Hamas#Recognition of Israel

{{short description|Palestinian political and military organization}}

{{other uses}}

{{redirect|Islamic Resistance Movement|other uses|Islamic Resistance (disambiguation) }}

{{for|their military wing, often also referred to as just "Hamas" in Israeli sources|Al-Qassam Brigades}}

{{protection padlock|small=yes}}

{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2024}}

{{Infobox political party

| country = Palestine

| name = Islamic Resistance Movement

| native_name = {{nobold|{{lang|ar|حركة المقاومة الإسلامية}}}}

| colorcode = {{party color|Hamas}}

| logo = Emblem of Hamas.svg

| caption = Emblem of Hamas' political wing

| leader1_title = Chairman of the Political Bureau

| leader1_name = Hamas temporary committee (acting){{efn|Consists of Khaled Mashal, Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammad Ismail Darwish, and an unnamed senior member of Hamas.}}{{Cite news |title=Hamas to be temporarily led by five-member ruling committee |url=https://thearabweekly.com/hamas-be-temporarily-led-five-member-ruling-committee |access-date=2024-10-24 |work=The Arab Weekly |language=en}}{{Cite news |title=Who will lead Hamas after killing of Yahya Sinwar? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04p04lq27ko |access-date=2024-10-24 |work=BBC |language=en}}

| leader2_title = Deputy Chairman of the Political Bureau

| leader2_name = Vacant{{efn|Khalil al-Hayya, who served as deputy chairman under Yahya Sinwar, is a member of the quinquevirate leadership that will lead Hamas until the next election that will take place in March 2025.{{citation needed|date=January 2025}}{{update needed|date=April 2025}}}}

| leader3_title = Chairman of the Shura Council

| leader3_name = Muhammad Ismail Darwish

| leader4_title = Leader in the Gaza Strip

| leader4_name = Mohammed Sinwar

| leader5_title = Military commander

| leader5_name = Mohammed Sinwar

| wing1_title = Military wing

| wing1 = Al-Qassam Brigades

| foundation = {{start date and age|df=y|10 December 1987}}

| founders = {{unbulleted list|Ahmed Yassin{{Assassinated|Killing of Ahmed Yassin}}|Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi{{Assassinated|Assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi}} }}

{{Collapsible list

| title = {{nobold|...{{nbsp}}and others}}

| Mahmoud al-Zahar

| Mohammad Taha

| Imad al-Alami{{cite news |last1=Downs |first1=Ray |title=Hamas leader dead after 'accidental' gunshot to head |url=https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2018/01/31/Hamas-leader-dead-after-accidental-gunshot-to-head/7131517379007/ |access-date=31 January 2024 |work=UPI |archive-date=7 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231207194243/https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2018/01/31/Hamas-leader-dead-after-accidental-gunshot-to-head/7131517379007/ |url-status=live }}

| Abdul Fatah Dukhan{{sfn|Abdelal|2016|p=122}}

| Ibrahim Fares Al-Yazouri{{sfn|Dalloul|2017}}

| 'Isa al-Nashshar{{sfn|Abu-Amr|1993|p=10}}

| Ibrahim Quqa{{sfn|Litvak|1998|p=151}}

| Mohammed Hassan Shama'a{{sfn|Barzak|2011}}

| Hassan Yousef{{sfn|AFP|2019}}

}}

| ideology = {{ubl|

|{{nowrap|Palestinian nationalism{{sfn|Dalacoura|2012|pp=66–67}}{{harvnb|Gelvin|2014|p=226}}: "As with Islamic political organizations elsewhere, Hamas offers its followers an ideology that appropriates the universal message of Islam for what is, in effect, a nationalist struggle."}}

|{{nowrap|Islamic nationalism{{sfn|Dalacoura|2012|pp=66–67}}{{sfn|Stepanova|2008|p=113}}{{harvnb|Cheema|2008|p=465}}: "Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation. The organisation's leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam. Since its inception, Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam. [...] Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic-nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda."{{harvnb|Litvak|2004|pp=156–57}}: "Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology."}}

|{{nowrap|Islamic fundamentalism{{Cite journal |last=Klein |first=Menachem |date=2007 |title=Hamas in Power |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4330419 |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=61 |issue=3 |pages=442–459 |doi=10.3751/61.3.13 |jstor=4330419 |issn=0026-3141}}{{Cite news |last=May |first=Tiffany |date=8 October 2023 |title=A Quick Look at Hamas |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/middleeast/hamas-military-gaza-explained.html |access-date=25 September 2024 |work=The New York Times}}{{cite web |last1=Maqdsi |first1=Muhammad |title=Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine |url=https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/attachments/jps-articles/2538093.pdf |website=Palestine Studies |publisher=University of California Press |access-date=20 March 2024 |archive-date=27 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240227022635/https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/attachments/jps-articles/2538093.pdf |url-status=live }}}}

|Islamism{{sfn|Dalacoura|2012|pp=66–67}}{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=270}}

|Anti-Zionism{{sfn|Mishal|Sela|2006}}

}}

| position = Right-wing{{Cite book|last1=Mabon|first1=Simon|last2=Ardovini|first2=Lucia|title=Sectarianism in the Contemporary Middle East|publisher=Routledge|location=London|quote=From a political perspective, Hamas ideologically leans more to a right-wing view in its political sense...|year=2018|ISBN=9781315097930}}{{Cite web|url=https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/is-hamas-left-wing-or-right-wing/|title=Is Hamas left-wing or right-wing?|date=1 January 2024|access-date=3 April 2025|website=The Times of Israel|author=Michael Jackson}}

| religion = Sunni Islam

| flag = Hamas Emblem Flag White Variant with Colored Emblem.svg{{!}}border

| logo_alt = Emblem of Hamas, featuring map of Palestine, dome of Al-Aqsa, two Palestinian flags, and two swords

| website = {{URL|https://hamasinfo.info/}}{{dead link|date=February 2025}}

| split =

| headquarters = Gaza City, Gaza Strip

| affiliation1_title = Political alliance

| affiliation1 = Alliance of Palestinian Forces

| international = Axis of Resistance (informal)

| colours = {{color box|{{party color|Hamas}}|border=darkgray}} Green

| seats1_title = Palestinian Legislative Council

| seats1 = {{composition bar|74|132|hex={{party color|Hamas}}}}

}}

The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas{{efn|{{IPAc-en|UK|h|ə|ˈ|m|æ|s}} {{respell|hə|MASS}}, {{IPAc-en|US|h|ə|ˈ|m|ɑː|s|audio=Hamas pronunciation.mp3}} {{respell|hə|MAHSS}};{{cite web |title=Hamas, n. meanings, etymology and more |website=Oxford English Dictionary |url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/hamas_n}} {{langx|ar|حَمَاس|Ḥamās}}, {{IPA|ar|ħaˈmaːs|IPA|LL-Q55633582 (ajp)-Mohammad-LPA-حماس.wav}}{{cite magazine |last=Taraki |first=Lisa |date=January–February 1989 |title=The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising |url=https://merip.org/1989/01/the-islamic-resistance-movement-in-the-palestinian-uprising/ |url-status=live |magazine=Middle East Report |location=Tacoma, WA |publisher=MERIP |issue=156 |pages=30–32 |doi=10.2307/3012813 |issn=0899-2851 |jstor=3012813 |oclc=615545050 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220201212246/https://merip.org/1989/01/the-islamic-resistance-movement-in-the-palestinian-uprising/ |archive-date=February 1, 2022 |access-date=February 1, 2022}}}} (the Arabic acronym from {{langx|ar|حركة المقاومة الإسلامية|rtl=yes|translit=Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah}}),{{cite web |title= HAMAS |date= September 2022 |accessdate= February 4, 2024 |website= National Counterterrorism Center |publisher= Director of National Intelligence#Office of the Director of National Intelligence |url= https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html |archive-date= 1 November 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231101140852/https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html |url-status= live }}{{efn| commonly {{langx|ar|حركة حماس|Haraka Hamas|Hamas Movement}}. }} is a Palestinian nationalist Sunni Islamist{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Anthony |title=The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding |last2=Ireland |first2=Carol |last3=Ireland |first3=Jane |last4=Lewis |first4=Michael |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2020 |isbn=9780429588952 |pages=239 |quote=The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s. It used terrorist attacks against civilians - particularly suicide bombings – to help build a larger movement, going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority.}} political organisation with a military wing, the Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip since 2007.{{sfn|Kear|2018|p=22}}{{Cite news |date=2023-10-08 |title=What is Hamas? A simple guide to the armed Palestinian group |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group |url-status=deviated |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231008152411/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group |archive-date=2023-10-08 |access-date=2024-06-26 |work=Al Jazeera}}

The Hamas movement was founded by Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin in 1987, after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation. It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.{{Cite news |last=Higgins |first=Andrew |date=January 24, 2009 |title=How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123275572295011847 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=January 25, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090926212507/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275572295011847.html |archive-date=September 26, 2009 |quote=When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank. 'When I look back at the chain of events I think we made a mistake,' says David Hacham, who worked in Gaza in the late 1980s and early '90s as an Arab-affairs expert in the Israeli military. 'But at the time nobody thought about the possible results.' Israeli officials who served in Gaza disagree on how much their own actions may have contributed to the rise of Hamas. They blame the group's recent ascent on outsiders, primarily Iran. This view is shared by the Israeli government. 'Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power, and is backed through funding, through training and through the provision of advanced weapons,' Mr. Olmert said last Saturday. Hamas has denied receiving military assistance from Iran.}} In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council by campaigning on promises of a corruption-free government and advocating for resistance as a means to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation.{{Cite web |title=Hamas wins huge majority |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/1/26/hamas-wins-huge-majority |access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}{{Cite news |last=McGreal |first=Chris |date=2006-01-27 |title=Hamas faces unexpected challenge: how to deal with power |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/27/israel |access-date=2024-08-05 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}} In the Battle of Gaza, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah,{{sfn|Davis|2017|pp=67–69}}{{sfn|Mukhimer|2012|pp=vii, 58}} and has since governed the territory separately from the Palestinian National Authority. After Hamas's takeover, Israel significantly intensified existing movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip.{{Cite web |title=The Gaza Strip {{!}} The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade – June 2022 |url=https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240409204047/https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022 |archive-date=9 April 2024 |access-date=7 August 2024 }} Egypt began its blockade of Gaza in 2007. This was followed by multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and an ongoing one since 2023, which began with the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel.

Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context.{{harvnb|Gelvin|2014|p=226}} While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.{{harvnb|Seurat|2019|pp=17–19}}: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."* {{harvnb|Baconi|2018|pp=114–116}}: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *{{harvnb|Roy|2013|p=210}}: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|pp=82}}: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders." In 2017, Hamas released a new charter{{cite news |date=2 May 2017 |title=Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders |publisher=Al Jazeera}} that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders:

  • {{cite book |author=Bjorn Brenner |title=Gaza Under Hamas |date=2022 |publisher=I. B. Tauris |page=206 |ref=none}}
  • {{cite book |author=Mohammed Ayoob |title=The Many Faces of Political Islam, Second Edition |publisher=University of Michigan Press |page=133 |ref=none}}
  • {{cite book |author=Maria Koinova |title=Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=150 |ref=none}}
  • {{harvnb|Zartman|2020|p=230}}
  • {{cite book |title=Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |editor=Asaf Siniver |ref=none}}
  • {{harvnb|Seurat|2019|pp=61–62}}{{cite news |date=9 October 2023 |title=What does Israel's declaration of war mean for Palestinians in Gaza? |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/what-does-israels-declaration-of-war-mean-for-palestinians-in-gaza |publisher=Al Jazeera}}{{cite news |date=22 September 2023 |title=What will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict look like in 30 years? |url=https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-760004 |website=The Jerusalem Post |quote=Even Hamas in 2017 said it was ready to accept a Palestinian state with 1967 borders if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians.}} Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years{{cite journal |author=Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod |date=2008 |title=Reframing Sacred Values |url=https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Negotiation Journal |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=221–246 |doi=10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240121114409/https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf |archive-date=21 January 2024 |access-date=20 March 2024}}) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as consistent with a two-state solution,* {{cite book |author=Halim Rane |title=Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms |year=2009 |page=34 |quote=Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."}}
  • {{cite book |author=Loren D. Lybarger |title=Palestinian Chicago |publisher=University of California Press |year=2020 |page=199 |quote=Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).}}
  • {{cite book |author=Tristan Dunning |title=Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy |publisher=Routledge |year=2016 |pages=179–180}}{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|p=108}}: "Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that 'a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.'" while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.{{cite journal |last1=Alsoos |first1=Imad |date=2021 |title=From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |volume=57 |issue=5 |pages=833–856 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006 |s2cid=234860010 |doi-access=free}} While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic,{{cite book |author=Qossay Hamed |title=Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation |publisher=IGI Global |year=2023 |page=161}} Hamas's 2017 charter {{Cite web |last=HAMAS |title=Hamas 2017 Document of General Principles & Policies |url=https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf |website=Federation of American Scientists}} removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=17}}{{Cite news |last=Amira |first=Hass |date=3 May 2017 |title=Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis |url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2017-05-03/ty-article/.premium/why-hamas-new-charter-is-aimed-at-palestinians-not-israelis/0000017f-eabf-d0f7-a9ff-eeffc7ec0000 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20230423130642/https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2017-05-03/ty-article/.premium/why-hamas-new-charter-is-aimed-at-palestinians-not-israelis/0000017f-eabf-d0f7-a9ff-eeffc7ec0000 |archive-date=23 April 2023 |access-date=12 November 2024 |work=Haaretz}}{{cite book |author=Timea Spitka |title=National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |publisher=Springer International Publishing |year=2023 |pages=88–89}}{{cite news |date=6 May 2017 |title=Khaled Meshaal: Struggle is against Israel, not Jews |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2017/5/6/khaled-meshaal-struggle-is-against-israel-not-jews |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231119044505/https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2017/5/6/khaled-meshaal-struggle-is-against-israel-not-jews |archive-date=19 November 2023 |access-date=19 November 2023 |publisher=Al-Jazeera}} It has been debated whether the charter has reflected an actual change in policy.{{Cite journal |last=Hroub |first=Khaled |date=2017 |title=A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26378710 |journal=Journal of Palestine Studies |volume=46 |issue=4 (184) |pages=100–111 |doi=10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.100 |issn=0377-919X |jstor=26378710 |quote=In a similar vein, Hamas's description of itself appears in a section titled “The Movement” that is couched in language quite different from the 1988 charter. Here, Hamas stresses the nationalist and resistance aspects of its purpose far more than the religious and pan-Islamic ones...Framing the struggle in nationalist terms is not only a novel element of the 2017 document but it is repeatedly emphasized and clearly articulated...Hamas makes plain that the “conflict is with the Zionist project, not with the Jews because of their religion...The new document offers a definitive framing of the struggle against Zionism and Israel as having nothing to do with religion...In “The Position toward Occupation and Political Solutions,” the document articulates a stance that reflects the movement's internal consensus on the two-state solution, that is, the creation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines...The “Resistance and Liberation” portion of the new document is also quite different in its language from the 1988 charter and other past statements. Here, there is a clear assertion of the right to a national liberation struggle on the basis of international law."}}{{cite journal |last=Spoerl |first=Joseph S. |year=2020 |title=Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26870795 |url-status=live |journal=Jewish Political Studies Review |publisher=Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs |volume=31 |issue=1/2 |pages=210–244 |issn=0792-335X |jstor=26870795 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116061115/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26870795 |archive-date=16 January 2024 |access-date=27 January 2024 |quote=Strictly speaking, the Hamas Covenant of 1988 focused its anti-Semitic language on Zionists, for example, describing The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the blueprint for the Zionist project (Article 32) and accusing the Zionists of aiming to "annihilate Islam" (Article 28). The May 2017 "Document" continues in this vein, albeit in somewhat less florid language, asserting that "the Zionist project does not target the Palestinian people alone; it is the enemy of the Arabic and Islamic Ummah posing a grave threat to its security and interests. It is also hostile to the Ummah's aspirations for unity, renaissance, and liberation and has been the major source of its troubles. The Zionist project also poses a danger to international security and peace and to mankind…." (#15). As in the 1988 Covenant, the 2017 "Document" merely takes all the classical tropes of anti-Semitism and focuses them on Zionism, noting that "it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity" (#16). In effect, Hamas is saying that it is at war with all Jews except those who are anti-Zionist, thus it is not anti-Semitic. This can hardly be regarded as a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism.}}

In terms of foreign policy, Hamas has historically sought out relations with Egypt,{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=88}} Iran,{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=88}} Qatar,{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=181}} Saudi Arabia,{{cite news|author=Samuel Ramani|title=Hamas's Pivot to Saudi Arabia|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/09/hamass-pivot-to-saudi-arabia?lang=en|publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|date=2015-09-01}} Syria{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=88}} and Turkey;{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=254}} some of its relations have been impacted by the Arab Spring.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=115,214}}{{Clarify|reason=This sentence is too vague and also misleading. See Talk:Hamas#No vague, meaningless (and even deceiving) sentences please, in the lead section (about “foreign relations”…) |date=May 2024}} Hamas and Israel have engaged in protracted armed conflict. Key aspects of the conflict include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, water rights,{{cite web |title=Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |url=http://www.international.gc.ca/name-anmo/peace_process-processus_paix/canadian_policy-politique_canadienne.aspx?lang=eng |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180218143423/http://www.international.gc.ca/name-anmo/peace_process-processus_paix/canadian_policy-politique_canadienne.aspx?lang=eng |archive-date=18 February 2018 |access-date=13 March 2010 |publisher=Government of Canada}} the permit regime, Palestinian freedom of movement,{{cite web |date=9 May 2007 |title=Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy |url=http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WestBankrestrictions9Mayfinal.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100410135638/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WestBankrestrictions9Mayfinal.pdf |archive-date=10 April 2010 |access-date=29 March 2010 |publisher=World Bank |quote=Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions}} and the Palestinian right of return. Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians, including using suicide bombings, as well as launching rockets at Israeli cities. Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union, have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2018 and 2023, a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected.{{efn|A two-thirds majority was required for the motion to pass. 87 voted in favour, 58 against, 32 abstained and 16 did not vote.{{sfn|DW|2018}}}}{{Cite news |title=UN rejects US motion to condemn Hamas |url=https://www.dw.com/en/un-general-assembly-rejects-us-resolution-to-condemn-hamas/a-46623413 |access-date=2024-08-05 |work=dw.com |publisher=Deutsche Welle |language=en}}{{Cite web |title=General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling for Immediate, Sustained Humanitarian Truce Leading to Cessation of Hostilities between Israel, Hamas {{!}} Meetings Coverage and Press Releases |url=https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12548.doc.htm |access-date=2025-03-25 |website=press.un.org}}

Etymology

Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase {{lang|ar|حركة المقاومة الإسلامية}} or {{transliteration|ar|Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah}}, meaning "Islamic Resistance Movement". This acronym, HMS, was glossed in the 1988 Hamas Covenant{{sfn|Jefferis|2016|p=119}} by the Arabic word {{transliteration|ar|ḥamās}} ({{lang|ar|حماس}}) which itself means "zeal", "strength", or "bravery".{{sfn|Herzog|2006|p=84}}

History

{{main|History of Hamas}}

Hamas was established in 1987, and allegedly has its origins in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood movement, which had been active in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s and gained influence through a network of mosques and various charitable and social organizations. Unlike other Palestinian factions, after the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1967, the Brotherhood in Gaza refused to join the resistance boycott against Israel.{{sfn|Filiu|2012|p=55}} In the 1980s, it emerged as a powerful political factor, challenging the influence of the PLO, whose Fatah faction it had played a core role in creating.{{sfn|Filiu|2012|p=55}} In December 1987, the Brotherhood adopted a more nationalist and activist line under the name of Hamas.{{sfn|Filiu|2012|p=66}} Hamas was initially discreetly supported by Israel as a counter-balance to the secular PLO.{{cite book |last1=Khalidi |first1=Rashid |title=The Hundred Years' War on Palestine |date=2020 |publisher=Metropolitan Books |isbn=978-1-627-79855-6 |page=223}} During the 1990s and early 2000s, the organization conducted numerous suicide bombings and other attacks against Israel.{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6NRYEr8FR1IC|title=The Palestinian People: A History|last=Kimmerling|first=Baruch|year=2009|page=372|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=9780674039599|access-date=July 31, 2024}}

In the Palestinian legislative election of January 2006, Hamas gained a large majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament, defeating the ruling Fatah party. After the elections, conflicts arose between Hamas and Fatah, which they were unable to resolve.[http://www.ifcj.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13130 "The Gangs of Gaza"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100708081039/http://www.ifcj.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13130 |date=2010-07-08 }}, Newsweek, June 26, 2006.al-Mughrabi, Nidal and Assadi, Mohammed. [http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03862017.htm Palestinian in-fighting provokes despair, frustration] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081207211606/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03862017.htm |date=2008-12-07 }}, Reuters, October 3, 2006.{{cite news|title=The Palestinian National Unity Government|url=http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/inss022407.htm|accessdate=June 4, 2010|date=February 24, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110814062056/http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/inss022407.htm|archive-date=August 14, 2011|url-status=live}} In June 2007, Hamas defeated Fatah in a series of violent clashes, and since that time Hamas has governed the Gaza portion of the Palestinian Territories, while at the same time they were ousted from government positions in the West Bank.{{cite news|title=Who are Hamas?|publisher=BBC News|date=January 26, 2006|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1654510.stm|location=London|access-date=September 23, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160124204240/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1654510.stm|archive-date=January 24, 2016|url-status=live}}[http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/exposing-the-bitter-truth-of-gaza-carnage/2007/06/22/1182019365851.html Exposing the bitter truth of Gaza carnage] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090113182446/http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/exposing-the-bitter-truth-of-gaza-carnage/2007/06/22/1182019365851.html |date=2009-01-13 }} The Age, June 23, 2007 Israel and Egypt then imposed an economic blockade on Gaza and largely sealed their borders with the territory.[http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/09/africa/ME-GEN-Israel-Palestinians.php "Gaza faces economic disaster if blockade continues, U.N. official warns"] International Herald TribuneDion Nissenbaum. [http://washingtonbureau.typepad.com/jerusalem/2008/12/olmert-aide-supports-free-gaza.html "Olmert aide supports free Gaza"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006090950/http://washingtonbureau.typepad.com/jerusalem/2008/12/olmert-aide-supports-free-gaza.html |date=2014-10-06 }}. McClatchy Newspapers. December 8, 2008.

