international drug control conventions

The three treaties are complementary and mutually supportive.{{Cite web |title=Treaties |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html |access-date=May 21, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}} They serve to maintain a classification system of controlled substances, including psychoactive drugs and plants, and chemical precursors, to ensure the regulated supply of those substances determined to be useful for medical and scientific purposes, and to otherwise prevent production, distribution and use, with some limited exceptions and exemptions.{{Cite web |last1=Armenta |first1=Amira |last2=Jelsma |first2=Martin |date=October 8, 2015 |title=The UN Drug Control Conventions - A Primer |url=https://www.tni.org/en/publication/the-un-drug-control-conventions |access-date=May 21, 2024 |website=Transnational Institute}}{{Cite web |title=Global Drug Policy |url=https://transformdrugs.org/drug-policy/global-drug-policy |access-date=May 25, 2024 |website=Transform Drug Policy Foundation}} Adoption of the treaties is near universal among the UN's 193 member countries.{{Cite web |title=About Us |url=https://www.un.org/en/about-us |access-date=June 13, 2024 |website=United Nations |quote=The UN’s Membership has grown from the original 51 Member States in 1945 to the current 193 Member States.}}{{Cite web |date=2023 |title=Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2023 |url=https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2023.html |access-date=June 15, 2024 |website=International Narcotics Control Board |pages=17–18}}

The treaties are not self-executing, they operate indirectly by providing a skeleton template of provisions that have to be fleshed out in the domestic law of each member country.{{Cite web |title=United Nations Treaty Collection: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Convention on psychotropic substances |url=https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-16&chapter=6&clang=_en |access-date=May 22, 2024 |website=United Nations}} Thus each country has a degree of flexibility in conforming treaty obligations to their own socio-cultural, political and economic realities; this latitude has been described as a "vast grey area{{Nbsp}}... subject to judicial interpretation and political contestation."{{Cite web |last1=Bewley-Taylor |first1=Dave |last2=Jelsma |first2=Martin |date=March 2012 |title=The Limits of Latitude |url=https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf |access-date=June 14, 2024 |website=Transnational Institute}}

The cornerstone Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended in 1972) integrated into a single framework nine pre-existing international drug treaties dating back to 1912, and extended the control system, including to the cultivation of plants used for narcotic drugs.{{Cite web |date=February 2021 |title=Celebrating 60 Years of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and 50 Years of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 |url=https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2020/Supplement/00_AR2020_supp_full_document.pdf |access-date=June 19, 2024 |website=International Narcotics Control Board |quote=The basis of this normative framework is the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. The 1961 Convention was followed by two more treaties: the 1971 Convention and the 1988 Convention. After 1988, with a view to implementing and complementing the conventions, the international community adopted a series of political declarations, plans of action and resolutions from 1990 to 2019"}}{{Cite web |last=Sinha |first=Jay |date=21 February 2001 |title=The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions |url=https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/committee/371/ille/library/history-e#G.%20The%201946%20Lake%20Success%20Protocol |access-date=May 15, 2024 |website=Senate of Canada}}{{Cite journal |last1=Bewley-Taylor |first1=David |last2=Jelsma |first2=Martin |date=Jan 2012a |title=Regime change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0955395911001575 |journal=International Journal of Drug Policy |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=76 |doi=10.1016/j.drugpo.2011.08.003|pmid=21996163 |url-access=subscription }} The subsequent two conventions addressed new developments and concerns; some 340 substances in total are listed across the three.{{Cite book |title=International export regulations and controls: navigating the global framework beyond WTO rules |date=2023 |publisher=World Trade Organization |isbn=978-92-870-7508-6 |editor-last=World Trade Organization |series=WTO publications |location=Geneva, Switzerland |pages=68 |chapter=International Drug Control Conventions (1961, 1971 and 1988 Conventions)}} For each of the conventions, an official Commentary provides comprehensive legal analysis to assist with interpretation.{{Cite web |title=Commentaries on and official records of the conventions |url=https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/v3/drugcontrolrepository/other-resources/commentaries-on-the-conventions.html |access-date=June 17, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}}

{{Main article|Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs}}

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 was adopted in 1961, entered into force on December 13, 1964,{{Cite journal |date=2022 |title=Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; New York, 30 March 1961 |url=https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=VI-15&chapter=6&clang=_en |url-status=live |journal=United Nations Treaty Series |publisher=Secretary-General of the United Nations |volume=IV "Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" |issue=15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908100825/https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=VI-15&chapter=6&clang=_en |archive-date=8 September 2022 |access-date=8 September 2022}} and, as amended by the 1972 Protocol;{{Cite journal |date=2022 |title=Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; New York, 8 August 1975 |url=https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en#1 |url-status=live |journal=United Nations Treaty Series |publisher=Secretary-General of the United Nations |volume=IV "Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" |issue=18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908103235/https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en#1 |archive-date=8 September 2022 |access-date=8 September 2022}} has been joined by 186 countries as of 2022.{{Refn|One state, Chad, remains party to the unamended convention.|name=|group=note}} According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Single Convention aims to "combat drug abuse" by limiting "the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes" and through "international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers".{{Cite web |title=Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-convention.html |access-date=May 22, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}} The Single Convention classifies drugs in four schedules; Schedules I and IV are the most prohibitive (IV is a subset of I) and included opium, heroin, cocaine and cannabis (in 2020, cannabis was removed from the most restrictive Schedule IV{{Cite web |date=December 2, 2020 |title=UN commission reclassifies cannabis, yet still considered harmful |url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1079132 |access-date=June 16, 2024 |website=United Nations}}).

{{Main|Convention on Psychotropic Substances}}

The Convention on Psychotropic Substances was adopted in 1971, entered into force on August 16, 1976, has been joined by 184 countries. It addresses a number of synthetic psychotropic substances, such as amphetamines, barbiturates, and LSD, that had become widely used since World War II, and especially in the 1960s, and were generally not regulated internationally. According to the UNODC, the convention "responded to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other".{{Cite web |title=Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/psychotropics.html |access-date=May 22, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}} The convention classifies the drugs it concerns in a four-schedule system different in the details from the Single Convention schedules.

