Pukguksong-1

In 2015, the missile was first launched with a liquid-fueled engine. Later, North Korea replaced the liquid-fueled engine with a solid-fueled one for later test fires.{{cite web|url=https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20160424000451315|title=(LEAD) N. Korea claims successful launch of SLBM|date=24 April 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=Yonhap News Agency}}

According to German analyst Norbert Brügge, the earlier launches, conducted from a barge, did not feature grid fins, while the later submarine launched missiles did. The difference between the Pukguksong-1 and the Pukguksong-3 are the missile diameter, with the -1 being about {{convert|1.1|m|ft}} in diameter, while the -3 is about {{convert|1.4|m|ft}}, like the Pukguksong-2, an older model Pukguksong-3 also exist, with a similar pointed nose cone.{{Cite web|title=Pukguksong-1 SLBM|url=https://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong-1_SLBM/index.htm|website=www.b14643.eu|access-date=2025-02-06}}

The missile's range is estimated to be {{convert|500-2500|km|abbr=on}}.{{cite web|author=David Wright|url=https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/range-of-the-north-korean-kn-11-sub-launched-missile/|title=Range of the North Korean KN-11 Sub-Launched Missile|website=Union of Concerned Scientists|date=30 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06}}{{cite web|author=Tian Xiaohui|url=http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-02/13/c_136052998.htm|title=S. Korea confirms DPRK's development of new missile|website=Xinhua News Agency|date=26 April 2016|access-date=2025-02-06}}{{cite web|url=https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20160426010900315|title=(News Focus) S. Korea building up anti-submarine defense amid North's SLBM advances|date=26 April 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=Yonhap News Agency}}

The Pukguksong-1 is claimed to have two variants: one is the land-based road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile Pukguksong-2, and the other, according to Norbert Brügge, is an SLBM first tested in 2021, later identified as Hwasong-11S.{{Cite web|title=PS-1 mod|url=https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong-1mod_SLBM/index.htm|access-date=2025-01-03|website=www.b14643.eu}}{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nk-idUSKBN15R10O|title=New nuclear-capable missile test a success, North Korea says|date=14 February 2017|newspaper=Reuters|last1=Park|first1=Ju-min|access-date=2025-06-11}}{{Cite web|title=The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database|url=https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx|access-date=2025-06-07|website=Nuclear Threat Initiative}}

{{See also|Hwasong-11A|Hwasong-11B}}

The Hwasong-11A (KN-23), which is usually reported as an Iskander clone{{Cite web|title=KN-23|url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-23/|access-date=2021-10-21|website=Missile Threat|language=en-US}} likely uses a Pukguksong-1 solid fuel motor with a different nozzle. Compared to the Iskander, it is noticeably wider and larger; it likely has the same {{convert|1.1|m|ft}} diameter as the Pukguksong-1 and thus shares the engine.{{Cite web|title=Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3|url=http://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_GLBM-2/index.htm|access-date=2021-10-21|website=www.b14643.eu}}{{Cite web|title=Overview of Iskander-like missiles|url=http://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Iskander-like_missiles/index.htm|access-date=2021-10-21|website=www.b14643.eu}} Similarly, while the Hwasong-11B (KN-24) is similar to the MGM-140 ATACMS, it is much larger than it with a {{convert|1.1|m|ft}} diameter; it is thus likely to be similar to the Pukguksong-1, but having only one stage.{{Cite web|title=Pukguksong GLBM-1|url=http://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_GLBM-1/index.htm|website=www.b14643.eu|access-date=2025-02-06}}

The motors, at around {{convert|1.1|m|ft}} in diameter, used in these missiles likely derive from the solid fuel motors of the Soviet RT-15, possibly originally acquired for scrap. The casing is made of an unknown metal and the nozzle is likely made from carbon fibre composites, which have been displayed on television.{{Cite web|title=North Korea's solid-fuel rocket motor "PS110"|url=http://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/North-Korean_solid-fuel_motor/index.htm|website=www.b14643.eu|access-date=2025-02-06}}

