2010) According to him, this is one of the great achievements of the Orange Revolution.

In the 2010 presidential election Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner which was labeled by some Yanukovych supporters as "an end to this Orange nightmare".[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8508276.stm Ukraine election: Yanukovych urges Tymoshenko to quit] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210118174445/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8508276.stm |date=18 January 2021 }}, BBC News, 10 February 2010, 13:23 GMT Immediately after his election Yanukovych promised to "clear the debris of misunderstanding and old problems that emerged during the years of the Orange power".[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/59193/ Yanukovych appeals to the nation, asks Tymoshenko to step down] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100212102953/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/59193/ |date=12 February 2010 }}, Kyiv Post (10 February 2010) According to influential Party of Regions member Rinat Akhmetov the ideals of the Orange Revolution won at the 2010 election "We had a fair and democratic independent election. The entire world recognised it, and international observers confirmed its results. That's why the ideals of the Orange Revolution won".[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/60518 Akhmetov: Ideals of 'Orange Revolution' won at election in 2010] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110713180646/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/60518 |date=13 July 2011 }}, Kyiv Post (26 February 2010) According to Yulia Tymoshenko the 2010 elections were a missed "chance to become a worthy member of the European family and to put an end to the rule of the oligarchy".[https://web.archive.org/web/20100227060506/http://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/article/ea5wzazv Yulia Tymoshenko’s address to the people of Ukraine], Yulia Tymoshenko official website (22 February 2010)

President Viktor Yushchenko decreed in 2005 that 22 November (the starting day of the Orange Revolution) will be a non-public holiday "Day of Freedom".[http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2011/11/23/151355.html Day of Freedom: here comes the end to revolutions] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111126230907/http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2011/11/23/151355.html |date=26 November 2011 }}, ForUm (23 November 2011) This date was moved to 22 January (and merged with Unification Day) by President Viktor Yanukovych late December 2011.[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/119839/ Yanukovych signs decree on new holiday replacing Ukrainian Independence Day] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120105060630/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/119839/ |date=5 January 2012 }}, Kyiv Post (30 December 2011)[http://zik.ua/en/news/2011/12/31/326863 Yanukovych cancels Freedom Day on 22 Nov.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224141540/https://zik.ua/en/news/2011/12/31/326863|date=24 February 2019}}, Z I K (31 December 2011)[http://eng.obozrevatel.com/politics/yanukovych-abolishes-day-of-liberty-on-november-22.htm Yanukovych abolishes Day of Liberty on 22 November] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140219074653/http://eng.obozrevatel.com/politics/yanukovych-abolishes-day-of-liberty-on-november-22.htm |date=19 February 2014 }}, "Observer" (30 December 2011) President Yanukovych stated he moved "Day of Freedom" because of "numerous appeals from the public".{{#tag:ref|Mid-October 2014 President Petro Poroshenko undid Yanukovych's merging of Unification Day when he decreed that 21 November will be celebrated as "Day of Dignity and Freedom" in honour of the Euromaidan-protests that started on 21 November 2013.{{cite news | url=http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/234303.html | title=Ukrainians to celebrate Day of Dignity and Freedom on November 21, Unity Day on January 22 | agency=Interfax-Ukraine | date=13 November 2014 | access-date=26 August 2020 | archive-date=5 March 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305085110/https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/234303.html | url-status=live }}|group=nb}}