{{Main|Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances}}

The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was adopted in 1988, entered into force on November 11, 1990,{{Cite web |title=United Nations Treaty Collection: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances |url=https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&clang=_en |access-date=May 22, 2024 |website=United Nations}} has been joined by 191 countries. The convention addressed concern over the rapid growth in international drug trafficking.{{Harvnb|Armenta|Jelsma|2015}} "The 1988 Convention came about in the framework of the political, historical and sociological context of the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the adoption of more repressive measures. The increase in demand for cannabis, cocaine and heroin for non-medical purposes mainly in the developed world gave rise to large-scale illicit production in the countries where these plants had traditionally been grown, in order to supply the market. International drug trafficking quickly became a multi-billion-dollar business controlled by criminal groups. This rapid expansion of the illicit drug trade became the justification for intensifying a battle that soon became an all-out war on drugs." According to the UNODC, it "provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals".{{Cite web |title=United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/illicit-trafficking.html |access-date=May 22, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}} The treaty essentially "criminalized the entire drug market chain, from cultivation/production to shipment, sale, and possession".{{Cite journal |last1=Lines |first1=Rick |last2=Elliott |first2=Richard |last3=Julie |first3=Hannah |last4=Rebecca |first4=Schleifer |last5=Tenu |first5=Avafia |last6=Damon |first6=Barrett |date=June 2017 |title=The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control |journal=Health and Human Rights |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=231–236 |pmid=28630555 |pmc=5473052 }}

The international drug conventions occurred within the newly formed United Nations, as the UN assumed the duties of the retired League of Nations after WWII. The preamble to the Single Convention establishes the overarching concern of the drug treaties as "the health and welfare of mankind". It recognizes "narcotic drugs" as "indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering" and that they "must be made [available] for such purposes". It also recognizes addiction to narcotics as "a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind" and that there is a duty of nations to "prevent and combat this evil".{{Cite web |last1=Jelsma |first1=Martin |last2=Boister |first2=Neil |last3=Bewley-Taylor |first3=David |last4=Fitzmaurice |first4=Malgosia |last5=Walsh |first5=John |date=March 2018 |title=Balancing Treaty Stability and Change: Inter se modification of the UN drug control conventions to facilitate cannabis regulation |url=https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/FINAL_Updated.pdf |access-date=Aug 25, 2024 |website=Washington Office on Latin America |page=3 |quote=The regime’s overarching goal as expressed in the preamble of the Single Convention is to safeguard the ‘health and welfare’ of humankind. In so doing it applies a dual imperative: to ensure an adequate supply of controlled drugs for the licit market—including World Health Organization (WHO) listed essential medicines—and at the same time to prevent the non-scientific and non-medical production, supply, and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances.}}

The conventions offer a degree of interpretative flexibility within a framework of control through prohibition.{{harvnb|Sinha|2001}}: "Although the three Conventions do leave member countries some leeway to craft drug control strategies shaped to their particular socio-cultural, political and economic realities, this flexibility is clearly limited by an overarching structure based on prohibition and criminalization."{{Cite journal |last=Krajewski |first=Krzysztof |date=1999 |title=How flexible are the United Nations drug conventions? |url=https://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugskrajewski_IJDP14.pdf |journal=International Journal of Drug Policy |volume=10 |issue=1999 |pages=329–338 |doi=10.1016/S0955-3959(99)00035-3 |quote=There are currently three United Nations drug conventions in force ... All of these conventions take a clearly prohibitionist approach to the drug problem. Indeed, prohibitionist drug policies around the world have been modelled after these international conventions. ... . There should be no doubt that the purpose of these conventions is to introduce some sort of global prohibition. |via=Elsevier}} Controlled substances used for medical and scientific purposes are regulated , while other uses are prohibited;{{Cite web |last=Adelstone |first=Jason |date=April 27, 2022 |title=Highly Non-Compliant: Does Non-Medical Cannabis Legalization Really Fit within the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs? No, It Does Not! |url=https://vicentellp.com/insights/non-medical-cannabis-legalization-does-not-fit-within-un-single-convention-narcotic-drugs/ |access-date=June 22, 2024 |website=Vicente LLP |quote=In fact, the Convention establishes a regime of both control and prohibition. It controls what is permitted and prohibits what is not. If it simply controlled without prohibition, all drugs could be regulated so long as they were controlled. This was obviously not the intent of the treaty.}} "each of the treaties encourages – and often requires – that member countries put in place strong domestic penal provisions."

A report by the Library of Parliament for the government of Canada on the history of the conventions identifies four themes as critical influences on the nature of the treaties: prohibition, United States involvement, external influences, and the outsized impact of certain powerful individuals. Prohibition of illicit use, "as opposed to regulation", has been the central philosophy. The US has been "the key player in most multilateral negotiations" and the prohibitionist approach "derives largely from U.S. policy – the various forms, past and present, of the U.S. 'war on drugs{{'"}}.{{Harvnb|Collins|2012|p=50}} "Although it is ultimately a multilateral construct, the shape and operation of the current treaty system is very much a result of American endeavour. The prohibitionist norm at the heart of the regime owes much to the successful internationalisation of the United States' domestic approach – namely, that the recreational use of certain substances is morally wrong. Furthermore, the near universal levels adherence to the regime cannot be divorced from Washington's support. States obviously perceive benefits from regime membership."{{Cite web |last=Hudak |first=John |date=April 7, 2016 |title=UNGASS and the consequences of international drug policy |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ungass-and-the-consequences-of-international-drug-policy/ |access-date=June 20, 2024 |website=Brookings Institution |quote=Much of the framework on international drug policy exists because of the forceful advocacy and insistence of the U.S. government on worldwide prohibition. That advocacy led to the most prominent international agreement on drugs: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in 1961. ... The U.S.-driven, U.N. drug policy prescribes a one size fits all policy around drugs for a variety of substances throughout the world.}} Outside interests, including "racism, fear, economic interests, domestic and international politics, global trade, domestic protectionism, war, arms control initiatives, the Cold War, development aid, and various corporate agendas", significantly shaped the conventions.{{Harvnb|Sinha|2001}} "Introduction", also William B. McAllister: "...the primary goal of the international drug control regime has never been to eliminate illicit drug use. The most important objective of the delegates to the 1961 and 1971 conventions was to protect sundry economic, social, cultural, religious, and/or geopolitical interests." {{Harvnb|Collins|2012|p=13}} William B. McAllister, "Reflections On a Century of International Drug Control": "... the regulatory system quickly became dominated by those concerned with issues such as promoting the sales of what we now call the 'ethical' drug industry; eliminating manufacturers producing in illicit ways from competing in the licit market; providing exceptions to maintain military stockpiles; promoting research and development; taking account of religious sensibilities; making allowances for 'backward' regions of the world that would have no medicinals whatsoever without recourse to drugs considered inappropriate in a western setting; and not interfering with imperial revenues in those colonies that maintained state-run opium monopolies." And certain individuals played an outsized role in forming the policies: "while in positions of power at opportune moments, their beliefs, morals, ambitions and single-minded determination enabled them to exert exceptional influence over the shape of the international drug control regime." The efforts of US drug control commissioner Harry Anslinger and his Canadian counterpart and policy ally, Charles Henry Ludovic Sharman, are particularly notable.{{Harvnb|Collins|2012|p=10-11}} William B. McAllister, "Reflections On a Century of International Drug Control": "Individual contributions – both positive and negative – matter more than we often appreciate. ... A careful reading of the record also reveals unsung heroes. ... Individual ambition has also had a profound impact on the operation and direction of the system. ... The configuration of the system, including what may strike observers as its nonsensical or counterproductive aspects, is better comprehended if one understands that certain features can be traced back to personal logics."