After acquiring control of Gaza, Hamas-affiliated and other militias launched rocket attacks upon Israel, which Hamas ceased in June 2008 following an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire.{{cite web|date=December 2008 |title=The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement pdf |work=Tel Aviv Terrorism Information Center |url=http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e017.pdf |accessdate=October 15, 2009 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20091013120923/http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e017.pdf |archivedate=October 13, 2009 }} The ceasefire broke down late in 2008, with each side accusing the other of responsibility.[http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3626260,00.html Qassam lands in western Negev, no injuries] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110106123823/http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3626260,00.html |date=2011-01-06 }} Ynet News November 20, 2008 In late December 2008, Israel attacked Gaza,{{cite web|url=http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232292897399&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813132815/http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232292897399&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull |archivedate=August 13, 2011 |date=January 19, 2009 |title=Pool of 8 foreign journalists allowed into Gaza |first=Etgar |last=Lefkovits |url-status=dead }} withdrawing its forces in mid-January 2009.[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5558389.ece "Israel withdraws its troops from Gaza"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110510005808/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5558389.ece |date=2011-05-10 }} Times Online Since 2009, Hamas has faced multiple military confrontations with Israel, notably the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, leading to substantial casualties. Hamas has maintained control over Gaza, often clashing with the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. Efforts at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah have seen limited success. Hamas continued to face international isolation and blockades, while engaging in sporadic rocket attacks and tunnel construction activities against Israel.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian militants attacked Israel killing nearly 1,200 Israelis, about two thirds of them civilians.{{cite news |title=Israel social security data reveals true picture of Oct 7 deaths |date=15 December 2023 |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231215-israel-social-security-data-reveals-true-picture-of-oct-7-deaths |work=France 24 |access-date=4 January 2024 |archive-date=17 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231217222630/https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231215-israel-social-security-data-reveals-true-picture-of-oct-7-deaths |url-status=live }} Approximately 250 Israeli civilians and soldiers were taken to the Gaza Strip, with the aim of securing the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel (as part of a prisoner swap).{{cite news |author=Al Jazeera Staff |title=Hamas says it has enough Israeli captives to free all Palestinian prisoners |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/hamas-says-it-has-enough-israeli-captives-to-free-all-palestinian-prisoners |work=Al Jazeera |language=en}} Hamas said its attack was in response to Israel's continued occupation, blockade of Gaza, and settlements expansion, as well as alleged threats to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the plight of Palestinians.{{#invoke:cite news||date=7 October 2023|title=Fears of a ground invasion of Gaza grow as Israel vows 'mighty vengeance'|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/world-is-watching-fears-grow-of-a-massive-gaza-invasion-by-israel|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=8 October 2023|archive-date=8 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231008024318/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/world-is-watching-fears-grow-of-a-massive-gaza-invasion-by-israel|url-status=live}} There are also reports of sexual violence by Hamas militants, allegations that Hamas has denied.{{Cite web |title=Hamas says October 7 attack on Israel was a 'necessary step' |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/21/hamas-says-october-7-attack-was-a-necessary-step-admits-to-some-faults |access-date=2025-01-22 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}} Israel responded by invading the Gaza Strip, killing over 70,000 Palestinians, 59.1% of them women, children and the elderly according to a peer-reviewed study in The Lancet.{{Cite journal |last1=Jamaluddine |first1=Zeina |last2=Abukmail |first2=Hanan |last3=Aly |first3=Sarah |last4=Campbell |first4=Oona M R |last5=Checchi |first5=Francesco |date=January 2025 |title=Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture–recapture analysis |journal=The Lancet |volume=405 |issue=10477 |pages=469–477 |language=en |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02678-3 |doi-access=free|pmid=39799952 }}

On 31 July 2024, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, after attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian.{{Cite news |last1=Al-Mughrabi |first1=Nidal |last2=Hafezi |first2=Parisa |date=2024-07-31 |title=Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh killed in Iran, Hamas says |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-chief-ismail-haniyeh-killed-iran-hamas-says-statement-2024-07-31/ |access-date=2024-08-02 |work=Reuters}} In August 2024, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was elected chairman of the group, replacing Haniyeh. Per Hamas officials, he was elected due to his considerable popularity in the Arab and Islamic worlds following the 7 October attacks and his strong connections with Iran and the "Axis of Resistance," an informal Iranian-led political and military coalition.{{Cite web |title=Behind the scenes as Hamas chose its new leader |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyl3yg7wzzo |access-date=2024-08-09 |website=www.bbc.com |date=8 August 2024 |language=en-GB}}{{Cite web |last1=Khadder |first1=Kareem|last2=Lister|first2= Tim |first3=Abeer |last3=Salman | first4=Eyad |last4=Kourdi | first5= Tara | last5=John |date=2024-08-06 |title=Hamas names Oct. 7 architect Yahya Sinwar new political leader. What does it mean for ceasefire talks? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/06/middleeast/hamas-yahya-sinwar-political-bureau-intl-latam/index.html |access-date=2024-08-09 |website=CNN |language=en}} On 16 October 2024, IDF troops killed Sinwar during a routine patrol and a chance encounter in southern Rafah.{{Cite news |first=Graeme |last=Baker |title=How Israel killed enemy number one Yahya Sinwar |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czj9zzz8xm7o |date=17 October 2024 |access-date=19 October 2024 |publisher=BBC News |language=en-GB}} In January 2025, the Wall Street Journal, citing Israeli sources, reported that Sinwar's younger brother, Mohammed Sinwar (aka Shadow), was leading Hamas. It's sources said that Israel were "working hard to find him" and that Izz al-Din Haddad, of al-Qassam Brigades, were the two most senior commanders in the Gaza Strip.{{cite web |title=Hamas Has Another Sinwar. And He's Rebuilding. |url=https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-has-another-sinwar-and-hes-rebuilding-0a16031d |publisher=The Wall Street Journal |access-date=14 January 2025 |date=13 January 2025}} On 19 January 2025, a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel went into effect.

On 18 March 2025, Israel broke the ceasefire and shelling of the territory continued.{{Cite news |last=Badshah |first=Nadeem |last2=Ambrose |first2=Tom |last3=Lowe |first3=Yohannes |last4=Belam |first4=Martin |last5=Lamb |first5=Kate |last6=Livingstone |first6=Helen |last7= |first7= |last8= |first8= |date=2025-03-18 |title=Israel strikes that shattered ceasefire ‘just the beginning’, Netanyahu says, after deadliest 24 hours in Gaza since 2023 – as it happened |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/mar/18/israel-gaza-live-blog-updates-air-strikes-strip-netanyahu-hamas?CMP=share_btn_url&page=with:block-67d947cb8f08d62d8e6fac79#block-67d947cb8f08d62d8e6fac79 |access-date= |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}{{Cite news |last=Hasson |first=Nir |date=2025-03-27 |title=In one of the Gaza war's darkest nights, the IDF killed nearly 300 women and children |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-03-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/in-one-of-the-gaza-wars-darkest-nights-the-idf-killed-nearly-300-women-and-children/00000195-d949-da7e-adb7-f9d9e5760000 |access-date= |work=Haaretz |language=en}}

Policies towards Israel and Palestine

Hamas' policy towards Israel has evolved. Historically, Hamas envisioned a Palestinian state on all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea).{{sfn|O'Malley|2015|p=118}} In 2006, Hamas signed the Palestinian Prisoners' Document which supports the quest for a Palestinian state[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5052288.stm Abbas risks all with vote strategy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231027111839/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5052288.stm|date=27 October 2023}}. Roger Hardy, BBC, 8 June 2006{{harvnb|Seurat|2019|p=47}} "on all territories occupied in 1967".{{Cite web |title=National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners (28 June 2006) - Non-UN document |url=https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208621/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241115223555/https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208621/ |archive-date=2024-11-15 |access-date=2024-12-15 |website=Question of Palestine |language=en-US |quote=The Palestinian people in the homeland and in the Diaspora seek and struggle to liberate their land and remove the settlements and evacuate the settlers and remove the apartheid and annexation and separation wall and to achieve their right to freedom, return and independence and to exercise their right to self-determination, including the right to establish their independent state with al-Quds al-Shareef as its capital on all territories occupied in 1967, and to secure the right of return for refugees to their homes and properties from which they were evicted and to compensate them and to liberate all prisoners and detainees without any discrimination and all of this is based on the historical right of our people on the land of our forefathers and based on the UN Charter and international law and legitimacy in a way that does not affect the rights of our people.}} This document also recognized authority of the President of the Palestinian National Authority to negotiate with Israel. Hamas also signed the Cairo Declaration in 2005, which emphasized the goal of ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|pp=82}}: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders." On 2 May 2017, Khaled Mashal, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau, presented a new Charter, in which Hamas accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state "on the basis of June 4, 1967" (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem). But the new Charter did not recognize Israel nor relinquish Palestinian claims to all of historical Palestine.{{cite news |date=2 May 2017 |title=Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders |publisher=Al Jazeera}} Many scholars saw Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders as a tacit acceptance of another entity on the other side{{sfn|Brenner|2022|p=206}}{{sfn|Zartman|2020|p=230}}{{cite book |author1=Jacqueline S. Ismael |title=Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East Continuity and Change |author2=Tareq Y. Ismael |author3=Glenn Perry |publisher=Routledge |year=2011 |isbn=9780415491440 |page=67}} while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.{{cite journal |last1=Alsoos |first1=Imad |date=2021 |title=From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |volume=57 |issue=5 |pages=833–856 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006 |s2cid=234860010 |doi-access=free}}

= Truce proposals =

The founder of Hamas, sheikh Ahmed Yassin, has offered Israel a ten-year hudna (armistice) in return for complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in the 1967 war and establishing a Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza. Later, Yassin has stated that this hudna could be renewed for 30, 40 or even 100 years.{{cite journal|author=Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod|title=Reframing Sacred Values|url=https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf|journal=Negotiation Journal|date=2008|volume=24|issue=3|page=238|doi=10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=21 January 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240121114409/https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf|url-status=live}} Hamas's spokesperson, Ahmed Yousef, has said that a "hudna" is more than a ceasefire and it "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=179}} Under Islamic international law, a hudna is a binding and the Qur'an prohibits its violation.{{cite web| date=October 2010 |last1=Tuastad |first1=Dag |title=The Hudna: Hamas's Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire|publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo|url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126174/The%20Hudna%20-%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%2009-2010.pdf}}

Hamas first proposed a hudna in 1999. In exchange Israel would have to end the occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip and release all Palestinian prisoners. The 1999 proposal did not mention the issues of the return of the Palestinian refugees or Hamas’s recognition of Israel, but interviewed Hamas leaders in 2010 added that the right of return should be accepted in principle by Israel (without direct actual implementation). Israel and Hamas should use the period of calm (armistice) for negotiating these two issues; if they would also be settled the temporary peace would convert into a permanent peace agreement.

In 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, shortly after being elected as Prime Minister, sent messages both to US President George W. Bush and to Israel's leaders, offering a long-term truce. Neither Israel nor the United States responded. Haniyeh's proposal reportedly was a fifty-year armistice with Israel, if a Palestinian state is created along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.{{cite book |author=Sumantra Bose |title=Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka |publisher=Harvard University Press |page=283}} A Hamas official added that the armistice would renew automatically each time.{{sfn|Slater|2020|p=285}} In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel. A similar proposal was once again offered by Hamas to Israel in November 2006.{{sfn|Brenner|2022|p=36}}

In November 2008, in a meeting, on Gaza Strip soil, with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh re-stated that Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state "in the territories of 1967" (Gaza Strip and West Bank), and offered Israel a long-term truce if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights; and stated that Israel rejected this proposal. A Hamas finance minister around 2018 contended that such a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same".{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=108|ps=" Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that "a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.""}}

Mkhaimer Abusada, a political scientist at Al Azhar University, wrote in 2008 that Hamas talks "of hudna [temporary ceasefire], not of peace or reconciliation with Israel. They believe over time they will be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine."{{Cite news |last=Erlanger |first=Steven |date=2008-04-01 |title=In Gaza, Hamas's Insults to Jews Complicate Peace |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/world/middleeast/01hamas.html |access-date=2024-08-04 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}} Some scholars have noted that alongside offering a long-term truce, Hamas retains its objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.{{cite journal |last1=Alsoos |first1=Imad |date=2021 |title=From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |volume=57 |issue=5 |pages=833–856 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006 |s2cid=234860010 |doi-access=free}} Hamas originally proposed a 10-year truce, or hudna, to Israel, contingent on the creation of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin indicated that such truce could be extended for 30, 40, or even 100 years, but it would never signal a recognition of Israel. A Hamas official said that having an indefinite truce with Israel doesn't contradict Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel, comparing it to the Irish Republican Army's willingness to accept a permanent armistice with the United Kingdom without recognizing the UK's sovereignty over Northern Ireland.

= Recognition of Israel =

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.{{cite news |date=2 May 2017 |title=Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders |publisher=Al Jazeera}} But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005,{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|pp=82}}: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders." 2006,{{harvnb|Seurat|2019|pp=17–19}}: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012." and 2007{{cite book |last1=Kear |first1=Martin |url=https://www.routledge.com/Hamas-and-Palestine-The-Contested-Road-to-Statehood/Kear/p/book/9780367584450 |title=Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood |publisher=Routledge |year=2019 |isbn=9781138585416 |page=217 |format=Hardcover |quote="Without expressly stating as much, Hamas had agreed to ‘respect’ UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the once reviled Oslo Accords, and by extension, the problematic issue of Israel’s existence. While Hamas had previously proposed hudnas with Israel, this was the first time that they had signed any Agreement that tacitly accepted that any future Palestinian state would only consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. After the Agreement, Meshaal reiterated Hamas’s position concerning its understanding of what any prospective peace agreement with Israel would look like: that any Palestinian state should be established along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, acknowledgement of the right of return for all Palestinian refugees, the dismantling of all West Bank settlements, and the complete withdrawal of all vestiges of Israeli rule (Tamimi 2009 : 261; Caridi 2012 : 248). This truncated version of any future Palestinian state was a key ideological concession from Hamas that finally brought it in line with Fatah, and more importantly, with the views of most of the Palestinian public."}}) and in its 2017 charter.{{cite book |author1=Jacqueline S. Ismael |title=Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East Continuity and Change |author2=Tareq Y. Ismael |author3=Glenn Perry |publisher=Routledge|page=67|year=2011|isbn=9780415491440 }} Some scholars saw Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders as a tacit acceptance of another entity on the other side,{{sfn|Brenner|2022|p=206}}{{sfn|Zartman|2020|p=230}} while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.{{sfn|Mishal|Sela|2006|pp=109-110}}{{cite book |last1=Burke |first1=Paul|last2=Elnakhala |first2=Doaa'

|last3=Miller |first3=Seumas|title=Global Jihadist Terrorism: Terrorist Groups, Zones of Armed Conflict and National Counter-Terrorism Strategies|publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing

|year=2021|pages=60–61|isbn=978-1800371309|quote=In response to accusations of contradicting Hamas's original charter, its leaders emphasised that this move is an intermediary one, until the liberation of the remainder of Palestine becomes more feasible}}{{cite book |last1=Bar-On |first1=Tamir|last2=Bale |first2=Jeffrey M.|title=Fighting the Last War: Confusion, Partisanship, and Alarmism in the Literature on the Radical Right|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|year=2024|pages=145|isbn=978-1793639387|quote=there is no doubt that ... Hamas is focused on ... destroying the 'Zionist entity'}} Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.{{Cite book |last=Hroub |first=Khaled |title=Hamas: A Beginner's Guide |publisher=St. Martin's Press |year=2010 |isbn=9781783714667 |edition=2nd |pages=55 |chapter=Hamas, Israel and Judaism |quote="Would Hamas ever recognize Israel and conclude peace agreements with it? It is not inconceivable that Hamas would recognize Israel. Hamas’s pragmatism and its realistic approach to issues leave ample room for such a development. Yet most of the conditions that could create a conducive climate for such a step lie in the hands of the Israelis. As long as Israel refuses to acknowledge the basic rights of the Palestinian people in any end result based on the principle of a two-state solution, Hamas will find it impossible to recognize Israel."}}{{Cite web |title=Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility |url=https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/06/hamas-ideological-rigidity-and-political-flexibility |archive-url=https://archive.today/20231118211615/https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/06/hamas-ideological-rigidity-and-political-flexibility |url-status=dead |archive-date=18 November 2023 |access-date=2024-11-02 |website=United States Institute of Peace |pages=16–18 |language=en}}{{Cite news |date=2023-12-14 |title=Top Hamas Official Suggests Recognizing Israel, Following Official PLO Stance |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-14/ty-article/top-hamas-official-suggests-recognizing-israel-following-official-plo-stance/0000018c-67e4-d798-adac-e7ef81fd0000 |access-date=2024-11-02 |work=Haaretz}} Others argue that the long term objective and lack of official recognition of Israel is merely maintained as a bargaining chip for future negotiations.{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}} Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.{{sfn|Beinart|2012|p=219, n.53}}Ayala H. Emmett, [https://books.google.com/books?id=7BazOwasdNMC&pg=PA101 Our Sisters' Promised Land: Women, Politics, and Israeli-Palestinian Coexistence,] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154534/https://books.google.com/books?id=7BazOwasdNMC&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false|date=20 March 2024}} University of Michigan Press, 2003 pp. 100–02.Noam Chomsky, in Elliot N. Dorff, Danya Ruttenberg, Louis E Newman (eds.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=JgfA4moXzEoC&pg=PA26 Jewish Choices, Jewish Voices: War and National Security] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154452/https://books.google.com/books?id=JgfA4moXzEoC&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false|date=20 March 2024}}, Jewish Publication Society, 2010 pp. 26–27{{cite news |date=17 May 2021 |title=Tareq Baconi: Hamas, Explained |url=https://www.unsettledpod.com/episodes/2021/5/17/tareq-baconi-hamas-explained |work=UNSETTLED Podcast}}{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}}

The 1988 Hamas charter strongly rejected any recognition of Israel.{{Cite journal |last=Alsoos |first=Imad |date=2021-09-03 |title=From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |language=en |volume=57 |issue=5 |pages=833–856 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006 |issn=0026-3206|doi-access=free }} In 1995 Hamas repeated this rejection.{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=32}} However, after Hamas won the 2006 elections, it did not implement then 1988 Charter as policy, and instead agreed to work with the existing Palestinian political system. In the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect previous agreements between Fatah and Israel, including the Oslo Accords in which the PLO recognized Israel.{{cite book |last1=Kear |first1=Martin |url=https://www.routledge.com/Hamas-and-Palestine-The-Contested-Road-to-Statehood/Kear/p/book/9780367584450 |title=Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood |publisher=Routledge |year=2019 |isbn=9781138585416 |page=217 |format=Hardcover |quote="Without expressly stating as much, Hamas had agreed to ‘respect’ UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, the once reviled Oslo Accords, and by extension, the problematic issue of Israel’s existence. While Hamas had previously proposed hudnas with Israel, this was the first time that they had signed any Agreement that tacitly accepted that any future Palestinian state would only consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. After the Agreement, Meshaal reiterated Hamas’s position concerning its understanding of what any prospective peace agreement with Israel would look like: that any Palestinian state should be established along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, acknowledgement of the right of return for all Palestinian refugees, the dismantling of all West Bank settlements, and the complete withdrawal of all vestiges of Israeli rule (Tamimi 2009 : 261; Caridi 2012 : 248). This truncated version of any future Palestinian state was a key ideological concession from Hamas that finally brought it in line with Fatah, and more importantly, with the views of most of the Palestinian public."}} Both in the 2007 agreement and in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, Hamas agreed to a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Scholars see this as "implicit" recognition of Israel because by accepting a Palestinian state limited to the 1967 borders, Hamas acknowledged the existence of an entity on the other side.{{sfn|Zartman|2020|p=230}}

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed).{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=50}} He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=50}} Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.{{Cite journal |last=Usher |first=Graham |date=2006-04-01 |title=The Democratic Resistance : Hamas , Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1525/jps.2006.35.3.20 |journal=Journal of Palestine Studies |language=en |volume=35 |issue=3 |pages=20–36 |doi=10.1525/jps.2006.35.3.20 |issn=0377-919X}}

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto".{{sfn|Brenner|2022|p=206}} While it did not abrogate the old charter, Hamas leaders explained that "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past."{{sfn|Brenner|2017|pp=205-207}} Khaled Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now."

Tareq Baconi notes that Hamas has said it would accept mutual recognition of Israel in any consensus peace deal approved by other Palestinian parties and the population in a referendum.{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}} To explain why it withholds formal recognition, Baconi argues that Hamas has learned from the fact that, in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO made a "historic concession" in recognizing Israel on 78% of the land of historic Palestine (along the 1967 borders), but was unable to convince Israel to recognize Palestine on the remaining 22% of the land. Having already recognized Israel, the PLO was unable to use recognition to extract any further concessions from Israel, thus according to Baconi the lesson for Hamas was that you can't negotiate from a position of weakness, and the issue of formal recognition of Israel is kept as bargaining chip for negotiations.{{cite news |last1=Baconi |first1=Tareq |last2=Denvir |first2=Daniel |title=How Hamas Became the Violent Face of Palestinian Resistance |url=https://jacobin.com/2023/11/hamas-israel-palestine-gaza-history-decolonization-violence |work=Jacobin}}{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}}

Some scholars, including Baconi, Ilan Pappé and Noam Chomsky, have argued that Hamas has offered more to the Israelis than Israeli major parties including Likud have offered in return to the Palestinians, both with its de facto recognition of the 1967 borders and its pledge to accept the recognition of Israel in any future peace deal that has the consensus and approval of the Palestinian parties and population.{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}}{{Cite book |first1=Noam |last1=Chomsky |author-link=Noam Chomsky |title=Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War against the Palestinians |first2=Ilan |last2=Pappé |author-link2=Ilan Pappé |publisher=Haymarket Books |year=2010 |isbn=978-1-60846-097-7 |publication-date=2010-11-09 |pages=16, 168–169}}{{Cite book |first1=Noam |last1=Chomsky |author-link=Noam Chomsky |title=On Palestine |first2=Ilan |last2=Pappé |author-link2=Ilan Pappé |publisher=Haymarket Books |year=2015 |isbn=9781608464708 |edition=Paperback |pages=147–148}} Rashid Khalidi said in November 2023: "It is well-established that Israeli major governing parties like Likud have refused to recognize Palestinian statehood under any conditions, the constant references to "Judea and Samaria", and this has only increased in recent times with the Knesset passing a resolution opposing Palestinian statehood."{{Cite news |last=Khalidi |first=Rashid |date=2023-11-22 |title=It's Time to Confront Israel's Version of "From the River to the Sea" |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/world/its-time-to-confront-israels-version-of-from-the-river-to-the-sea/ |access-date=2025-02-11 |language=en-US |issn=0027-8378}}

= Allegations of antisemitism =

The 1988 Hamas charter proclaims that jihad against Jews is required until Judgement Day.{{cite web |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/hamas-covenant-israel-attack-war-genocide/675602/ |title=Understanding Hamas's Genocidal Ideology |author=Bruce Hoffman |date=10 October 2023 |publisher=The Atlantic |access-date=October 20, 2023 |archive-date=11 October 2023 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20231011135511/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/hamas-covenant-israel-attack-war-genocide/675602/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last= |first= |last2= |date=2023-11-16 |title=Have war crimes been committed in Israel and Gaza and what laws govern the conflict? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/16/middleeast/israel-hamas-gaza-war-crimes-international-law-explainer-intl/index.html |access-date=2023-11-18 |website=CNN |language=en}} Article 7 of the 1988 governing charter of Hamas "openly dedicate(s) Hamas to genocide against the Jewish people".{{cite book |last1=Bayefsky |first1=Anne F. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lHxTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA91 |title=Incitement to Terrorism |last2=Blank |first2=Laurie R. |date=March 22, 2018 |publisher=BRILL |isbn=978-90-04-35982-6 |page=91 |quote=[note12] The governing charter of Hamas, "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," openly dedicates Hamas to genocide against the Jewish people (…) [see] The Covenant (…) 1988. Articles 7, … |access-date=20 March 2024 |archive-date=15 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101112/https://books.google.com/books?id=lHxTDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA91 |url-status=live }} More authors have characterized the violent language against all Jews in the original Hamas charter as genocidal,{{cite journal |last=Tsesis |first=Alexander |date=2014–2015 |title=Antisemitism and Hate Speech Studies |url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/rjlr16&id=352&div=&collection= |journal=Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion |volume=16 |pages=352 |quote=For Jews, the Holocaust remains a real concern in an age when Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist organization, continues to advocate genocide in its core Charter. |access-date=20 March 2024 |archive-date=15 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101043/https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/rjlr16&id=352&div=&collection= |url-status=live }} incitement to genocide,{{cite magazine |last1=Gourevitch |first1=Philip |title=An Honest Voice in Israel |url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/honest-voice-israel |access-date=9 May 2020 |magazine=The New Yorker |date=2 August 2014 |language=en |archive-date=22 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022095942/https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/honest-voice-israel |url-status=live }}{{cite news |last1=Goldberg |first1=Jeffrey |author-link1=Jeffrey Goldberg |title=What Would Hamas Do If It Could Do Whatever It Wanted? |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/what-would-hamas-do-if-it-could-do-whatever-it-wanted/375545/ |access-date=9 May 2020 |work=The Atlantic |date=4 August 2014 |archive-date=23 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200423083359/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/what-would-hamas-do-if-it-could-do-whatever-it-wanted/375545/ |url-status=live }} or antisemitic.{{cite journal |last=Breedon |first=Jennifer R. |date=2015–2016 |title=Why the Combination of Universal Jurisdiction and Polical Lawfare Will Destroy the Sacred Sovereignty of States |url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jglojpp2&id=411&div=&collection= |url-status=live |journal=Journal of Global Justice and Public Policy |volume=2 |pages=389 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101142/https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jglojpp2&id=411&div=&collection= |archive-date=15 October 2023 |access-date=20 March 2024 |quote=The Hamas Charter not only calls for the militant, perhaps genocidal, liberation of Palestine (e.g., "raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine"), but also demonstrates anti-Semitic, murderous intent.}} The charter attributes collective responsibility to Jews, not just Israelis, for various global issues, including both World Wars.Freilich, C. D. (2018). Israeli National security: a new strategy for an Era of change. Oxford University Press. p. 34, 37

The American Interest magazine wrote that the charter "echoes" Nazi propaganda in claiming that Jews profited during World War II.{{cite web|last1=Herf|first1=Jeffrey|title=Why They Fight: Hamas' Too-Little-Known Fascist Charter|url=https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/08/01/why-they-fight-hamas-too-little-known-fascist-charter/|publisher=The American Interest|access-date=3 May 2017|date=August 1, 2014|archive-date=10 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170310013401/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/08/01/why-they-fight-hamas-too-little-known-fascist-charter/|url-status=live}} Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine, has compared statements in the 1988 charter with those that appear in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Hamas has called for the annihilation of Israel, and has stated that to be necessary for creating a pan-Islamic empire.{{Cite book |last1=Afflerbach |first1=Holger |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gh6VIodYxNMC&dq=hamas+%22annihilation+of+israel%22&pg=PA427 |page=427|title=How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender |last2=Strachan |first2=Hew |date=2012-07-26 |publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-969362-7 |language=en}}{{Cite book |last1=Lange |first1=Armin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WJZEEAAAQBAJ&dq=hamas+%22annihilation+of+israel%22&pg=PT86 |title=Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds |last2=Mayerhofer |first2=Kerstin |last3=Porat |first3=Dina |last4=Schiffman |first4=Lawrence H. |date=2021-05-10 |publisher=Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG |isbn=978-3-11-067203-9 |language=en|page=86}}

On the other hand, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the anti-Semitic language, saying that their struggle is against Zionism and not Jews,{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=17}}{{cite news |date=6 May 2017 |title=Khaled Meshaal: Struggle is against Israel, not Jews |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2017/5/6/khaled-meshaal-struggle-is-against-israel-not-jews |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231119044505/https://www.aljazeera.com/program/talk-to-al-jazeera/2017/5/6/khaled-meshaal-struggle-is-against-israel-not-jews |archive-date=19 November 2023 |access-date=19 November 2023 |publisher=Al-Jazeera}} while also advancing goals for a Palestinian state which are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution.

