Template:Game theory
{{Navbox with collapsible groups
| name = Game theory
| title = Game theory
| state = {{{state|uncollapsed}}}
| bodyclass = hlist
| selected = {{{selected|{{{1|}}}}}}}
| above =
| abbr1 = traditional
| section1 = Traditional game theory
| list1 = {{Navbox|child
| group1 = Definitions
| list1 =
- Asynchrony
- Bayesian regret
- Best response
- Bounded rationality
- Cheap talk
- Coalition
- Complete contract
- Complete information
- Complete mixing
- Confrontation analysis
- Conjectural variation
- Contingent cooperator
- Coopetition
- Cooperative game theory
- Dynamic inconsistency
- Escalation of commitment
- Farsightedness
- Game semantics
- Hierarchy of beliefs
- Imperfect information
- Incomplete information
- Information set
- Move by nature
- Mutual knowledge
- Non-cooperative game theory
- Non-credible threat
- Outcome
- Perfect information
- Perfect recall
- Ply
- Preference
- Rationality
- Sequential game
- Simultaneous action selection
- Spite
- Strategic complements
- Strategic dominance
- Strategic form
- Strategic interaction
- Strategic move
- Strategy
- Subgame
- Succinct game
- Topological game
- Tragedy of the commons
- Uncorrelated asymmetry
| group2 = Equilibrium
concepts
| list2 =
- Backward induction
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- Bayesian efficiency
- Bayesian game
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Berge equilibrium
- Bertrand–Edgeworth model
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Core
- Correlated equilibrium
- Cursed equilibrium
- Edgeworth price cycle
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Gibbs equilibrium
- Incomplete contracts
- Inequity aversion
- Individual rationality
- Iterated elimination of dominated strategies
- Markov perfect equilibrium
- Mertens-stable equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium
- Open-loop model
- Pareto efficiency
- Payoff dominance
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Price of anarchy
- Program equilibrium
- Proper equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Rational agent
- Rationalizability
- Rationalizable strategy
- Satisfaction equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
- Shapley value
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
- Trembling hand equilibrium
| group3 = Strategies
| list3 =
- Appeasement
- Bid shading
- Cheap talk
- Collusion
- Commitment device
- De-escalation
- Deterrence
- Escalation
- Fictitious play
- Focal point
- Grim trigger
- Hobbesian trap
- Markov strategy
- Max-dominated strategy
- Mixed strategy
- Pure strategy
- Tit for tat
- Win–stay, lose–switch
| group4 = Games
| list4 =
- All-pay auction
- Battle of the sexes
- Nash bargaining game
- Bertrand competition
- Blotto game
- Centipede game
- Coordination game
- Cournot competition
- Deadlock
- Dictator game
- Trust game
- Diner's dilemma
- Dollar auction
- El Farol Bar problem
- Electronic mail game
- Gift-exchange game
- Guess 2/3 of the average
- Keynesian beauty contest
- Kuhn poker
- Lewis signaling game
- Matching pennies
- Obligationes
- Optional prisoner's dilemma
- Pirate game
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Public goods game
- Rendezvous problem
- Rock paper scissors
- Stackelberg competition
- Stag hunt
- Traveler's dilemma
- Ultimatum game
- Volunteer's dilemma
- War of attrition
| group5 = Theorems
| list5 =
- Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Aumann's agreement theorem
- Brouwer fixed-point theorem
- Competitive altruism
- Folk theorem
- Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
- Gibbs lemma
- Glicksberg's theorem
- Kakutani fixed-point theorem
- Kuhn's theorem
- One-shot deviation principle
- Prim–Read theory
- Rational ignorance
- Rational irrationality
- Sperner's lemma
- Zermelo's theorem
| group6 = Subfields
| list6 =
- Algorithmic game theory
- Behavioral game theory
- Behavioral strategy
- Compositional game theory
- Contract theory
- Drama theory
- Graphical game theory
- Heresthetic
- Mean-field game theory
- Negotiation theory
- Quantum game theory
- Social software
| group7 =Key people
| list7 =
- Albert W. Tucker
- Alvin E. Roth
- Amos Tversky
- Antoine Augustin Cournot
- Ariel Rubinstein
- David Gale
- David K. Levine
- David M. Kreps
- Donald B. Gillies
- Drew Fudenberg
- Eric Maskin
- Harold W. Kuhn
- Herbert Simon
- Herbert Scarf
- Hervé Moulin
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-François Mertens
- Jennifer Tour Chayes
- Ken Binmore
- Kenneth Arrow
- Leonid Hurwicz
- Lloyd Shapley
- Martin Shubik
- Melvin Dresher
- Merrill M. Flood
- Olga Bondareva
- Oskar Morgenstern
- Paul Milgrom
- Peyton Young
- Reinhard Selten
- Robert Aumann
- Robert Axelrod
- Robert B. Wilson
- Roger Myerson
- Samuel Bowles
- Suzanne Scotchmer
- Thomas Schelling
- William Vickrey
}}
| group8 = Other topics
| list8 =
- Bertrand paradox
- Chainstore paradox
- Computational complexity of games
- Helly metric
- Multi-agent system
- PPAD-complete
| abbr2 = combinatorial
| section2 = Combinatorial game theory
| list2 = {{Navbox|child
| group1 = Core
concepts
| list1 =
- Combinatorial explosion
- Determinacy
- Disjunctive sum
- First-player and second-player win
- Game complexity
- Game tree
- Impartial game
- Misère
- Partisan game
- Solved game
- Sprague–Grundy theorem
- Strategy-stealing argument
- Zugzwang
| group2 = Games
| list2 =
- Chess
- Chomp
- Clobber
- Cram
- Domineering
- Hackenbush
- Nim
- Notakto
- Subtract a square
- Sylver coinage
- Toads and Frogs
| group3 = Mathematical
tools
| list3 =
| group4 = Search
algorithms
| list4 =
- Alpha–beta pruning
- Expectiminimax
- Minimax
- Monte Carlo tree search
- Negamax
- Paranoid algorithm
- Principal variation search
| group5 =Key people
| list5 =
}}
| abbr3 = evolutionary
| section3 = Evolutionary game theory
| list3 = {{Navbox|child
| group1 = Core
concepts
| list1 =
- Bishop–Cannings theorem
- Evolution and the Theory of Games
- Evolutionarily stable set
- Evolutionarily stable state
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Replicator equation
- Risk dominance
- Stochastically stable equilibrium
- Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
| group2 = Games
| list2 =
| group3 = Applications
| list3 =
| group4 =Key people
| list4 =
}}
| abbr4 = mechanism
| section4 = Mechanism design
| list4 = {{Navbox|child
| group1 = Core
concepts
| list1 =
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Bayesian-optimal mechanism
- Incentive compatibility
- Market design
- Monotonicity
- Participation constraint
- Revelation principle
- Strategyproofness
- Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
| group2 = Theorems
| list2 =
| group3 = Applications
| list3 =
}}
| below =
- {{Portal-inline|Mathematics}}
- {{Icon|Commons}}Commons
- {{Icon|WikiProject}}WikiProject
- {{Icon|Category}}Category
}}
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