While many scholars view the drug conventions as a US-engineered prohibitionist regime, others offer more nuanced analyses. Among them, John Collins finds that, though "a plurality of the policy literature maintains this narrative, the historiography has since moved on." He suggests that the conventions emerged from complex multilateral negotiations, "a triangulation between various state interests and blocs."{{Cite journal |last=Collins |first=John |date=2020 |title=A Brief History of Cannabis and the Drug Conventions |journal=AJIL Unbound |language=en |volume=114 |pages=279–284 |doi=10.1017/aju.2020.55 |issn=2398-7723 |quote=What might be termed the Orthodox School of drug regime theory argues that the United States created a robust “global drug prohibition regime” via the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations. While a plurality of the policy literature maintains this narrative, the historiography has since moved on. ... I have suggested that the International Drug Control System (IDCS) emerged from a triangulation between various state interests and blocs. ... The United States was a key participant in the IDCS, albeit frequently an absent one, but hardly the sole force.|doi-access=free }} Sebastien Scheerer finds that global drug policy "rests on a highly coercive consensus masterminded by ... the United States", yet the US relied on "other governments' prejudices, plans and interests" in drug prohibition; America may have to "share the credit (and blame)" with other parties.{{Cite book |last=Scheerer |first=Sebastian |title=Cannabis science: from prohibition to human right = Cannabis-Wissenschaft |date=1997 |publisher=Lang |isbn=978-0-8204-3238-0 |editor-last=Böllinger |editor-first=Lorenz |location=Frankfurt am Main Berlin |chapter=North American Bias and Non-American Roots of Cannabis Prohibition |quote=... while serious analyses convincingly show that [global drug policy] really rests on a highly coercive consensus masterminded by just one international moral entrepreneur : the United States. ... On the other hand, the U.S. did rely on other governments' prejudices, plans and interests concerning the prohibition of mind - altering substances. ... any future reduction of the North American bias in drug research might lead to a revaluation of the interactions between U.S. diplomacy and oriental governments to such an extent that the U.S.A. might even have to share the credit (and blame) for the global prohibition regime with some hitherto hidden entrepreneurs.}} James Windle notes that "prohibitions were enforced in Asian countries while the United States and Western Europe were routinely trading opium"; the "concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is, therefore, flawed".{{Cite journal |last=Windle |first=James |date=Oct 2013 |title=How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2013.820769 |journal=The International History Review |language=en |volume=35 |issue=5 |pages=1185–1199 |doi=10.1080/07075332.2013.820769 |issn=0707-5332 |quote=... prohibitions were enforced in Asian countries while the United States and Western Europe were routinely trading opium. The concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is, therefore, flawed. ... While the United States may not have constructed prohibition, it did globalise its prohibitionist policies and the preventive measures it employs against drugs. It may even be that global prohibition is a 'US dream', however, this is not the same as national prohibition being an American construct.}} Collins concludes, "The United States was a key participant in the [International Drug Control System], albeit frequently an absent one, but hardly the sole force."

{{Main article|Commission on Narcotic Drugs|UN Office on Drugs and Crime|International Narcotics Control Board|WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence}}

Four entities are given authority under the drug conventions: the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

The 53-member CND, a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is the UN's main drug policy body, responsible for the drug classification schedules and policy guidance. Members are elected by ECOSOC, one of the six UN main organs.{{Cite web |title=The Commission on Narcotic Drugs |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html |access-date=2024-06-15 |website=United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime |language=en}} The CND also is the governing body of the UNODC,{{Cite web |title=United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/index.html |access-date=May 30, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}} which advises governments on implementation of the conventions and produces an annual World Drug Report. UNODC's focus is mainly on security and law enforcement, rather than public health.

The INCB is an independent treaty body, mandated by the Single Convention, that monitors implementation of the conventions, oversees the legal drug supply, and maintains discussions with countries regarding compliance issues. Central to its function is an annual set of reports, submitted to ECOSOC through the CND, that overlook the global drug situation. The reporting identifies and predicts problem trends and suggests corrective actions. Technical reports list estimated national requirements, and production, manufacture, trade and consumption data, for controlled drugs for medical and scientific use, gathered from individual countries. Trends in trafficking in precursors and essential chemicals for illicit drug manufacture, and evaluation of government measures taken to prevent that traffic, are also reported.{{Cite web |last=INCB |date=2022 |title=Mandate and functions |url=https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221211144221/https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html |archive-date=11 December 2022 |access-date=2022-12-11 |website=www.incb.org}}

The WHO is responsible for providing the CND with the scientific evidence and recommendations used in determining drug scheduling and evaluating proposed treaty amendments. This work is carried out by the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD), a chosen group of independent experts within the field of pharmacology.{{cite web |title=46th ECDD Committee Member Biographies |url=https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/46th-ecdd/46th-ecdd-biographies.pdf?sfvrsn=344c8b03_3 |publisher=WHO}} The ECDD evaluates drugs for potential for harm including addiction, and for possible medical value.{{Cite web |last=Expert Committee on Drug Dependence |title=[Flyer] WHO's role under the international drug control conventions |url=https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/controlled-substances/whos-role-in-intl-drug-system-flyer.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210522210526/https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/controlled-substances/whos-role-in-intl-drug-system-flyer.pdf |archive-date=22 May 2021 |access-date=22 May 2021 |publisher=World Health Organization |publication-place=Geneva}}{{Cite web |title=Role of the WHO under International Drug Control Conventions |url=https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/role-of-the-WHO-under-international-drug-control-conventions |access-date=22 May 2021 |website=World Health Organization |language=en}}