  • {{cite book|title=Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms|author=Halim Rane|page=34|year=2009|quote=Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."}}
  • {{cite book|title=Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy|year=2016|publisher=Routledge|author=Tristan Dunning|pages=179–180}}
  • {{cite book|title=Palestinian Chicago|author=Loren D. Lybarger|publisher=University of California Press|year=2020|page=199|quote=Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).}}{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|p=108}}: "Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that 'a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.'" Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, said in a 1988 interview, reacting to accusations that 'Hamas hate Jews':

{{cquote|"We don't hate Jews and fight Jews because they are Jewish. They are a people of faith and we are a people of faith, and we love all people of faith. If my brother, from my own mother and father and my own faith takes my home and expels me from it, I will fight him. I will fight my cousin if he takes my home and expels me from it. So when a Jew takes my home and expels me from it, I will fight him. I don't fight other countries because I want to be at peace with them, I love all people and wish peace for them, even the Jews. The Jews lived with us all of our lives and we never assaulted them, and they held high positions in government and ministries. But if they take my home and make me a refugee like 4 million Palestinians in exile? Who has more right to this land? The Russian immigrant who left this land 2000 years ago or the one who left 40 years ago? We don't hate the Jews, we only ask for them to give us our rights."{{cite web |url= https://www.aljazeera.net/blogs/2017/12/18/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%88%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9 |title= فلسطين.. ووهم أسلمة الصراع! |accessdate= December 7, 2023 |date= 18 December 2017 |work= Al Jazeera |archive-date= 26 February 2024 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20240226023131/https://www.aljazeera.net/amp/blogs/2017/12/18/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%88%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9 |url-status= live }}}}

= Evolution of positions =

== 1988–1992 (first charter) ==

In its early days, Hamas functioned as a social-religious charity center. Its members armed themselves for the ongoing resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and in August 1988 published their first charter in which Hamas stated that "Israel" should be "eliminated" through a "clash with the enemies", a "struggle against Zionism" and "conflict with Israel".{{cite web |url=https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/880818.htm |title=The Charter of the HAMAS (1988) (full text, translated at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem) |website=Intelligence Resource Project |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |access-date=15 November 2023 |archive-date=15 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231115072059/https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/880818.htm |url-status=live }}{{rp|loc=preamble, art. 14, 15, 32}} They wrote that 'Palestine', that is all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea),{{sfn|O'Malley|2015|p=118}} should be "liberated" from "Zionism"{{rp|loc=art. 14}} and transformed into an Islamic {{transliteration|ar|Waqf}} (Islamic charitable endowment) in which "followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety".{{rp|loc=art. 6, 11}}{{sfn|Dalacoura|2012|p=67}} Practically speaking, Hamas is and was at war with Israel's army (later also attacking Israeli civilians) since the spring of 1989, initially as part of the First Intifada, a general protest movement that gradually turned more riotous and violent.

== 1992–2005 ==

In 1999, the Hamas leadership, in a memorandum to European diplomats, proposed a long-term ceasefire with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal of military troops and civilian illegal settlements from West Bank and Gaza Strip, release of all Palestinian prisoners, and the right of Palestinian self-determination (see also section Truce proposals). Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, who was assassinated by Israel in 2004, at unreported date has offered Israel a ten-year hudna (truce, armistice) in return for establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Yassin later added, the hudna could be renewed, even for longer periods, but would never signal a recognition of Israel.{{cite journal|author=Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod|title=Reframing Sacred Values|url=https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf|journal=Negotiation Journal|date=2008|volume=24|issue=3|pages=221–246|doi=10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=21 January 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240121114409/https://websites.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf|url-status=live}}

In 2005, Hamas signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration, which confirms "the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital" (etc.), aiming to reconcile several Palestinian factions but not describing specific steps or strategies towards Israel.{{Cite web |title=Palestine Media Center: Text of the Palestinian 'Cairo Declaration'|url=http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=849 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070704163620/http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=849 |archive-date=2007-07-04 |access-date=2025-02-14 |website=palestine-pmc.com}}

== 2006–2007: 1967 borders and a truce ==

In March 2006, after winning an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Hamas published its government program in which Hamas claimed sovereignty for the Palestinian territories but did not repeat its claim to all of mandatory Palestine, instead declared their willingness to have contacts with Israel "in all mundane affairs: business, trade, health, and labor".{{Cite journal |last=Hroub |first=Khaled |title=A "New Hamas" through Its New Documents |url=http://palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=7087&jid=1&href=fulltext |url-status=dead |journal=Journal of Palestine Studies |date=2006 |volume=35 |issue=1 (Summer 2006) |pages=6–27 |doi=10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080918090220/http://palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=7087&jid=1&href=fulltext |archive-date=2008-09-18 |ref=none}} The program further stated: "The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction, nor the government, but a decision for the Palestinian people."

Since then until today, spokesmen of Hamas seem to disagree about their attitudes towards Israel, and debates are running as to whether the original 1988 Hamas charter has since March 2006 become obsolete and irrelevant or on the contrary still spells out Hamas's genuine and ultimate goals (see: 1988 Hamas charter, § Relevance).

The March 2006 Hamas legislative program was further explained on 6 June 2006 by Hamas' MP Riad Mustafa: "Hamas will never recognize Israel", but if a popular Palestinian referendum would endorse a peace agreement including recognition of Israel, "we would of course accept their verdict".{{cite web|url=https://fair.org/extra/nixed-signals/|title=Nixed Signals|author=Seth Ackerman|date=September–October 2006|work=Extra!|publisher=Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting|access-date=March 18, 2012|archive-date=24 January 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240124004638/https://fair.org/extra/nixed-signals/|url-status=live}}

Also on 6 June 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and at that time Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, sent a letter to US President George W. Bush (via University of Maryland's Jerome Segal), stating: "We are so concerned about stability and security in the area that we don't mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and offering a truce for many years", and asking Bush for a dialogue with the Hamas government. A similar message he sent to Israel's leaders. Haniyeh had reportedly proposed a fifty-year armistice.{{cite book|title=Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka|publisher=Harvard University Press|author=Sumantra Bose|page=283}} Neither Washington nor Israel replied.{{cite news|url=http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/in-2006-letter-to-bush-haniyeh-offered-compromise-with-israel-1.257213|title=In 2006 letter to Bush, Haniyeh offered compromise with Israel|author=Barak Ravid|date=November 14, 2008|access-date=March 18, 2012|work=Haaretz|archive-date=25 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151125215124/http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/in-2006-letter-to-bush-haniyeh-offered-compromise-with-israel-1.257213|url-status=live}}Dr. Lorenzo Kamel, [http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.608906 "Why do Palestinians in Gaza support Hamas?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010124417/https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.608906 |date=10 October 2017 }}, Haaretz, August 5, 2014 Nuancing sheikh Ahmed Yassin's statements before 2004 about a hudna (truce) with Israel (see above), Hamas's (former) senior adviser Ahmed Yousef has said (at unknown date) that a "hudna" (truce, armistice) is more than a ceasefire and "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=179}}

On 28 June 2006, Hamas signed the second version of (originally) 'the Palestinians' Prisoners Document' which supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967".* {{harvnb|Baconi|2018|pp=114–116}}: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *{{harvnb|Roy|2013|p=210}}: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5052288.stm Abbas risks all with vote strategy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231027111839/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5052288.stm |date=27 October 2023 }}. Roger Hardy, BBC, 8 June 2006{{harvnb|Seurat|2019|p=47}} This document also recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people", and states that "the negotiations" should be conducted by PLO and President of the Palestinian National Authority and eventual agreements must be ratified by either the Palestinian National Council or a general referendum "held in the homeland and the Diaspora". Leila Seurat also notes that this document "implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders, agreed on the construction of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital and accepted limitations to the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967", and was produced following consultations with the entire Political Bureau.{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=199}}

In an August 2006 interview with The New York Times, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and then Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, said: "We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm."{{cite news|title=Is Hamas Ready to Deal?|author=SCOTT ATRAN|work=New York Times|date=2006-08-17}} In November 2006, Hamas again proposed a truce for many years to Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.{{sfn|Brenner|2022|p=36}}

In February 2007, Hamas signed the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement, stressing "the importance of national unity as basis for (...) confronting the occupation" and "activate and reform the PLO", but without further details about how to confront or deal with Israel.{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=49}} At the time of signing that 2007 agreement, Mousa Abu Marzook, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, underlined his view of the Hamas position: "I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli (amr wâqi') or, as the French say, a de facto recognition, but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state".{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=50}} More Hamas leaders, through the years, have made similar statements.{{sfn|Baconi|2018|p=230}}

In June 2007, Hamas ousted the Fatah movement from the Gaza Strip, took control there, and since then Hamas occasionally fired rockets from the Gaza Strip on Israel, purportedly to retaliate Israeli aggression against the people of Gaza.

== 2008–2016 ==

In April 2008, former US President Jimmy Carter met with Khaled Mashal, the recognized Hamas leader since 2004. Mashal said to Carter, Hamas would "accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders" and accept the right of Israel "to live as a neighbour" if such a deal would be approved by a referendum among the "Palestinians". Nevertheless, Mashal did not offer a unilateral ceasefire (as Carter had suggested him to do). The US State Department showed utter indifference for Mashal's new stance; Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert even refused to meet with Carter in Jerusalem, not to mention paying attention to the new Hamas stance.Al Jazeera English, [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/04/2008615098393788.html "Hamas ready to accept 1967 borders"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200922035242/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/04/2008615098393788.html |date=22 September 2020 }}. April 22, 2008.

On 19 June 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed to a six-month cease-fire,{{Citation|title=Hamas declares Israel truce over|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7791100.stm|work=BBC News|date=22 December 2008|access-date=3 January 2010|archive-date=18 January 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090118015406/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7791100.stm|url-status=live}} which Hamas declared finished at 18 December{{Citation|url=http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/tipping_point/9631 |title=Tipping Point After years of rocket attacks, Israel finally says, 'Enough!' |last=Jacobs |first=Phil |date=30 December 2008 |work=Baltimore Jewish Times|access-date=7 January 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090115020744/http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/tipping_point/9631 |archive-date=15 January 2009 }} amidst mutual accusations of breaching the agreed conditions.

Meanwhile, in November 2008, in a meeting with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas senior official Ismail Haniyeh repeated what he had written in June 2006 to U.S. President George W. Bush but with one extra condition: "the Hamas government had agreed to accept a Palestinian state that followed the 1967 borders and to offer Israel a long-term hudna (truce), if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights" – a proposal which he said Israel had declined.{{cite news |url=http://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-hamas-willing-to-accept-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders-1.256915 |title=Hamas willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders |author=Amira Hass |date=November 9, 2008 |newspaper=Haaretz |access-date=April 16, 2014 |archive-date=10 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010124644/https://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-hamas-willing-to-accept-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders-1.256915 |url-status=live }}

In September 2009, Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that Hamas would support any steps leading to a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders: "We would never thwart efforts to create an independent Palestinian state with borders [from] June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital."{{cite news|url=http://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-to-un-chief-hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-in-67-borders-1.7460|title=Haniyeh to UN chief: Hamas accepts Palestinian state in '67 borders|author=Yoav Segev|date=September 22, 2009|newspaper=Haaretz|access-date=February 25, 2012|archive-date=8 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131008015926/http://www.haaretz.com/news/haniyeh-to-un-chief-hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-in-67-borders-1.7460|url-status=live}}

In May 2010, Khaled Mashal, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau (thus Hamas' highest leader), again stated that a state "Israel" living next

to "a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967" would be acceptable for Hamas – but only if a referendum among "the Palestinian people" would endorse this arrangement. In November 2010, Ismail Haniyeh,{{efn|Haniyeh at the time was the (overall) Prime Minister of the State of Palestine but as such was dismissed{{cite news|title=Abbas sacks Hamas-led government|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6754499.stm|date=14 June 2007|access-date=14 June 2007|work=BBC News|archive-date=27 August 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070827140345/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6754499.stm|url-status=live}} by President Abbas in 2007; nevertheless he remained head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.}} also proposed a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, though added three further conditions: "resolution of the issue of refugees", "the release of Palestinian prisoners", and "Jerusalem as its capital"; and he made the same reservation as Mashal in May 2010 had made, that a Palestinian referendum needed to endorse this arrangement.Peter Beinart, [https://books.google.com/books?id=v0U1fjErMGkC&pg=PT231 The Crisis of Zionism,] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153321/https://books.google.com/books?id=v0U1fjErMGkC&pg=PT231#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }} Melbourne University Press 2012, p. 219. Statement of Mashal in May 2010: 'If Israel withdraws to the borders of 1967, it doesn't mean that it gives us back all the land of the Palestinians. But we do consider this as an acceptable solution to have a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967... the Palestinian state will have a referendum and the Palestinian people will decide. We in Hamas will respect the decision of the Palestinian majority.' Haniyeh in November 2010: 'We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees.... Hamas will respect the results (of a referendum) regardless of whether it differs with its ideology and principles.' (Beinart refers to the original sources of those statements, respectively Current Affairs 28 May 2010 and Haaretz 1 December 2010.)David Whitten, Smith, Elizabeth Geraldine Burr, [https://books.google.com/books?id=5v-iBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA250 Understanding World Religions: A Road Map for Justice and Peace] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153330/https://books.google.com/books?id=5v-iBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA250#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014 p. 250

On December 1, 2010, Ismail Haniyeh (senior Hamas leader, see above), in a news conference in Gaza, repeated his November 2010 message: "We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees," but only if such arrangement would be endorsed by "a referendum" held among all Palestinians: in Gaza, West Bank, and the diaspora.{{cite news|url=http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hamas-vows-to-honor-palestinian-referendum-on-peace-with-israel-1.328234|title=Hamas Vows to Honor Palestinian Referendum on Peace with Israel: Islamist Leader Ismail Haniyeh Says He Would Accept a Deal with Israel Based on 1967 Borders and Denies that Gaza has Become a Stronghold for Al-Qaida|date=December 1, 2010|newspaper=Haaretz|agency=Reuters|access-date=February 25, 2012|archive-date=15 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151015233322/http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hamas-vows-to-honor-palestinian-referendum-on-peace-with-israel-1.328234|url-status=live}}

In May 2011, Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement in Cairo, agreeing to form a ('national unity') government and appoint the Ministers "in consensus between them", but it contained no remarks about how to confront or deal with Israel.[http://peacemaker.un.org/node/463 Text of the Hamas-Fatah Agreement, made in Cairo on 3 May 2011.]. Website peacemaker.un.org. Retrieved 21 February 2024. In February 2012, Hamas and Fatah signed the Fatah–Hamas Doha Agreement, agreeing (again) to form an interim national consensus government, which (again) did not materialize.

Still in February 2012, according to the Palestinian authority (either the Fatah branch in West Bank or the Hamas branch in Gaza), Hamas forswore the use of violence against Israel ("ceasefire", an Israeli news website called it), followed by a few weeks without violence between Hamas and Israel.{{cite news |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/37526/ |title=The eye of the Islamic Jihad storm |first=Ilan |last=Ben Zion |date=March 14, 2012 |work=The Times of Israel |access-date=October 9, 2023 |archive-date=10 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231010155019/https://www.timesofisrael.com/37526/ |url-status=live }}{{cite news |first=Marc |last=Tracy |author-link=Marc Tracy |date=March 12, 2012 |title=Terrorist Killing Prompts Gaza Rocket Exchange |work=Tablet Magazine |url=http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/93795/terrorist-killing-prompts-gaza-rocket-exchange/ |access-date=March 31, 2012 |archive-date=2 April 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120402114940/http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/93795/terrorist-killing-prompts-gaza-rocket-exchange/ |url-status=live }} But violence between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel, also involving Hamas, would soon resume.

== 2017–6 Oct. 2023 (new charter) ==

{{See also|2017 Hamas charter}}

On 1 May 2017, after much internal discussion, Hamas and its Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mashal published "A Document of General Principles and Policies", also known as the 2017 Hamas charter.{{sfn|Brenner|2017|pp=205-207}} In the new charter Hamas accepts a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel.{{Cite web |last1=Qiblawi |first1=Tamara |first2=Angela |last2=Dewan |first3=Larry |last3=Register |date=2017-05-01 |title=Hamas presents new policy document |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/01/middleeast/hamas-charter-palestinian-israeli/ |access-date=2025-02-11 |website=CNN |language=en}}{{Cite book |last=Schulz |first=Michael |title=Between Resistance, Sharia Law, and Demo-Islamic Politics |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2020 |isbn=978-1-5381-4610-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4WQGEAAAQBAJ |page=70}} When asked, Hamas leaders explained that "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past."{{sfn|Brenner|2017|pp=205-207}} Khaled Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now."{{Cite web |last=Younes |first=Ali |title=Meshaal: Hamas is not a rigid ideological organisation |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/2/meshaal-we-want-to-restore-our-national-rights |access-date=2025-02-11 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}} However, Hamas fell short of formally repudiating the original 1988 charter.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=62}} According to some analysts Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=62}}

Around 2018, a Hamas finance minister has suggested that a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas [hudna] and a two-state settlement are the same". In 2021 Hamas organized and financed a conference among 250 Gaza citizens about the future management of the State of Palestine following the takeover of Israel which was predicted to come soon. According to the conclusions of the conference, the Jewish Israeli fighters would be killed, while the peaceful individuals could be integrated or be allowed to leave. At the same time the highly skilled and educated would be prevented from leaving.{{cite news |title=Suffering, dreaming and forgetting in Gaza |url=https://www.nzz.ch/english/in-gaza-hamas-rules-as-egypt-and-israel-maintain-their-blockades-ld.1653551 |access-date=8 April 2024 |publisher=Neue Zürcher Zeitung |date=4 November 2021 |archive-date=8 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240408100154/https://www.nzz.ch/english/in-gaza-hamas-rules-as-egypt-and-israel-maintain-their-blockades-ld.1653551 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |title=Hamas Actually Believed It Would Conquer Israel. In Preparation, It Divided the Country Into Cantons |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-05/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/hamas-actually-believed-it-would-conquer-israel-and-divided-it-into-cantons/0000018e-ab4a-dc42-a3de-abfad6fe0000 |access-date=8 April 2024 |publisher=Haaretz |date=5 April 2024 |archive-date=7 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240407224539/https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-05/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/hamas-actually-believed-it-would-conquer-israel-and-divided-it-into-cantons/0000018e-ab4a-dc42-a3de-abfad6fe0000 |url-status=live }}

In 2020 Ismail Haniyeh said in an interview that one of the principles of Hamas was "Palestine from the sea to the river."{{cite news |title=حوار مع إسماعيل هنية ، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس |url=https://lusailnews.net/media/video/27/07/2020/%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%87%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3 |access-date=13 October 2024 |publisher=Lusail news |date=27 July 2020 |language=ar |quote=11:40}} In 2022, Yahya Sinwar cautioned Israelis that Hamas would one day "march through your walls to uproot your regime."{{cite news |title=Hamas envisioned deeper attacks, aiming to provoke an Israeli war |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/11/12/hamas-planning-terror-gaza-israel/ |access-date=4 December 2023 |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=13 November 2023 |archive-date=13 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231113024604/http://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/11/12/hamas-planning-terror-gaza-israel/ |url-status=live }}

== 7 Oct. 2023–present ==

File:October 2023 Gaza−Israel conflict (7– 8 October).svg

In a flash attack on 7 October 2023, Hamas and associates murdered 767 civilians and killed a further 376 security personnel of the state of Israel. Israel retaliated with warfare in the Gaza Strip, aiming at Hamas militants but also harming much civilian infrastructure and directly killing tens of thousands of civilians, as admitted even by Israel (not counting the presumed multiple number of indirect deaths). A number of conflicting statements since then were made by Hamas senior leaders regarding the Hamas policy towards Israel.

On 24 October, Ghazi Hamad—member of the decision-making Hamas Political Bureau{{Cite web |last=Martin |first=Clémence |title="Israël n'a pas sa place sur notre terre" : qui est Ghazi Hamad, la "voix du Hamas" depuis le massacre du 7 octobre ? |trans-title='Israel has no place on our land': who is Ghazi Hamad, the 'voice of Hamas' since the October 7 massacre? |url=https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/israel-na-pas-sa-place-sur-notre-terre-qui-est-ghazi-hamad-la-voix-du-hamas-depuis-le-massacre-du-7-octobre-20231103_Z6ZD7UK24JBYVAHSCDKYYS5K7Y/ |access-date=2023-11-06 |website=Libération |language=fr}}—explained the 7 October attack: "Israel is a country that has no place on our land. We must remove that country because it constitutes a security, military and political catastrophe to the Arab and Islamic nation". "We are called a nation of martyrs and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs". Hamad called the creation of the Jewish state "illogical": "(...) We are the victims of the occupation. Therefore, nobody should blame us for the things we do".{{Cite web |last=Pacchiani |first=Gianluca |date=1 November 2023 |title=Hamas official says group will repeat Oct. 7 attack 'twice and three times' to destroy Israel |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-official-says-group-will-repeat-oct-7-attack-twice-and-three-times-to-destroy-israel/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240307141412/https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-official-says-group-will-repeat-oct-7-attack-twice-and-three-times-to-destroy-israel/ |archive-date=7 March 2024 |access-date=17 February 2024 |website=Times of Israel}}{{Cite news |last=Leifer |first=Joshua |date=2024-03-21 |title=What is the real Hamas? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/21/what-is-the-real-hamas |access-date=2024-04-27 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |quote=He [Hamad] said that "Al-Aqsa Flood", Hamas's name for its armed offensive, "is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth". Once considered a thoughtful observer of Palestinian politics, Hamad now declared that "nobody should blame us for what we do – on 7 October, on 10 October, on October 1,000,000. Everything we do is justified." }}

On 1 November 2023, Ismail Haniyeh, then incumbent highest Hamas leader (but assassinated by Israel 31 July 2024), stated that if Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the Gaza war, if humanitarian corridors would be opened, and aid would be allowed into Gaza,

Hamas would be "ready for political negotiations for a two-state solution with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine". Haniyeh also praised the support of movements in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon for the Palestinian struggle.{{cite news |title=Haniyeh says Hamas ready for negotiations on a two-state solution if Israel stops war on Gaza |url=https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/511435/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/Haniyeh-says-Hamas-ready-for-negotiations-on-a-two.aspx |work=Al-Ahram |date=1 November 2023 |access-date=20 March 2024 |archive-date=20 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153323/https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/58/1262/511435/War-on-Gaza/War-on-Gaza/Haniyeh-says-Hamas-ready-for-negotiations-on-a-two.aspx |url-status=live }}

File:An aerial view showing destruction in Rafah after Israeli forces withdrawal and as the ceasefire took hold, Gaza Strip.jpg in January 2025 after Israel's Rafah offensive against Hamas]]

In January 2024 Khaled Mashal, a former Hamas leader, slighted "The West" and "the two-state solution", saying "The 1967 borders represent 21% of Palestine, which is practically one fifth of its land, so this cannot be accepted", and adding that "our right in Palestine from the sea to the river" cannot be waived.{{cite news |title=Meshaal: Hamas rejects 'two-state solution' |url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240118-meshaal-hamas-rejects-two-state-solution/ |access-date=20 January 2024 |publisher=Middle East Monitor |date=18 January 2024 |archive-date=19 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240119101010/https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240118-meshaal-hamas-rejects-two-state-solution/amp/ |url-status=live }} However, he reiterated that Hamas "accepts a state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, with complete independence and with the right of return without recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."

