Popular Mobilization Forces

File:Raising flag of Iraq and Popular Mobilization Forces after defeating DAESH.jpg after the Third Battle of Fallujah with flags of Iraq and the local militia]]

While the factions have their own flags,{{cite web | last1=Parker | first1=Ned | last2=Landay | first2=Jonathan | title=Special Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militias | website=Reuters | date=2016-08-23 | url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD | access-date=2020-09-28 | archive-date=2020-09-29 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200929034737/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD | url-status=live }} a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF{{cite web|url=http://al-hashed.net/category/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9/|website=al-hashed.net|access-date=2020-02-09|title=الادارة المركزية – مديرية الاعلام|archive-date=2020-01-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200128075008/http://al-hashed.net/category/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9/|url-status=live}} along with the Iraqi flag.{{cite web|url=https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86/128162/alsumaria-news|title=الحشد الشعبي يعلن رفع العلم العراقي فوق مركز شرطة بشير بكركوك|website=قناه السومرية العراقية}}{{Cite web |url=http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/video/4af5a5e7-d537-4914-b656-5cc387e7fd7b |title=VIDEO: Hashd al-Shaabi recruits child soldiers in southern Kirkuk |first=Baxtiyar |last=Goran |website=Kurdistan24}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2017/10/23/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82|title=أبرز فصائل الحشد الشعبي في العراق|website=www.aljazeera.net|access-date=2022-01-08|archive-date=2022-01-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220108144415/https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2017/10/23/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82|url-status=live}}{{cite web|url=https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/79497|title=الحسكة.. التنظيم يهاجم الحشد الشعبي العراقي في معبر تل صفوك|website=www.zamanalwsl.net|access-date=Jan 4, 2020}} PMF factions frequently hold up Iranian flags and posters of Iranian religious figures such as Ruhollah Khomeini.{{Cite web |date=2019-06-03 |title=Iran, Shiite Proxies Mark Al-Quds Day with Burning of U.S., Israeli Flags |url=http://www.thetower.org/7377-iran-shiite-proxies-mark-al-quds-day-with-burning-of-u-s-israeli-flags/ |access-date=2025-03-27 |website=The Tower |language=en-US}}

With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word {{lang|ar|الشعبي}} (ash-Shaʿbī) translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word {{lang|ar|الحشد}} (al-Ḥashd) translates as "mobilization" or "Mass", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", "gathering".

{{Further|Special Groups (Iraq)}}

The PMF trace their origins to the so-called Special Groups, a US term to designate groups of the Iraqi insurgency which were Shiite, supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force, as opposed to Ba'athist loyalist or radical sunni salafi jihadist insurgents. The Special Groups fought both the US-led Coalition forces, but also the afforementioned Ba'ath and sunni insurgent in a sectarian conflict.{{Cite web |last=Center |first=Combating Terrorism |date=2010-11-01 |title=The Evolution of Iran's Special Groups in Iraq |url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-evolution-of-irans-special-groups-in-iraq/ |access-date=2023-11-07 |website=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point |language=en-US}} Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014. These were:

• Badr Organization
• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
• Kata'ib Hezbollah
• Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
• Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba
• Kata'ib al-Imam Ali
• Kata'ib Jund al-Imam
• Ya Ali Popular Formations (Alleged){{Cite web |title=Institute for the Study of War |url=https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025 |access-date=2025-04-01 |website=Institute for the Study of War |language=en}}

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.

File:Retaking Fallujah from ISIS by Iraqi Armed Forces and patriot militias (9).jpg]]

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June. The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014.{{cite news |title=AP Interview: Iraq's al-Maliki denies seeking comeback |url=http://wtop.com/middle-east/2015/02/ap-interview-iraqs-al-maliki-denies-seeking-comeback/ |access-date=15 March 2015 |date=2 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402121158/http://wtop.com/middle-east/2015/02/ap-interview-iraqs-al-maliki-denies-seeking-comeback/ |archive-date=2 April 2015 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all}} The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014.{{cite news|title=Islamic State: Iraq Battle Against ISIS For Tikrit Led By Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Forces|url=http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-iraq-battle-against-isis-tikrit-led-iran-backed-shiite-militia-forces-1835134|agency=International Business Times|date=March 3, 2015|access-date=March 28, 2015|archive-date=January 1, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200101094804/https://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-iraq-battle-against-isis-tikrit-led-iran-backed-shiite-militia-forces-1835134|url-status=live}} The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Masdar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group.{{cite web|url=https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/law-passes-making-pmu-part-iraqs-national-forces/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220213759/https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/law-passes-making-pmu-part-iraqs-national-forces/|url-status=dead|archive-date=December 20, 2016|title=Law passes making the PMU a part of Iraq's national forces.|first=Paul|last=Antonopoulos|work=Al-Masdar News|date=December 19, 2016}}{{better source needed|not very reliable|date=September 2020}} However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.{{cite news|last1=Mamouri|first1=Ali|title=Concern in Iraq grows over unregulated Shiite forces|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iraq-popular-mobilization-crimes-government-control.html|access-date=15 March 2015|work=al-Monitor.com|date=17 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150324065114/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iraq-popular-mobilization-crimes-government-control.html|archive-date=24 March 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}

On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.{{cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar/comments/60ndx1/iraqi_pmu_announce_launch_of_their_special_forces/|title=Iraqi PMU announce the launch of their Special Forces training course to form a new Special Forces Division|website=Reddit|date=21 March 2017|access-date=21 March 2017|archive-date=9 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009170611/https://www.reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar/comments/60ndx1/iraqi_pmu_announce_launch_of_their_special_forces/|url-status=live}}{{better source needed|reddit|date=September 2020}} On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate. However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.{{cite news|title=Iraq elections become a battleground for Iranian influence|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/iraq-elections-become-battleground-iranian-influence|access-date=13 May 2018|work=The Guardian|date=12 May 2018|archive-date=17 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211217205049/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/iraq-elections-become-battleground-iranian-influence|url-status=live}}

According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.{{cite news|last1=al-Khadimi|first1=Mustafa|title=Iraqi volunteers' victories don't justify atrocities|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/contents/articles/originals/2014/12/iraq-popular-mobilization-shiite-achievements-violations.html|access-date=14 March 2015|work=al-Monitor|date=22 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402134304/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/contents/articles/originals/2014/12/iraq-popular-mobilization-shiite-achievements-violations.html|archive-date=2 April 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}