The conventions are legally binding, effectively under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).{{Cite web |date=2008 |title=The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008 |url=https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2008/AR_08_English.pdf |access-date=June 15, 2024 |website=International Narcotics Control Board |page=6 |quote=According to article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 'every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.'}}{{Cite web |last1=Haase |first1=Heather J. |last2=Eyle |first2=Nicolas Edward |last3=Schrimpf |first3=Joshua Raymond |date=August 2012 |title=The International Drug Control Treaties: How Important Are They to U.S. Drug Reform? |url=https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/InternationalDrugControlTreatiesArticle.pdf |access-date=April 24, 2024 |publisher=New York City Bar Association (Committee on Drugs & the Law) |quote=The Conventions are legally binding under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a country “may not circumscribe its obligations under the treaties by enacting a conflicting domestic law.”}}{{Refn|The VCLT, effective 1980, is not retroactive, however, many of its provisions are accepted as reflecting customary international law, which can apply to previously existing treaties. "When questions of treaty law arise during negotiations or litigation, whether concerning a new treaty or one concluded before the entry into force of the VCLT, the rules set forth in the VCLT are invariably relied upon by the States concerned, or the international or national court or tribunal, even when the States concerned are not parties to the VCLT."{{Cite web |last=Aust |first=Anthony |date=June 2006 |title=Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) |url=https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Vienna_Convention_on_the_Law_of_Treaties_1969.pdf |access-date=Aug 8, 2024 |website=Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law}}|group=note}} The INCB, charged with monitoring treaty compliance, relies primarily on direct discussion with individual countries to address non-compliance issues. Formal drug treaty disagreements between countries over issues such as treaty compliance and amendment, import-export, jurisdiction, and extradition, are addressed in dispute provisions in each of the conventions that call for remedies including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial proceedings, or other "peaceful means", or turning to the International Court of Justice.{{Citation needed|date=September 2024}} Periodically, the UN General Assembly holds special session meetings on drugs that provide a normative framework for the drug conventions.{{cite book |last1=Ruder |first1=Nicole |url=https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-new-york/en/documents/UN_GA__Final.pdf |title=The GA Handbook: A practical guide to the United Nations General Assembly |last2=Nakano |first2=Kenji |last3=Aeschlimann |first3=Johann |date=2017 |publisher=Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations |isbn=978-0-615-49660-3 |editor1-last=Aeschlimann |editor1-first=Johann |edition=2nd |location=New York |pages=14–15 |editor2-last=Regan |editor2-first=Mary}}

Falling out of compliance with the conventions, apart from denunciation by the UN and other countries, could have practical consequences, particularly for developing nations. The conventions regulate trade in legal pharmaceuticals, including the WHO list of essential drugs—leaving the system could make securing medicine more difficult. Being party to the three conventions is also a requirement for certain trade agreements, and for access to the European Union (EU).

Enforcement measures rely largely on dialog and diplomacy. The INCB, in addition to discussion, can call out perceived non-compliance in its reports and in public statements – "naming and shaming" – and by alerting the CND and ECOSOC. Beyond that, it has no practical enforcement power.{{Harvnb|Haase|Eyle|Schrimpf|2012|p=2}} "The International Narcotics Control Board’s enforcement powers are limited to 'quiet diplomacy,' or 'blaming and shaming.' In extreme cases, the INCB can recommend an embargo on all prescription medicines coming into or going out of a country. However, in our interview with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and current INCB member Melvyn Levitsky, he noted that this is 'not a strong provision,' since, for humanitarian reasons, it is highly unlikely such a measure would ever be taken."{{Cite web |title=Global Drug Policy |url=https://transformdrugs.org/drug-policy/global-drug-policy |access-date=May 25, 2024 |website=Transform Drug Policy Foundation}}{{Cite web |last=INCB |date=2022 |title=Mandate and functions |url=https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221211144221/https://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html |archive-date=11 December 2022 |access-date=2022-12-11 |website=www.incb.org}} The US has used its dominant power to enforce the conventions in other countries, in ways that include making financial aid contingent on drug control efforts, and supplying economic and military support for drug intervention.{{Harvnb|Armenta|Jelsma|2015}} "Emerging from the Second World War as the dominant political, economic and military power, the United States was then in a position to forge a new drug control regime (the 1946 Lake Success Protocol) and apply the necessary pressure to impose it on other countries in the setting of the United Nations. The political climate enabled the globalisation of prohibitionist anti-drug ideals."{{Cite web |last=Spencer |first=Bill |date=Sep 1, 1998 |title=Drug Certification |url=https://fpif.org/drug_certification/ |access-date=Jul 31, 2024 |website=Foreign Policy in Focus |quote=Enacted by Congress in 1986, the certification process was meant to press the administration to demand tougher counternarcotics measures by other governments. Each year, the administration must produce a list of major drug-producing or drug-transit countries. Countries included in the “majors” list ... face mandatory sanctions unless the administration certifies ... that a country is fully cooperating with U.S. anti-narcotics efforts, or is taking sufficient steps on its own to meet the terms of the 1988 UN drug control convention. The sanctions include the withdrawal of most U.S. foreign assistance not directly related to counternarcotics programs and U.S. opposition to loans those countries seek from multilateral development banks. The administration can also waive sanctions against a country that is not fully certified, if it determines that doing so is in the “vital national interests” of the United States.}}

The drug conventions do not explicitly prohibit, they establish control over a set of drugs. The personal use of illicit drugs is not outlawed, although possession is. Penalties are not specified, they are at the discretion of individual countries, and can range from mild to harsh. In practice, this flexibility has been used to create a prohibitionist, punitive war on drugs that is not explicitly required by the treaties. Negative effects of this hardline approach – increased violence and organized crime; human rights violations{{Cite journal |last1=Lines |first1=R |last2=Elliott |first2=R |last3=Hannah |first3=J |last4=Schleifer |first4=R |last5=Avafia |first5=T |last6=Barrett |first6=D |date=June 2017 |title=The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control. |journal=Health and Human Rights |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=231–236 |pmc=5473052 |pmid=28630555 |quote=The international drug control treaties contribute directly to this environment of human rights risk and violations. The drug treaties are what are known within international law as “suppression conventions.” Suppression regimes obligate states to use their domestic laws, including criminal laws, to deter or punish the activities identified within the treaty, and are therefore “important legal mechanisms for the globalization of penal norms.” However, while suppression treaties mandate all states to act domestically and collectively to combat crimes defined as being of international concern, they offer no obligations and little guidance on what is and is not an appropriate penal response. ... In many cases, this is an invitation to governments to enact abusive laws and policies, especially in a global context where drugs and drug trafficking are defined as an existential threat to society and the stability of nations ...}} – have led to an increasing number of countries deviating from the regime. Deviation undermines the credibility of the drug conventions, which in turn, can weaken the entire system of UN international treaties.{{Cite web |date=October 2012 |editor-last=Collins |editor-first=John |title=Governing the Global Drug Wars |url=https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Governing-the-Global-Drug-Wars.pdf |access-date=June 20, 2024 |website=London School of Economics}}{{Cite journal |last=Krajewski |first=Krzysztof |date=1999 |title=How flexible are the United Nations drug conventions? |url=https://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugskrajewski_IJDP14.pdf |journal=International Journal of Drug Policy |volume=10 |issue=1999 |pages=329–338 |doi=10.1016/S0955-3959(99)00035-3 |quote=There are currently three United Nations drug conventions in force ... All of these conventions take a clearly prohibitionist approach to the drug problem. Indeed, prohibitionist drug policies around the world have been modelled after these international conventions. ... . There should be no doubt that the purpose of these conventions is to introduce some sort of global prohibition. |via=Elsevier}}

There are limited exceptions and exemptions. For instance, the Single Convention provides exceptions to the central "exclusively to medical and scientific purposes" rule, such as for the cultivation of industrial hemp, the use of the coca leaf as a flavoring agent, and a general exemption in article 2(9) of any drug used for "other than medical and scientific purposes" (a phrase with conflicting interpretations).{{Cite book |last=Riboulet-Zemouli |first=Kenzi |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4057428 |title=High Compliance, a Lex Lata Legalization for the Non-Medical Cannabis Industry: How to Regulate Recreational Cannabis in Accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 |date=2022 |publisher=FAAAT |isbn=979-10-97087-23-4 |location=Paris and Washington, D.C. |ssrn=4057428}} Countries can also join the treaties with specific national reservations.