Hamas Member of Parliament Khalil al-Hayya, also deputy chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, told the Associated Press in April 2024 that Hamas is willing to agree to a truce of five years or more with Israel and that it would lay down its weapons and convert into a political party if an independent Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders. The Associated Press considered this a "significant concession", but presumed that Israel would not even want to consider this scenario following the October 2023 attack.{{cite web | last=Sewell | first=Abby | title=Hamas official says group would lay down its arms if an independent Palestinian state is established | website=AP News | date=25 Apr 2024 | url=https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438 | access-date=1 May 2024}}

== Reactions ==

The vision that Hamas articulated in its original 1988 charter resembles the vision of certain Zionist groups regarding the same territory, as noted by several authors.Louise Fawcett, [https://books.google.com/books?id=nNUiHaUzzNgC&pg=PA249 International Relations of the Middle East] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154519/https://books.google.com/books?id=nNUiHaUzzNgC&pg=PA249#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Oxford University Press 2013 p. 49: 'The Hamas platform calls for full Muslim-Palestinian control of the Mediterranean to the Jordan River—the mirror image of Likud's platform for Jewish control of the same land.'{{citation |last=Dunning |first=Tristan |title=Israel's policy on statehood merits the same scrutiny as Hamas gets |date=November 20, 2014 |url=http://theconversation.com/israels-policy-on-statehood-merits-the-same-scrutiny-as-hamas-gets-33897 |access-date=20 March 2024 |archive-date=15 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101228/https://theconversation.com/israels-policy-on-statehood-merits-the-same-scrutiny-as-hamas-gets-33897 |url-status=live }} This may suggest that Hamas's views were inspired by those Zionist perspectives.Glenn Frankel, Beyond the Promised Land: Jews and Arabs on the Hard Road to a New Israel, Simon and Schuster, 1996 pp. 389–91, cites Binjamin Netanyahu as declaring: 'You say the Bible is not a property deed. But I say the opposite-the Bible is our mandate, the Bible is our deed'. Yitzhak Rabin at the time charged that "Bibi Netyanyahu is a Hamas collaborator. ... Hamas and Likud have the same political goal.'{{harvnb|O'Malley|2015|p=26|ps=: Israel incessantly invokes provisions of Hamas's charter that call for the elimination of Jews and the destruction of Israel, and its refusal to recognize the state of Israel. ... Hamas also calls attention to the clauses in the Likud charter that explicitly denounce a two-state solution. A double standard, says Hamas.}}

Several (other) authors have interpreted the 1988 Hamas charter as a call for "armed struggle against Israel".{{sfn|O'Malley|2015|p=118}}

In 2009, Taghreed El-khodary and Ethan Bronner, writing in the New York Times, said that Hamas' position is that it doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist, but is willing to accept as a compromise a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

Writing for Middle Eastern Studies, Imad Alsoos says that Hamas has both a short and long-term objective: "The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety. Establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (as part of a hudna deal) would be Hamas's interim solution, during which Israel would not be formally recognized.{{cite book |last1=Hroub |first1=Khaled |title=Hamas : political thought and practice |date=2000 |publisher=Institute for Palestine Studies |isbn=0887282768 |pages=72–73}}

In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel.

As of January 2007, Israeli, American and European news media considered Hamas to be the "dominant political force" within the Palestinian territories.{{cite web |last1=Byman |first1=Daniel |last2=Palmer |first2=Alexander |date=October 7, 2023 |title=What You Need to Know About the Israel-Hamas Violence |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231007230520/https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/07/hamas-attack-israel-declares-war-gaza-why-explained/ |archive-date=October 7, 2023 |access-date=October 8, 2023 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}{{cite news |last=Urquhart |first=Conal |date=January 10, 2007 |title=Hamas leader acknowledges 'reality' of Israel |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/10/israel1 |access-date=October 9, 2023 |issn=0261-3077 |archive-date=15 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101442/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/10/israel1 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |last=Aviad |first=G. |date=2009 |title='Hamas' Military Wing in the Gaza Strip: Development, Patterns of Activity, and Forecast' |url=https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FILE1272778269-1.pdf |access-date=October 9, 2023 |website=Military and Strategic Affairs, Institute for National Security Studies (Israel) |quote=However, once Hamas became the dominant political force in Palestinian society... |archive-date=15 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015100941/https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FILE1272778269-1.pdf |url-status=live }}

Journalist Zaki Chehab wrote in 2007 that Hamas's public concessions following the 2006 elections were "window-dressing" and that the organisation would never recognise Israel's right to exist.{{sfn|Chehab|2007|p=203}}

As to the question whether Hamas would be capable to enter into a long-term non-aggression treaty with Israel without being disloyal to their understanding of Islamic law and God's word, the Atlantic magazine columnist Jeffrey Goldberg in January 2009 stated: "I tend to think not, though I've noticed over the years a certain plasticity of belief among some Hamas ideologues. Also, this is the Middle East, so anything is possible".[http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/01/nizar_rayyan_of_hamas_on_gods.php "Nizar Rayyan of Hamas on God's Hatred of Jews" (by Jeffrey Goldberg)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090122023505/http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/01/nizar_rayyan_of_hamas_on_gods.php |date=January 22, 2009 }}, The Atlantic, (January 2, 2009).

Professor Mohammed Ayoob in his 2020 book, while discussing the 2017 Hamas charter, stated that “acceptance of the 1967 borders can be interpreted as a de facto acceptance of the preconditions for a two-state solution”.{{cite book |author=Mohammed Ayoob |title=The Many Faces of Political Islam, Second Edition (January 2020) |publisher=University of Michigan Press |page=133}}

Religious policy

= Gaza Strip =

{{Main| Islamism in the Gaza Strip | Islamist anti-Hamas groups in the Gaza Strip | Jamila Abdallah Taha al-Shanti | Palestinian Christians }}

Hamas' Change and Reform electoral list for the 2006 Palestinian legislative election included a Palestinian Christian candidate, Hosam al-Taweel, running as an independent for the Christian reserved seat in Gaza City.{{efn| His name has been spelled: Hussam al-Tawil, Hossam Al-Tawil, or Hosam al-Taweel. }}{{cite web | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/1/25/christian-candidate-on-hamas-ticket | title=Christian candidate on Hamas ticket }}{{cite web | url=https://english.palinfo.com/o_post/MP-Hussam-al-Tawil-dies-in-Gaza/ | title=MP Hussam al-Tawil dies in Gaza | date=31 October 2012 }}{{cite news | title= Palestinian relatives of Christian Hossam Al-Tawil mourn on his body during his funeral at the Church of Saint Porphyrius | url= https://www.apaimages.info/image/I0000glJOxm4mGcU | work= www.apaimages.info AP Images }} Israeli media were surprised by the team.{{cite web | url=https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/hamas-boosts-image-by-backing-christian-candidate | title=Hamas boosts image by backing Christian candidate | date=24 January 2006 }} Hosam al-Taweel won the seat, one of six seats reserved for Palestine's Christian minority, with the highest winning vote of the six elected, due to the endorsement of Hamas and other nationalist groups.{{cite web |date=4 March 2006 |title=Palestinian Christians: 'We don't feel threatened by rise of Hamas' |url=https://imemc.org/article/17091/ |website=International Middle East Media Center}}

The gender ideology outlined in the Hamas charter, the importance of women in the religious-nationalist project of liberation is asserted as no lesser than that of males. Their role was defined primarily as one of manufacturing males and caring for their upbringing and rearing, though the charter recognized they could fight for liberation without obtaining their husband's permission and in 2002 their participation in jihad was permitted.{{sfn|Davis|2017|p=55}} The doctrinal emphasis on childbearing and rearing as woman's primary duty is not so different from Fatah's view of women in the First Intifada and it also resembles the outlook of Jewish settlers, and over time it has been subjected to change.{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|pp=73–74}}{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=81}} A few were worried about imposition of Islamic dress codes, but most Christians in the Gaza Strip said these worries were baseless were not worried about the Hamas government.

In 1989, during the First Intifada, a small number of Hamas followers{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|p=74}} campaigned for polygamy, and also insisted women stay at home and be segregated from men. In the course of this campaign, women who chose not to wear the hijab were verbally and physically harassed, with the result that the hijab was being worn 'just to avoid problems on the streets'.{{sfn|Rubenberg|2001|pp=230–31}} The harassment dropped drastically when, after 18 months, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) condemned it,{{sfn|Gerner|2007|p=27}} though similar campaigns reoccurred.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}} Polygamy is practised in some Bedouin communities in Israel, and some Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, particularly in the Negev desert (Arabic pronunciation: Naqab) surrounding the Gaza Strip.{{cite journal |last1=Aburabia |first1=Rawia |title=Trapped Between National Boundaries and Patriarchal Structures: Palestinian Bedouin Women and Polygamous Marriage in Israel |journal=Journal of Comparative Family Studies |date=2017 |volume=48 |issue=3 |pages=339–349 |doi=10.3138/jcfs.48.3.339 |jstor=44509032 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44509032 |issn=0047-2328}}{{cite journal | last1=Boulos | first1=Sonia | date= 2 January 2021 | title= National Interests Versus Women's Rights: The Case of Polygamy Among the Bedouin Community in Israel | doi= 10.1080/08974454.2019.1658692 | url= https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08974454.2019.1658692 | journal= Women & Criminal Justice | volume=31 | pages=53–76 |issn=0897-4454}}{{cite news |last1=Lidman |first1=Melanie |title=Polygamy is illegal in Israel. So why is it allowed to flourish among Negev Bedouin? |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-sorry-plight-of-bedouin-women-trapped-by-polygamy/ |work=www.timesofisrael.com |date=16 February 2016}}{{cite news |title=No more than 1 wife: Israel looks to tackle Bedouin polygamy |url=https://apnews.com/general-news-486a1223036f436eb39bf497652a11ec |work=AP News |date=9 January 2019 |language=en}}{{cite news |title=Bedouin women are pushing Israel to crack down on polygamy |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/polygamy-persists-among-israel-s-bedouins-women-are-pushing-change-n922296 |work=NBC News |date=22 October 2018 |language=en}}

Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, some of its members have attempted to impose Islamic dress or the hijab head covering on women.[https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/world/middleeast/06gaza.html Hamas Fights Over Gaza's Islamist Identity] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170119001358/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/world/middleeast/06gaza.html |date=19 January 2017 }} The New York Times, September 5, 2009{{cite news |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/03/content_12748559.htm |title=Hamas encourages Gaza women to follow Islamic code _English_Xinhua |publisher=Xinhua News Agency |date=January 3, 2010 |access-date=August 2, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110514030330/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/03/content_12748559.htm |archive-date=May 14, 2011}} The government's "Islamic Endowment Ministry" has deployed Virtue Committee members to warn citizens of the dangers of immodest dress, card playing, and dating.[https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aB2RfynNbLmk Hamas Bans Women Dancers, Scooter Riders in Gaza Push] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151118123632/http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aB2RfynNbLmk |date=November 18, 2015}} By Daniel Williams, Bloomberg, November 30, 2009 There are no government laws imposing dress and other moral standards, and the Hamas education ministry reversed one effort to impose Islamic dress on students. There has also been successful resistance to attempts by local Hamas officials to impose Islamic dress on women.[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-code Hamas patrols beaches in Gaza to enforce conservative dress code] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170210235710/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/18/hamas-gaza-islamist-dress-code |date=10 February 2017 }} The Guardian (UK), October 18, 2009 Hamas officials deny having any plans to impose Islamic law, one legislator stating that "What you are seeing are incidents, not policy," and that Islamic law is the desired standard "but we believe in persuasion".

In 2013, UNRWA canceled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas prohibited women from participating in the race.{{cite news |last=Rettig |first=Haviv |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-cancels-gaza-marathon-over-hamas-ban-on-women/ |title=UN Cancels Gaza Marathon |newspaper=The Times of Israel |date=March 5, 2013 |access-date=March 27, 2013 |archive-date=10 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310055227/http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-cancels-gaza-marathon-over-hamas-ban-on-women/ |url-status=live }}

= In the West Bank =

In 2005, the human rights organization Freemuse released a report titled "Palestine: Taliban-like attempts to censor music", which said that Palestinian musicians feared that harsh religious laws against music and concerts will be imposed since Hamas group scored political gains in the Palestinian Authority local elections of 2005.{{cite news |url=http://www.freemuse.org/sw10095.asp |title=Palestine: Taliban-like attempts to censor music |publisher=Freemuse.org |date=August 17, 2006 |access-date=August 2, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807211707/http://www.freemuse.org/sw10095.asp |archive-date=August 7, 2011}}

The attempt by Hamas to dictate a cultural code of conduct in the 1980s and early 1990s led to a violent fighting between different Palestinian sectors. Hamas members reportedly burned down stores that stocked videos they deemed indecent and destroyed books they described as "heretical".[http://www.haaretz.com/culture/arts-leisure/afghanistan-in-palestine-1.165006 "Afghanistan in Palestine"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151015233322/http://www.haaretz.com/culture/arts-leisure/afghanistan-in-palestine-1.165006 |date=15 October 2015 }}, by Zvi Bar'el, Haaretz, July 26, 2005

In 2005, an outdoor music-and-dance performance in Qalqiliya was suddenly banned by the Hamas-led municipality, for the reason that such an event would be "haram", i.e. forbidden by Islam."Battling over the public sphere: Islamic reactions to the music of today". Jonas Otterbeck. Contemporary Islam. Volume 2, Number 3, 211–28,{{doi|10.1007/s11562-008-0062-y}}. "... the over-all argument was that the event was haram" The municipality also ordered that music no longer be played in the Qalqiliya zoo, and mufti Akrameh Sabri issued a religious edict affirming the municipality decision. In response, the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish warned that "There are Taliban-type elements in our society, and this is a very dangerous sign.""Palestinians Debate Whether Future State Will be Theocracy or Democracy". Associated Press, July 13, 2005.[http://newhumanist.org.uk/937/gaza-taliban Gaza Taliban?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110907185601/http://newhumanist.org.uk/937/gaza-taliban |date=7 September 2011 }} by Editorial Staff, The New Humanist, volume 121 issue 1, January/February 2006

The Palestinian columnist Mohammed Abd Al-Hamid, a resident of Ramallah, wrote that this religious coercion could cause the migration of artists, and said "The religious fanatics in Algeria destroyed every cultural symbol, shattered statues and rare works of art and liquidated intellectuals and artists, reporters and authors, ballet dancers and singers—are we going to imitate the Algerian and Afghani examples?"

=Erdoğan's Turkey as a role model=

Some Hamas members have stated that the model of Islamic government that Hamas seeks to emulate is that of Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The foremost members to distance Hamas from the practices of the Taliban and to publicly support the Erdoğan model were Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad, advisers to Prime Minister Hanieh.[http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB41.pdf Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120402221410/http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB41.pdf |date=2 April 2012 }}, Yezid Sayigh, Crown Center for Middle East studies, March 2010See also: [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-gaza?page=show Letter from Gaza] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100627013735/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-gaza?page=show |date=27 June 2010 }}, Hamas's tunnel diplomacy, By Thanassis Cambanis, June 18, 2010. Foreign Affairs. "They want to know if we are more like the Taliban or Erdogan. They will see that we are closer to Erdogan." Yusuf, the Hamas deputy foreign minister, reflected this goal in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, stating that while foreign public opinion equates Hamas with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the analogy is inaccurate. Yusuf described the Taliban as "opposed to everything", including education and women's rights, while Hamas wants to establish good relations between the religious and secular elements of society and strives for human rights, democracy and an open society.[http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=box-2010-06-10 Hamas: 'We want Erdoğan's model, not Taliban's'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110810222815/http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=box-2010-06-10 |date=10 August 2011 }}. Cansu Çamlibel, The Daily Hurriyet. June 10, 2010 According to professor Yezid Sayigh of King's College in London, how influential this view is within Hamas is uncertain, since both Ahmad Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were dismissed from their posts as advisers to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh in October 2007. Both have since been appointed to other prominent positions within the Hamas government. Khaled al-Hroub of the West Bank-based and anti-Hamas[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/world/middleeast/21mideast.html A Leader of Hamas Warns of West Bank Peril for Fatah] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090425004712/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/world/middleeast/21mideast.html |date=25 April 2009 }} The New York Times. June 21, 2006. "Mr. Sawaf's West Bank office in Ramallah has been destroyed, and the Palestinian paper Al Ayyam has refused to continue printing his paper in the West Bank." Palestinian daily Al Ayyam added that despite claims by Hamas leaders that it wants to repeat the Turkish model of Islam, "what is happening on the ground in reality is a replica of the Taliban model of Islam."[http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hamas-Gaza-extremism.-a0211366448 Hamas-Gaza-extremism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231123164955/https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hamas-Gaza-extremism.-a0211366448 |date=23 November 2023 }}, The Weekly Middle East Reporter (Beirut, Lebanon), August 8, 2009{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-hamas-is-not-terrorist-organisation-2023-10-25/ |title=Turkey's Erdogan says Hamas is not terrorist organisation, cancels trip to Israel |date=October 25, 2023 |work=Reuters |last1=Gumrukcu |first1=Tuvan |last2=Hayatsever |first2=Huseyin |access-date=26 October 2023 |archive-date=10 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231110142510/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-hamas-is-not-terrorist-organisation-2023-10-25/ |url-status=live }}

Charter and policy documents

=1988 charter=

{{main|1988 Hamas charter}}{{See also|Calls for the destruction of Israel}}

Hamas published its charter in August 1988, wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its desire to establish "an Islamic state throughout Palestine".{{sfn|Kabahā|2014|p=324}} The foundational document was written by a single individual, an "old guard" member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza isolated from the outside world, and it was made public without going through the usual prior consultation, revision or consensus process, which Hamas leaders regretted in later years.{{harvnb|Hroub|2006|p=33}}: "The Charter was written in early 1988 by one individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation, revision or consensus, to the regret of Hamas's leaders in later years. The author of the Charter was one of the 'old guard' of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, completely cut off from the outside world. All kinds of confusions and conflations between Judaism and Zionism found their way into the Charter, to the disservice of Hamas ever since, as this document has managed to brand it with charges of 'anti-Semitism' and a naïve world-view' Hamas leaders and spokespeople have rarely referred to the Charter or quoted from it, evidence that it has come to be seen as a burden rather than an intellectual platform that embraces the movement's principles." It was then signed on August 18, 1988. It compares Israeli attacks on civilians to that by Nazi Germany.Ronni Shaked, 'Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society,' in Keren Sharvit, Eran Halperin (eds.) [https://books.google.com/books?id=ysdyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal,] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153323/https://books.google.com/books?id=ysdyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA142#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }} Springer, 2016 Volume 2 pp. 133–49 [142]. The charter also claims all of historical Palestine{{harvnb|Hroub|2006b|p=6}}: cited Michael Schulz, "Hamas Between Sharia Rule and Demo-Islam", in Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer, Joakim Öjendal (eds.),[https://books.google.com/books?id=cTXekQIjsLgC&pg=PA202 Globalization and Challenges to Building Peace] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153822/https://books.google.co.ma/books?id=cTXekQIjsLgC&pg=PA202&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, pp. 195–201: 'Hamas continues to be characterized with reference to its 1988 charter drawn up less than a year after the movement was established in direct response to the outbreak of the third intifada and when its raison d'être was armed resistance to the occupation. Yet when its election and post-election documents are compared to the charter, it becomes clear that what is being promoted is a profondly different organization{{Cite book |last=Hroub |first=Khaled |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-XsW4-8VVJ4C&pg=PA31 |title=Hamas |date=2009 |publisher=The Other Press |isbn=978-983-9541-64-9 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153823/https://books.google.com/books?id=-XsW4-8VVJ4C&pg=PA31 |archive-date=2024-03-20|quote=The non-Zionist Jew is one who belongs to the Jewish culture, whether as a believer in the Jewish faith or simply by accident of birth, but...(who) takes no part in aggressive actions against our land and our nation. ... Hamas will not adopt a hostile position in practice against anyone because of his ideas or his creed but will adopt such a position if those ideas and creed are translated into hostile or damaging actions against our people.}}{{cite book |last1=Picco |first1=Giandomenico |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BhKsDwAAQBAJ |title=The Fog of Peace: The Human Face of Conflict Resolution |last2=Rifkind |first2=Gabrielle |date=2013 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-0857723437 |pages=47–48 |author1-link=Giandomenico Picco |author2-link=Gabrielle Rifkind |access-date=January 16, 2021 |archive-date=20 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153822/https://books.google.com/books?id=BhKsDwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}{{harvnb|Robinson|2004|p=130}}: 'The second major component in Palestine's sanctity, according to Hamas, is its designation as a {{transliteration|ar|waqf}} by the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab. When the Muslim armies conquered Palestine in the year 638, the Hamas Charter says, the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab decided not to divide the conquered land among the victorious soldiers, but to establish it as a {{transliteration|ar|waqf}}, belonging to the entire Muslim nation until the day of resurrection.'{{sfn|Litvak|1998|p=153}}Gabriel Weimann,Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, US Institute of Peace Press, 2006 p. 82.{{Excessive citations inline|date=April 2025|reason=I'm not sure what the context is for including all of these citations, so this could be a superfluous (ironically) tag... could also be bundled.}} but promises religious coexistence under Islam's rule.Jim Zanotti, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ajKhf9y93nkC&pg=PA15 Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153823/https://books.google.com/books?id=ajKhf9y93nkC&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Diane Publishing, 2011 p. 15.Roberts [https://books.google.com/books?id=xveCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA68 p. 68] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320153901/https://books.google.com/books?id=xveCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA68 |date=20 March 2024 }}:'The Charter condemns world Zionism and the efforts to isolate Palestine, defines the mission of the organization, and locates that mission within Palestinian, Arab and Islamic elements. It does not condemn the West or non-Muslims, but does condemn aggression against the Palestinian people, arguing for a defensive jihad. It also calls for fraternal relations with the other Palestinian nationalist groups'. Article 6 states that the movement's aim is to "raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned".{{cite web |date=August 18, 1988 |title=Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement |url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp |access-date=February 15, 2009 |work=The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy |publisher=Yale Law School |archive-date=17 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117074547/http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp |url-status=live }}{{sfn|Mishal|Sela|2006|p=178}} The charter rejects a two-state solution, stating that the conflict cannot be resolved "except through jihad".