The Tribal Mobilization forces are also a part of PMF.{{cite web|url=https://www.almaalomah.com/2016/07/30/72096/|title=الحشد العشائري يؤكد انه جزء من هيئة الحشد ومقاتليه يتقاضون رواتبهم من بغداد | وكالة المعلومة|first=Al-Maalomah|last=Publisher|access-date=2020-01-02|archive-date=2020-02-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200214144518/https://www.almaalomah.com/2016/07/30/72096/|url-status=dead}}{{cite web|url=http://www.alliraqnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=25372|title=الحشد الشعبي: الحشد العشائري جزء اساسي منا [صوتي] -كل العراق الاخبارية [أين]|website=www.alliraqnews.com|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-date=2020-01-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200110142004/http://www.alliraqnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=25372|url-status=live}}{{Cite web |url=http://al-hashed.net/2016/11/30/%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84/ |title=هيئة الحشد الشعبي: حشد الانبار يناهز الــ17 الف مقاتل – مديرية الاعلام |access-date=2021-12-17 |archive-date=2020-02-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200211093327/http://al-hashed.net/2016/11/30/%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84/ |url-status=live }}

In February 2019, (PMF) raided a base belonging to Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, during the raid the group's leader Aws al-Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes. The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government.{{cite web|url = https://www.mideastcenter.org/post/the-arrest-of-aws-al-khafaji-looking-at-the-abu-al-fadl-al-abbas-forces|title = The Arrest of Aws al-Khafaji: Looking at the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces|date = 2 April 2019|access-date = 31 July 2020|archive-date = 31 July 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200731120534/https://www.mideastcenter.org/post/the-arrest-of-aws-al-khafaji-looking-at-the-abu-al-fadl-al-abbas-forces|url-status = live}}

In 2020, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

While there are no official data about the strength of the Popular Mobilization Forces, there are some estimates, differing significantly. Around Tikrit reports in 2015 suggested there were about 20,000 engaged militiamen, while the grand total ranges are from 2–5 million{{cite news|title=Better pay, better weapons: are shiite militias growing more powerful than iraqi army?|url=http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3614|agency=Niqash|date=January 29, 2015|access-date=March 22, 2015|archive-date=April 20, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150420073826/http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3614|url-status=dead}} to 300,000–450,000 Iraqi armed forces.{{cite news|last1=Sly|first1=Liz|title=Pro-Iran militias' success in Iraq could undermine U.S.|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html|access-date=22 March 2015|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=15 February 2015|archive-date=26 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180826161328/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html|url-status=live}} Higher estimates have included about 40,000 Sunni fighters in 2016,{{cite news|last1=Saadoun|first1=Mustafa|title=It's official: Sunnis joining Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/iraq-sunnis-join-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces.html|access-date=29 March 2016|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=14 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160401040009/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/iraq-sunnis-join-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces.html|archive-date=1 April 2016|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}} a figure evolving from reports in early 2015, which counted 1,000 to 3,000 Sunni fighters.{{cite web|last1=Wright|first1=Robin|title=In War Against ISIS, Numbers Don't Always Tell the Story |url=https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/03/13/in-war-against-isis-numbers-dont-always-tell-the-story/|work=The Wall Street Journal|access-date=23 March 2015|date=13 March 2015}}{{cite news|last1=Raineri|first1=Daniele|title=Dentro a Tikrit, gli sciiti arrivano sui luoghi delle stragi|url=http://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2015/04/04/iraq-dentro-a-tikrit-gli-sciiti-arrivano-sui-luoghi-delle-stragi___1-v-127413-rubriche_c389.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150405024638/http://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2015/04/04/iraq-dentro-a-tikrit-gli-sciiti-arrivano-sui-luoghi-delle-stragi___1-v-127413-rubriche_c389.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=April 5, 2015|access-date=11 April 2015|date=4 April 2015|language=it}} By early March 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces appeared to be strengthening its foothold in the Yazidis town of Shingal by recruiting and paying local people.{{cite news |last1=Nasir|first1=Ali|title=Shiite militia recruiting Yezidis, strengthening foothold in Shingal|url=http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/02032015|access-date=12 November 2015|publisher=Rudaw|date=2 March 2015}}

The Popular Mobilization Forces consist of both new volunteers and pre-existing militias, which have been grouped within the umbrella organization formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Units directorate.{{cite news|last1=al-Kadhimi|first1=Mustafa|title=Why Iraq needs to depoliticize their Popular Mobilization Units|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/iraq-popular-mobilization-forces-politics-isis.html|access-date=12 November 2015|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=10 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150922122544/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/iraq-popular-mobilization-forces-politics-isis.html|archive-date=22 September 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}{{cite web |last1=Ali|first1=Ahmed |title=Iraq's Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders|url=http://iswiraq.blogspot.it/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html |publisher=Institute for the Study of War|access-date=15 March 2015|date=14 November 2014}} Among these militias there are the Peace Companies (formerly known as the Mahdi Army), Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization.{{cite news|title=Iraqi Popular Forces Warn to Disclose Coalition's Support for ISIL|url=http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2015/03/01/iraqi-popular-forces-warn-to-disclose-coalitions-support-for-isil/|access-date=17 March 2015|publisher=Islamic Invitation Turkey|date=1 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303180934/http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2015/03/01/iraqi-popular-forces-warn-to-disclose-coalitions-support-for-isil/|archive-date=3 March 2016|url-status=dead}}

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered on April 7, 2015, that the Popular Mobilization Forces be placed under the direct command of the prime minister's office,{{cite news |last1=Nordland|first1=Rod|title=After Victory Over ISIS in Tikrit, Next Battle Requires a New Template |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-anbar-sunni-shiite.html?_r=0|access-date=15 April 2015|work=The New York Times|date=7 April 2015}} thus giving a further official status to the militia.{{cite news|title=Iraqi Cabinet regards Popular Mobilization Forces an official organ, Cabinet|url=http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/iraqi-cabinet-regards-popular.html|access-date=12 May 2015|work=Iraq TradeLink News Agency|date=7 April 2015|archive-date=15 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150515005856/http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/iraqi-cabinet-regards-popular.html|url-status=live}}

In 2015, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee in the Iraqi government was Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also the National Security Adviser.{{cite news|title=The National Security Adviser and the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee arrives at Kirkuk. |url=http://www.beladinews.net/index.php?aa=news&id22=10983|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150217105451/http://www.beladinews.net/index.php?aa=news&id22=10983|url-status=dead|archive-date=February 17, 2015|agency=Beladi News|date=January 5, 2015}} The Popular Mobilization Committee is under the Office of Prime Minister. The PMF are said to have been led on the battlefields by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, also known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah,{{cite news|last1=Badran|first1=Tony|title=Exporting the Islamic Revolution|url=https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/564933-exporting-the-islamic-revolution|access-date=15 March 2015|work=NOW|date=6 March 2015|archive-date=15 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160315204957/https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/564933-exporting-the-islamic-revolution|url-status=live}}{{cite news|last1=Hashem|first1=Ali|title=Iraqi town celebrates victory over Islamic State|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/islamic-state-loses-dhuluiya.html|access-date=15 March 2015|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=2 January 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403155352/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/islamic-state-loses-dhuluiya.html|archive-date=3 April 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}} but the chain of command runs through pre-existing leaders.{{cite news|last1=Sly|first1=Liz|title=Iraq's pro-Iranian Shiite militias lead the war against the Islamic State|url=http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraq-s-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state-1.329733|access-date=15 March 2015|work=Star and Stripes|date=16 February 2015|archive-date=2 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402135206/http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraq-s-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state-1.329733|url-status=dead}} According to Iraqi sources, as well as to the London-based pro-Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat, the different militias rely on their own chain of command, and rarely work together or follow regular Iraqi Army's orders.{{cite news|title=Possible Armed Confrontations between Popular Mobilization Forces, Iraqi Army|url=http://english.aawsat.com/2016/02/article55347410/possible-armed-confrontations-between-popular-mobilization-forces-iraqi-army|access-date=29 March 2016|work=Asharq al-Awsat|date=9 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160411070113/http://english.aawsat.com/2016/02/article55347410/possible-armed-confrontations-between-popular-mobilization-forces-iraqi-army|archive-date=11 April 2016|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}