In international law, it is said that "treaty interpretation is an art, not a science"{{Cite book |last=Merkouris |first=P |title=Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on |date=2010 |publisher=Martinus Nijhoff Publishers |editor-last=Fitzmaurice |editor-first=M |at=1–17 |chapter=Interpretation is a Science, is an Art, is a Science |editor-last2=Elias |editor-first2=O |editor-last3=Merkouris |editor-first3=P}} Expanding that view, Philip Allott states that "interpretation in International Law is an art and a game and a field of battle."{{Cite book |last=Allott |first=P |title=Interpretation in International Law |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |editor-last=Bianchi |editor-first=A |at=373–392 |chapter=Interpretation – An Exact Art |editor-last2=Peat |editor-first2=D |editor-last3=Windsor |editor-first3=M}} While the drug conventions define clear limitations, and the VCLT serves as a critical interpretive tool, there is "a degree of latitude for policy choices at the national and subnational level" that has allowed for ample interpretive divergence.{{Cite web |last1=Bewley-Taylor |first1=Dave |last2=Jelsma |first2=Martin |date=March 2012 |title=The Limits of Latitude |url=https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf |access-date=June 14, 2024 |website=Transnational Institute}}

One study examining interpretive latitude in the conventions proposed three categories of deviation by member countries: permissible policies deviate while being generally accepted, contested policies are vigorously defended as in fact being within the guidelines, and impermissible policies are clear breaches of the conventions.

In recent decades, a growing number of countries, and a majority of states in the US, have moved towards drug liberalization by variously decriminalizing cannabis and other drugs for personal consumption, and by legalizing cannabis for recreational use. This has resulted in a variety of interpretations of, and tension with, the drug treaties.

In 1976, the Netherlands' policy of tolerance of limited cannabis sale and personal use came into practice. The Dutch government amended the country's Opium Act to consider cannabis as a "soft drug" and permitted gedoogbeleid (Dutch: "tolerance policy").{{Cite web |last=Robinson |first=Rowland |date=July 1, 2024 |title=Exploring Dutch coffeeshops then and now |url=https://www.icwa.org/exploring-dutch-coffeeshops/ |access-date=Aug 28, 2024 |website=Institute of Current World Affairs}} Trafficking and possession of cannabis remained illegal; cannabis laws were not enforced for sale of small quantities for on-site use in coffeeshops.{{Cite journal |last1=Knottnerus |first1=J. André |last2=Blom |first2=Tom |last3=van Eerden |first3=Sanne |last4=Mans |first4=Jan H.H. |last5=van de Mheen |first5=Dike |last6=de Neeling |first6=J.Nico D. |last7=Schelfhout |first7=David C.L. |last8=Seidell |first8=Jaap C. |last9=van Wijk |first9=Albert H. |last10=van Wingerde |first10=C.G. (Karin) |last11=van den Brink |first11=Wim |display-authors=1 |date=March 2023 |title=Cannabis policy in The Netherlands: Rationale and design of an experiment with a controlled legal ('closed') cannabis supply chain |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016885102200313X#bib0015 |journal=Health Policy |volume=129 |issue=March 2023 |doi=10.1016/j.healthpol.2022.12.007 |via=Elsevier Science Direct}} The INCB criticism of the Dutch system has been ongoing. One annual report called it "an activity that might be described as indirect incitement. This is not in accordance with the spirit or the letter of the international drug control treaties."{{Cite journal |last=Fordham |first=Ann |date=Feb 1, 2008 |title=The International Narcotics Control Board: Current Tensions and Options for Reform |url=http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1910543 |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |language=en |publisher=International Drug Policy Consortium |doi=10.2139/ssrn.1910543 |issn=1556-5068|url-access=subscription }}

In 2001, Portugal decriminalized purchase and possession for personal use of all psychoactive drugs. It maintained its treaty obligations by changing the form of prohibition from criminal law to administrative law, replacing criminal penalties with fines, reporting requirements, and treatment referrals; drugs still had to be obtained from illegal sources, as selling remained a criminal act. Initially taking a negative view, the INCB in 2005 accepted the policy as legitimate, finding that "the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is consistent with the international drug control treaties".{{Cite web |last=Laqueur |first=Hannah |date=2014 |title=Uses and Abuses of Drug Decriminalization in Portugal |url=https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Laqueur_%282014%29_-_Uses_and_Abuses_of_Drug_Decriminalization_in_Portugal_-_LSI.pdf |access-date=June 14, 2024 |website=Law & Social Inquiry}}

Some two dozen countries have taken similar approaches to decriminalizing cannabis and other drugs for personal consumption.{{Cite web |date=February 2015 |title=Approaches to Decriminalizing Drug Use & Possession |url=https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/DrugPolicyAlliance/DPA_Fact_Sheet_Approaches_to_Decriminalization_Feb2015_1.pdf |access-date=June 18, 2024 |website=Drug Policy Alliance}} For instance, in Mexico in 2009, "personal use" quantities were established for a number of drugs – cannabis (5 g), cocaine (0.5 g), heroin (50 mg), methamphetamine (40 mg), LSD (0.015 mg) – possession of which would result in a referral for treatment.{{Cite web |date=August 21, 2009 |title=Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/world/americas/21mexico.html |access-date=July 6, 2024 |website=New York Times}} A 2023 briefing to the European Parliament noted: "The UN bodies monitoring compliance with the conventions seem to have come to accept these policy choices" of tolerance or administrative rather than criminal penalties.{{Cite web |date=2023 |title=Recreational use of cannabis |url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/749792/EPRS_BRI(2023)749792_EN.pdf |access-date=Aug 28, 2024 |website=European Parliamentary Research Service |quote=Various countries around the world have made use of the flexibility of the UN system, not applying criminal penalties in some cases (e.g. for possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use) or replacing them with administrative ones. The UN bodies monitoring compliance with the conventions seem to have come to accept these policy choices. However, they remain resistant to the still rare yet increasingly common practice of legalising the recreational use of cannabis, which may entail regulating drug distribution and sale in a manner akin to that for alcohol and tobacco.}}