Many scholars have pointed out that both the 1988 Hamas's charter and the Likud party platform sought full control of the land, thus denouncing the two-state solution.{{sfn|Beinart|2012|p=219, n.53}}

=2017 charter=

{{main|2017 Hamas charter}}

In May 2017, Hamas published a document titled "A Document of General Principles and Policies". While this policy document was much shorter than the 1988 charter, and Hamas leaders stated that it did not replace the 1988 charter,{{cite web |last=Al-Mughrabi |first=Nidal |date=10 May 2017 |title=Leading Hamas official says no softened stance toward Israel |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/world/leading-hamas-official-says-no-softened-stance-toward-israel-idUSKBN1862O4/ |website=Reuters}} it covers some of the same topics and is referred to as the "2017 charter". It accepted a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel, which is seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution,*{{cite book|title=Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms|author=Halim Rane|page=34|year=2009|quote=Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."}}

  • {{cite book|title=Palestinian Chicago|author=Loren D. Lybarger|publisher=University of California Press|year=2020|page=199|quote=Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).}}
  • {{cite book|title=Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy|year=2016|publisher=Routledge|author=Tristan Dunning|pages=179–180}} while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. The charter also argued that armed resistance to occupation is supported by international law.Jean-François Legrain: Hamas according to Hamas: A reading of its Document of General Principles. In: Shahram Akbarzadeh (Hrsg.): Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, Routledge, London 2020, pp. 79–90.{{cite web |title=Hamas in 2017: The document in full |url=http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-charter-1637794876 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024100126/http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-charter-1637794876 |archive-date=24 October 2017 |access-date=January 6, 2018 |website=MiddleEastEye}} Hamas has described these changes as adaptation within a specific context, as opposed to abandonment of its principles.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=18}}

While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic,{{cite book |author=Qossay Hamed |title=Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation |publisher=IGI Global |year=2023 |page=161}} Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.{{sfn|Seurat|2019|p=17}}{{Cite news |last=Amira |first=Hass |date=3 May 2017 |title=Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis |url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2017-05-03/ty-article/.premium/why-hamas-new-charter-is-aimed-at-palestinians-not-israelis/0000017f-eabf-d0f7-a9ff-eeffc7ec0000 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20230423130642/https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2017-05-03/ty-article/.premium/why-hamas-new-charter-is-aimed-at-palestinians-not-israelis/0000017f-eabf-d0f7-a9ff-eeffc7ec0000 |archive-date=23 April 2023 |access-date=12 November 2024 |work=Haaretz}} Some sources maintain its condemnation of Zionists is antisemitic:{{cite book|title=National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict|author=Timea Spitka|year=2023|publisher=Springer International Publishing|pages=88–89}} it describes Zionism as the enemy of all Muslims and a danger to international security, what author J.S. Spoerl in 2020 has disqualified as "hardly (...) a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism".{{cite journal | last=Spoerl | first=Joseph S. | title=Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism | journal=Jewish Political Studies Review | publisher=Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs | volume=31 | issue=1/2 | year=2020 | issn=0792-335X | jstor=26870795 | pages=210–244 | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26870795 | access-date=27 January 2024 | quote=Strictly speaking, the Hamas Covenant of 1988 focused its anti-Semitic language on Zionists, for example, describing The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the blueprint for the Zionist project (Article 32) and accusing the Zionists of aiming to "annihilate Islam" (Article 28). The May 2017 "Document" continues in this vein, albeit in somewhat less florid language, asserting that "the Zionist project does not target the Palestinian people alone; it is the enemy of the Arabic and Islamic Ummah posing a grave threat to its security and interests. It is also hostile to the Ummah's aspirations for unity, renaissance, and liberation and has been the major source of its troubles. The Zionist project also poses a danger to international security and peace and to mankind…." (#15). As in the 1988 Covenant, the 2017 "Document" merely takes all the classical tropes of anti-Semitism and focuses them on Zionism, noting that "it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity" (#16). In effect, Hamas is saying that it is at war with all Jews except those who are anti-Zionist, thus it is not anti-Semitic. This can hardly be regarded as a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism. | archive-date=16 January 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116061115/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26870795 | url-status=live }} Hroub, though not responding directly, disagrees, writing that the 2017 document shows that Hamas is stressing the nationalist/resistance aspects of its purpose, providing a "clear assertion of the right to a national liberation struggle on the basis of international law."{{Cite journal |last=Hroub |first=Khaled |date=2017 |title=A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26378710 |journal=Journal of Palestine Studies |volume=46 |issue=4 (184) |pages=100–111 |doi=10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.100 |jstor=26378710 |issn=0377-919X |quote=In a similar vein, Hamas's description of itself appears in a section titled “The Movement” that is couched in language quite different from the 1988 charter. Here, Hamas stresses the nationalist and resistance aspects of its purpose far more than the religious and pan-Islamic ones...Framing the struggle in nationalist terms is not only a novel element of the 2017 document but it is repeatedly emphasized and clearly articulated...Hamas makes plain that the “conflict is with the Zionist project, not with the Jews because of their religion...The new document offers a definitive framing of the struggle against Zionism and Israel as having nothing to do with religion...In “The Position toward Occupation and Political Solutions,” the document articulates a stance that reflects the movement's internal consensus on the two-state solution, that is, the creation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines...The “Resistance and Liberation” portion of the new document is also quite different in its language from the 1988 charter and other past statements. Here, there is a clear assertion of the right to a national liberation struggle on the basis of international law."}}

Organization

=Leadership and structure=

{{main|List of leaders of Hamas}}

File:Hamasleadership.png

Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services, of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council. Traditionally it had four distinct functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (dawah); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun); (c) a security service (Jehaz Aman); and (d) a media branch (A'alam).{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=10–11}} Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (Kuwaidia) under Khaled Mashal.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=11–12}}{{update inline|date=September 2024}} The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat's decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait, with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw.{{sfn|Roy|2013|p=30}} On May 6, 2017, Hamas' Shura Council chose Ismail Haniyeh to become the new leader, to replace Mashal.{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/06/middleeast/hamas-leadership-ismail-haniya/index.html|title=Ismail Haniya elected new Hamas leader|author=Andrew Carey and Joe Sterling|publisher=CNN|date=May 6, 2017|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=20 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020134958/https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/06/middleeast/hamas-leadership-ismail-haniya/index.html|url-status=live}}

The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, but this has been questioned. It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants. After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretional autonomy over operations.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=44–45}}

== Shura Council and Political Bureau ==

Hamas's overarching governing body is the Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council), based on the Quranic concept of consultation and popular assembly ({{transliteration|ar|shura}}), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework.A. Hovdenak, "Hamas in Transition:The Failure of Sanctions", in Michelle Pace, Peter Seeberg (eds.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=RgLcAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154331/https://books.google.com/books?id=RgLcAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA64#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Routledge, 2013 pp. 50–79 [64]. As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased, the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council, with members elected from local council groups. The council elects the 15-member Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi)Peter Mandaville,[https://books.google.com/books?id=2bvcAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA282 Islam and Politics] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154524/https://books.google.com/books?id=2bvcAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA282#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Routledge, 2014 Rev.ed, p. 282. that makes decisions for Hamas. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and Israeli prisons.Benedetta Berti, [https://books.google.com/books?id=EUcDAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154536/https://books.google.com/books?id=EUcDAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, JHU Press, 2013 p. 88. The Political Bureau was based in Damascus until January 2012, when Hamas's support for the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war led to the office's relocation to Qatar.Mohammed Ayoob, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ph6eAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT47 Will the Middle East Implode?], John Wiley & Sons, 2014 p. 47.

=Finances and funding=

{{see also|Blockade of the Gaza Strip|Zaher Jabarin|Israeli support for Hamas|Taxation in the State of Palestine|Fatah–Hamas reconciliation process}}

Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's {{transliteration|ar|waqf}} properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.{{sfn|Abu-Amr|1993|p=8}}

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 Gulf War.{{sfn|Roy|1993|p=21}} At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read George H. W. Bush's outline of a New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=148}} Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=72}} It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (Beit al-Mal), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}}

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70 million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=143–44}} It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief.{{sfn|Clarke|2015|p=97}} Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8 million to Palestinian charities of the $57 million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13 million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.Interpal and Development and the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation Fund. pp. 146, 154–59.

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50 million in the early 2000s,Marsh E. Burfeindt, 'Rapprochement with Iran', in Thomas A. Johnson (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198 Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155024/https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. CRC Press. 2012. pp. 185–235 [198]. but, under US pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004,Jodi Vittori, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193 Terrorist Financing and Resourcing] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155054/https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 pp. 72–74, 193 notes 50, 51. which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=173}}{{sfn|Gleis|Berti|2012|p=156}} Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties including Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid.Robert Mason, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155031/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 |date=20 March 2024 }}, I.B. Tauris, 2015 pp. 48–49 During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30 million. It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s. According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=172–74}} Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah. After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom.Lawrence Rubin, [https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155102/https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. Stanford University Press, 2014 p. 104 The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas.Jalil Roshandel, Alethia H. Cook, [https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 The United States and Iran: Policy Challenges and Opportunities] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p. 104. The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguaçu area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.Mark P. Sullivan, [https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf 'Latin America: Terrorism Issues'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181121061624/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf |date=21 November 2018 }}. Congressional Research Service. July 14, 2009. p. 4.

After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.Davis, [https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173 p. 173] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}.

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked.{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|title=Palestinian Authority rejects Israeli, U.S. ideas to help Gaza|website=The Jerusalem Post|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=20 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020135417/https://www.jpost.com//arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|url-status=live}} The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."The Jerusalem Post, March 12, 2019, [https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 "Netanyahu: Money to Hamas Part of Strategy to Keep Palestinians Divided"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231030230739/https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 |date=30 October 2023 }}

According to U.S. officials, as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.{{Cite news |last=Stein |first=Jeff |date=2023-11-04 |title=Far from war in Gaza, Hamas chief oversees vast financial network |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |access-date=2023-12-15 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=17 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231217194737/http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |url-status=live }} Hamas has denied such allegations.{{cite news|title=US sanctions Hamas official, finance network|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|publisher=Al-Jazeera English|access-date=15 December 2023|archive-date=15 December 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231215173652/https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|url-status=live}}

In 2024, financial activity in Gaza is mainly carried out via money changers in order to bypass the international financial authorities.[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-11-14/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/by-allowing-suitcases-of-cash-into-gaza-israel-harmed-the-global-fight-against-hamas/00000193-2b39-d0a3-a5d3-bfb998bd0000 Targeting a shadow economy], Haaretz Also in 2024, the European Council added six people to its sanctions list for helping fund Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including a senior official from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Three businesses were also added, including companies in Spain and Sudan that functioned as front companies.[https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240628-new-eu-sanctions-list-for-hamas-financiers-includes-front-companies-based-in-spain-sudan New EU sanctions list for Hamas financiers includes front companies based in Spain, Sudan], France 24[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-sanctions-6-people-3-firms-hamas-finance-crackdown-2024-06-28/ EU sanctions 6 people and 3 firms in Hamas finance crackdown], Reuters

=Social services wing=

Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance.{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=136}} In Islamic tradition, {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} ({{translation|literal=yes|"the call to God"}}) obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both {{transliteration|ar|waqf}} endowment resources and charitable donations ({{transliteration|ar|zakat}}, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=16–23}} In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=78}} Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza.{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|p=71}} Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=75}} As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=47ff}}

The {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.{{efn|'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' {{transliteration|ar|dawa}} infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.'{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=23}}}} In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=25–26}} In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60 million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45 million to detainees and their families.Mohsen Saleh, [https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 The Palestinian Strategic Report 2006] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154908/https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 |date=20 March 2024 }}, Al Manhal, 2007 p. 198. Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others.James J.F. Forrest, "Conclusion", in James Dingley, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CVJ_AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA290 Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland], Routledge, 2008 pp. 280–300 [290]. Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=81}}{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=122–23}}

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip.{{sfn|Davis|2016|p=48}} After the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=48–49}}

=Media=

{{see also|Media coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict|Public diplomacy of Israel|Palestinian propaganda}}

== Al-Aqsa TV ==

{{main|Al-Aqsa TV}}{{see also|Shehab News Agency}}

Al-Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas.{{Cite news|date=January 1, 2009|title=Hamas leader killed in air strike|publisher=BBC News|location=London|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7807124.stm|access-date=1 January 2009|archive-date=4 January 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090104073652/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7807124.stm|url-status=live}} The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006,{{cite news|title=Hamas TV station shut down|url=http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1867389,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071009220331/http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0%2C%2C2-10-1462_1867389%2C00.html|archive-date=October 9, 2007|access-date=October 9, 2007}}, news24.com, January 22, 2006{{cite web|title=Terrorism: Al Aqsa TV|url=http://www.adl.org/terrorism/profiles/al_aqsa_tv.asp|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120114454/http://www.adl.org/terrorism/profiles/al_aqsa_tv.asp|archive-date=January 20, 2013|publisher=ADL}} less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver antisemitic messages.{{cite news|date=May 16, 2008|title=Anti-Semitic Hate Speech in the Name of Islam|publisher=Spiegel Online International|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,553724,00.html |first1=Matthias |last1=Küntzel |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231025065729/https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/wipe-out-the-jews-anti-semitic-hate-speech-in-the-name-of-islam-a-553724.html |archive-date= Oct 25, 2023 }} Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement", and that Hamas does not hold antisemitic views.{{Cite news |date=2008-05-12 |title=Hamas condemns the Holocaust |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/12/hamascondemnstheholocaust |issn=0261-3077 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015101630/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/12/hamascondemnstheholocaust |archive-date= Oct 15, 2023 }} The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment.{{cite news |title=Hamas Launches Television Network |publisher=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5186883 |date=February 3, 2006 |first1=Eric |last1=Westervelt |access-date=February 3, 2006 |archive-date=27 April 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060427063105/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5186883 |url-status=live }} According to the Anti-Defamation League, the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis. Al-Aqsa TV is headed by the controversial Fathi Ahmad Hammad, chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, Voice of al-Aqsa, and its biweekly newspaper, The Message.{{cite news|last=Johnson|first=Alan|date=May 15, 2008|title=Hamas and antisemitism|newspaper=The Guardian|location=London|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/15/hamasandantisemitism|access-date=11 December 2016|archive-date=19 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170119091754/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/15/hamasandantisemitism|url-status=live}} Hamad has made a number of controversial comments, including a speech in which he reportedly stated: 'you have Jews everywhere and we must attack every Jew on the globe by way of slaughtering and killing' {{Cite news |last=Cohen |first=Danny |date=2024-02-02 |title=The blinkered BBC shamefully ignores Hamas's genocidal aims |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/02/the-blinkered-bbc-shamefully-ignores-hamass-genocidal-aims/ |access-date=2024-03-18 |work=The Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=18 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240318180950/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/02/the-blinkered-bbc-shamefully-ignores-hamass-genocidal-aims/ |url-status=live }}

== Al-Fateh magazine ==

{{distinguish|Hamaas}}

{{main|Al-Fateh}}

{{disputed section|date=October 2023}}

Al-Fateh ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".{{cite web |url=http://globalpolitician.com/24252-terror |title=Online Terrorists Prey on the Vulnerable |publisher=Globalpolitician.com |access-date=August 1, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720001052/http://globalpolitician.com/24252-terror |archive-date=July 20, 2011}} According to the Anti-Defamation League, al-Fateh promotes violence and antisemitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs".{{cite web |url=http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_fateh_hamas.htm |title=Hamas Magazine for Kids Promotes Martyrdom and Hatred |publisher=Anti-Defamation League |access-date=August 1, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110804222805/http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_fateh_hamas.htm |archive-date=August 4, 2011}}

==Social media==

Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people. According to Time magazine, a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the October 7 attack: Hamas asserted itself as the dominant resistance force in the Middle East by recording and broadcasting the brutality of their attacks.{{cite news |title=The Oct. 7 Massacre Revealed a New Hamas Social Media Strategy |url=https://time.com/6330005/the-oct-7-massacre-revealed-a-new-hamas-social-media-strategy/ |access-date=29 November 2023 |publisher=Time |date=31 October 2023 |archive-date=28 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231128173944/https://time.com/6330005/the-oct-7-massacre-revealed-a-new-hamas-social-media-strategy/ |url-status=live }}

According to Dr. Harel Horev, historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University, Hamas has used social media to dehumanize Israelis/Jews. According to his research, Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement. This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis. These included posters, songs and videos glorifying threats; computer games that encourage the murder of Jews; training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks; and anti-Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli/Jew in the Palestinian online discourse.{{cite news |title=מה ידענו ומדוע סירבנו להפנים את הכוונות הרצחניות של חמאס? |url=https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-1050383 |access-date=19 November 2023 |publisher=Maariv |date=7 November 2023 |language=he |archive-date=18 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118000716/https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-1050383 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |title=קולקטיבינדואליזם: הדור הפלסטיני הצעיר בין אינדיבידואליזם לקולקטיביזם והאתגר לחמאס |url=https://dayan.org/he/content/5212 |website=Tel Aviv University. The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies |access-date=19 November 2023 |language=he |archive-date=18 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118013737/https://dayan.org/he/content/5212 |url-status=live }}

= Internal security =

{{see also|Ministry of Interior (State of Palestine)}}

The General Security Service, formally part of the Hamas political party, operates akin to a governmental body within Gaza. Under the direct oversight of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, it conducts extensive surveillance on Palestinians, compiling files on various individuals including journalists and government critics. This secret police force relies on a network of informants and employs tactics such as censorship and surveillance to maintain control. Before the conflict with Israel, the unit reportedly had a monthly budget of $120,000 and consisted of 856 personnel, including more than 160 individuals paid to spread Hamas propaganda and conduct online attacks against opponents.{{Cite news |last1=Rasgon |first1=Adam |last2=Bergman |first2=Ronen |date=2024-05-13 |title=Secret Hamas Files Show How It Spied on Everyday Palestinians |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/world/europe/secret-hamas-files-palestinians.html |access-date=2024-05-13 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}

Other powerful internal security bodies in Gaza include Military Intelligence, which focuses on Israel, and the Internal Security Service, an arm of the Interior Ministry.

== Civilian crisis management ==

During the COVID-19 pandemic in Palestine Gaza's Ministry of the Interior formed a crisis management team, headed by Hamas police officer Faiq Al-Mabhouh.{{cite news| url= https://ara.tv/b2xtn | title = Since 7 October: these are the most prominent Hamas leaders who have been assassinated by Israel | date= 19 March 2024 | work= www.alarabiya.net | language=ar }}{{cite news | title= Al-Mahouh: "Lockdown" is an option among procedures evaluated by the competent authorities according to the epidemic situation | url= https://felesteen.news/post/79065/ | work= Palestine Online | date= 5 December 2020 }}{{cite news| title = He sent a message to citizens: Head of the Crisis Management Team in Gaza: We will conduct an evaluation of all the measures taken by this date | url = https://samanews.ps/ar/post/448555/%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF | work= Sama News | date= 30 December 2020 }} Mabhouh played a prominent role in communicating with the public about the changing situation. He appeared in video announcements on Al-Aqsa TV and social media channels, and gave interviews to local media to explain changes in restrictions. The Gaza Strip restrictions took the "flattening the curve" approach. The restrictions imposed were similar to most western countries, and more relaxed than the zero COVID policy implemented by China and their neighbors. The Gaza Strip's starter was to avoid total lockdowns using partial measures like weekend lockdowns and curfews. The weekend lockdowns included mosques being closed for Friday prayers. But during times while the mosques were open, one creative measure initiated by Gaza’s Ministry of Health was to replace the mosque preachers with doctors who gave health information seminars.{{cite web | url= http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/21/c_138900288.htm | title= Roundup: Gaza replaces mosque preachers with doctors for sermon amid COVID-19 - Xinhua - English.news.cn | date= 2020-03-21 | access-date= 2024-05-22 }}

Qassam Brigades (military wing)

{{main|Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades}}

File:Flickr - Israel Defense Forces - Weapons Found in a Mosque During Cast Lead (2).jpg, according to the IDF. ]]

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is Hamas' military wing.{{cite web| title= Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) | date= 18 December 2023 | url= https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/10/كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام | publisher= Al Jazeera Arabic | quote= (image caption) {{langx|ar| شعار كتائب عز الدين القسام الجناح العسكري لحركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس (الجزيرة) || Logo of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). }} | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20240918231927/https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/10/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85 | archive-date= 18 September 2024 | access-date= 18 September 2024 }}{{cite news |last=Beaumont |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Beaumont (journalist) |date=2023-10-12 |title=What is Hamas, the militant group that rules Gaza? |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/what-is-hamas-the-militant-group-that-rules-gaza |access-date=2023-10-16 |issn=0261-3077 |archive-date=18 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240318031644/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/what-is-hamas-the-militant-group-that-rules-gaza |url-status=live }} While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership, Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training, including training in Iran and in Syria (before the Syrian Civil War).{{sfn|Guidère|2012|p=173}} Additionally, the brigades have an estimated 10,000–17,000 operatives,{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|p=71}}{{sfn|Najib|Friedrich|2007|p=106}} other sources say 15,000–40,000 militants,{{cite book |last1=(IISS) |first1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance, 2018, Vol. 118, No. 1, February 2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781857439557 |date=14 February 2018 }}{{in lang|fr}} Christian Chesnot, [https://www.franceculture.fr/geopolitique/michel-goya-militairement-le-hamas-monte-en-gamme-depuis-2010 Michel Goya : "Militairement, le Hamas monte en gamme depuis 2010"], France Culture, 18 May 2021.{{undue weight inline|1=Conflicting estimates of size of Qassam Brigades|reason=no indication on relative reliability of these different figures|date=July 2024}} forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade. Recruitment training lasts for two years.{{sfn|Guidère|2012|p=173}} The group's ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur'an, and this translates into three policy priorities:

To evoke the spirit of Jihad (Resistance) among Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims; to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations; to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.{{sfn|Najib|Friedrich|2007|p=105}}

According to its official stipulations, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades' military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine, engaging with Israeli soldiers,{{efn|'Consistent attacks on army units by Hamas activists are as new as the use of anti-tank missiles against civilian homes by the Israeli military.'{{sfn|Roy|1993|p=21}}}} and in exercising the right of self-defense against armed settlers. They are to avoid civilian targets, to respect the enemy's humanity by refraining from mutilation, defacement or excessive killing, and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond.{{sfn|Najib|Friedrich|2007|pp=105–06}}

File:2013 Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades exercise (8).jpg

Down to 2007, the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations. Aside from Yahya Ayyash (January 5, 1996), it has lost Emad Akel (November 24, 1993), Salah Shehade (July 23, 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (March 8, 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (August 21, 2003), Ahmed Yassin (March 22, 2004), and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (April 17, 2004).{{sfn|Najib|Friedrich|2007|p=107}}{{sfn|Hueston|Pierpaoli|Zahar|2014|p=67}}

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4–5 man cells, which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions. Unlike the political section, which is split between an internal and external structure, the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership, and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare.{{sfn|Najib|Friedrich|2007|pp=107–08}}

Although the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas, the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated.{{sfn|Levitt|2008|pp=89ff.}} They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas, exercising a certain autonomy.{{sfn|Davis|2004|p=100}}{{sfn|Herrick|2011|p=?}}{{cite book |author1=John L.Esposito |title=Islam and Violence |date=1 August 1998 |publisher=Syracuse University Press |page=231|isbn=978-0-8156-2774-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SlhxoTHLxeMC&pg=PA231 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20240426014404/https://books.google.com/books?id=SlhxoTHLxeMC&pg=PA231#v=onepage&q&f=false |archive-date=26 April 2024}} Some cells have independent links with the external leadership, enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza.{{sfn|Gunning|2007|pp=123–55|ps=: p. 134}} Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, likening Hamas's relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Féin's relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army, quote a senior Hamas official as stating: "The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance."{{sfn|Kass|O'Neill|1997|p=267}}{{efn|Matthew Levitt on the other hand claims that Hamas's welfare institutions act as a mere façade or front for the financing of terrorism, and dismisses the idea of two wings as a 'myth'.{{sfn|Herrick|2011|p=179}} He cites Ahmed Yassin stating in 1998: "We can not separate the wing from the body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body."{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=24}}}}

= Gaza forces, October 2023 =

During the 2023 Gaza war, the IDF published its intelligence about the Hamas military in the Strip.{{Cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-hamas-has-lost-control-in-gaza-troops-kill-gunmen-who-fired-from-hospital/|title=Gallant: Hamas has lost control in Gaza; gunmen who fired from hospital entrance killed | The Times of Israel|website=The Times of Israel|date=13 November 2023|access-date=14 November 2023|archive-date=14 November 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231114074143/https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-hamas-has-lost-control-in-gaza-troops-kill-gunmen-who-fired-from-hospital/|url-status=live}} They put the strength of the Qassam Brigades there at the start of the war at 30,000 fighters, organised by area in five brigades, consisting in total of 24 battalions and c. 140 companies. Each regional brigade had a number of strongholds and outposts, and included specialised arrays for rocket firing, anti-tank missiles, air defenses, snipers, and engineering.