The Laws and conduct by which the PMF should abide are those of the Iraqi Government since the Iraqi Prime Minister has the final control over the PMF. Nonetheless, Marja' Ali al-Sistani issued an "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields" which included a 20 points form of how the PMF should conduct themselves. The main points were that the PMF should treat the liberated areas locals with the Islamic Law which is as quoted from the second point which is a Hadith of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed; "Do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill an elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do no not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise". Other points included the same aforementioned guidance when treating non-Muslims and also not to steal or disrespect people even if they are the families of the ISIS fighters.http://www.sistani.org/english/archive/25036/ (www.sistani.org) on 12th of Feb 2015, accessed on the 3rd of April 2015{{Primary source inline|date=September 2020}}

Alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, other people in charge of the PMF include Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hadi Al-Amiri, the chief of the Badr Organization.{{cite news|last1=Grappo|first1=Gary|title=Iran's Strategic Victory: Hezbollah-ized Iraq |url=http://thedailyjournalist.com/the-strategist/irans-strategic-victory-hezbollah-ized-iraq/|access-date=16 March 2015|work=The Daily Journalist|date=14 March 2015}} According to The New York Times, such organizational autonomy may present a challenge to the consolidation of Haider al-Abadi's authority.{{cite news|last1=Barnard|first1=Anne|title=A Balancing Act as Iraq Claims Gains in Tikrit|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/world/middleeast/tikrit-isis-iraq.html|access-date=16 March 2015|work=The New York Times|date=12 March 2015}} Volunteers include Shia Arabs, and smaller numbers of Iraqi Christians, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Turkmen.

The militias are trained and supported by military advisers from Turkey (for Sunni and Turkmeni troops),{{cite news|title=20 Turkish officers train Iraqi Mobilization Forces, media sources|url=http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/20-turkish-officers-train-iraqi.html|access-date=15 April 2015|agency=Iraq Tradelink News Agency|date=15 April 2015|archive-date=15 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150415194007/http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/20-turkish-officers-train-iraqi.html|url-status=dead}} Iran, and Hezbollah,{{cite news|last1=Hashem|first1=Ali|title=Iraq's Shiite forces claim victory over IS|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html|access-date=20 March 2015|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=16 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150320044125/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html|archive-date=20 March 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}} including prominent Quds Force figures, such as (until his 2020 death) Qasem Soleimani.{{cite web|title=Analysis 03-06-2015 |url=http://thinktankmonitor.org/analysis-03-06-2015/ |website=Center for American and Arab Studies |access-date=17 March 2015 |date=7 March 2015}} The PMF also appeared to have deployed at least a regiment under the command of Colonel Jumaa al-Jumaily in Al Anbar Governorate.{{cite news |title=Iraqi forces retake region, police station in Anbar|url=http://www.iran-daily.com/News/113939.html |access-date=15 March 2015|work=Iran Daily |date=15 March 2015}} They are also said to have their own military intelligence, administrative systems, a sort of "media war team" that provides morale boosting, battlefield updates and propaganda videos,{{cite journal |last1=Gulmohamad|first1=Zana K.|title=A short profile of Iraq's Shi'a militias |journal=Terrorism Monitor |date=17 April 2015|volume=XIII|issue=8|page=4 |url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43805&cHash=fb0c37346ddcdbab61870c190dda484e |access-date=10 July 2015}} and a court of law.{{cite news|last1=Hendawi|first1=Hamza|last2=Qassim|first2=Abdul-Zahra|title=Fears in Iraqi government, army over Shiite militias' power|url=http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2016/mar/20/fears-in-iraqi-government-army-over-shiite/all/?print|access-date=5 April 2016|work=San Diego Union Tribune|agency=Associated Press|date=20 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160420113310/http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2016/mar/20/fears-in-iraqi-government-army-over-shiite/all/?print|archive-date=20 April 2016|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}

File:PMF with Iranian advisors during Hawija offensive.png advisors during the Hawija offensive (2017)]]

According to a Sunni newspaper, there are three main Shia components within the Popular Mobilization Forces: the first are the groups that were formed following Sistani's fatwa, without political roots or ambitions; the second are groups that were formed by political parties or are initially the military wings of these parties, with definite political characterization; the third is the armed groups that have been present in Iraq for years and have fought battles against US forces and also participated in operations in Syria.

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, the Popular Mobilization Forces are factionally divided into three Shia components: a component pledging allegiance to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei; a faction pledging allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; and the faction headed by Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The most powerful groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces are the groups which maintain strong ties with Iran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The pro-Khamanei faction would consist of already established parties and of relatively small paramilitaries: Saraya Khurasani, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. These groups serve as a kind of border guard—a sort of Iranian insurance policy against threats on its immediate border. Their leaders publicly take pride in such affiliations, professing religious allegiance to Khamenei and his notion of Vilayat al-Faqih.

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the pro-Sistani faction consists of those armed groups formed by Sistani's fatwa to defend Shia holy sites and by paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. There are four major groups organized by Najaf: Saraya al-Ataba al-Abbasiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Hussainiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Alawiya, and Liwa 'Ali al-Akbar, corresponding to Shia holy sites in Kadhimiya, Karbala, and Najaf. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq also swears allegiance to Sistani. After the Badr Organization left the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, its leader Ammar al-Hakim formed new paramilitary units, including Saraya el-Jihad, Saraya el-'Aqida, and Saraya 'Ashura.

Muqtada al-Sadr's Peace Companies (Saraya al-Salam) were founded in June 2014 from the Mahdi Army. According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the Sadrists have largely been cut off from Iranian funding.

According to Shia P.M.F. officials, the recruitment campaign is successful also because it is administered by the religious establishment and Shia religious scholars from the hawza are instrumental in recruitment.{{cite web|last1=Mansour|first1=Renad|title=The Popularity of the Hashd in Iraq|url=http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62638 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160202111318/http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62638 |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 2, 2016 |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|access-date=29 March 2016|date=1 February 2016}} Recruitment via Shia Islamist political party structures and even individual clerics or members of parliament is pursued more the official PMF Commission, which lacks recruitment offices.

