Nicaraguan Revolution

{{Main|Somoza family}}

Following the United States occupation of Nicaragua in 1912 during the Banana Wars, the Somoza family political dynasty took power, and ruled from 1937 until its ouster in 1979. The Somoza dynasty consisted of Anastasio Somoza García, his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle, and finally Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somoza era was characterized by economic development, albeit with rising inequality and political corruption, strong US support for the government and its military,Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Nicaragua, State-based conflict, In depth, Background, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas# {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194454/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas |date=31 March 2016 }} [link is not working] as well as a reliance on US-based multinational corporations.{{cite web|url=http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1985/04/nicaragua.html|title=Taking Care of Business in Nicaragua|access-date=10 April 2015}}

In 1961 Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez formed the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) with other student activists at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua (UNAN) in Managua. The founders were experienced activists. Amador, first General Secretary, had worked with others on a newspaper "broadly critical" of the Somoza reign titled Segovia.{{Cite book|title=Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas|last=Baracco|first=Luciano|publisher=Algora Publishing|year=2005|location=New York|pages=61}}

Consisting of approximately 20 members during the 1960s, with the help of students, FSLN gathered support from peasants and anti-Somoza elements, as well as from the communist Cuban government, the socialist Panamanian government of Omar Torrijos, and the social democratic Venezuelan government of Carlos Andrés Pérez.Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Nicaragua, State-based conflict, In depth, The Sandinista revolution, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas# {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194454/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas |date=31 March 2016 }} [link is not working]

By the 1970s the coalition of students, farmers, businesses, churches, and a small percentage of Marxists was strong enough to launch a military effort against the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. FSLN focused on guerrilla tactics, inspired by Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara. They launched an unsuccessful the Río Coco/Bocay-Raití campaign: "when guerrillas did encounter the National Guard, they had to retreat...with heavy losses."{{Cite book|title=Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas|last=Baracco|first=Luciano|publisher=Algora Publishing|year=2005|location=New York|pages=66}} Further operations included a devastating loss near the city of Matagalpa, during which Mayorga was killed.{{Cite book|title=Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation – From Nineteenth-Century Liberals to Twentieth-Century Sandinistas|last=Baracco|first=Luciano|publisher=Algora Publishing|year=2005|location=New York|page=67}} During this time, FSLN reduced attacks, instead focusing on solidifying the organization.

Fonseca died in combat in November 1976. The FSLN then split into three factions that fought separately: the Maoist Tendencia GPP (Guerra Popular Prolongada) (English: Prolonged People's War); Marxist-Leninist Tendencia Proletaria (English: proletarian); and Left-wing nationalist Tendencia Tercerista (English: third).

Cuban intervention under the leadership of Fidel Castro was also critical in the military success of the FSLN. The arms, money, advice, and diplomatic support that the Sandinistas received from nearby Cuba was crucial in overcoming the military superiority of the National Guard. Castro's support of the revolution while the Somoza government was receiving funding from the U.S. is one reason why this conflict is considered one of the proxy wars of the Cold War. {{Cite book |last=Brands |first=Hal |title=Latin America's Cold War |date=2010 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-05528-5 |location=Cambridge (Mass.)}}

File:Insurrección de Estelí.jpg tank of the Nicaraguan National Guard during clashes with Sandinista rebels in Estelí, 1979]]

In the 1970s, FSLN began a campaign of kidnappings, which led to national recognition of the group in the Nicaraguan media and solidification of the perception of the group as a threat. The ruling regime, which included the Nicaraguan National Guard, trained by the U.S. military, declared a state of siege, and proceeded to use torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, intimidation and press censorship in order to combat the FSLN attacks. This led to international condemnation of the regime and in 1978 the US cut off aid over its human rights violations. In response, Somoza lifted the state of siege.

Other opposition parties and movements began to consolidate. In 1974, the Unión Democrática Liberal (UDEL; English: Union for Democratic Liberation) was founded by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, editor of the Managua newspaper La Prensa. The alliance included two anti-Somoza liberal parties as well as conservatives and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party.María Dolores Ferrero Blanco La Nicaragua de los Somoza : 1936–1979. Managua: Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica de la Universidad Centroamericana; Huelva : Universidad de Huelva, 2012. p. 132.