Symbols

File:25th anniversary of Hamas (08).jpg

The flag of Hamas is a green field (a traditionally respected color in Islam) charged in the middle with the writing of the Shahada, an Islamic statement of faith, in white calligraphic script: "There is no god but God" and "Muhammad is the messenger of God".{{Cite book |last=Marshall |first=Tim |title=A Flag Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of National Symbols |publisher=Scribner |pages=148 |author-link=Tim Marshall (journalist)}}{{Cite web |last=McLaughlin |first=Jenna |title=Stop mixing up the Islamic flags: A guide for lazy journalists |url=https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/islamic-isis-flags-black-banners-hamas/ |access-date=2023-11-12 |website=Mother Jones |language=en-US}}

The emblems of their political{{Cite web|url=https://aja.me/wrr8z0|title=حركة حماس.. مقاومة للاحتلال انطلقت مع انتفاضة الحجارة | الموسوعة | الجزيرة نت}}{{Cite news |last=Bullock |first=Tom |date=2007-06-19 |title=Q&A: Hamas and Fatah |work=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/2007/06/19/10390803/q-a-hamas-and-fatah }} and military wings are distinctly different.{{cite web| title= Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) | date= 18 December 2023 | url= https://aja.me/fv6c2t | publisher= Al Jazeera Arabic | quote= (image caption) {{langx|ar| شعار كتائب عز الدين القسام الجناح العسكري لحركة المقاومة الإسلامية حماس (الجزيرة) || Logo of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). }} | archive-url= https://archive.today/20240920044737/https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/10/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85 | archive-date= 2024-09-20 | access-date= 2024-09-20 }} The emblem of Hamas' political wing features Islamic and militaristic motifs. It shows two crossed swords in front of the central building of the Al-Aqsa mosque complex, in Jerusalem. The mosque is framed by two Palestinian flags that feature the two statements that comprise the Shahada. Above Al Aqsa is a map of Palestine, matching the borders of Mandatory Palestine. Immediately below the Dome it reads "Palestine" and below that in the green banner: "Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas".{{Cite web |last=Lybarger |first=Loren |date=2017-12-23 |title=Other Jerusalem Realities: The "City of Prayer" in Palestinian Nationalist Imaginaries |url=https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/global-currents/jerusalem-palestinian-imaginaries/ |access-date=2023-11-12 |website=Contending Modernities}} The emblem of their Al-Qassam Brigades militant wing does not include a map or a Palestinian flag, the militant wing emblem is a cartoon drawing of a man holding an M16 rifle and a Quran, with his face mostly covered by a black and white Palestinian keffiyeh.{{cite news | title= הופל אתר עז א-דין אל קסאם, דף הפייסבוק שלהם הוסר | url= https://www.haaretz.co.il/captain/net/2014-07-17/ty-article/0000017f-e36c-d804-ad7f-f3fed4890000 | access-date= 20 September 2024 | work= Haaretz (Hebrew edition) | date= 17 July 2014 |archive-url= https://archive.today/20240920083929/https://www.haaretz.co.il/captain/net/2014-07-17/ty-article/0000017f-e36c-d804-ad7f-f3fed4890000 | archive-date= 20 September 2024 }} He is standing in front of a green flag and the golden dome of the Al-Aqsa mosque, but the building is more stylised than it is in the political wing emblem.{{cite news| title= ar: حماس قد توجه هجمات ضخمة من داخل قطاع غزة | date= 13 December 2015 | work= Times of Israel (Arabic edition) | url= https://ar.timesofisrael.com/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9/ | quote= (image caption) The logo of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas… }}

Violence

Hamas has used both political activities and violence in pursuit of its goals. For example, while politically engaged in the 2006 Palestinian Territories parliamentary election campaign, Hamas stated in its election manifesto that it was prepared to use "armed resistance to end the occupation".{{cite news |author=Madelene Axelsson |date=January 27, 2006 |title=Islamistisk politik vinner mark |url=http://www.stockholmsfria.nu/artikel/6296 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927034525/http://www.stockholmsfria.nu/artikel/6296 |archive-date=September 27, 2007 |access-date=April 10, 2006 |publisher=Stockholms Fria Tidning |language=sv}} Hamas has repeatedly justified its violence by arguing "People under occupation have a right to resist that occupation". Hamas also argues its armed resistance only started after decades of Israeli occupation.{{cite book |last1=Sen |first1=Somdeep |title=Decolonizing Palestine: Hamas between the anticolonial and the postcolonial |date=2020 |publisher=Cornell University Press |location=Ithaca [New York] |isbn=9781501752735 |pages=60–62}}

From 2000 to 2004, Hamas was responsible for killing nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2001 through May 2008, Hamas launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks into Israel.[https://www.foxnews.com/story/israel-at-war-to-the-bitter-end-strikes-key-hamas-sites Israel At 'War to the Bitter End,' Strikes Key Hamas Sites] December 29, 2008, Fox News

=Attacks on civilians=

File:HAMAS suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 25 February (DoS Publication 10321).png in which 26 people were killed]]

Hamas have committed massacres targeting Israeli civilians. Hamas's most deadly suicide bombing was an attack on a Netanya hotel on March 27, 2002, in which 30 people were killed and 140 were wounded. The attack has also been referred to as the Passover massacre since it took place on the first night of the Jewish festival of Passover at a Seder.

Hamas has defended suicide attacks as a legitimate aspect of its asymmetric warfare against Israel. In 2003, according to Stephen Atkins, Hamas resumed suicide bombings in Israel as a retaliatory measure after the failure of peace talks and an Israeli campaign targeting members of the upper echelon of the Hamas leadership.{{efn|'This ceasefire ended when Israel started targeting Hamas leaders for assassination in July 2003. Hamas retaliated with a suicide bombing in Israel on August 19, 2003, that killed 20 people, including 6 children. Since then Israelis have mounted an assassination campaign against the senior leadership of Hamas that has killed 13 Hamas members, including Ismail Abu Shanab, one of the most moderate leaders of Hamas. ... After each of these assassinations, Hamas has sent a suicide bomber into Israel in retaliation.'{{sfn|Atkins|2004|p=123}}}} but they are considered as crimes against humanity under international law.{{cite web |author=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |url=https://www.refworld.org/country,,HRW,COUNTRYREP,ISR,,3dc9379d4,0.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130416012248/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,COUNTRYREP,ISR,,3dc9379d4,0.html |archive-date=April 16, 2013 |title=Refworld | Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians |publisher=UNHCR |access-date=March 27, 2013 |url-status=live }}{{Cite journal|last=Saarnivaara|first=Minn|title=Suicide Campaigns as a Strategic Choice: The Case of Hamas |journal=Policing|volume=2|issue=4|pages=423–33|year=2008|doi=10.1093/police/pan061}} In a 2002 report, Human Rights Watch stated that Hamas leaders "should be held accountable" for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" committed by the al-Qassam Brigades.[https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-05.htm#P735_169095 Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians] V. Structures and Strategies of the Perpetrator Organizations, Human Rights Watch, October 2002. {{ISBN|1564322807}}{{cite web |url=https://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/30/indiscriminate-fire-0 |title=Indiscriminate Fire, Palestinian Rocket Attacks on Israel and Israeli Artillery Shelling in the Gaza Strip |publisher=Human Rights Watch |date=June 30, 2007 |access-date=May 27, 2010 |archive-date=May 24, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100524155207/http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/30/indiscriminate-fire-0 }}{{cite web |url=https://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/28/civilians-under-assault |title=Civilians under Assault, Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War |publisher=Human Rights Watch |date=August 28, 2007 |access-date=May 27, 2010 |archive-date=May 24, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100524155118/http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/28/civilians-under-assault }}

In 2008, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, offered that Hamas would attack only military targets if the IDF would stop causing the deaths of Palestinian civilians.{{cite news |url=http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1206632372365&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080609190105/http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1206632372365&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull |archive-date=June 9, 2008 |title=Mashaal offers to cease civilian attacks |access-date=June 1, 2016}} March 31, 2008, The Jerusalem Post Following a June 19, 2008, ceasefire, the al-Qassam Brigades ended its rocket attacks and arrested Fatah militants in Gaza who had continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks against Israel. The al-Qassam Brigades resumed the attacks after the November 4 Israeli incursion into Gaza.File:Nova_massacre_dashcam.jpg left 364 people dead with many others wounded or taken hostage]]

During the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Hamas infiltrated homes, shot civilians en masse, and took scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages into Gaza.{{cite web |last=Debre |first=Isabel |date=October 8, 2023 |title=Israeli hostage crisis in Hamas-ruled Gaza becomes a political trap for Netanyahu |url=https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-israel-military-prisoners-hostage-hamas-soldiers-e75729364f8c0b453da272365c16d136 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231014211944/https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-israel-military-prisoners-hostage-hamas-soldiers-e75729364f8c0b453da272365c16d136 |archive-date=October 14, 2023 |access-date=October 15, 2023 |publisher=AP News}}{{cite web |last1=Gold |first1=Hadas |last2=Murphy |first2=Paul P. |last3=Salma |first3=Abeer |last4=Dahman |first4=Ibrahim |last5=Khadder |first5=Kareem |last6=Mezzofiore |first6=Gianluca |last7=Goodwin |first7=Allegra |date=October 8, 2023 |title=Hamas captures hostages as Israelis share photos of those missing |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/07/middleeast/hostages-hamas-israel-gaza/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231014210614/https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/07/middleeast/hostages-hamas-israel-gaza/index.html |archive-date=October 14, 2023 |access-date=October 15, 2023 |publisher=CNN}} According to Human Rights Watch, the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and taking of civilians as hostages amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law.{{cite web |date=9 October 2023 |title=Israel/Palestine: Devastating Civilian Toll as Parties Flout Legal Obligations |url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/09/israel/palestine-devastating-civilian-toll-parties-flout-legal-obligations |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231009202840/https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/09/israel/palestine-devastating-civilian-toll-parties-flout-legal-obligations |archive-date=9 October 2023 |website=Human Rights Watch}} During its October 2023 offensive against Israel, Hamas massacred 364 people at the Re'im music festival, while abucting others.{{cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/death-count-from-massacre-at-reim-music-festival-reportedly-updated-to-364-a-third-of-oct-7-deaths/|title=Death count from Re'im music festival massacre reportedly updated to 364 — a third of Oct. 7 fatalities|work=The Times of Israel|date=17 November 2023|access-date=20 November 2023}}{{Cite news |last1=Morris |first1=Loveday |last2=Piper |first2=Imogen |last3=Sohyun Lee |first3=Joyce |last4=George |first4=Susannah |date=8 October 2023 |title=How a night of dancing and revelry in Israel turned into a massacre |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/08/israel-festival-attack-gaza-militants/ |url-status=live |access-date=8 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231008200354/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/08/israel-festival-attack-gaza-militants/ |archive-date=8 October 2023}} During the same offensive, it also was reported that Hamas had massacred the population of the Kfar Aza kibbutz.{{cite news |last=Lubell |first=Maayan |date=October 10, 2023 |title=Bodies of residents and militants lie in the grounds of ravaged Israeli kibbutz |publisher=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bodies-residents-militants-lie-grounds-ravaged-israeli-kibbutz-2023-10-10/ |access-date=October 10, 2023}} About 10 percent of the residents of the Be'eri kibbutz were killed.{{cite news |title=10 Percent of Kibbutz Population Found Dead After Hamas Massacre in Southern Israel |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-10/ty-article/.premium/10-percent-of-kibbutz-population-found-dead-after-hamas-massacre-in-southern-israel/0000018b-191c-df31-a99f-7ddf54fa0000 |work=Haaretz |date=10 October 2023}} Hamas militants attacked the Psyduck festival, that took place near kibutz Nir Oz, killing 17 Israeli partygoers.{{Cite web |last=Ntieb |first=Arnold |date=2023-10-10 |title=לא רק ברעים: המסיבה הנוספת בדרום שמשתתפיה טרם שבו הביתה |trans-title=Not only in Re'im: The participants of the other southern festival who did not come back |url=https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-1043995 |access-date=2023-12-20 |website=maariv |language=he}} Video footage shows children being deliberately killed during the kibbutz attacks,{{Cite news |last=Carroll |first=Rory |date=2023-10-23 |title=Israel shows footage of Hamas killings 'to counter denial of atrocities' |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/israel-shows-footage-of-hamas-killings-to-counter-denial-of-atrocities |access-date=2023-10-26 |issn=0261-3077}} as well as what appears to be an attempt to decapitate a living person using a garden hoe.{{Cite news |date=23 October 2023 |title=Israel shows Hamas bodycam attack footage to journalists |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67198270 |access-date=26 October 2023}} Forensic teams who examined bodies of victims said many bodies showed signs of torture as well as sexual and gender-based violence, and testimonies to this effect were also collected by Israeli police.{{Cite news |date=2023-11-25 |title=Israel investigates an elusive, horrific enemy: Rape as a weapon of war |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/25/israel-hamas-rape-sexual-violence/ |access-date=2023-12-04 |newspaper=Washington Post |language=en}}{{Cite news |title=The Scope of Hamas' Campaign of Rape Against Israeli Women Is Revealed, Testimony After Testimony |language=en |work=Haaretz |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-30/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/hamas-campaign-of-rape-against-israeli-women-is-revealed-testimony-after-testimony/0000018c-2144-da36-a1de-6767dac90000 |access-date=2023-12-04}}{{Cite news |date=2023-10-15 |title=Israeli forensic teams describe signs of torture, abuse |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forensic-teams-describe-signs-torture-abuse-2023-10-15/ |access-date=2023-12-04}}{{Cite news |title=Israeli Police Collect Eyewitness Testimony of Gang Rape During Hamas Attack |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-08/ty-article/israeli-police-collect-eyewitness-testimony-of-gang-rape-during-hamas-attack/0000018b-b025-d3c1-a39b-bee5ef400000 |access-date=2023-12-04 |work=Haaretz |language=en}} Haaretz later reported that forensic pathologists who examined bodies of the victims taken the Shura Base for identification found "no signs on any of those bodies attesting to sexual relations having taken place or of mutilation of genitalia." Not all bodies could be fully examined given the lack of forensic pathologists, and for some conclusions could not be drawn given their deteriorated state.{{Cite news |last=Rozovsky |first=Liza |date=18 April 2024 |title=15 Witnesses, Three Confessions, a Pattern of Naked Dead Bodies. All the Evidence of Hamas Rape on October 7 |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-18/ty-article-magazine/witnesses-confessions-naked-dead-bodies-all-the-evidence-of-hamas-rape-on-oct-7/0000018e-f114-d92e-abfe-f77f7e3f0000 |access-date=28 November 2024 |work=Haaretz}} Israeli forensic pathologists in charge of the process clarified later that all bodies had been examined, and some were disfigured or burned.{{Cite journal |last1=Mor |first1=Zohar |last2=Kugel |first2=Chen |last3=Mizrahi |first3=Hagar |last4=Kaliner |first4=Ehud |date=November 2024 |title=Mass killing during terror attack at the Israel-Gaza border and the role of the Ministry of Health in identification of human remains and their release |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39128201/ |journal=Forensic Science International |volume=363 |pages=1 |doi=10.1016/j.forsciint.2024.112188 |issn=1872-6283 |pmid=39128201 |quote=Bodies were delivered to a central mortuary. Each body was coded and undressed for external inspection and documentation of physical elements... Whole-body CT was performed in cases the bodies were disfigured or burned from the second week}} Some of the testimonies were later proven to be false.{{cite news |last1=Grim |first1=Ryan |last2=Boguslaw |first2=Daniel |last3=Scahill |first3=Jeremy |date=29 February 2024 |title=Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Story Behind the New York Times October 7 Exposé |url=https://theintercept.com/2024/02/28/new-york-times-anat-schwartz-october-7/ |access-date=1 April 2024 |work=The Intercept}}{{cite news |last1=Grim |first1=Jeremy |last2=Scahil |first2=Ryan |date=4 March 2024 |title=Kibbutz Be'eri Rejects Story in New York Times October 7 Exposé: "They Were Not Sexually Abused" |url=https://theintercept.com/2024/03/04/nyt-october-7-sexual-violence-kibbutz-beeri/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=The%20Intercept%20Newsletter |access-date=7 March 2024 |work=The Intercept}}{{Cite news |date=22 May 2024 |title=How 2 debunked accounts of sexual violence on Oct. 7 fueled a global dispute over Israel-Hamas war |url=https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-sexual-violence-zaka-ca7905bf9520b1e646f86d72cdf03244 |access-date=25 August 2024 |work=AP News |language=en}} Detailed reports by the UN and The Times concluded that Israel's claims about the scale and formally sanctioned, systematic nature of sexual assaults did not stand up to scrutiny.{{cite web |title=Mission report - Official visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the occupied West Bank 29 January – 14 February 2024 |url=https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/report/mission-report-official-visit-of-the-office-of-the-srsg-svc-to-israel-and-the-occupied-west-bank-29-january-14-february-2024/20240304-Israel-oWB-CRSV-report.pdf |access-date=5 March 2024 |publisher=United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict}}{{cite report |url=https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-26-auv.docx |title=Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel |author=Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory |date=12 June 2024 |publisher=Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |access-date=23 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240829134953/https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-26-auv.docx |archive-date=29 August 2024 |url-status=live}}{{Cite web |last1=Philp |first1=Catherine |last2=Weiniger |first2=Gabrielle |date=7 June 2024 |title=Israel says Hamas weaponised rape. Does the evidence add up? |url=https://www.thetimes.com/magazines/the-times-magazine/article/israel-hamas-rape-investigation-evidence-october-7-6kzphszsj |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241008030639/https://www.thetimes.com/magazines/the-times-magazine/article/israel-hamas-rape-investigation-evidence-october-7-6kzphszsj |archive-date=8 October 2024 |access-date=11 August 2024 |website=The Times}}

=Rocket attacks on Israel=

{{see also|Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel}}

{{Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel}}

Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have launched thousands of rockets into Israel since 2001, killing 15 civilians, wounding many more, and posing an ongoing threat to the nearly 800,000 Israeli civilians who live and work in the weapons' range. Hamas officials have said that the rockets were aimed only at military targets, saying that civilian casualties were the "accidental result" of the weapons' poor quality. According to Human Rights Watch, statements by Hamas leaders suggest that the purpose of the rocket attacks was indeed to strike civilians and civilian objects. From January 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, Hamas largely stopped launching rocket attacks on Israel and has on at least two occasions arrested members of other groups who have launched rockets, "showing that it has the ability to impose the law when it wants".[https://www.hrw.org/en/node/89574/section/3 HRW report] April 11, 2010 In February 2010, Hamas issued a statement regretting any harm that may have befallen Israeli civilians as a result of Palestinian rocket attacks during the Gaza war. It maintained that its rocket attacks had been aimed at Israeli military targets but lacked accuracy and hence sometimes hit civilian areas. Israel responded that Hamas had boasted repeatedly of targeting and murdering civilians in the media.{{Cite news|author=Al-Mughrabi, Nidal|url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6141LC|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101030958/http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6141LC|url-status=dead|archive-date=1 January 2016|title=Hamas "regrets" civilian deaths, Israel unmoved|publisher=Reuters|date=February 5, 2010}}

According to one report, commenting on the 2014 conflict, "nearly all the 2,500–3,000 rockets and mortars Hamas has fired at Israel since the start of the war seem to have been aimed at towns", including an attack on "a kibbutz collective farm close to the Gaza border", in which an Israeli child was killed.{{cite news|last=Baker|first=Luke|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-gaza-hamas-document-idUSKBN0GO0D120140824|title=Israel says it found Hamas training manual in Gaza|publisher=Reuters|date=August 24, 2014|access-date=August 25, 2014|archive-date=August 24, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140824134841/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/24/us-mideast-gaza-hamas-document-idUSKBN0GO0D120140824|url-status=live}} Former Israeli Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi stated that "Hamas has expressed pride in aiming long-range rockets at strategic targets in Israel including the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the chemical plants in Haifa, and Ben-Gurion Airport", which "could have caused thousands" of Israeli casualties "if successful".{{cite web|last=Halevi|first=Jonathan D.|url=http://jcpa.org/hamas-threat-no-different-from-isis/|title=The Hamas Threat to the West Is No Different from ISIS|work=Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs |publisher=Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs|date=August 4, 2014|access-date=August 25, 2014}}

In July 2008, Barack Obama, then the Democratic presidential candidate, said: "If somebody was sending rockets into my house, where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same thing."Steven Lee Myers and Helene Cooper, [https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/washington/29diplo.html Obama Defers to Bush, for Now, on Gaza Crisis], New York Times December 28, 2009 On December 28, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement: "the United States strongly condemns the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel."[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,473167,00.html U.S. Condemns Hamas in Midst of Israeli Strikes] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130625060725/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,473167,00.html |date=June 25, 2013}}, Fox News December 28, 2008 On March 2, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks.[https://web.archive.org/web/20090307170418/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gid-B97gmhLgqf8brVLEKN46E-Lw Clinton calls for 'durable' Gaza truce, condemns rockets], AFP March 2, 2009

On October 7, 2023, Hamas claimed responsibility for a barrage of missile attacks originating from the Gaza Strip.{{cite news |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-07/israel-targets-hamas-military-operation-rocket-attacks/102947766 |title='We are at war': Palestinian militants launch new military operation, Israel strikes targets in Gaza |publisher=ABC News |date=October 7, 2023}}

=Guerrilla warfare=

File:Weapons Found in Shuja'iya, Gaza (14552909800).jpg

Hamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank.{{cite news|url=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3310425,00.html|work=Ynetnews |date=October 3, 2006|title=Report: Hamas weighing large-scale conflict with Israel}} It has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled between several hundred and 1,300 tons of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza.

Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible, time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas—this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.{{cite web|url=http://www.humanities.uci.edu/history/levineconference/papers/aburaiya.pdf#search=%22hamas%20enjoys%20great%20popular%20support%22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031104083809/http://www.humanities.uci.edu/history/levineconference/papers/aburaiya.pdf#search=%22hamas%20enjoys%20great%20popular%20support%22|archive-date=November 4, 2003|author=Issam Aburaiya|date=October 3, 2006|title=Hamas and Palestinian Nationalism}}

= Extrajudicial killings of rivals =

{{anchor|EJK}}{{see also| Capital punishment in the Gaza Strip }}

In addition to killing Israeli civilians and armed forces, Hamas has also murdered suspected Palestinian Israel collaborators and Fatah rivals.{{cite news |last=Corey Flintoff |date=31 July 2008 |title=Palestinian Rivals Accused Of Human Rights Abuses |publisher=NPR |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93143826}}{{cite news|url=https://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&pubid=968163964505&cid=1159712646109&col=968705899037&call_page=TS_News&call_pageid=968332188492&call_pagepath=News/News|title=Fatah, Hamas gunbattles kill 7|newspaper=Toronto Star|date=October 1, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110805234113/http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar%2FLayout%2FArticle_Type1&c=Article&pubid=968163964505&cid=1159712646109&col=968705899037&call_page=TS_News&call_pageid=968332188492&call_pagepath=News%2FNews|archive-date=August 5, 2011}} According to the Associated Press, collaborating with Israel is a crime punishable by death in Gaza.{{cite web |last=Associated Press |date=2021-04-02 |title=Gaza Activist: After Lengthy Torture, Hamas Forced Me to Divorce |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_gaza-activist-after-lengthy-torture-hamas-forced-me-divorce/6204063.html |access-date=2023-10-16 |website=Voice of America}} Hundreds of Palestinians were executed by both Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada.{{cite book|author=Yosif Mahmoud Haj-Yahis|title=Alleged Palestinian Collaborators with Israel and Their Families: A Study of Victims of Internal Political Violence|publisher=Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem|year=2009|pages=18–19|display-authors=etal}} In the wake of the 2006 Israeli conflict with Gaza, Hamas was accused of systematically rounding up, torturing and summarily executing Fatah supporters suspected of supplying information to Israel. Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were "maimed" and tortured in the aftermath of the conflict. Seventy-three Gazan men accused of "collaborating" had their arms and legs broken by "unidentified perpetrators", and 18 Palestinians accused of helping Israel were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict.[https://www.hrw.org/en/node/82359/section/2 Under Cover of War|Human Rights Watch] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140419012758/http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82359/section/2 |date=19 April 2014 }}. Human Rights Watch (April 20, 2009). Retrieved on August 21, 2010.[https://web.archive.org/web/20080510125140/http://www.btselem.org/English/Inter_Palestinian_Violations/ B'Tselem – Violations of the human rights of Palestinians by Palestinians – Severe human rights violations in inter-Palestinian clashes]. Btselem.org (November 12, 2007). Retrieved on August 21, 2010.{{cite news |last=Kalman |first=Matthew |title=Hamas executes suspected Fatah traitors in Gaza |url=http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/21/MNHV15EHUT.DTL |newspaper=San Francisco Chronicle |date=January 22, 2009 |access-date=September 7, 2013}} In November 2012, Hamas's Izzedine al-Qassam brigade publicly executed six Gaza residents accused of collaborating with Israel. According to the witnesses, six alleged informers were shot dead one by one in Gaza City, while the corpse of the sixth victim was tied by a cable to the back of a motorcycle and dragged through the streets.{{cite news|author=The Associated Press |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hamas-militants-kill-6-suspected-informers-witnesses-say-1.1172426 |title=Hamas militants kill 6 suspected informers, witnesses say |publisher=CBC News |date=November 20, 2012 |access-date=January 6, 2013}} In 2013, Human Rights Watch issued a statement condemning Hamas for not investigating and giving a proper trial to the six men. Their statement was released the day before Hamas issued a deadline for "collaborators" to turn themselves in, or they will be pursued "without mercy".{{cite news|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/rights-group-pans-hamas-for-not-probing-executions/|title=Rights group pans Hamas for not probing executions|newspaper=The Times of Israel}} During the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Hamas executed at least 23 accused collaborators after three of its commanders were assassinated by Israeli forces, with Amnesty International also reporting instances of torture used by Hamas forces.{{Cite news |date=May 27, 2015 |title=Amnesty International: Hamas guilty of torture, summary executions |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-international-hamas-guilty-of-torture-summary-executions/2015/05/27/4d1ee6b1-ac6a-420f-b7a7-80aa62d24b86_story.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126163031/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-international-hamas-guilty-of-torture-summary-executions/2015/05/27/4d1ee6b1-ac6a-420f-b7a7-80aa62d24b86_story.html |archive-date=January 26, 2021 |access-date=October 16, 2023 |newspaper=The Washington Post}}{{cite news|title=Large number of alleged Israeli informers killed in Gaza|url=http://www.palestiniannews.net/index.php/sid/225005191|date=August 22, 2014|access-date=August 23, 2014|publisher=Palestinian News.Net|archive-date=August 26, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140826115720/http://www.palestiniannews.net/index.php/sid/225005191|url-status=dead}} An Israeli source denied that any of the commanders had been targeted on the basis of human intelligence.