As of 2019, there have been no further flight tests.{{cite news |url=https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiepen090619/ |title=Cutting Through the Hype About the North Korean Ballistic Missile Submarine Threat |author=Vann H. Van Diepen |publisher=The Henry L. Stimson Center |work=38 North |date=6 September 2019 |access-date=15 September 2019}}

The Pukguksong-1 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. It is thought that the country needs more time to develop submarines for reliably deploying weapons like the Pukguksong-1 missile.{{cite web |title=North Korea test-fired ballistic missile from submarine, South Korea says |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/north-korea-test-fired-ballistic-missile-from-submarine-south-korea-says |website=PBS NewsHour |language=en-us |date=7 May 2022|access-date=2025-02-06}} "The North in recent years has been developing and testing a family of missiles named Pukguksong, which are designed to be fired from submarines or land vehicles. Still experts say the heavily sanctioned nation would need considerably more time, resources and major technological improvements to build at least several submarines that could travel quietly in seas and reliably execute strikes."

Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan on a "suicide mission" to fire the Pukguksong-1 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force.

A more likely scenario would be deployment along the Korean coastline within North Korean local air and surface cover and silent movement into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before achievement of a pre-designated position, with quiet submerged operation on battery power; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

A land based, mobile derivative of the Pukguksong-1 would significantly complicate U.S, Japan and South Korean defenses. Unlike the liquid fueled Rodong or SCUD derivatives, the solid fueled Pukguksong-1 can be fired at a much shorter notification time.{{cite web|author=Jeffrey Lewis|url=https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201857/kn-11-and-thaad/|title=KN-11 and THAAD|date=28 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06}} The North Korean have since achieved this with the Pukguksong-2, a land-based, mobile derivative of the Pukguksong-1 first tested on 12 February 2017.

On 24 August 2016 at around 5:30 am (Pyongyang Standard Time), North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1 as the missile flew {{cvt|500|km|abbr=on}} into Japan's ADIZ without issue. Unlike the recent successful Hwasong-10 flight, KCNA did not officially announce the test until a day later, calling it a great success on the part of Kim Jong Un. The entire development has since been published worldwide.{{cite web|author=Đăng Khoa|url=https://plo.vn/trieu-tien-phong-ten-lua-dan-dao-tu-tau-ngam-ve-huong-nhat-post402683.html|title=Triều Tiên phóng tên lửa đạn đạo từ tàu ngầm về hướng Nhật|trans-title=North Korea fired SLBM toward Japan|date=24 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=PLO|language=vi}}{{cite web|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-koreas-leader-kim-jong-un-says-latest-missile-test-was-greatest-success-kcna|title=North Korean leader Kim Jong Un says latest missile test was greatest success: KCNA|date=25 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=The Straits Times}}

In light of recent development of the Pukguksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukguksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory. This is without confirmation of the actual apogee, and therefore the range could have been at least {{cvt|1000|km|abbr=on}} or more had the missile launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017. Hawkish forces in South Korea have renewed calls for South Korea to construct nuclear submarines to counter North Korea's 'provocation'.{{cite web|url=https://www.koreaherald.com/article/1068277|title=Saenuri hawks renew call for nuclear submarine after NK SLBM launch|date=29 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=The Korea Herald}}

However, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University rejected South Korean claims that the Pukguksong-1 could be operationally deployed before 2017, suggesting its initial operational capability will not be achieved before June 2018. Specifically, North Korea still faces significant technological challenges, including building a new class of submarine to carry three such missiles at once.{{cite web|url=http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-korea-submarine-missiles-not-ready-until-2018-experts|title=North Korea submarine missiles not ready until 2018: Experts|date=27 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=The Straits Times}}

On 30 August 2016, David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, suggested that the apogee achieved by this test was {{cvt|550|km|abbr=on}} and the range would have been {{cvt|1250|km|abbr=on}}, assuming the same payload on standard trajectory.