Outright vote rigging diminished after the 2004 presidential election.[https://books.google.com/books?id=Wp7VKL4p7kQC&dq=vote+rigging+Ukraine&pg=PA63 Understanding Ukrainian Politics:Power, Politics, And Institutional Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160510175921/https://books.google.com/books?id=Wp7VKL4p7kQC&pg=PA63&dq=vote+rigging+Ukraine&hl=nl&ei=phVxTqClNIGdOqDkmJMJ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=vote%20rigging%20Ukraine&f=false |date=10 May 2016 }} by Paul D'Anieri, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, {{ISBN|978-0-7656-1811-5}} (page 63)[http://euobserver.com/?aid=29431 EU endorses Ukraine election result] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605033800/http://euobserver.com/?aid=29431 |date=5 June 2011 }}, euobserver (8 February 2010)[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/08/AR2010020803583.html International observers say Ukrainian election was free and fair] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201012114207/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/08/AR2010020803583.html |date=12 October 2020 }}, Washington Post (9 February 2010)[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/59077/ European Parliament president greets Ukraine on conducting free and fair presidential election] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100211014322/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/59077/ |date=11 February 2010 }}, Kyiv Post (9 February 2010) No officials involved in the 2004 elections that preceded the Orange Revolution were convicted for election fraud.[https://books.google.com/books?id=cQqr7f9QkngC&dq=officials+convicted+election+fraud+Ukraine&pg=PA52 Ukraine on its meandering path between East and West] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603130835/https://books.google.com/books?id=cQqr7f9QkngC&pg=PA52&dq=officials+convicted+election+fraud+Ukraine&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=dV5ST6nPE8Hd8QPpxZXwBQ&ved=0CFcQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=officials%20convicted%20election%20fraud%20Ukraine&f=false |date=3 June 2016 }} by Andrej Lushnycky and Mykola Riabchuk, Peter Lang, 2009, {{ISBN|303911607X}} (page 52)[http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061785.html Ukraine:Has Yushchenko Betrayed The Orange Revolution? ] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151126083026/http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061785.html |date=26 November 2015 }}, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (30 September 2005)[http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2005/10/28/164030.html Independent standpoint on Ukraine:Dismissal of Prosecutor-General, Closure of Poroshenko Case Create New] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103105813/http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2005/10/28/164030.html|date=3 November 2013}}, ForUm (28 October 2005)

A 2007 study revealed that opinion about the nature of the Orange Revolution had barely shifted since 2004 and that the attitudes about it in the country remained divided along the same largely geographical lines that it had been at the time of the revolution (West and Central Ukraine being more positive about the events and South and Eastern Ukraine more cynical (seniors also). This research also showed that Ukrainians in total had a less positive view on the Orange Revolution in 2007 than they had in 2005. It has been suggested that since the Orange Revolution was impactful enough to interest people of all ages it increased the overall unity of Ukraine.{{Original research inline|date=December 2012}}

During the elections campaign of the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary election the Party of Regions' campaign focused heavily on (what they called) "the chaos and ruins of 5 years of orange leadership".[http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/en/program Draft Campaign Program of the Party of Regions] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140326215342/http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/en/program |date=26 March 2014 }}, Party of Regions (2012)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20121026120142/http://www.wespeaknews.com/world/the-upcoming-parliamentary-elections-in-ukraine-summary-106098.html The upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine [Summary]], WSN (23 October 2012)[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20031821 Q&A:Ukrainian parliamentary election] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021080306/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20031821 |date=21 October 2020 }}, BBC News (23 October 2012)

File:Pro-Putin rally 2012-02-04 (orange).jpg; banner reads (in Russian) "Orange Revolution will not pass!"]]

In March 2005 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk stated that Ukraine would not be exporting revolution.[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27717 BEREZOVSKY HOPES TO SELL ORANGE REVOLUTION TO RUSSIA] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304024651/http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27717 |date=4 March 2016 }}, The Jamestown Foundation (17 March 2005)