On 10 January 1978 Cardenal was murdered, allegedly by the Somoza regime, and riots broke out in Managua targeting the Somoza regime.Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas: [{{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=FJe87T4G0w0C |page=657 }} Stage and Regime in US Policy toward Nicaragua 1969–1981], Author: Morris H. Morley, Published: 2002, {{ISBN|978-0521523356}}, p. 106 Following the riots, a general strike on 23–24 January called for the end of the Somoza regime and was successful at shutting down around 80% of businesses in Managua and the provincial capitals of León, Granada, Chinandega, and Matagalpa.

In the words of William Dewy, a Citi Bank employee who witnessed the Managua riots:

{{blockquote|Our offices at the time were directly across the street from La Prensa and in the fighting that followed part of our branch was burned, but not intentionally. They were going after the Somoza-owned bank. In the turmoil they torched the [Somoza] bank and our building also burnt down. It was clear [to the U.S. business community] that the Chamorro assassination had changed things dramatically and permanently for the worse. — Interview with Morris H. Morley, 17 October 1987}}

On 22 August 1978 the FSLN staged a massive kidnapping operation. Led by Éden Pastora, the Sandinistan forces captured the National Palace while the legislature was in session, taking 2,000 hostages. Pastora demanded money, the release of Sandinistan prisoners, and "a means of publicizing the Sandinista cause." After two days, the government agreed to pay $500,000 and to release certain prisoners, a major victory for the FSLN. Revolts against the state and guerrilla warfare continued.

In early 1979 the Organization of American States supervised negotiations between the FSLN and the government. However, these broke down when it became clear that the Somoza regime had no intention of allowing democratic elections.

By June 1979, following a successful urban offensive, the FSLN militarily controlled all of the country except the capital. On 17 July President Somoza resigned, and on 19 July the FSLN entered Managua, ceding control to the revolutionary movements. Somoza fled to Miami; his Nationalist Liberal Party became practically defunct, and many government functionaries and business figures overtly compromised with somocismo chose exile. The Catholic church and the professional sectors generally approved of the new reality.María Dolores Ferrero Blanco La Nicaragua de los Somoza : 1936–1979. Managua: Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica de la Universidad Centroamericana; Huelva : Universidad de Huelva, 2012. p. 273.

Immediately following the fall of the Somoza regime, Nicaragua lay largely in ruins. The country had suffered both war and, earlier, natural disaster in the devastating 1972 Nicaragua earthquake. In 1979, approximately 600,000 Nicaraguans were homeless and 150,000 more were either refugees or in exile,Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Nicaragua, State-based conflict, In depth, Nicaragua under Sandinista rule, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas# {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194454/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas |date=31 March 2016 }} [link is not working] out of a total population of just 2.8 million.evolution of demography in Nicaragua (1961–2003), Data FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/help-copyright/copyright-e.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060719110524/http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/help-copyright/copyright-e.htm |date=19 July 2006 }} (last updated 11 February 2005)

In response, a state of emergency was declared. The US sent US$99 million in aid. Land and businesses of the Somoza regime were expropriated, the courts were abolished, and workers were organized into Civil Defense Committees. The new regime declared that "elections are unnecessary", which led to criticism from the Catholic Church and others.

File:Nicaragua inflation rate 1980-1993.webp

The Somocista regime had created a big and modern center, Managua, surrounding an almost semifeudal rural economy with few productive outputs, including cotton, sugar and other agricultural products. All sectors of the economy of Nicaragua were determined, in great part, by the Somozas or their supporters, whether by directly owning agricultural brands/trusts, or actively choosing their owners (local or foreign). Somoza himself was (incorrectly) alleged to have owned 1/5 of all profitable land in Nicaragua. Somoza or his people did own or give away banks, ports, communications, services and massive amounts of land.Solá Monserrat, Roser. "Geografía y Estructura Económicas de Nicaragua" (Nicaragua's Geography and Economical Structure). Universidad Centroamericana. Managua, 1989. 2nd ed.