In early stages of the PMF, the Shia component was almost exclusive and the Sunni one was negligible since it counted only 1,000 to 3,000 men. In January 2016, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi approved the appointment of 40,000 Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Forces. According to Al-Monitor, his move was decided in order to give a multiconfessional image to the Forces; however, Sunni fighters began to volunteer even before the al-Abadi's decision. Adding Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Units could set the stage for the force to become the core of the envisioned National Guard. According to The Economist, as of late April 2016 the Hashd had approximately 16,000 Sunnis.{{cite news|title=Islamic State in Iraq: The last battle: The long fight to retake Iraq's second-biggest city, Mosul, has begun|url=https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21696951-long-fight-retake-iraqs-second-biggest-city-mosul-has-begun-last|access-date=20 April 2016|newspaper=The Economist |date=16 April 2016}}

It has been observed that the Sunni Arab tribes that took part in al-Hashd al-Shaabi 2015 recruitment are those which also had good relations with Nouri al-Maliki during his tenure as Prime Minister.{{cite book |last1=Duman |first1=Bilgay |title=A new controversial actor in post-ISIS Iraq: al-Hashd al-Shaabi (the Popular Mobilization Forces) |date=May 2015 |page=8 |url=http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/Raporlar/rapor198/198eng.pdf |access-date=18 June 2017 |publisher=ORSAM |isbn=978-605-9157-01-8 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009171411/http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/Raporlar/rapor198/198eng.pdf |archive-date=2017-10-09}}

According to Yazan al-Jabouri, a secular Sunni commander of anti-ISIS Liwa Salahaddin, as of November 2016, there were 30,000 Iraqi Sunnis fighting within the ranks of PMUs.{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/iraqs-good-sunni/|title=Iraq's 'Good Sunni'|first=Nour|last=Samaha|date=16 November 2016 }}

The Turkmen Hashd overall constitute around four thousand members and are called “Brigade 12”.{{Cite web |url=https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/13689.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2020-07-27 |archive-date=2020-08-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200809133738/https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/13689.pdf |url-status=live }}

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, Shia Turkmen joined Popular Mobilization Forces in order to increase their local autonomy from the Kurdistan Region and in order to counter Sunni Turkmen, who joined the Islamic State.

There are also Christian PMF units in the Nineveh plains. The Imam Ali Brigades trained two Christian units called Kata’ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam (Spirit of God, Jesus Son of Mary Brigade) and the Babylon Brigades.{{cite web|title=Who's Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces|url=https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/16/quick-facts-about-local-and-sub-state-forces|access-date=2021-09-12|website=www.gppi.net|language=en-US}} The Babylon Brigades have been described as "psuedo-Christian", as they are led by a Christian commander but are mostly made up of Shabaks and Shia Arabs.{{Cite web |title=Nineveh Plain Protection Units (Iraq) |url=https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/iq%5Enpu.html |access-date=2024-10-12 |website=www.crwflags.com}}{{Cite web |title=Nineveh Plains Christians Defend Against the Babiliyoun Militia {{!}} The Washington Institute |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/nineveh-plains-christians-defend-against-babiliyoun-militia |access-date=2024-10-12 |website=www.washingtoninstitute.org |language=en}} In March 2023 there was a brief clash between the Babylon Brigades and the Assyrians of Qaraqosh after the former attempted to take control of a base belonging to the Nineveh Plains Protection Units.

File:Popular Mobilization Forces during Hawija offensive 2.png during the Hawija offensive in 2017.]]

The equipment of the Popular Mobilization Forces is a major issue. At the end of January 2015, a video showed a large Kata'ib Hezbollah convoy transporting several American-made military vehicles, including an M1 Abrams Tank, M113 armoured personnel carriers, Humvees, and MRAP vehicles as well as Iranian-made Safir 4×4s and technicals with Kata'ib Hezbollah's flags flying.{{cite web|last1=Roggio|first1=Bill|last2=Weiss|first2=Caleb|title=Video shows Hezbollah Brigades convoy transporting American M1 tank |url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/hezbollah_brigades_c.php|website=The Long War Journal|access-date=17 March 2015|date=28 January 2015}} According to some sources, the Iraqi government is supplying U.S.-provided military equipment to the militias.{{cite news|last1=Rogin|first1=Josh|last2=Lake|first2=Eli|title=Iran-Backed Militias Are Getting U.S. Weapons|url=http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-08/iranbacked-militias-are-getting-us-weapons-in-iraq|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108181049/http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-08/iranbacked-militias-are-getting-us-weapons-in-iraq|url-status=dead|archive-date=January 8, 2015|access-date=17 March 2015|work=Bloomberg View}}{{cite news|title=Armed with U.S. weapons, infamous militia beating ISIS|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/news/armed-with-u-s-weapons-ruthless-militia-beating-isis-in-iraq/|access-date=17 March 2015|date=2 February 2015}} Iraqi minister of transportation, and the head of the Badr Organization, Hadi Al-Amiri criticized the U.S. for the lack of providing arms.{{cite news|title="Those Kissed US Hands, Didn't Get Anything": Iraq Shiite Commander|url=http://en.alalam.ir/news/1685165|access-date=17 March 2015|work=Alalam|date=14 March 2015}} On the other hand, U.S. officials argue that the operators of heavy weapons allegedly taken over by Kata'ib Hezbollah were regular Iraqi soldiers who raised the Hezbollah flag merely in solidarity with the militant group, while the same source acknowledged that it is generally difficult to monitor U.S.-made weapons.{{cite news|last1=Missy|first1=Ryan|title=Tracking U.S. weapons grows harder in the fog of Iraq's fragmented war|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tracking-us-weapons-grows-harder-in-the-fog-of-iraqs-fragmented-war/2015/03/26/5d94e7a4-d313-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html|access-date=4 April 2015|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=26 March 2015}}

Alongside U.S.-made military equipment handed over to or fallen into the hands of Popular Mobilization Forces, Iran is a major supplier. According to some sources, in 2014 Tehran sold Baghdad nearly $10 billion worth of weapons and hardware. Furthermore, there is a daily supply of Iranian weapons,{{cite news|last1=Hemdawi|first1=Hamza|last2=Abdul-Zahra|first2=Qassim|title=Iran eclipses U.S. as Iraq's ally in fight against militants|url=http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/01/12/iran-iraq-militants/21623533/|access-date=20 March 2015|work=MilitaryTimes|date=12 January 2015|archive-date=27 October 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161027030019/http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/01/12/iran-iraq-militants/21623533/|url-status=live}} including Iranian-made 106 mm anti-tank guns as well as 120 mm, 82 mm and 60 mm mortars.{{cite web|title=Better pay, better weapons: Are Shiite militias growing more powerful than Iraqi army?|url=http://www.preemptivelove.org/better_pay_better_weapons_are_shiite_militias_growing_more_powerful_than_iraqi_army|publisher=Preemptive Love Coalition|access-date=23 March 2015|date=31 January 2015|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402095749/http://www.preemptivelove.org/better_pay_better_weapons_are_shiite_militias_growing_more_powerful_than_iraqi_army|archive-date=2 April 2015}}