Frequent{{ambiguous|date=August 2024}} killings of unarmed people have also occurred during Hamas-Fatah clashes.{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2090520.stm |title=Middle East | Unrest erupts in Gaza Strip |publisher=BBC News |date=July 3, 2002 |access-date=May 27, 2010}}{{Cite news |last=Levinson |first=Charles |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/10/wirq310.xml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070615173959/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2007%2F06%2F10%2Fwirq310.xml |archive-date=June 15, 2007 |title=Shot by their own side, healed by the enemy |newspaper=The Daily Telegraph |date=June 10, 2007 |access-date=May 27, 2010 |location=London}} NGOs have cited a number of summary executions as particular examples of violations of the rules of warfare, including the case of Muhammad Swairki, 28, a cook for Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas's presidential guard, who was thrown to his death, with his hands and legs tied, from a 15-story apartment building in Gaza City.{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/13/isrlpa16156.htm|title=Gaza: Armed Palestinian Groups Commit Grave Crimes|publisher=Human Rights Watch|date=June 13, 2007}} Hamas security forces reportedly shoot and torture Palestinians who opposed Hamas rule in Gaza.{{Cite web |last=Agence France-Presse |date=2009-04-21 |title=Hamas must stop killings: HRW |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/04/21/2003441620 |access-date=2023-10-16 |website=Taipei Times}} In one case, a Palestinian had criticized Hamas in a conversation on the street with some friends. Later that day, more than a dozen armed men with black masks and red kaffiyeh took the man from his home, and brought him to a solitary area where they shot him three times in the lower legs and ankles. The man told Human Rights Watch that he was not politically active.

On 14 August 2009, Hamas fighters stormed the Mosque of extremist cleric Abdel-Latif Moussa.{{cite news|publisher=BBC News | url= http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8202553.stm|title=Mosque gun battle rages in Gaza|date=August 14, 2009|location=London}} The cleric was protected by at least 100 fighters from Jund Ansar Allah ("Army of the Helpers of God"), an Islamist group with links to Al-Qaeda. The resulting battle left at least 13 people dead, including Moussa and six Hamas fighters, and 120 people injured.{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8202746.stm|title=Gaza Islamist leader dies in raid|date=August 15, 2009|publisher=BBC News|location=London}}

According to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, during 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, Hamas killed more than 120 Palestinian youths for defying house arrest imposed on them by Hamas, in addition to 30–40 Palestinians killed by Hamas in extrajudicial executions after accusing them of being collaborators with Israel.{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/abbas-hints-pa-close-to-ending-unity-deal-with-hamas-374626|title=Abbas hints PA close to ending unity agreement with Hamas|website=The Jerusalem Post}} Referring to the killing of suspected collaborators, a Shin Bet official stated that "not even one" of those executed by Hamas provided any intelligence to Israel, while the Shin Bet officially "confirmed that those executed during Operation Protective Edge had all been held in prison in Gaza in the course of the hostilities".{{cite news|last1=Klein|first1=Aaron J.|last2=Ginsburg|first2=Mitch|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/none-of-alleged-gaza-collaborators-were-israeli-assets-intel-official-says/|title=None of alleged Gaza collaborators were Israeli assets, intel official says|newspaper=The Times of Israel|date=September 3, 2014|access-date=September 23, 2014}}

Criticism

{{main|Criticism of Hamas|Use of human shields by Hamas|Allegations of genocide in the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel|Hamas baby beheading hoax}}

Aside from its use of political violence in pursuit of its goals, Hamas has been widely criticised for a variety of reasons, including the use of antisemitic hate speech by its representatives, frequent calls for the military destruction of Israel, its reported use of human shields{{Cite web |last=Taub |first=Amanda |date=2014-08-07 |title=Did Israel violate international law in Gaza? |url=https://www.vox.com/2014/8/7/5975255/9-questions-you-were-embarrassed-to-ask-about-whether-the-war-in-gaza |access-date=2024-01-29 |website=Vox |language=en |quote=It is true that Hamas and other-Gaza based militants aren't complying with international law themselves. They target Israeli civilians in rocket attacks, commingle military sites and operations with civilian institutions, and, according to some reports, force people to remain in buildings after warnings from the Israeli military in order to serve as human shields.}} and child combatants as part of its military operations,{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=124-134}} its restriction of political freedoms within the Gaza Strip,{{Cite web |title=Gaza Strip: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2023 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015092232/https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2023 |archive-date=2023-10-15 |access-date=2023-10-16 |website=Freedom House |language=en}} and human rights abuses.{{cite book |url=https://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-israeloccupied-palestinian-territories |title=World Report 2012: Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories |date=January 22, 2012 |publisher=Human Rights Watch |access-date=January 6, 2013}}

After the start of the 2023 war, the European Parliament passed a motion stating the need for Hamas to be eliminated, with US President Biden having expressed the same sentiment.{{Cite web |title=European Parliament calls for Hamas to be 'eliminated,' urges release of hostages |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/european-parliament-calls-for-hamas-to-be-eliminated-urges-release-of-hostages/ |access-date=2023-10-21 |website=www.timesofisrael.com |language=en-US}}{{Cite news |last1=Bose |first1=Nandita |last2=Jackson |first2=Katharine |date=2023-10-16 |title=Biden says Hamas must be eliminated, US officials warn of escalation |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/conflict-middle-east-could-escalate-us-national-security-adviser-warns-2023-10-15/ |access-date=2023-10-21}} Hamas was accused of having committed genocide against Israelis on 7 October 2023 by 240 legal experts, including jurists and academics.

  • {{Cite web |date=2023-10-19 |title=Genocide Emergency Alert: Israel and Gaza |url=https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-alert-israel-and-gaza |access-date=2023-12-07 |website=genocidewatch |language=en}}
  • {{Cite web |date=2023-11-03 |title=Israeli families bring war crime complaint to ICC: lawyer |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231103-israeli-families-bring-war-crime-complaint-to-icc-lawyer |access-date=2023-12-07 |website=France 24 |language=en}}
  • {{Cite news |title=Deadly Hamas Rampage Constitutes 'International Crime of Genocide,' Hundreds of Legal Experts Say |language=en |work=Haaretz |url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-16/ty-article/hamas-deadly-rampage-constitutes-crime-of-genocide-hundreds-of-legal-experts-say/0000018b-37d1-d450-a3af-7fddda070000 |access-date=2023-12-07}}
  • {{Cite news |last=Winer |first=Stuart |date=15 October 2023 |title=Hamas actions are war crimes, could constitute genocide – international law experts |work=Times of Israel |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-actions-are-war-crimes-could-constitute-genocide-international-law-experts/}}
  • {{Cite web |last=Winer |first=Stuart |date=2023-10-18 |title=Legal Experts: Hamas committed War Crimes, Genocide |url=https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/legal-experts-hamas-committed-war-crimes-genocide |access-date=2023-12-07 |website=genocidewatch |language=en}}

Electoral performance

= Legislative Council =

In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the party won 44.45% of the vote, becoming the largest party of the Legislative Council.

class=wikitable
Election

! Leading candidate

! Votes

! %

! Seats

! +/–

! Position

2006

| Ismail Haniyeh

| 440,409

| 44.45

|{{Composition bar|74|132|{{party color|Hamas}}}}

| New

| 1st

Public opinion

A poll conducted in 2021 found that 53% of Palestinians believed Hamas was "most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people". Only 14% preferred Abbas's Fatah party.{{cite news |date=June 15, 2021 |title=Poll finds dramatic rise in Palestinian support for Hamas |publisher=Associated Press |url=https://apnews.com/article/hamas-middle-east-science-32095d8e1323fc1cad819c34da08fd87}} At the same time, a majority of Gazans also saw Hamas as corrupt, but were frightened to criticize the group.Fattel, Isabel. [https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2023/10/what-is-hamas/675594/ "What is Hamas?"] The Atlantic. 9 October 2023. 9 October 2023. Polls conducted in September 2023 found that support for Hamas among Palestinians stood at around 27–31%.{{cite web |date=13 September 2023 |title=Public Opinion Poll No (89) |url=https://pcpsr.org/en/node/955 |access-date=2023-10-10 |website=Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research}}

Public opinions of Hamas deteriorated after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Prior to the takeover, 62% of Palestinians had held a favorable view of the group, while a third had negative views. According to a 2014 Pew Research survey just prior to the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, only about a third had positive opinions, and more than half viewed Hamas negatively. Furthermore, 68% of Israeli Arabs viewed Hamas negatively.[http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/ Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East]. Pew Research. July 1, 2014. In July 2014, 65% of Lebanese viewed Hamas negatively. In Jordan and Egypt, roughly 60% viewed Hamas negatively, and in Turkey, 80% had a negative view of Hamas. In Tunisia, 42% had a negative view of Hamas, while 56% of Bangladeshis and 44% of Indonesians had a negative opinion of Hamas.

Hamas popularity surged after the war in July–August 2014 with polls reporting that 81 percent of Palestinians felt that Hamas had "won" that war.{{cite news|title=Hamas popularity 'surges after Gaza war'|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/hamas-popularity-surges-after-gaza-war-20149215723979443.html|publisher=Al Jazeera English|date=September 2, 2014}}{{cite news|title=Poll: Hamas popularity surges after war with Israel|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/02/poll-hamas-popularity-surges-after-war-with-israel/|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=September 2, 2014}} A June 2021 opinion poll found that 46% of respondents in Saudi Arabia supported rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.{{cite news |title=Recent Saudi Poll: Increased Support for Moderate Islam, Hamas, and Ties with Arab Partners |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/recent-saudi-poll-increased-support-moderate-islam-hamas-and-ties-arab-partners |publisher=The Washington Institute |date=August 27, 2021}} A March/April 2023 poll found that 60% of Jordanians viewed Hamas firing rockets at Israel at least somewhat positively.{{cite news |last=Almaari |first=Faris |title=New Public Opinion Poll: Jordanians Favor De-escalation in the Region, But Sentiment Against Israel Remains |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-public-opinion-poll-jordanians-favor-de-escalation-region-sentiment-against |publisher=The Washington Institute |date=June 9, 2023}}

Following the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023 and the Gaza war that followed, Hamas's popularity in Gaza fell while increasing in the West Bank. A May 2024 poll by the Arab World for Research and Development, a West Bank-based independent organization, only a quarter of Gazans supported Hamas, while 76% of Palestinians in the West Bank views Hamas positively. Views on the attack among Gazans plummeted from 50% support to 24% in favor from a poll taken in November 2023 to the May 2024 poll.{{cite web | last=Scheindlin | first=Dahlia | title=How Popular Is Hamas, in Gaza and Outside of It, After Nine Months of War? | website=Haaretz.com | date=July 17, 2024 | url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2024-07-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/how-popular-is-hamas-in-gaza-and-outside-of-it-after-nine-months-of-war/00000190-bfda-d211-a5da-ffdbea210000 | access-date=October 21, 2024}} According to the poll conducted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy from November 14 to December 6, 2023, 40% of Saudi participants expressed a positive view of Hamas, 95% of Saudis did not believe that Hamas killed civilians in its attack on Israel, and only 16% of Saudis said Hamas should accept a two-state solution.{{cite news |title=Saudis Overwhelmingly Oppose Ties With Israel, Poll Finds |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-poll-israel-gaza-war-hamas.html |work=The New York Times |date=22 December 2023}}

File:Pro Hamas Rally in Damascus.jpg, Syria.]]

Foreign relations

{{See also|Foreign relations of Hamas}}

File:Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh meeting Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.jpg and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2012]]

After winning the Palestinian elections, Hamas leaders made multi-national diplomatic tours abroad. In April 2006, Mahmoud al-Zahar (then foreign minister) visited Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=69}} He met the Saudi foreign minister Prince Faysal. In Syria he held talks on the issue of Palestinians stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi border.{{Clarify|reason=This is mysterious: In what sense were “Palestinians stuck on” that border (Syria–Iraq) in 2006? Car without petrol? Arrested by police? Intraversable fence? Far too often I find such vague, metaphorical language in this Hamas article, and quite often, like this time, it comes from a book of ms. Seurat, who apparently is dedicated to producing such vague or meaningless language.|date=May 2024}} He also stated that he unofficially met officials from Western Europe in Qatar who did not wish to be named.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=69}} In May 2006, Hamas foreign minister visited Indonesia, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and Iran.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=69}} The minister also participated in China–Arab States Cooperation Forum.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=70}} Ismail Haniyeh in 2006 visited Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=71}}

Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure that Israel cannot kill its top political and military leaders.{{cite news |last=Schanzer |first=Jonathan |title=How Hamas Lost the Arab Spring |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/how-hamas-lost-the-arab-spring/277102/ |website=The Atlantic |date=June 21, 2013}} Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria. Iran gave Hamas an estimated $13–15 million in 2011 as well as access to long-range missiles. Hamas's political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital of Damascus before the start of the Syrian civil war. Relations between Hamas, Iran, and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Instead, Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad. As a result, Iran cut funding to Hamas, and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon.{{cite magazine |last=Gidda |first=Mirren |title=Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left |url=https://time.com/3033681/hamas-gaza-palestine-israel-egypt/ |magazine=Time |date=July 25, 2014 |access-date=October 18, 2023 |archive-date=14 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190414135347/http://time.com/3033681/hamas-gaza-palestine-israel-egypt/ |url-status=live }} Hamas was then forced out of Syria, and subsequently has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau, but both countries refused, although they welcomed many Hamas members leaving Syria.{{cite news |title=Hamas Ties to Qatar Have Cost |url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/hamas-qatar-relationship-independence.html# |date=April 22, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616195431/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/hamas-qatar-relationship-independence.html |archive-date=June 16, 2016}}

From 2012 to 2013, under the short-lived leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas had the support of Egypt. After Morsi was removed from office, his successor Abdul Fattah al-Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt. In 2015, Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organization. But this decision was overturned by Egypt in June of the same year.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=108}} There was a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt, when a Hamas delegation visited Cairo on 12 March 2016.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=109}} Hamas has assisted Egypt in controlling the insurgency in Sinai.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=109}} Hamas denied Egypt's request to deploy its own militants in the Sinai leading to tensions between the two.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=109}}

Egypt has occasionally served as mediator between Hamas and Fatah, seeking to unify the two factions. In 2017, Yahya Sinwar visited Cairo for 5 weeks and convinced the Egyptian government to open the Rafah crossing, letting in cement and fuel in exchange for Hamas committing to better relations with Fatah; this subsequently led to the signing of the 2017 Fatah–Hamas Agreement.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=110}}

The United Arab Emirates has been hostile to Hamas, viewing it as the Palestinian equivalent of the Muslim Brotherhood, a designated terrorist organization in the UAE.

Hamas enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia in its early years. Saudi Arabia funded most of its operations from 2000 to 2004, but reduced its support due to US pressure. In 2020, many Hamas members in Saudi Arabia were arrested. In 2022, Saudi Arabia began releasing Hamas members from prison. In April 2023, Ismail Haniyeh visited Riyadh, a sign of improving relations.{{Cite web|url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-host-hamas-delegation-first-over-decade|title=Saudi Arabia to host first Hamas delegation in over a decade|website=Middle East Eye}} Haniyeh had long sought to visit Saudi Arabia, and his requests to do so had been long ignored up until then.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=84-85}}

Despite its Sunni Islamist ideology, Hamas has been flexible and pragmatic in its foreign policy, moderating and toning down its religious rhetoric when expedient;{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=185}} it has developed strong ties with Iran,{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=x}} and has also established relations with constitutionally secular states such as Syria and Russia.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=x}}{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=185}} Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence, has accused Russia of supporting Hamas by supplying the group with stolen Ukrainian weaponry,{{cite web |last1=Bigg |first1=Matthew Mpoke |title=As World's Eyes Shift, Ukraine and Russia Look to Sway Opinions |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/12/world/europe/ukraine-russia-israel-hamas.html |website=The New York Times |access-date=July 25, 2024 |date=October 12, 2023}} and the National Resistance Center of Ukraine alleged that the Russian Wagner Group trained Hamas militants ahead of the October 7 attacks.{{cite web |last1=Struck |first1=Julia |title=Wagner Trained Hamas Militants for Attack on Israel, Ukrainian Partisans Claim |url=https://www.kyivpost.com/post/22528 |website=Kyiv Post |access-date=July 25, 2024 |date=October 9, 2023}}

According to AP some North Korean arms were "likely" used during the Oct. 7 assault on Israel.{{Cite web |date=2023-10-19 |title=Evidence shows Hamas militants likely used some North Korean weapons in attack on Israel |url=https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-north-korea-weapons-703e33663ea299f920d0d14039adfbb8 |access-date=2023-11-18 |website=AP News |language=en}} Ali Barakeh, a Hamas official living in Lebanon, claimed the two are allies.{{Cite news |last=PACCHIANI |first=GIANLUCA |date=5 November 2023 |title=Hamas official says North Korea is ally, insinuates it could one day target the US |work=Times of Israel |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-official-says-north-korea-is-ally-insinuates-it-could-one-day-target-the-us/}}{{Cite web |title=Hamas official says North Korea could attack US over Gaza war |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/baraka-11072023171130.html |access-date=2023-11-18 |website=Radio Free Asia |language=en}}

Hamas leaders reportedly re-established relations with Kuwait, Libya and Oman, all of which reportedly have not had warm relations with Fatah.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=144}} The cool relationship between Fatah and Kuwait owed to Arafat's support for Saddam during the First Gulf War, which lead to the Palestinian exodus from Kuwait (1990–91).{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=144}} This rapproachment is in part due to Hamas's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=144}} Mahmoud al-Zahar stated that Hamas does not "play the game" of siding with one Arab nation against another (e.g. in the Gulf War).{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=145}} When Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and other Sunni ulema, called for an uprising against Assad's regime in Syria, Mahmoud al-Zahar maintained that taking sides would harm the Palestinian cause.{{sfn|Seurat|2022|p=224-225}}{{clarify|reason=it's mentioned earlier that Hamas supported Syrian rebels against Assad|date=December 2023}}

After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas congratulated the Syrian people for achieving their "aspirations for freedom and justice," and expressed hope that the new Syrian government would continue "its historical and pivotal role in supporting the Palestinian people."{{Cite web |last=Agencies and ToI Staff |title=Hamas, Islamic Jihad congratulate Syrians on achieving 'freedom and justice' by toppling Assad |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-islamic-jihad-congratulate-syrians-on-achieving-freedom-and-justice-by-toppling-assad/ |date=9 December 2024 |website=Times of Israel}} In February 2025, Hamas condemned Israeli attacks on Syria.{{cite news |title=Israel bombs 'military targets' in southern Syria, outside Damascus |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/26/israel-bombs-military-targets-in-southern-syria-outside-damascus |work=Al Jazeera |date=26 February 2025}}

=Terrorist designation=

[[File:International views on Hamas.svg|thumb|{{legend|#FF0000|Designated Hamas as a terrorist organization}}

{{legend|#FFA500|Designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization}}]]

The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 1995, as did Canada in November 2002,[https://books.google.com/books?id=9fQ3AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA15 The World Almanac of Islamism: 2014], American Foreign Policy Council/Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 15. and the United Kingdom in November 2021.{{cite web|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2/proscribed-terrorist-groups-or-organisations-accessible-version|title=Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations|website=GOV.UK|access-date=26 November 2021|archive-date=19 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210719150016/https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2/proscribed-terrorist-groups-or-organisations-accessible-version|url-status=live}} In May 2021, the Organization of American States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation.{{cite news |url=https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-051/21 |title=Qualification of Hamas as a Terrorist Organization by the OAS General Secretariat |publisher=oas.org |date=19 May 2021 |access-date=4 September 2024}} The European Union so designated Hamas's military wing in 2001 and, under US pressure,{{sfn|Gunning|2004|p=234}} designated Hamas in 2003.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=50–51}} Hamas challenged this decision,[http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150119_01_en.htm Statement by High Representative/Vice-president Federica Mogherini on the decision to appeal the Judgment regarding Hamas], January 19, 2015 which was upheld by the European Court of Justice in July 2017.{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-palestinians-hamas-idUSKBN1AB0VE|title=EU court keeps Hamas on terrorism list, removes Tamil Tigers|date=July 26, 2017|publisher=Reuters|quote=The lower court had found that the listing was based on media and internet reports rather than decisions by a "competent authority". But the ECJ said such decisions were not required for groups to stay on the list, only for their initial listing.}} JapanAccording to Michael Penn, ([https://books.google.com/books?id=ly8zBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA205 Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance], I.B. Tauris 2014 pp. 205–06), Japan initially welcomed the democratic character of the elections that brought Hamas to power, and only set conditions on its aid to Palestine, after intense pressure was exerted by the Bush Administration on Japan to alter its policy. and New Zealand{{cite web |url=http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities/lists-associated-with-resolution-1373 |title=Lists associated with Resolution 1373 |publisher=New Zealand Police |date=July 20, 2014 |access-date=August 16, 2014}} have designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organisation.David Sobek,[https://books.google.com/books?id=BiWsx7ClSpEC&pg=PT45 The Causes of War], John Wiley & Sons, 2013 p. 45. The organisation is banned in Jordan.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=49}} In late February 2024, New Zealand re-designated the entire Hamas organisation as a terror entity.{{cite web |url=https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-designates-entirety-hamas-terrorist-entity |title=NZ designates entirety of Hamas as terrorist entity |date=29 February 2024 |website=Beehive.govt.nz|publisher=New Zealand Government|access-date=29 February 2024}} In September 2024, Switzerland approved a draft law on to ban the group.{{Cite web |date=2024-09-04 |title=Swiss government approves draft law to ban Hamas |url=https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-818713 |access-date=2024-09-04 |website=The Jerusalem Post {{!}} JPost.com |language=en}}

In April 2025, Hamas filed a legal case in Britain appealing its designation as a terrorist group. The filing argues that Hamas has never engaged in an armed operation outside of historic Palestine and is not a threat to Western nations. Hamas politician Mousa Abu Marzook submitted a written statement arguing, "Hamas is not a terrorist group. It is a Palestinian Islamic liberation and resistance movement whose goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project."{{cite web |last1=Scahill |first1=Jeremy |title=Hamas Launches Unprecedented Legal Case in Britain, Demanding the Government Remove its Terror Designation |url=https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/hamas-terrorism-uk-marzouk |website=Drop Site News |access-date=9 April 2025}}{{cite web |last1=Siddique |first1=Haroon |title=Hamas calls on UK government to remove it from list of banned terrorist groups |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/09/hamas-calls-on-the-uk-government-to-remove-it-from-list-of-banned-terrorist-groups |website=The Guardian |language=en-gb |date=9 April 2025}}

Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organisation by Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran,Alethia H. Cook, "The Subtle Impact of Iran on the Flotilla Incident", in Thomas E. Copeland (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=bsuYAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA36 Drawing a Line in the Sea: The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict], Lexington Books, 2011 pp. 35–44 [36]. Russia,Robert O. Freedman, 'Russia,' in Joel Peters, David Newman (eds.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=kftqQdNNDWAC&pg=PA331 The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict], Routledge, 2013 pp. 325–33 [331] Norway,{{efn|"In 2006, Norway explicitly distanced itself from the EU proscription regime, claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'"{{sfn|Haspeslagh|2016|p=199}}}} Turkey, China,David J. Whittaker (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=SOhJQbP77h0C&pg=PA84 The Terrorism Reader], Routledge (2001), 2012, p. 84. Egypt, Syria, and Brazil.Samuel Feldberg,'Israel and Brazil:An Emerging Power and its Quest for Influence in the Middle East,' in Colin Shindler (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=d7f2AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA199 The World Powers:Diplomatic Alliances and International Relations Beyond the Middle East], I.B. Tauris, 2014 pp. 187–99{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/11/21/9-questions-about-israel-gaza-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/|title=9 questions about Israel-Gaza you were too embarrassed to ask|first=Max|last=Fisher|date=November 21, 2012|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=January 6, 2018}}{{sfn|Amossy|2017|p=273, n4}} "Many other states, including Russia, China, Syria, Turkey and Iran consider the (armed) struggle waged by Hamas to be legitimate."{{sfn|Brenner|2017|p=203, n.27}}

Tobias Buck, a journalist with the British Financial Times newspaper wrote in 2012 that Hamas is "listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU, but few dare to treat it that way" and in the Arab and Muslim world it had lost its pariah status with its emissaries welcomed in capitals of Islamic countries.{{cite news |last=Buck |first=Tobias |url=http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80ce6306-348e-11e2-8986-00144feabdc0.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/wvyCq |archive-date=December 10, 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |title=Five lessons from the Gaza conflict |work=Financial Times |date=November 22, 2012 |access-date=January 6, 2013}} In the early 2010s, Hamas was considered a terrorist group by some governments and academics, others regarded Hamas as a complex organisation, with terrorism as only one component.Krista E. Wiegand, [https://books.google.com/books?id=H96cqNJ0fTAC&pg=PA124 Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups], Ashgate Publishing, Revised edition 2013 p. 124. "Officially, Hamas is considered by American and Israeli policymakers and some academics as the epitome of a terrorist group. [...] Due to the gravity and consequences of Hamas's use of terrorism as a tactic, all other aspects of Hamas, including its extensive social services programs and its role as a political party are overshadowed and often ignored by policy makers. Others recognize the complexity of Hamas as an organisation and suggest that Hamas will continue to transform itself into a full political party and eventually disarm and cease all violent tactics. They view Hamas as a complex organisation with terrorism as only one component, which is likely to evolve into a non-violent political party."Luke Peterson, [https://books.google.com/books?id=nrsbBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA99 Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media: Contending Discourses], Routledge 2014 p. 99.