Over 50 countries and the large majority of US states have legalized cannabis for medical use. In 2020, the CND acted on a recommendation from the WHO's ECDD by removing cannabis from the Single Convention's most restrictive Schedule IV category and recognized its medical value, while retaining it in the next most restrictive Schedule I. Addressing recreational use, the INCB in 2023 stated that "legalizing the non-medical use of cannabis ... contravenes the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" and that "the effects of cannabis use on individuals and societies should be studied further before Governments make long-term binding decisions", reminding governments that "the drug control conventions offer significant flexibility" for finding alternative solutions than legalization.{{Cite web |date=Mar 9, 2023 |title=The International Narcotics Control Board expresses concern over the trend to legalize non-medical use of cannabis, which contravenes the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs |url=https://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/press-releases/2023/international-narcotics-control-board-expresses-concern-over-the-trend-to-legalize-non-medical-use-of-cannabis--which-contravenes-the-1961-single-convention-on-narcotic-drugs.html |access-date=Aug 27, 2024 |website=International Narcotics Control Board}}

In 2012, two US states, Colorado (Amendment 64) and Washington (Initiative 502), legalized cannabis by direct vote through ballot initiatives. The INCB had warned, "Implementing the decisions of popular votes held in the United States in Colorado and Washington to allow for the recreational use of cannabis would be a violation of international laws."{{Cite web |last=Nelson |first=Steven |date=December 11, 2013 |title=Uruguay Violating Treaties By Legalizing Marijuana, U.N. Agency Says |url=https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/11/uruguay-violating-treaties-by-legalizing-marijuana-un-agency-says |access-date=June 11, 2024 |website=U.S. News & World Report}} In August 2013, the federal government announced it would not act against states opening cannabis stores, with the expectation that state regulations would be "tough in practice, not just on paper, and include strong, state-based enforcement efforts, backed by adequate funding."{{Cite web |last=Nelson |first=Steven |date=August 29, 2013 |title=DOJ: Marijuana Stores Can Open in Colorado and Washington |url=https://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/08/29/doj-marijuana-stores-can-open-in-colorado-and-washington |access-date=June 11, 2024 |website=U.S. News & World Report}} The UN did not propose sanctions against the US, in particular since there exists no applicable sanction for the UN to apply. In 2022, the INCB said, regarding state legalization, “The Board has repeatedly expressed its concern that these developments may be inconsistent with the country’s legal obligations as a party to the three international drug conventions." Since then, over 20 other US states have legalized non-medical cannabis use.{{cite web |title=MARIJUANA OVERVIEW |url=http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx |access-date=January 23, 2018 |website=National Conference of State Legislatures}}

In 2013, Uruguay legalized cannabis, with the law taking effect in April 2014, making it the first country to do so. The INCB condemned the move and stated that Uruguay "knowingly decided to break the universally agreed and internationally endorsed legal provisions". The statement continued: "Cannabis is not only addictive but may also affect some fundamental brain functions, IQ potential, and academic and job performance and impair driving skills. Smoking cannabis is more carcinogenic than smoking tobacco."

In 2018, Canada legalized cannabis, with the law taking effect that October.{{Cite web |last=Butler |first=Patrick |date=October 17, 2018 |title=Cannabis is legal in Canada — here's what you need to know |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/marijuana-faq-legalization-need-to-know-1.4862207 |access-date=June 16, 2024 |website=CBC News}} In "A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada", it was acknowledged that "Canada is one of more than 185 Parties to three United Nations drug control conventions" and said: "... it is our view that Canada's proposal to legalize cannabis shares the objectives agreed to by member states in multilateral declarations", citing protection of vulnerable citizens, evidence-based policy, and public health, safety and welfare as "the heart of a balanced approach to treaty implementation."{{Cite web |last1=McLellan |first1=A. Anne |last2=Ware |first2=Mark A. |last3=Boyd |first3=Susan |last4=Chow |first4=George |last5=Jesso |first5=Marlene |last6=Kendall |first6=Perry |last7=Souccar |first7=Raf |last8=von Tigerstrom |first8=Barbara |last9=Zahn |first9=Catherine |date=November 30, 2016 |title=A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada |url=https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/laws-regulations/task-force-cannabis-legalization-regulation/framework-legalization-regulation-cannabis-in-canada.html#a1.1 |access-date=June 16, 2024 |website=Government of Canada}} The CND and INCB stated, "this decision contravenes the provisions of the drug control conventions, and undermines the international legal drug control framework and respect for the rules-based international order."{{Cite web |date=June 21, 2018 |title=Statement attributable to the UNODC Spokesperson on Canada's Cannabis Act |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2018/statement-attributable-to-the-unodc-spokesperson-on-canadas-cannabis-act.html |access-date=June 16, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}}

In Mexico, the Supreme Court in 2018 overturned as unconstitutional the prohibition of recreational cannabis use and ordered the government to enact corresponding legislation.{{cite news |last1=Orsi |first1=Peter |date=31 October 2018 |title=Mexico court sets precedent on legal, recreational pot use |url=https://www.apnews.com/5b3636e028ee41f09b7f34bc3b28d4cb |access-date=14 January 2019 |work=Associated Press}}{{Cite web |date=April 23, 2021 |title=Mexico: Reform Marijuana Policy |url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/23/mexico-reform-marijuana-policy |access-date=Aug 27, 2024 |website=Human Rights Watch}} In 2021, the Mexican Congress had still failed to change the laws, and the Court legalized personal use of cannabis. However, without updated legislation, the situation remains murky. Individuals have to apply for a permit and the federal criminal code with respect to recreational use has not been changed.{{Cite news |date=2021-07-30 |title=How Mexico Has Legalized But Still Not Regulated Cannabis |url=https://filtermag.org/mexico-cannabis-legalization |access-date=2021-09-17 |work=Filter Magazine |language=en-US}} The INCB, in its 2022 "Analysis of the world situation", reported, "In Mexico, legislative and policy changes concerning cannabis use for non-medical purposes continue to be in flux."{{Cite web |date=2022 |title=Report 2022 |url=https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2022/Annual_Report_Chapters/060_Chapter_III.pdf |access-date=Aug 27, 2024 |website=International Narcotics Control Board |page=78}}

In 2021, Malta legalized cannabis, the first EU country to do so.{{Cite web |date=Dec 14, 2021 |title=Malta becomes first EU nation to legalise cannabis |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59660856 |access-date=Aug 25, 2024 |website=BBC}} It adopted a law echoing article 2(9) of the Single Convention (exemption for the use of drugs for industrial purposes), leading some scholars to consider it the first national legalization to achieve compliance with the drug control treaties.{{Cite book |last1=Riboulet |first1=Kenzi |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368487545 |title=Treaty compliance options for cannabis regulations in he EU: Models of decriminalisation and legal regulation compliant with International Law and EU acquis (Policy Brief) |last2=Jeanroy |first2=Benjamin-Alexandre |date=2022 |publisher=Racionální politiky závislostí |location=Prague}}