In May 2015, the United States started delivering about $1.6 billion worth of military equipment under the supervision of the Government of Iraq. According to some sources, the major beneficiaries of the weapons deliveries are to be the Popular Mobilization Forces.{{cite news|last1=Enders|first1=David|title=US Starts Sending $1.6 Billion Worth of Promised Arms to Iraq — But Who Will Get Them?|url=https://news.vice.com/topic/popular-mobilization-forces|access-date=21 June 2015|work=Vice News|date=6 June 2015|archive-date=9 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009171128/https://news.vice.com/topic/popular-mobilization-forces|url-status=dead}}

Heavy armour seemed to be operated by Popular Mobilization Forces in the operations surrounding the battle of Mosul.{{cite web|last1=Taylor|first1=Ann|title=The Battle for Mosul Enters Its Final Stage|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2017/06/the-battle-for-mosul-enters-its-final-stage/532032/#img05 |website=The Atlantic|access-date=29 June 2017|date=28 June 2017}}

The Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in several battles of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since their founding, the most important being the Second Battle of Tikrit. After the end of the battle of Tikrit, the complex of occupation forces handed over security issues to local police and security forces.{{cite news|title=Mobilization forces hand over security affairs to local police in Tikrit|url=http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/mobilization-forces-hand-over-security.html|access-date=15 April 2015|agency=Iraq Tradelink News Agency|date=4 April 2015|archive-date=22 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200522005823/http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/04/mobilization-forces-hand-over-security.html|url-status=live}}

On Monday April 6, 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that, while being heavily involved in the conquest of Tikrit, the Popular Mobilization Forces will not join the planned Mosul conquest.{{cite news|title=Iraqi PM Abadi: Shiite militia won't join battle for Mosul|url=http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/07042015|access-date=16 April 2015|agency=Rudaw|date=7 April 2015|archive-date=17 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150417030933/http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/07042015|url-status=live}} This statement was reversed in March 2016, when al-Abadi reportedly rejected calls by Nineveh's provincial council to prohibit Popular Mobilization Forces from taking part in retaking Mosul.{{cite news|last1=Saleh|first1=Ibrahim|title='All Iraqis' can help retake Mosul from Daesh: PM|url=http://aa.com.tr/en/politics/all-iraqis-can-help-retake-mosul-from-daesh-pm/531151|access-date=6 April 2016|agency=Andalou Agency|date=3 March 2016|archive-date=18 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160418082814/http://aa.com.tr/en/politics/all-iraqis-can-help-retake-mosul-from-daesh-pm/531151|url-status=live}}

Shia volunteers reportedly entered Al Anbar Governorate on the first days of May 2015, among heavy protests of Sunnite personalities,{{cite news|title=Shiite volunteers enter Anbar province|url=http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/05/shiite-volunteers-enter-anbar-province.html|access-date=12 May 2015|agency=Iraq TradeLink News Agency|date=6 May 2015|archive-date=15 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150515031754/http://www.iraqtradelinknews.com/2015/05/shiite-volunteers-enter-anbar-province.html|url-status=dead}}{{cite news|last1=Salama|first1=Vivian|title=Iraq militias say they don't need US help in Anbar operation|url=http://uk.businessinsider.com/iraq-militias-say-they-dont-need-us-help-in-anbar-operation-2015-6?r=US|access-date=21 June 2015|work=Business Insider|date=13 June 2015|archive-date=9 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009170612/http://uk.businessinsider.com/iraq-militias-say-they-dont-need-us-help-in-anbar-operation-2015-6?r=US|url-status=live}} with limited operations continuing in 2016.{{cite news|title=Badr Organization: Iraqi Shia popular mobilization forces liberates 21 km in western Anbar|url=http://en.abna24.com/service/middle-east-west-asia/archive/2016/03/07/739377/story.html|access-date=6 April 2016|agency=AhlulBayt News Agency|date=7 March 2016|archive-date=7 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407070328/http://en.abna24.com/service/middle-east-west-asia/archive/2016/03/07/739377/story.html|url-status=live}}

In Autumn 2016, they participated in the Mosul Offensive acting as left flank of the anti-IS forces, and by November had captured a number of smaller towns and villages from IS, expanding roughly along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar, while keeping a distance (20+ km) to the city of Mosul itself.

In October 2017, the PMF was part of the Iraqi government forces that recaptured Kirkuk,{{cite news|title=Iraqi forces push into disputed Kirkuk as Kurds withdraw |url=https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iraqi-kurds-federal-forces-attack-disputed-kirkuk-50502049|access-date=17 October 2017|agency=ABC News|date=16 October 2017|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171017134620/https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iraqi-kurds-federal-forces-attack-disputed-kirkuk-50502049 |archive-date=17 October 2017}} which had been under Kurdish control since 2014.{{cite news|title=Iraqi Kurdish forces take Kirkuk as Isis sets its sights on Baghdad|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/iraq-isis-kirkuk-baghdad-kurdish-government|access-date=17 October 2017|work=The Guardian|date=12 June 2014|archive-date=18 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018191301/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/iraq-isis-kirkuk-baghdad-kurdish-government|url-status=live}}

Khomeinist PMF militia factions loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader have been heavily deployed in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime, often with the stated aim of defending Shi'ite shrines.Phillip Smyth, [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138_Smyth-2.pdf The Shiite Jihad In Syria And Its Regional Effects] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150713052402/https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138_Smyth-2.pdf |date=2015-07-13}}, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Policy Focus 138, 2015 Although at the time of the formation of the PMF, most of its component groups were primarily engaged in Iraq against ISIL, after the reduction of the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq from 2015, many returned to Syria. For instance, in January 2015, pro-Iran Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militant group announced the deaths of two of its fighters in defense of Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus, and the militia's involvement in the 2015 Southern Syria offensive was documented by the Iraqi TV station Al-Anwar 2.{{cite web |author=Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi |title=The Return of Iraqi Shi'i Militias to Syria |website=Middle East Institute |date=2015-03-16 |url=https://www.mei.edu/publications/return-iraqi-shii-militias-syria |access-date=2020-09-28 |archive-date=2020-11-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201107121438/https://www.mei.edu/publications/return-iraqi-shii-militias-syria |url-status=live}} Between 2013 and early 2016, 1,200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria, including combatants of pro-Iran militias Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, among them senior commanders Abu al-Fadl and Abu Haider al-Nazari.{{cite web |author=The New Arab |title=Bodies of Iraqis killed in Syria received in Baghdad |website=Al Araby |date=2016-02-02 |url=https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/2/2/bodies-of-iraqis-killed-in-syria-received-in-baghdad |access-date=2020-09-28 |archive-date=2020-08-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200802175224/https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/2/2/bodies-of-iraqis-killed-in-syria-received-in-baghdad |url-status=live}}

On the other hand, pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF militias wary of Iranian influence in Iraq are strongly opposed to the intervention in Syria and have been resisting recruitment attempts made by pro-Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on the side of Assad regime.

Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the forces of the PMF, is listed by Japan's Public Security Intelligence Agency as a terrorist organization.{{cite web|url=http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/ITH/organizations/ME_N-africa/KH.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190302123316/http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/ITH/organizations/ME_N-africa/KH.html|archive-date=2019-03-02|title=カタイブ・ヒズボラ（KH） | 国際テロリズム要覧（Web版） | 公安調査庁|date=March 2, 2019}} The United Arab Emirates also classifies it as terrorist.{{cite web|url=http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates-arab-international/1395272465559.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141117230142/http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates-arab-international/1395272465559.html|archive-date=2014-11-17|title=مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية. | WAM|date=November 17, 2014}} Kata'ib Hezbollah was designated a terrorist entity in 2009 by the United States.{{cite web | last = Lawrence | first = John | date = 26 May 2015 | title = Iraq Situation Report: May 23–25, 2015 | url = http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-report-may-23-25-2015 | website = understandingwar.org | publisher = Institute for the Study of War | access-date = 27 May 2015 | archive-date = 3 January 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200103082720/http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-report-may-23-25-2015 | url-status = live }} See paragraph 5 of the report. Its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was also designated a terrorist.{{cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx|title=Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq|website=www.treasury.gov|access-date=2020-01-07|archive-date=2020-01-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200107021240/https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx|url-status=live}} In March 2019, U.S. designated Harakat al-Nujaba and its leader Akram al-Ka'abi Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). In 2020, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, a powerful Iran-backed militia, part of the PMF, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.{{cite web|date=January 3, 2020|title=U.S. to designate Iran-backed Iraqi militia as foreign terrorist organization|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-designation-idUSKBN1Z220Y|url-status=live|website=Reuters|access-date=December 12, 2021|archive-date=December 12, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211212235002/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-designation-idUSKBN1Z220Y}} In November 2023, U.S. added PMF militia Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.{{Cite web |date=November 17, 2023 |title=US designates Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, officer as specially designated global terrorists -statement |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-designates-kataib-sayyid-al-shuhada-officer-specially-designated-global-2023-11-17/ |website=Reuters}} In June 2024, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya was designated as a terrorist organization, following several attacks on U.S. bases in the region including the Tower 22 drone attack.{{cite web |url=https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-harakat-ansar-allah-al-awfiya/ |title=Terrorist Designation of Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya |publisher=U.S. Department of State |date=17 June 2024 }}

During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, which called for the end of the sectarian political system, some militias associated with PMF took part in violently suppressing the protests by using live bullets, marksmen, hot water, hot pepper gas and tear gas against protesters, leading to over 1,000 deaths and over 30,000 injuries.{{Cite news|last=Arraf|first=Jane|date=2021-09-18|title='There Is Chaos': Iran-Backed Militias Battle Activists in a Holy Iraqi City|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iraq-karbala-iran-militias.html|access-date=2021-11-10|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=2021-11-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211109122915/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iraq-karbala-iran-militias.html|url-status=live}}{{Cite news|date=2019-10-17|title=Exclusive: Iran-backed militias deployed snipers in Iraq protests – sources|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-iran-snipers-exclusive-idUSKBN1WW0B1|access-date=2021-11-10|archive-date=2021-10-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211019224640/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-iran-snipers-exclusive-idUSKBN1WW0B1|url-status=live}}{{cite web|date=2019-12-05|title=Pro-Iran militia supporters converge on Baghdad protests|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/05/pro-iran-militia-supporters-converge-on-baghdad-protests|access-date=2021-11-10|website=the Guardian|language=en|archive-date=2021-10-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020014505/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/05/pro-iran-militia-supporters-converge-on-baghdad-protests|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Iraq: HRW denounces lethal force against protesters, urges probe|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/10/iraq-hrw-denounces-lethal-force-against-protesters-urges-probe|access-date=2021-11-10|website=www.aljazeera.com|language=en|archive-date=2021-10-31|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211031102524/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/10/iraq-hrw-denounces-lethal-force-against-protesters-urges-probe|url-status=live}}

Some of the militias constituting the Popular Mobilization Forces have been accused of war crimes motivated by sectarian revenge. According to Amnesty International in 2014, Shia militias have abducted, tortured and killed numerous Sunni civilians{{cite news|title=Iraqi Shia militias accused of murder spree|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/10/iraq-shia-fighters-guilty-war-crimes-2014101311251478369.html|access-date=16 March 2015|work=Al-Jazeera|date=14 October 2014|archive-date=22 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200522012125/https://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/10/iraq-shia-fighters-guilty-war-crimes-2014101311251478369.html|url-status=live}} and, according to Western sources, in Tikrit militants have committed some violence, while being publicly praised; In the wake of the conquest of Tikrit, Iraqi authorities declared that war crimes would be investigated and their perpetrators punished.

High Shia authorities, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Ayatollah Hussein Al-Sadr, called on the militants in the PMF to refrain from war crimes or other despicable behaviour.{{cite news|last1=Mamouri|first1=Ali|title=Iraq needs justice, not revenge|url=http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/news/id_10194/Iraq-needs-justice,-not-revenge.html|access-date=15 March 2015|work=The Arab American News|date=12 March 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150315082046/http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/news/id_10194/Iraq-needs-justice,-not-revenge.html|archive-date=15 March 2015}} In 2015, ad hoc government inquiry committees were established to investigate civilian deaths attributed to the militias.{{cite news|title=Iraq's PM Abadi Orders Probe Into Two Civilian Deaths at Anbar Security HQ|url=http://canadaheadline.com/world-news/asia/149-iraq-s-pm-abadi-orders-probe-into-two-civilian-deaths-at-anbar-security-hq|access-date=15 March 2015|work=Canada Headlines|date=13 February 2015|archive-date=5 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150405013632/http://canadaheadline.com/world-news/asia/149-iraq-s-pm-abadi-orders-probe-into-two-civilian-deaths-at-anbar-security-hq|url-status=live}}

In 2016, Mosul Sunni dignitaries and officials accused the PMF of killings of Sunnis, takeovers of schools and forcing Sunnis to sell property in the prime real estate area close to the Mosul shrine. According to City council's deputy chairman Muzher Fleih, 650 Sunnis have disappeared. Militia leaders insist any abuses are isolated incidents, and target only captured Islamic State's collaborators.{{cite web|url=https://nypost.com/2016/06/21/isis-cross-dressers-busted-trying-to-escape-fallujah/|title=ISIS cross-dressers busted trying to escape Fallujah|publisher=Fox News|date=21 June 2016|via=NY Post}}