=Israeli policy towards Hamas=

{{See also|Israeli support for Hamas}}

Benjamin Netanyahu had been Israel's prime minister for most of the two decades preceding the Gaza war, and was criticized for having championed a policy of empowering Hamas in Gaza.{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/15/israels-big-new-shift-in-hamas-policy/|title=Israel's Big New Shift in Hamas Policy|work=Foreign Policy|accessdate=28 October 2023|date=15 June 2021}}{{cite web|url=https://www.vox.com/23910085/netanyahu-israel-right-hamas-gaza-war-history|title=Benjamin Netanyahu failed Israel|work=Vox|date=9 October 2023|accessdate=28 October 2023}}{{cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/10/16/how-benjamin-netanyahu-empowered-hamas/|work=The Telegraph|title=How Benjamin Netanyahu empowered Hamas ... and broke Israel|accessdate=28 October 2023|date=16 October 2023}} This policy was part of a strategy to sabotage a two-state solution by confining the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank and weakening it, and to demonstrate to the Israeli public and western governments that Israel has no partner for peace.The Jerusalem Post, 12 Mar. 2019 [https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/netanyahu-money-to-hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-palestinians-divided-583082#583082 "Netanyahu: Money to Hamas Part of Strategy to Keep Palestinians Divided: 'Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes," the source said, paraphrasing Netanyahu"] This criticism was leveled by several Israeli officials, including former prime minister Ehud Barak, and former head of Shin Bet security services Yuval Diskin.{{cite web|url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/netanyahu-israel-gaza-hamas-1.7010035|title=How Netanyahu's Hamas policy came back to haunt him — and Israel|accessdate=28 October 2023|date=28 October 2023|work=CBS News}} Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority were also critical of Israel under Netanyahu allowing suitcases of Qatari money to be given to Hamas, in exchange for maintaining the ceasefire. The Times of Israel reported after the Hamas attack that Netanyahu's policy to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset had "blown up in our faces".{{cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-years-netanyahu-propped-up-hamas-now-its-blown-up-in-our-faces/|title=For years, Netanyahu propped up Hamas. Now it's blown up in our faces|work=The Times of Israel|date=8 October 2023|accessdate=28 October 2023}}

= Qatar and Turkey =

{{see also|Qatari support for Hamas|Turkish support for Hamas}}

According to Middle East experts, now Hamas has two firm allies: Qatar and Turkey. Both give Hamas public and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Qatar has transferred more than $1.8 billion to Hamas.{{cite news|url=https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-hamas/a-57537872|title=What is Hamas and who supports it?|author=Ehl, David|publisher=Deutsche Welle|date=May 15, 2021|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=11 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231011025905/https://amp.dw.com/en/who-is-hamas/a-57537872|url-status=live}} Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, says that "Qatar also hosts Hamas's political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal." Meshaal also visits Turkey frequently to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdogan has dedicated himself to breaking Hamas out of its political and economic seclusion. On US television, Erdogan said in 2012 that "I don't see Hamas as a terror organization. Hamas is a political party."

Qatar has been called Hamas' most important financial backer and foreign ally.{{Cite news|date=June 19, 2017|title=Hamas is feeling the pain of Qatar's crisis, and is looking to Egypt for help|work=Los Angeles Times|url=https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-qatar-hamas-egypt-20170619-story.html}} In 2007, Qatar was, with Turkey, the only country to back Hamas after the group ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip. The relationship between Hamas and Qatar strengthened in 2008 and 2009 when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit where he was seated next to the then Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who pledged $250 million to repair the damage caused by Israel in the Israeli war on Gaza. These events caused Qatar to become the main player in the "Palestinian issue". Qatar called Gaza's blockade unjust and immoral, which prompted the Hamas government in Gaza, including former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, to thank Qatar for their "unconditional" support. Qatar then began regularly handing out political, material, humanitarian and charitable support for Hamas.

File:Numan Kurtulmuş İsmail Heniye.jpeg, 20 November 2012]]

In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama personally requested that Qatar, one of the U.S.'s most important Arab allies, provide a base for the Hamas leadership. At the time, the U.S. were seeking to establish communications with Hamas and believed that a Hamas office in Qatar would be easier to access than a Hamas bureau in Iran, the group's main backer.{{Cite news |title=Qatar reconsiders mediator role between Hamas and Israel |url=https://www.ft.com/content/007b0cce-1778-4ba8-a3c0-0879e8492292 |access-date=2024-04-26 |newspaper=Financial Times|date=18 April 2024 |last1=England |first1=Andrew }}{{Cite news |last=Koelbl |first=Susanne |date=2023-11-02 |title=NATO Partner and Hamas Host |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-partner-and-hamas-host-a-39579533-e4a2-400a-a78e-9a8836606ccc |access-date=2024-04-21 |work=Der Spiegel |language=en |issn=2195-1349}}

In 2012, Qatar's former Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, became the first head of state to visit Gaza under Hamas rule. He pledged to raise $400 million for reconstruction.{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/23/qatari-emir-welcome-gaza-visit|title=Qatari emir's visit to Gaza is a boost for Hamas|first1=Ian|last1=Black|first2=Harriet|last2=Sherwood|date=October 23, 2012|newspaper=The Guardian}} Sources say that advocating for Hamas is politically beneficial to Turkey and Qatar because the Palestinian cause draws popular support amongst their citizens at home.{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/meast/mideast-hamas-support/index.html|title=Which Mideast power brokers support Hamas? |first=Josh |last=Levs|date=August 6, 2014 |publisher=CNN}}

Speaking in reference to Qatar's support for Hamas, during a 2015 visit to Palestine, Qatari official Mohammad al-Emadi, said Qatar is using the money not to help Hamas but rather the Palestinian people as a whole. He acknowledges that giving to the Palestinian people means using Hamas as the local contact. Emadi said, "You have to support them. You don't like them, don't like them. But they control the country, you know."{{Cite news|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/18/414693807/why-israel-lets-qatar-give-millions-to-hamas|title=Why Israel Lets Qatar Give Millions To Hamas|publisher=NPR|date=18 June 2015}} Some argue that Hamas's relations with Qatar are putting Hamas in an awkward position because Qatar has become part of the regional Arab problem. Hamas says that having contacts with various Arab countries establishes positive relations which will encourage Arab countries to do their duty toward the Palestinians and support their cause by influencing public opinion in the Arab world. In March 2015, Hamas has announced its support of the Saudi Arabian-led military intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.[http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/725241 Hamas supports military operation for political legitimacy in Yemen] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160807021350/http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/725241 |date=August 7, 2016}}. Arab News. March 30, 2015. In a controversial deal, Israel's government under Benjamin Netanyahu supported Qatar's payments to Hamas for many years, in the hope that it would turn Hamas into an effective counterweight to the Palestinian Authority and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.{{Cite web |last1=Elbagir |first1=Nima |last2=Arvanitidis |first2=Barbara |last3=Platt |first3=Alex |last4=Razek |first4=Raja |last5=Ebrahim |first5=Nadeen |date=2023-12-11 |title=Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years – with Israel's backing. Here's what we know about the controversial deal |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/11/middleeast/qatar-hamas-funds-israel-backing-intl/index.html |access-date=2024-04-06 |website=CNN |language=en}}

In May 2018, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tweeted to the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a resistance movement that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power. During that period there were conflicts between Israeli troops and Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip, due to the decision of the United States to move their embassy to Jerusalem.{{cite news|url=https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/246031|title=Erdogan: Hamas is not a terrorist organization|website=Israel National News|date=May 16, 2018}} Also in 2018 the Israel Security Agency accused SADAT International Defense Consultancy (a Turkish private military company with connections to the Turkish government) of transferring funds to Hamas.{{cite web |title=Turkish Militias and Proxies |url=https://trendsresearch.org/research/turkish-militias-and-proxies/ |website=trendsresearch |date=January 25, 2021 |author1=Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak |author2=Dr. Jonathan Spyer |access-date=April 17, 2022 |archive-date=May 16, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220516150904/https://trendsresearch.org/research/turkish-militias-and-proxies/ |url-status=dead}}

In February 2020, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with Turkish President Erdoğan.{{cite news|title=US Criticizes Turkey for Hosting Hamas Leaders|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_us-criticizes-turkey-hosting-hamas-leaders/6194990.html|work=VOA News|date=26 August 2020}} On 26 July 2023, Haniyeh met with Erdoğan and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Behind the meeting was Turkey's effort to reconcile Fatah with Hamas.{{cite news |title=Erdogan hosts PA's Abbas, Hamas head Haniyeh to prepare for détente talks |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-hosts-pas-abbas-hamas-head-haniyeh-to-prepare-for-detente-talks/ |work=The Times of Israel |date=26 July 2023}} On 7 October 2023, the day of the Hamas attack on Israel, Haniyeh was in Istanbul, Turkey.{{cite news |title=Report: Hamas chiefs were asked to leave Turkey after October 7 attacks |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-hamas-chiefs-were-asked-to-leave-turkey-after-october-7-attacks/ |work=The Times of Israel |date=23 October 2023}} On 21 October 2023, Haniyeh spoke with Erdoğan about the latest developments in the Gaza war and the current situation in Gaza.{{cite news |title=Turkey's Erdogan discussed Gaza with Hamas leader – Turkish presidenc |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-discussed-gaza-with-hamas-leader-turkish-presidency-2023-10-21/ |work=Reuters |date=21 October 2023}} On 25 October 2023, Erdoğan said that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people.

= United States =

{{see also|Palestine–United States relations}}

In early 2025, the US' Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs, Adam Boehler, talked directly with Hamas in an attempt to secure the release of American hostages. Following these talks, Boehler said that Hamas had proposed a 5 to 10 year ceasefire and a full prisoner exchange, and told Kan News that he "does believe" that Hamas would not only lay down its weapons but also leave power in Gaza. He told Fox News that "Hamas is aiming for a long-term ceasefire. We discussed a cease-fire that includes Hamas disarming, staying out of politics, and ensuring they cannot harm Israel."{{Cite news |last=Crissy |first=Ron |date=2025-03-12 |title=He's Jewish, met with Hamas and was Jared Kushner's college roommate: Meet Adam Boehler |url=https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/b14fmtpiye |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=Ynetnews |language=en}} Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters that the talks were a "one-off situation in which our special envoy for hostages, whose job it is to get people released, had an opportunity to talk directly to someone who has control over these people and was given permission and encouraged to do so. He did so."{{Cite news |last1=Roth |first1=Andrew |last2=Burke |first2=Jason |date=2025-03-10 |title=US envoy's secret talks with Hamas anger Netanyahu administration |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/10/us-envoy-secret-talks-hamas-anger-netanyahu-administration |access-date=2025-03-15 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250310225206/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/10/us-envoy-secret-talks-hamas-anger-netanyahu-administration |archive-date=2025-03-10 |url-status=live}} According to Ynet, since he was appointed, Boehler has made several "controversial" proposals, including everything from U.S. commando raids into Gaza "and hinting at the possibility of a long-term cease-fire ("hudna") between Hamas and Israel."

See also

Notes

{{notelist}}

References

{{Reflist|22em}}

= Sources =

== Books ==

{{refbegin|35em}}

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}}

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|title=Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance

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}}

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|title=Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance

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|isbn=978-0755634392

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies

|last=Chehab

|first=Zaki

|author-link = Zaki Chehab

|publisher=I.B. Tauris

|year=2007

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rWEg6Tfai_oC

|isbn=978-1845113896

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Hamas and Politics in Palestine:Impact on Peace-Building

|last=Cheema

|first=Sujata Ashwarya

|title=West Asia and the Region: Defining India's Role

|editor-last=Abhyankar

|editor-first=Rajendra Madhukar

|publisher=Academic Foundation

|location=New Delhi

|year=2008

|isbn=978-8171886166

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YopTyDFI1U4C&pg=466

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare

|last=Clarke

|first=Colin P.

|publisher=ABC-CLIO

|year=2015

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PJRzCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA96

|isbn=978-1440831041

}}

  • {{Cite book

|author-last=Dalacoura

|author-first=Katerina

|year=2012

|chapter=Islamist Terrorism and National Liberation: Hamas and Hizbullah

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PlTKrMFyawoC&pg=PA66

|title=Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East

|location=Cambridge

|publisher=Cambridge University Press

|pages=66–96

|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511977367.004

|isbn=9780511977367

|lccn=2010047275

|s2cid=150958046

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Women in Modern Terrorism: From Liberation Wars to Global Jihad and the Islamic State

|last=Davis

|first=Jessica

|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield

|year=2017

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uR_aDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA57

|isbn=978-1442274990

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East

|last=Davis

|first=Joyce

|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan

|year=2004

|page=100

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GxwbNesHJBkC&pg=PA100

|isbn=978-1403966810

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East: Insurgency in the Holy Land

|last=Davis

|first=Richard

|publisher=Routledge

|year=2016

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bmaFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT68

|isbn=978-1317402589

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy: Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine

|last=Dunning

|first=Tristan

|publisher=Routledge

|year=2016

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vTp-CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT270

|isbn=978-1317384946

}}

  • {{cite journal

|title= The Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool?

|first=Jean-Pierre

|last=Filiu

|author-link=Jean-Pierre Filiu

|journal= Journal of Palestine Studies

|volume = 41

|issue =3

|pages = 54–70

|date=Spring 2012

|doi=10.1525/jps.2012.xli.3.54

|jstor=10.1525/jps.2012.xli.3.54

|url= https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2012.xli.3.54

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=The Palestinian National Movement Comes of Age

|last=Gelvin

|first=James L.

|title=The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War

|edition=3rd

|publisher=Cambridge University Press

|location=New York

|year=2014

|isbn=978-1-107-61354-6

|page=226

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Mobilizing Women for Nationalist Agendas

|last=Gerner

|first=Deborah J.

|title=From Patriarchy to Empowerment: Women's Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia

|editor-last=Moghadam

|editor-first=Valentine M.

|publisher=Syracuse University Press

|year=2007

|pages=17–39

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iKsSEulnPTsC&pg=PA27

|isbn=978-0815631118

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study

|last1=Gleis

|first1=Joshua L.

|last2=Berti

|first2=Benedetta

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vYBtwkj78BUC&pg=PT111

|year=2012

|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press

|isbn=978-1421406718

|pages=111

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism

|last=Guidère

|first=Mathieu

|publisher=Scarecrow Press

|year=2012

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tCvhzGiDMYsC&pg=PA173

|isbn=978-0810878211

}}

  • {{cite book

|last=Gunning

|first=Jeroen

|editor1=Marianne Heiberg

|editor2=Brendan O'Leary

|chapter=Hamas: Harakat al-Muqamama al-Islamiyya

|title=Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=m8_pM7Ncij8C&pg=PA134

|year=2007

|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press

|isbn=978-0812239744

|pages=134–

}}

  • {{Cite book

|chapter="Listing terrorists"; the impact of proscription on third-party efforts to engage armed groups in peace processes- a practitioner's perspective'

|last=Haspeslagh

|first=Sophie

|title=Terrorism: Bridging the Gap with Peace and Conflict Studies: Investigating the Crossroad

|editor1-last=Tellidis

|editor1-first=Ioannis

|editor2-last=Toros

|editor2-first=Harmonie

|publisher=Routledge

|year=2016

|pages=189–207

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tbxYCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA189

|isbn=978-1317665595

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Non-State Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and Development Within Hamas and Hezbollah

|last=Herrick

|first=Julie C.

|title=The Changing Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics

|editor-last=Korany

|editor-first=Bahgat

|publisher=Oxford University Press

|year=2011

|pages=167–95

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xyMjPQDzIp8C&pg=PA179

|isbn=978-9774165139

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Hamas

|last1=Hueston

|first1=Harry Raymond

|last2=Pierpaoli

|first2=Paul G.

|last3=Zahar

|first3=Sherifa

|title=Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide

|editor-last=Roberts

|editor-first=Priscilla

|publisher=ABC-CLIO

|year=2014

|pages=67–71

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xveCBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA67

|isbn=978-1610690683

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Hamas: A Beginner's Guide

|last=Hroub

|first=Khaled

|publisher=Pluto Press

|year=2006

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-XsW4-8VVJ4C&pg=PA33

|isbn=978-0745325910

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and Its Future in Middle East Politics

|last=Jefferis

|first=Jennifer

|publisher=ABC-CLIO

|year=2016

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rzRpCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA150

|isbn=978-1440839030

}}

  • {{cite book

|last=Kabahā

|first=Muṣṭafá

|title=The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTCNAEACAAJ

|year=2014

|publisher=[ Boulder, CO], Lynne Rienner Publishers

|isbn=978-1588268822

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process

|last1=Kass

|first1=Ilana

|last2=O'Neill

|first2=Bard E.

|publisher=University Press of America/National Institute for Public Policy

|year=1997

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ApANDp1XzmgC&pg=PA267

|isbn=978-0761805359

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood

|last=Kear

|first=Martin

|publisher=Routledge

|year=2018

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yfl0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT22

|isbn=978-0429999406

}}

  • {{Cite book

|title=Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad

|last=Levitt

|first=Matthew

|author-link=Matthew Levitt

|publisher=Yale University Press

|year=2006

|url=https://archive.org/details/hamaspoliticscha00levi

|isbn=978-0300122589

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks

|last=Levitt

|first=Matthew

|author-link=Matthew Levitt

|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield

|year=2008

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F5EmiYXQUcsC&pg=PA89

|isbn=978-0742565661

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism:Hamas

|last=Litvak

|first=Meir

|author-link=Meir Litvak

|title=Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age

|editor1-last=Hughes

|editor1-first=Matthew

|editor2-last=Johnson

|editor2-first=Gaynor

|publisher=Frank Cass

|year=2004

|pages=156–72

|isbn=978-1135753641

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TuaQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156

}}

  • {{cite book

|first1=Shaul

|last1=Mishal

|first2=Avraham

|last2=Sela

|title=The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AO-tZkbPDKYC

|publisher=Columbia University Press

|year=2006

|isbn=9780231140065

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Hamas Rule in Gaza: Human Rights Under Constraint

|last=Mukhimer

|first=Tariq

|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan

|year=2012

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ktH7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1

|isbn=978-1137310194

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance

|last1=Najib

|first1=Mohammad

|last2=Friedrich

|first2=Roland

|title=Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform

|editor1-last=Friedrich

|editor1-first=Roland

|editor2-last=Luethold

|editor2-first=Arnold

|publisher=DCAF

|year=2007

|pages=101–127

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=icV4k__xMmgC&pg=PA106

|isbn=978-9292220617

}}

  • {{cite book

|first=Padraig

|last=O'Malley

|title=The Two-State Delusion: Israel and Palestine – A Tale of Two Narratives

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3_kVBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA126

|year=2015

|publisher=Penguin Publishing Group

|isbn=978-0698192188

|pages=126–

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition

|last=Phillips

|first=David L.

|publisher=Transaction Publishers

|year=2011

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cNq0gvBPcGQC&pg=PA81

|isbn=978-1412812016

}}

  • {{cite book

|chapter=Hamas as a Social Movement

|last=Robinson

|first=Glenn E.

|title=Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach

|editor-last=Wiktorowicz

|editor-first=Quintan

|publisher=Indiana University Press

|year=2004

|pages=112–39

|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0Oljj6FhZZ4C&pg=PA130

|isbn=978-0253216212

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector

|last=Roy

|first=Sara

|author-link=Sara Roy

|publisher=Princeton University Press

|edition=2

|year=2013

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wmmYDwAAQBAJ

|isbn=978-0691124483

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank

|last=Rubenberg

|first=Cheryl

|author-link=Cheryl Rubenberg

|publisher=Lynne Rienner Publishers

|year=2001

|url=https://archive.org/details/palestinianwomen0000rube/page/231

|isbn=978-1555879563

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=The Foreign Policy of Hamas

|last=Seurat

|first=Leila

|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing

|year=2019|isbn=9781838607449

}}

  • {{cite book

|last=Seurat

|first=Leila

|title=The foreign policy of Hamas: ideology, decision making and political supremacy

|date=2022

|publisher=I.B. Tauris

|isbn=9781838607456

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Righteous Transgressions: Women's Activism on the Israeli and Palestinian Religious Right

|last=Shitrit

|first=Lihi Ben

|publisher=Princeton University Press

|year=2015

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zUjuCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA71

|isbn=978-1400873845

}}

  • {{cite book

|first=Jerome

|last=Slater

|title=Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917–2020

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y1AAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA280

|year=2020

|publisher=Oxford University Press

|isbn=978-0190459086

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects

|last=Stepanova

|first=Ekaterina

|publisher=SIPRI / Oxford University Press

|year=2008

|url=http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR23.pdf

|isbn=978-0199533558

|access-date=May 5, 2015

|archive-date=March 10, 2016

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310143530/http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR23.pdf

}}

  • {{cite book

|title=Terrorist Financing and Resourcing

|last=Vittori

|first=Jodi

|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan

|year=2011

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193

|isbn=978-0230117716

}}

  • {{cite book

| last=Zartman

| first=Jonathan K.

| title=Conflict in the Modern Middle East

| publisher=ABC-CLIO

| publication-place=Santa Barbara, California

| date=2020-03-19

| isbn=978-1-4408-6502-2

}}

{{refend}}

== Journal articles ==

{{refbegin|35em}}

  • {{cite journal

|title=Hamas: A Historical and Political Background

|last=Abu-Amr |first=Ziad

|journal=Journal of Palestine Studies

|date=Summer 1993

|volume=22

|issue=4

|pages=5–19

|doi=10.2307/2538077

|jstor=2538077

}}

  • {{Cite journal |title=Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation

|last=Gunning |first=Jeroen

|journal=International Affairs |publisher=Royal Institute of International Affairs

|volume=80

|issue=2

|pages=233–55

|date=March 2004

|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00381.x

|jstor=3569240

}}

  • {{Cite journal |title=Can Hamas Be Tamed?

|last=Herzog |first=Michael

|journal=Foreign Affairs

|volume=85

|issue=2

|pages=83–94

|date=March–April 2006

|doi=10.2307/20031913

|jstor=20031913

}}

  • {{cite journal |title=A 'New Hamas' through Its New Documents

|last=Hroub |first=Khaled

|journal=Journal of Palestine Studies

|date=Summer 2006b

|volume=35

|issue=4

|pages=6–27

|doi=10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6

|jstor=10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6 }}

  • {{cite journal |title=The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas

|last=Litvak |first=Meir

|author-link=Meir Litvak

|journal=Middle Eastern Studies

|date=January 1998

|volume=34

|issue=1

|pages=148–63

|doi=10.1080/00263209808701214

|jstor=4283922

}}

  • {{cite journal |title=Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration

|last=Roy |first=Sara

|author-link=Sara Roy

|journal=Journal of Palestine Studies

|date=Summer 1993

|volume=22

|issue=4

|pages=20–31

|doi=10.2307/2538078

|jstor=2538078

}}

{{refend}}

== Other ==

{{refbegin|35em}}

  • {{cite news |ref={{harvid|AFP|2019}} |title=Hamas West Bank leader given six-month detention without trial

|agency=Agence France-Presse

|publisher=Arab News

|date=April 8, 2019

|url=https://www.arabnews.com/node/1479531/middle-east

}}

  • {{cite news|title=Hamas Owes Its 'Palestine From the River to the Sea' Slogan to Zionism

|last=Assi

|first=Seraj

|newspaper=Haaretz|url-access=subscription

|date=December 16, 2018

|url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-hamas-owes-its-from-the-river-to-the-sea-slogan-to-zionists-1.6746730

}}

  • {{cite news |title=Muhammad Hassan Shama, little-known Hamas founder

|last=Barzak |first=Ibrahim

|newspaper=The Boston Globe

|date=June 11, 2011

|url=http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/obituaries/articles/2011/06/11/muhammad_hassan_shama_little_known_hamas_founder/

}}

  • {{cite news |ref={{harvid|DW|2018}} |title=UN General Assembly rejects US resolution to condemn Hamas

|publisher=Deutsche Welle

|date=December 7, 2018

|url=https://www.dw.com/en/un-general-assembly-rejects-us-resolution-to-condemn-hamas/a-46623413

}}

  • {{cite web |title=Interview with Dr Ibrahim Al-Yazouri, a founder of Hamas

|last=Dalloul |first=Motasem A

|publisher=Middle East Monitor

|date=December 14, 2017

|url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171214-interview-with-dr-ibrahim-al-yazouri-a-founder-of-hamas/

}}

{{refend}}

Further reading

  • Tom Stevenson, "Illusions of Containment" (review of Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Quest for Power, Polity, 2024, {{ISBN|978 1 5095 6493 4}}, 331 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 47, no. 2 (6 February 2025), pp. 7–10.