The US banking industry has created pressure on both domestic and foreign cannabis legalization. While the US has allowed state-level legalization, cannabis remains a federally prohibited drug, keeping the US broadly in compliance with the international drug treaties. Thus, federally regulated banks in the US are reluctant to engage with cannabis-related businesses. In the US, this has largely prevented access to bank accounts, credit card processing, and loans by cannabis businesses operating legally at the state level.{{Cite journal |last=Andersen Hill |first=Julie |date=May 2021 |title=Cannabis Banking: What Marijuana Can Learn from Hemp |url=https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2021/07/HILL.pdf |journal=Boston University Law Review |volume=101 |issue=3 |pages=1043–1104}} The situation is similar in Canada, where all five major national banks have a significant presence in the US.{{Cite web |last=Passifiume |first=Bryan |date=Jan 4, 2024 |title=Cannabis advocates say banks still refuse their business, fuelling the illicit market and hurting the industry |url=https://nationalpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-advocates-say-banks-still-refuse-their-business-fuelling-the-illicit-market-and-hurting-the-industry |access-date=Aug 22, 2024 |website=National Post}}{{Cite web |last=Ullman |first=Laura |date=May 16, 2019 |title=Cross Border Cannabis? |url=https://commercial.bmo.com/en/us/resource/doing-business-in-canada/cross-border-cannabis/ |access-date=Aug 22, 2024 |website=BMO Bank}} The US Patriot Act, which prohibits US banks from doing business with distributors of "controlled substances" such as cannabis, adds further complication: after legalization in Uruguay, US banks threatened to sever ties with Uruguayan banks that were dealing with cannabis suppliers.{{Cite journal |last=Barry |first=Rachel Ann |date=2023-01-02 |title='We never thought this would be considered drug trafficking': International finance rules, policy space and Uruguay's regulation of recreational cannabis |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441692.2023.2283042 |journal=Global Public Health |language=en |volume=18 |issue=1 |doi=10.1080/17441692.2023.2283042 |pmid=37970837 |issn=1744-1692|url-access=subscription }}{{Cite web |last=Pimentel |first=Yakir |date=Nov 7, 2017 |title=Uruguay Short on Banks To Deal in Marijuana Funds |url=https://internationalbanker.com/finance/uruguay-short-banks-deal-marijuana-funds/ |access-date=Aug 22, 2024 |website=International Banker}}

When joining any of the three drug treaties, a country has the option to make reservations in order to modify or exclude specific treaty provisions for that country.{{Harvnb|Armenta|Jelsma|2015|p=}} "At the moment of signing, acceding or ratifying a treaty, states have the option to make reservations regarding specific provisions, as many countries in fact did in the case of all three drug control treaties. Reservations ... are meant to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty for the reserving state."

In joining the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the US filed a reservation excepting "peyote harvested and distributed for use by the Native American Church in its religious rites";{{Cite web |last=Castellanos |first=Kiko |date=2022-01-25 |title=United States of America: Legal situation of ayahuasca |url=https://www.iceers.org/united-states-of-america/ |access-date=2024-08-23 |website=ICEERS |language=en-US}}{{Cite web |title=Narcotic Drugs and Pyschotropic Substances |url=https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=VI-16&chapter=6&clang=_en |website=United Nations |quote=}} the American Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) made a corresponding exemption to the US Controlled Substances Act.{{Cite web |date=July 9, 2014 |title=Peyote Exemption for Native American Church |url=https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/peyote-exemption-native-american-church |access-date=Aug 24, 2024 |website=US Department of Justice}}

In January 2012, Bolivia withdrew from the Single Convention over the indigenous use of the coca leaf. It soon re-applied to the convention with a reservation allowing traditional use of coca; the re-accession came into force in February 2013. Blocking the reservation required objection by 61 countries, one-third of the, at the time, 183 parties to the convention; 15 countries objected by the deadline. The UNODC said it would "continue to work in Bolivia in accordance with its mandates to support the national system of drug control and the country's international cooperation in these matters."{{Cite web |title=Bolivia to re-accede to UN drug convention, while making exception on coca leaf chewing |url=https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/January/bolivia-to-re-accede-to-un-drug-convention-while-making-exception-on-coca-leaf-chewing.html |access-date=June 18, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}}

The drug conventions have been criticized for contributing to violations of the human rights principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.{{Cite journal |last1=Lines |first1=R |last2=Elliott |first2=R |last3=Hannah |first3=J |last4=Schleifer |first4=R |last5=Avafia |first5=T |last6=Barrett |first6=D |date=June 2017 |title=The Case for International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Control. |journal=Health and Human Rights |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=231–236 |pmc=5473052 |pmid=28630555 |quote=The international drug control treaties contribute directly to this environment of human rights risk and violations. The drug treaties are what are known within international law as “suppression conventions.” Suppression regimes obligate states to use their domestic laws, including criminal laws, to deter or punish the activities identified within the treaty, and are therefore “important legal mechanisms for the globalization of penal norms.” However, while suppression treaties mandate all states to act domestically and collectively to combat crimes defined as being of international concern, they offer no obligations and little guidance on what is and is not an appropriate penal response. ... In many cases, this is an invitation to governments to enact abusive laws and policies, especially in a global context where drugs and drug trafficking are defined as an existential threat to society and the stability of nations ...}} Some scholars have also pointed at a violations of a number of international human right provisions contained in instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among others.{{Cite journal |last1=Riboulet-Zemouli |first1=Kenzi |last2=Krawitz |first2=Michael A. |date=2021 |title=Voluntary Contribution to INCB Guidelines on Medical Cannabis – Due Diligence, Good Faith, & Technical Concerns |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3829901 |journal=SSRN |language=en |location=Paris and Washington, DC |ssrn=3829901}}

{{As of|2023}}, 35 countries have the death penalty for drug offenses; of those, the 33 UN full member countries are parties to the UN drug conventions. Nine of those countries – China, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Vietnam – are considered "high application" countries that regularly perform drug crime executions.{{Cite web |date=2023 |title=The Death Penalty for Drug Offences: Global Overview 2023 |url=https://hri.global/flagship-research/death-penalty/the-death-penalty-for-drug-offences-global-overview-2023/ |access-date=July 2, 2024 |website=Harm Reduction International}} The conventions encourage criminal penalties but do not provide guidelines for what is appropriate, which can be "an invitation to governments to enact abusive laws and policies, especially in a global context where drugs and drug trafficking are defined as an existential threat to society and the stability of nations".