On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), since recommends that South Korea deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea's firing a Pukguksong-1 outside its 120-degree field of vision. However, Lewis also stressed that it does little to address the possibility of lofted attack, because the missile's reentry in lofted trajectory will be at very high speeds and at a very steep angle, the ability of THAAD interception depending on the missile range. He also noted that THAAD was never field tested against an intermediate-range target or on an unusual angle of attack. With this in mind, he ended by suggesting it is time to use diplomatic measures for dissuading North Korea from enhancing such capabilities and defense measures. This is a very ineffective strategy, since North Korea has the ability to use numerous counter-measures for every measures the US and South Korea have.{{cite web|url=https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20160830000200315|title=Two THAAD batteries necessary for S. Korea to better defend against N.K. SLBMs: U.S. expert|date=30 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=Yonhap News Agency}}{{cite web|url=https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/759284.html|title=US expert says THAAD can’t intercept North Korea’s SLBM|date=31 August 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=The Hankyoreh}}

On 3 September 2016, US expert Bruce Bechtol, a North Korea expert at Angelo State University, and another South Korean national security researcher, Shin Jong-woo, claimed that China must have provided North Korea with the relevant SLBM technologies, since it took a mere 4 months from the first successful cold launch test (23 April 2016) to the first complete test (24 August 2016) and further claimed that the Pukguksong-1 is a carbon-copy of first China's first SLBM, JL-1. In comparison, China took 15 years to develop JL-1. Bruce Bechtol also stated his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute. However, Dave Schmerler of the James Martin Center of Non Proliferation Studies noted that the North Korean missile used a single engine design (the JL-1 used four engines) and grid fins for flight stability, features not found on the Chinese JL-1, and urged caution in jumping to conclusions. He added that the single-engine design had more in common with the Iranian Sejjil MRBM than the JL-1.{{cite web|url=https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=121571|title=Experts Suspect Chinese Assistance in N. Korean Submarine Missile Development|website=Korean Broadcasting System English|date=3 September 2016|access-date=2025-02-06}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-did-we-learn-from-north-koreas-latest-kn-11-test/|title = What did we learn from North Korea's latest KN-11 test?|website=NK Pro|date = 5 September 2016|access-date=2025-02-06}}

On 5 September 2016, the Chinese media refuted the report by citing that the People's Republic of China as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state and stating that one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council would never proliferate by providing or selling nuclear and missile-related technologies to North Korea.{{efn|The actual excerpts are as follows: 作为联合国安理会常任理事国、《核不扩散条约》缔约国，中国绝对不会向朝鲜提供或者出售与核武器和弹道导弹相关的装备和技术。}} This report also states that some US experts and think-tanks have all along been irresponsible in making defamatory statements about China, as they unreasonably link North Korea's nuclear capability to China and have sought to use media influence to pressure China. This report does not contain actual evidence of supposed proliferation on China's part.{{efn|The actual excerpts read as follows: 一些美国媒体和智库一向很擅长将朝鲜的涉核问题与中国进行无端挂钩，就是希望通过这种方式向中国施压，而这些说法通常没有任何证据，是很不负责任的。}}{{cite web|url=https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-09-05/doc-ifxvqctu6221169.shtml|title=韩媒妄称朝潜射导弹与巨浪1完全一样 我军专家驳斥|trans-title=South Korean media thinking that the North Korean SLBM is the exact carbon copy of Julang-1 - China military experts refute|date=5 September 2016|access-date=2025-02-06|website=Sina News|language=zh}}

• {{lwc|Sagarika (missile)|Sagarika}}
• {{lwc|JL-1}}
• {{lwc|M1 (missile)|M1}}
• {{lwc|R-27 (ballistic missile)|R-27}} – (Soviet Union)

{{Notelist|group=efn}}

{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}

• [http://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-11/ CSIS Missile Threat - Pukguksong-1 (KN-11)]
• [https://rpubs.com/alex-lev/269151 Estimating KN-11 range and reliability, applying Bayesian model) ]

{{DPRK missiles}}

Category:Ballistic missiles of North Korea

Category:Submarine-launched ballistic missiles of North Korea