During Alexander Lukashenko's inauguration (ceremony) as President of Belarus of 22 January 2011 Lukashenko vowed that Belarus would never have its own version of the Orange Revolution and Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution.[http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lukashenko-growls-at-inauguration/429432.html Lukashenko Growls at Inauguration] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160602203428/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lukashenko-growls-at-inauguration/429432.html |date=2 June 2016 }}, The Moscow Times (24 January 2011) In the aftermath of the 2011 South Ossetian presidential election (in December 2011) and during the protests following the 2011 Russian elections (also in December 2011) the Ambassador of South Ossetia to the Russian Federation Dmitry Medoyev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Putin's supporters named the Orange Revolution an infamous foreknowledge for their countries.[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/118993/ Putin calls 'color revolutions' an instrument of destabilisation] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111216034341/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/118993/ |date=16 December 2011 }}, Kyiv Post (15 December 2011)[http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/118053/ 'Orange' methods will fail in South Ossetia] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111204001642/http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/118053/ |date=4 December 2011 }}, Kyiv Post (2 December 2011) Putin also claimed that the organisers of the Russian protests in December 2011 were former (Russian) advisors to Yushchenko during his presidency and were transferring the Orange Revolution to Russia. A 4 February 2012 rally in favor of Putin was named the "anti-Orange protest".{{in lang|ru}} [http://ria.ru/society/20120204/556495673.html Антиоранжевый митинг проходит на Поклонной горе] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029191011/http://ria.ru/society/20120204/556495673.html |date=29 October 2013 }} RIAN (4 February 2012) In 2013 a Russian State Duma Oleg Nilov and former fellow Russian politician Sergey Glazyev referred to political adversaries as "different personalities in some sort of orange or bright shorts" and "diplomats and bureaucrats that appeared after the years of the 'orange' hysteria".{{#tag:ref|During a January 2013 debate in the Russian State Duma on a bill criminalising gay "propaganda" in Russia the A Just Russia deputy Oleg Nilov referred to "different personalities in some sort of orange or bright shorts".{{in lang|ru}} [http://vz.ru/politics/2013/1/25/617482.html «В оранжевых и радужных трусах» In orange and red shorts] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130129082911/http://vz.ru/politics/2013/1/25/617482.html |date=29 January 2013 }}, Vzglyad (25 January 2013) Former fellow Russian politician Sergey Glazyev stated in August 2013 that "a whole generation of diplomats and bureaucrats has appeared after the years of the 'orange' hysteria, who are carrying out an anti-Russian agenda" "creates an effect that Ukraine doesn't want", namely Ukrainian integration into the European Union and not into the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.[http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/putins-aide-calls-opinion-that-all-ukrainians-want-european-integration-sick-self-delusion-2/ Putin’s aide calls opinion that all Ukrainians want European integration "sick self-delusion"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927070103/http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/putins-aide-calls-opinion-that-all-ukrainians-want-european-integration-sick-self-delusion-2/ |date=27 September 2013 }}, Interfax-Ukraine (21 August 2013)|group=nb}} In 2016 the Russian newspaper Izvestia claimed, "in Central Asia weak regimes are already being attacked by extremists and 'Orange Revolutions'."[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37837432 Russian media's love affair with Trump] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180414082116/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37837432 |date=14 April 2018 }}, BBC News (2 November 2016){{#tag:ref|Writing about the 2016 US presidential election Izvestia claimed "If the war-like, Russia-hating Hillary Clinton wins the US election, a third front could open up in the Caucasus; money will pour in to support terrorists, just like it did during the two Chechen wars. There could even be a fourth front in Central Asia, where weak regimes are already being attacked by extremists and 'Orange Revolutions'."|group=nb}}

In Russian nationalist circles the Orange Revolution has been linked with fascism because, albeit marginally, Ukrainian nationalist extreme right-wing groups and Ukrainian Americans (including Viktor Yushchenko's wife, Kateryna Yushchenko, who was born in the United States) were involved in the demonstrations; Russian nationalist groups see both as branches of the same tree of fascism. The involvement of Ukrainian Americans led them to believe the Orange Revolution was steered by the CIA.[https://www.academia.edu/4195331/New_Extremely_Right-Wing_Intellectual_Circles_in_Russia_The_Anti-Orange_Committee_the_Isborsk_Club_and_the_Florian_Geyer_Club New Extremely Right-Wing Intellectual Circles in Russia: The Anti-Orange Committee, the Isborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812204001/https://www.academia.edu/4195331/New_Extremely_Right-Wing_Intellectual_Circles_in_Russia_The_Anti-Orange_Committee_the_Isborsk_Club_and_the_Florian_Geyer_Club |date=12 August 2019 }} by Andreas Umland, International Relations and Security Network (5 August 2013)

In a televised meeting with military bloggers on 13 June 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that, the winner of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Viktor Yushchenko had come to power with the help of a coup d'etat, which "at least took place in a relatively peaceful way."{{cite web |title=Putin said that the Russian Federation was not given a chance to build normal relations with the Ukrainian people|url=https://tass.ru/politika/17996675|website=TASS|date=13 June 2023|access-date=13 June 2023|language=Russian}}