Alongside war crimes accusations, concerns regarding the constitutionality and politicization of al-Hashd al-Shaabi have been raised. Sunni sources have called for depoliticization of the Popular Mobilization Forces, to be achieved under the proposed National Guard bill. According to some critics in 2015, the Popular Mobilization Forces were not sanctioned by the Constitution of Iraq and nonetheless had a budget and were paid on regular basis by the Iraqi government, whilst the legally established Peshmerga had not received their wages.{{cite web|last1=Farhadi|first1=Imad|title=The Constitutionality of the Popular Mobilization Force|url=https://menainformer.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/the-constitutionality-of-the-popular-mobilization-force/|website=The MENA Informer|access-date=31 March 2015|date=24 March 2015|archive-date=2 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402205836/https://menainformer.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/the-constitutionality-of-the-popular-mobilization-force/|url-status=live}}{{cite news|title=Shiite "Popular Mobilization" is unconstitutional|url=http://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/8EF79FCE3C546F61E02187FF98D68916/Shiite-Popular-Mobilization-is-unconstitutional-.html|access-date=31 March 2015|work=KurdishGlobe|date=2 February 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403223418/http://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/8EF79FCE3C546F61E02187FF98D68916/Shiite-Popular-Mobilization-is-unconstitutional-.html|archive-date=3 April 2015}} The official status and actual dependence of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Baghdad government and its help was not fully resolved as of late 2015.{{cite web|last1=Mansour|first1=Renad|title=From Militia to State Force: the Transformation of al-Hashd al-Shaabi|url=http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61986|publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|access-date=29 March 2016|date=16 November 2015|archive-date=14 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160314084107/http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61986|url-status=dead}} However, by the end of 2016, a law was passed bringing the PMU under the auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Iraqi National Army, incorporating PMF units into the official army of Iraq and removing any official affiliation with any social, religious or political group.

Recruitment of Yazidis in Kurdish areas has been deemed to go against official Kurdish policy against the move: in February 2015, Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani asked the Peshmerga minister to stop all militia activities in the area.

Allegedly, clerics from the Najaf Seminary, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also criticized the monopolistic conduct of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.{{cite web |last1=Mansour |first1=Renad |last2=Jabar |first2=Faleh A. |title=The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future |url=http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810 |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |website=Carnegie Middle East Center |access-date=24 June 2017 |date=28 April 2017 |archive-date=4 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200604184741/https://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810 |url-status=live }}

The Popular Mobilization Forces are accused of accruing a power base in Iraq and of being Iran's instrument to dominate Iraq.{{cite news | title=Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran's Intrigue, Built a Shiite Axis of Power in Mideast | website=The New York Times | date=2020-01-03 | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/obituaries/qassem-soleimani-dead.html | access-date=2020-09-28 | archive-date=2020-09-27 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200927233811/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/obituaries/qassem-soleimani-dead.html | url-status=live }} The main fears are that the permanent militia would turn themselves into enforcers of Shia domination. The Iraqi Police headquarters in the Muthanna Governorate announced that they were in the process of commissioning Popular Mobilization battalions with security tasks in early January 2016. These tasks included protecting public and private establishments in open desert areas, among others. Other reports indicate that Popular Mobilization is securing border outlets and controlling security in liberated cities.{{cite web|title=Is the influence of Iraq's popular mobilization forces growing?|url=http://www.rcssmideast.org/en/Article/10598/Is-the-influence-of-Iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-growing#.VwQABjEpq90|website=The Regional Center for Strategic Studies Cairo|access-date=5 April 2016|date=13 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170309062546/http://www.rcssmideast.org/en/Article/10598/Is-the-influence-of-Iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-growing#.VwQABjEpq90|archive-date=9 March 2017|url-status=dead}}

According to General Ali Omran, commander of the army's 5th Infantry Division, P.M.F. militias are too entrenched in politics and at risk of "coming to blows" with the Armed Forces. In February 2016, militiamen refused orders to vacate a building in a military base north of Baghdad.

According to AP-interviewed government officials and militia leaders, due to the fear of a return to Sunni minority rule over the Iraqi Shia majority, PMF militias want to remain a permanent, independent armed force; Hamed al-Jazaeery, head of the al-Khorasani Brigades militia, stated that the model is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In 2016, Commander of the CJTF-OIR Lt Gen. Stephen J. Townsend described the PMF as "remarkably disciplined" allies since he arrived. He added that the PMF could make Iraq more secure—if they become a national guard-like force, and not a "puppet" of Iran.{{cite news|url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/25/top-u-s-general-two-more-years-to-beat-isis|title=Top U.S. General: Two More Years to Beat ISIS|first=Kimberly|last=Dozier|date=26 December 2016|access-date=17 November 2017|work=The Daily Beast|archive-date=19 May 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519061449/http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/25/top-u-s-general-two-more-years-to-beat-isis|url-status=live}}

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, a member of the PMF, stated that their forces were bombed by US planes on 7 August 2017, in Al Anbar Governorate near the Iraq–Syria border and that Hashd al-Shaabi forces suffered many casualties.{{Cite web |url=http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/070820172 |title=Archived copy |access-date=2018-02-13 |archive-date=2019-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190830111503/http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/070820172 |url-status=live }} The Baghdad-based spokesman of the U.S.-led coalition, Army Col. Ryan Dillon, dismissed the allegation, saying on Twitter that no coalition airstrikes took place in the area at the time. According to the militia's deputy, Ahmed al-Maksousi, they were hit by artillery fire in Syria's Jamouna area, about 12 kilometers (about 7.5 miles) from the Iraqi border. Along with 40 killed, many militiamen were wounded, al-Maksousi added.{{cite web|url=http://waarmedia.com/english/iraqi-shiite-militia-says-40-fighters-killed-syria/|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200428230537/http://waarmedia.com/english/iraqi-shiite-militia-says-40-fighters-killed-syria/|archive-date = 2020-04-28|title = WAAR Media}}

On 22 August 2019, The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), blamed the United States and Israel for a number of bombings on their warehouses and bases. The group accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces for executing attacks on Iraqi territory. The group pledged to counter any attack in the future.{{cite web|url=https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/37f6b699-af89-4128-9353-13a6f13ccf5e|title=Iran-backed militias blame US for strikes on arms depots in Iraq|access-date=22 August 2019|publisher=KURDISTAN24|archive-date=21 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200521141430/https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/37f6b699-af89-4128-9353-13a6f13ccf5e|url-status=live}} On 23 August, a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri called for attacks against US troops in Iraq, "the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden (haram) under any title: military training, advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism".{{cite news |last1=Mamouri |first1=Ali |title=Will Iran-backed factions attack US troops in Iraq? |url=https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/iraq-us-israel-pmu.html |access-date=30 August 2019 |date=28 August 2019 |work=Al-Monitor |archive-date=2 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191102134802/https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/iraq-us-israel-pmu.html |url-status=live }}