Despite an increasing number of countries deviating from the conventions, particularly in the area of cannabis legalization, the prospect of fundamental amendment of the treaties seems distant at best, as the parties are roughly split between those who favor reform and those who adamantly back the existing prohibitionist regime.Fassihi, Farnaz, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-conference-on-drugs-ends-without-shift-in-policy-1461299583 "U.N. Conference on Drugs Ends Without Shift in Policy"], Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2016. Retrieved 2016-04-25.{{Cite journal |last=Bewley-Taylor |first=D. |date=2020 |title=Politics and Finite Flexibilities: The UN Drug Control Conventions and their Future Development |journal=AJIL Unbound |publisher=Cambridge University Press |volume=114 |pages=285–290 |doi=10.1017/aju.2020.56 |quote=Mindful of the glacial pace of systemic change within the UN and international law in general, it seems unlikely that we will witness substantive formal change to the drug control regime any time soon. ... As observation of debates and attendant divisions at the CND suggest, reaching a new global consensus necessary to amend the conventions to allow for regulated cannabis markets is not realistic in the foreseeable future, if ever. |doi-access=free }} Provisions for treaty revision in the conventions allow changes to be easily blocked by states supporting a more prohibitive approach.{{Cite journal |last=Bewley-Taylor |first=David R. |date=April 2003 |title=Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities |url=https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/challenging_the_un_drug_control_conventions.pdf |journal=International Journal of Drug Policy |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=171–179 |doi=10.1016/S0955-3959(03)00005-7 |quote=... changing the regime is problematic. The provisions concerning treaty revision in all the Conventions permit those nations supporting the current prohibition based system to easily block change. Within the UN drug control system procedures and politics are inextricably entwined.}} The 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention marked the only successful attempt to modify the drug conventions to date.{{Citation needed|date=September 2024}}

Apart from formal amendment, there other the options. Countries can of withdraw entirely, or withdraw and re-accede with a reservation, as in the case of Bolivia's coca leaf exception. Another option is inter se treaty modification, provided for in the VCLT,{{Refn|Before VCLT Article 41, there were no standardized rules for inter se modification, but certain practices could still be considered customary international law if they were widely accepted and followed by states: "only arid formalism would insist that a rule such as that contained in article 41 was not a 'rule of international law'."{{Cite journal |last1=Boister |first1=Neil |last2=Jelsma |first2=Martin |date=October 2018 |title=Inter se Modification of the UN Drug Control Conventions: An Exploration of its Applicability to Legitimise the Legal Regulation of Cannabis Markets |journal=International Community Law Review |volume=20 |issue=5 |pages=456–492 |doi=10.1163/18719732-12341385 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328524287|via=ResearchGate}}|group=note}} where two or more countries create a sub-treaty framework and modify certain convention provisions, such as for cannabis, to their needs; additional countries could accede at later dates.{{Sfn|Bewley-Taylor|2020}} A 2023 policy paper on treaty-compliant approaches to cannabis regulation within the EU explored 11 potential options under a variety of scenarios.{{Refn|In the European Union, it has been argued that the inter se amendment may not be possible under the current Treaty of Lisbon (Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 to 334 TFEU) which "deleted previously-existing provisions facilitating inter se between EU Member States"|group=note}}

Three Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) sessions have been held on the subject of drugs: "Drug abuse" (1990), "World drug problem" (1998), and "World drug problem" (2016). These high-level gatherings, involving heads of state and ministers, are documented usually in the form of a political declaration, an action plan, or a strategy{{cite book |last1=Ruder |first1=Nicole |url=https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-new-york/en/documents/UN_GA__Final.pdf |title=The GA Handbook: A practical guide to the United Nations General Assembly |last2=Nakano |first2=Kenji |last3=Aeschlimann |first3=Johann |date=2017 |publisher=Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations |isbn=978-0-615-49660-3 |editor1-last=Aeschlimann |editor1-first=Johann |edition=2nd |location=New York |pages=14–15 |editor2-last=Regan |editor2-first=Mary}} that provide additional treaty guidance. These sessions can indicate whether the status quo will be maintained or if there is a broad openness to reform.{{Cite web |last=Hudak |first=John |date=Apr 7, 2016 |title=UNGASS and the consequences of international drug policy |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ungass-and-the-consequences-of-international-drug-policy/ |access-date=Sep 13, 2024 |website=Brookings Institution |quote=... the eyes of the drug policy community will be fixated on the United Nations. As the [2016] United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem draws near, the future of international drug policy is at stake. Questions abound about whether UNGASS will push forward the status quo or be open to reform. Will recent changes to drug laws in states across the U.S., and in member countries like Uruguay, Canada, Colombia, Spain, Mexico, and others drive the international body to shift away from a powerfully prohibitionist position?}}

In March 2016, the INCB stated that the UN drug treaties do not mandate a "war on drugs" and that the choice is not between "'militarized' drug law enforcement on one hand and the legalization of non-medical use of drugs on the other", health and welfare should be the focus of drug policy.[http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unisnar1264.html INCB Report 2015 ] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170426031831/http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unisnar1264.html|date=April 26, 2017}} United Nations Information Service 2.3.2016. That April, at the UNGASS on the "World drug problem", the Wall Street Journal assessed the attendees' positions as "somewhat" in two camps: "Some European and South American countries as well as the U.S. favored softer approaches. Eastern countries such as China and Russia and most Muslim nations like Iran, Indonesia and Pakistan remained staunchly opposed."Fassihi, Farnaz, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-conference-on-drugs-ends-without-shift-in-policy-1461299583 "U.N. Conference on Drugs Ends Without Shift in Policy"], Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2016. Retrieved 2016-04-25. The outcome document recommended treatment, prevention and other public health measures, and committed to "intensifying our efforts to prevent and counter" drug production and trafficking, through, "inter alia, more effective drug-related crime prevention and law enforcement measures."{{Cite web |date=2016 |title=Outcome Document of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem |url=https://www.unodc.org/documents/postungass2016/outcome/V1603301-E.pdf |access-date=April 9, 2024 |website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime}}[http://enewspf.com/2016/04/21/public-statement-by-the-global-commission-on-drug-policy-on-ungass-2016 "Public Statement by the Global Commission on Drug Policy on UNGASS 2016"], Press release, April 21, 2016. Retrieved 2016-04-25. A statement signed by 189 civil society organizations criticized the 2016 outcome document, itemizing the lack of progress and calling out the "highly problematic, non-inclusive and non-transparent" process that made it possible for "a handful of vocal and regressive countries [to] block progressive language", resulting in "an expensive restatement of previous agreements and conventions".{{Cite web |date=March 14, 2016 |title=The UNGASS outcome document: Diplomacy or denialism? |url=https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-ungass-outcome-document-diplomacy-or-denialism |access-date=June 27, 2024 |website=Transnational Institute |quote=}}

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