{{columns-list|colwidth=30em|

• Civil resistance
• Colour revolution
• Euromaidan
• Foreign electoral intervention
• Orange Revolution (film)
• Rise up, Ukraine!
• Rose Revolution
• Tulip Revolution
• Ukraine without Kuchma

}}

{{Reflist|group=nb}}

{{Reflist}}

{{See also|Bibliography of Ukrainian history|List of Slavic studies journals}}

{{refbegin}}

• Paul D'Anieri, ed. Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilisation, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press; 2011) 328 pages{{ISBN?}}
• Tetyana Tiryshkina. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine – a Step to Freedom (2nd ed. 2007){{ISBN?}}
• Andrew Wilson (March 2006). Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Yale University Press. {{ISBN|0300112904}}.
• Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul (January 2006). Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. {{ISBN|0870032216}}.
• Askold Krushelnycky (2006). An Orange Revolution: A Personal Journey Through Ukrainian History. {{ISBN|0436206234}}.
• Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbrig (eds.). Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe. German Marshall Fund, 2007.
• Lehrke, Jesse Paul. "The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988–2005." Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge (2013). Especially pp. 185–199 and pp. 152–159 for background. (See: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415688369/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141025050603/http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415688369/ |date=25 October 2014 }}).
• Andrey Kolesnikov (2005). Первый Украинский: записки с передовой (First Ukrainian [Front]: Notes from the Front Line). Moscow: Vagrius. {{ISBN|5969700622}}. {{in lang|ru}}
• Giuseppe D'Amato, [http://www.europarussia.com/books/l%e2%80%99eurosogno-e-i-nuovi-muri-ad-est/the-euro-dream-and-new-walls-to-the-east EuroSogno e i nuovi Muri ad Est] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110710091441/http://www.europarussia.com/books/l%E2%80%99eurosogno-e-i-nuovi-muri-ad-est/the-euro-dream-and-new-walls-to-the-east |date=10 July 2011 }} (The Euro-Dream and the new Walls to the East). L'Unione europea e la dimensione orientale. Greco-Greco editore, Milano, 2008. pp. 133–151. {{in lang|it}}
• The Orange Ribbon: A Calendar of the Political Crisis in Ukraine, compiled by Wojciech Stanistawski. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies (www.osw.waw.pl), 2005. by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, 2005.
• [https://www.theguardian.com/international/story/0,,1360080,00.html US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305085100/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa |date=5 March 2022 }}, The Guardian, 2, 6 November 2004.
• [https://www.theguardian.com/ukraine/story/0,15569,1364361,00.html Six questions to the critics of Ukraine's orange revolution] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305085055/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/02/ukraine.comment |date=5 March 2022 }}, The Guardian, 2 December 2004.
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20060716122003/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C1101041206-832225-1%2C00.html The Orange Revolution], Time.com, Monday, 6 December 2004 (excerpt, requires subscription)
• [https://www.theguardian.com/ukraine/story/0,15569,1368078,00.html The price of People Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305085046/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/07/ukraine.comment |date=5 March 2022 }}, The Guardian, 7 December 2004.
• [http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041211/news_1n11usaid.html U.S. Money has Helped Opposition in Ukraine] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120502172724/http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041211/news_1n11usaid.html |date=2 May 2012 }}, Associated Press, 11 December 2004.

{{refend}}

{{Commons category multi|Orange Revolution|Presidential election of Ukraine, 2004}}

{{wikinews|has=News related to this article| Ukraine political crisis| Ukrainian opposition leader calls for police and army to join revolution| Ukraine opposition candidate Yushchenko is suffering from a Dioxin intoxication, doctors say| Yushchenko claims victory in re-run| Yushchenko Sworn In}}

• [https://web.archive.org/web/20070628091634/http://azfilms.us/orange-winter.html Orange Winter, a feature documentary about the Orange revolution] by Andrei Zagdansky
• "[https://web.archive.org/web/20121021025553/http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2992/2599 Role of Internet-based Information Flows and Technologies in Electoral Revolutions: The Case of Ukraine's Orange Revolution]", Lysenko, V.V., and Desouza, K.C., First Monday, 15 (9), 2010
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20130314185417/http://www.iep.ru/files/text/guest/aslund/as_2005_07_29.pdf] The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution by Anders Åslund

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