On 29 December 2019, the United States bombed the headquarters of PMF member Kata'ib Hezbollah near Al-Qa'im, killing 25 militiamen.{{cite web|date=30 December 2019|title=US airstrikes in Iraq anger Baghdad government|url=https://www.dw.com/en/us-airstrikes-in-iraq-anger-baghdad-government/av-51841608|url-status=live|website=DW|access-date=14 December 2021|archive-date=14 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211214125555/https://www.dw.com/en/us-airstrikes-in-iraq-anger-baghdad-government/av-51841608}}

On 3 January 2020, PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, PMF PR head Mohammed Redha al-Jabri,{{cite web|url=https://www.newsweek.com/iraq-militia-official-killed-us-iran-tensions-1480181|title=Trump orders U.S. drone strike killing Iranian general who had "plans to attack" American diplomats and military|first1=Tom|last1=O'Connor|first2=James LaPorta On 1/2/20 at 7:34 PM|last2=EST|date=January 2, 2020|website=Newsweek|access-date=January 7, 2020|archive-date=January 3, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200103030530/https://www.newsweek.com/iraq-militia-official-killed-us-iran-tensions-1480181|url-status=live}} and the Quds Force head, Qasem Soleimani, were among those killed in an assassination near Baghdad Airport.{{Cite web |url=https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-01-02/irans-soleimani-and-iraqs-muhandis-killed-in-air-strike-militia-spokesman |title=Archived copy |access-date=2020-01-03 |archive-date=2020-01-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200107072107/https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-01-02/irans-soleimani-and-iraqs-muhandis-killed-in-air-strike-militia-spokesman |url-status=live }}{{cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-quds-force-head-qassem-soleimani-killed-in-baghdad-strike-iraqi-tv/|title=US kills powerful Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad airstrike|website=www.timesofisrael.com|access-date=Jan 4, 2020|archive-date=January 3, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200103051222/https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-quds-force-head-qassem-soleimani-killed-in-baghdad-strike-iraqi-tv/|url-status=live}}

On 12 March 2020, the U.S. launched air raids against five Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases across Iraq in retaliation for the 2020 Camp Taji attacks.{{Cite news |date=13 March 2020 |title=Iraq base attack: US in retaliatory strikes on Iran-backed fighters |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51865489 |access-date=14 January 2023 |archive-date=14 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230114002634/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51865489 |url-status=live }}

On 25 February 2021, a U.S. air raid killed one and wounded four while targeting PMF facilities on the Iraqi-Syrian border in Syria's eastern Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The facilities were used by PMF forces combatting ISIL in collaboration with the Iraqi and Syrian governments. U.S. officials described the PMF as an "Iranian-backed militia" and the air strike as a retaliation for purported Iranian military aggression against U.S. facilities in Iraq, while Iranian officials denied involvement. Iraqi officials repudiated any connection between the PMF and the insurgents who previously attacked U.S. facilities.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}} The Pentagon asserted that the air raid followed consultation with the Iraqi government and other partners in the region,{{cite web|url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/02/26/syria-bombing-biden-airstrikes-mark-test-us-role-worlds-police/6831034002/|title=Biden's airstrikes are first test of role as world's police|website=USA Today|date=26 February 2021|access-date=February 26, 2021|author=Hjelmgaard, Kim|archive-date=26 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226164929/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/02/26/syria-bombing-biden-airstrikes-mark-test-us-role-worlds-police/6831034002/|url-status=live}} but the Iraqi military denied providing the U.S. with information regarding locations within Syria.{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-syria-strike-iraq-int/after-syria-air-strikes-iraq-military-denies-exchanging-information-with-us-idUSKBN2AQ29Q|title=After Syria air strikes, Iraq military denies exchanging information with U.S.|website=Reuters|date=26 February 2021|access-date=February 26, 2021|archive-date=26 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226195101/https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-syria-strike-iraq-int/after-syria-air-strikes-iraq-military-denies-exchanging-information-with-us-idUSKBN2AQ29Q|url-status=live}}

On 27 June 2021, U.S. forces bombed two locations after an increase in drone attacks. One location was a drone-making facility and the other a conventional weapons exchange depot. Four members of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada faction were claimed to have been killed in the action.{{cite web |url= https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-carries-out-air-strikes-against-iran-backed-militia-iraq-syria-2021-06-27/ |title= U.S. warplanes strike Iran-backed militia in Iraq, Syria |publisher= Reuters |date= 27 June 2021 |access-date= June 28, 2021 |archive-date= 2021-11-01 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20211101150552/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-carries-out-air-strikes-against-iran-backed-militia-iraq-syria-2021-06-27/ |url-status= live }}

On 4 January 2024, U.S. airstrikes on PMF's logistical headquarters killed two people, including the organization's deputy head of operations in Baghdad, Mushtaq Talib al-Saeedi, and wounded five others.{{Cite web |last= |first= |title=Airstrike in Baghdad kills Iran-backed militia leader as regional tensions escalate |url=https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/airstrike-central-baghdad-kills-iran-backed-militia-leader-106095625 |access-date=2024-01-04 |website=ABC News |language=en}}

On 2 February 2024, U.S. airstrikes targeted the headquarters of the PMF in Akashat in Anbar Governorate, killing 16 fighters and wounding 25.{{cite news |date=2 February 2024 |title=America launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria in response to the Jordanian attack |url=https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1690378-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%86-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%94%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240202213608/https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1690378-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%86-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%94%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86 |archive-date=2 February 2024 |access-date=2 February 2024 |publisher=Sky News Arabia |language=Arabic}}{{cite news |date=3 February 2024 |title=16 martyrs and 25 wounded.. The Popular Mobilization Forces reveals the death toll of the American raids |url=https://almorageb.com/lifestyle/16-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%8825-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240204042552/https://almorageb.com/lifestyle/16-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%8825-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9/ |archive-date=4 February 2024 |access-date=3 February 2024 |publisher=almorageb |language=Arabic}}

In March 2025, the Iraqi parliament introduced a draft law aimed at reforming the PMF and more fully integrating them into the state security apparatus. A central provision of the proposed legislation is the formal subordination of the PMF to the authority of the Iraqi Prime Minister, who serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces - explicitly distancing the group from external influence, particularly from Iran. The bill also includes measures such as a mandatory retirement age for senior commanders, which could lead to the replacement of key figures with longstanding ties to Tehran. The initiative reflects growing U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government to assert national control over the PMF and curb Iranian influence within its ranks. In contrast, the close relationship between PMF leadership and Iran was underscored by a February 2025 visit by PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh to senior Iranian officials - a move widely interpreted as an attempt to rally support from Tehran against the proposed legislation, especially among hardline factions that often operate with considerable autonomy.{{Cite web |title=Iraq advances PMF law amid US calls for greater control over the force |url=https://www.rudaw.net/notfound.html |access-date=2025-03-25 |website=www.rudaw.net}}

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