The Nicaraguan Revolution brought immense restructuring to all three sectors of the economy, directing it towards a mixed economy. The biggest economic impact was on agriculture, in the form of agrarian reform, which was proposed as a process that would develop pragmatically along with other changes (economic, political, etc.)."Agrarian Productive Structure in Nicaragua", Solá Monserrat, Roser. 1989. Pag 69 and ss.

Economic reforms overall needed to restart the economy. As a developing country, Nicaragua had an agriculture-based economy, susceptible to commodity market prices. The rural economy was far behind in technology and devastated by the guerrilla warfare.

Article 1 of the Agrarian Reform Law says that property is guaranteed if it is used efficiently and described different forms of property:

• state property (confiscated land from Somocistas)
• cooperative property (confiscated land, but without individual certificates of ownership, to be used efficiently)
• communal property (for people and communities from Miskito regions in the Atlantic)
• individual property (as long as it was efficiently used and integrated to national development plans)

The principles that defined the reform matched those of the Revolution: pluralism, national unity, and economic democracy.

Agrarian reform developed in four phases:

1. phase (1979): confiscation of property owned by Somocistas and its partners
2. phase (1981): Agrarian Reform Law of 19 July 1981
3. phase (1984–85): massive cession of land individually
4. phase (1986): Agrarian Reform Law of 1986, or "reform to the 1981 Law"

In 1985, the Agrarian Reform distributed {{convert|235000|acre|km2|order=flip}} of land to the peasantry. This represented about 75 percent of all land distributed to peasants since 1980. The reform had the twofold purpose of increasing support for the government among the campesinos, and guaranteeing ample food delivery into the cities. During 1985, ceremonies were held throughout the countryside in which Daniel Ortega gave each peasant title to land and a rifle to defend it.Louis Proyect, Nicaragua, about 4/5 of the way down.

The Revolution brought many cultural developments. The Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign (Cruzada Nacional de Alfabetización) focused on secondary school and university students drafting teachers as volunteer teachers. Within five months they claimed to have reduced the overall illiteracy rate from 50.3% to 12.9%.{{cite news |first=Ulrike |last=Hanemann |title=Nicaragua's Literacy Campaign |url=http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/67b39f3aaf8f20da06be3c6a4e4c6dfeHanemann_U.doc|work=UNESCO|access-date=2 July 2007 |format=DOC |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070703020810/http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/67b39f3aaf8f20da06be3c6a4e4c6dfeHanemann_U.doc|archive-date=3 July 2007}} In September 1980, UNESCO awarded Nicaragua the "Nadezhda K. Krupskaya" award. This was followed by literacy campaigns of 1982, 1986, 1987, 1995 and 2000, each of which was also awarded by UNESCO.{{cite news|first=Juan|last=B. Arrien|title=Literacy in Nicaragua |publisher=UNESCO |url=http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145937e.pdf| access-date=1 August 2007 }}

The Sandinistas established a Ministry of Culture, one of only three in Latin America at the time, and established a new editorial brand, called Editorial Nueva Nicaragua and, based on it, started to print cheap editions of basic books rarely seen by Nicaraguans. It founded an Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo (Institute for Studies of Sandinismo) where it printed the work and papers of Augusto C. Sandino and those that reflected the ideologies of FSLN, such as Carlos Fonseca and Ricardo Morales Avilés.

Such programs received international recognition for improving literacy, health care, education, childcare, unions, and land reform.[http://www.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discovery_eng/history/background.html Background History] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170422185323/http://stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discovery_eng/history//background.html |date=22 April 2017 }} of Nicaragua[http://www.globalexchange.org/tours/NicaraguaReportOct2001.html globalexchange.org] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060930032055/http://www.globalexchange.org/tours/NicaraguaReportOct2001.html |date=30 September 2006 }} Report on Nicaragua

Amnesty International noted numerous human rights violations by the Sandinista government. They contended that civilians "disappeared" after their arrest, that "civil and political rights" were suspended, due process was denied detainees, detainees were tortured, and "reports of the killing by government forces of those suspected of supporting the contras".{{cite book|author=Amnesty International|title=Nicaragua: The human rights records 1986–1989|publisher=Amnesty International Publications|year=1989|isbn= 978-0939994502}}

The Sandinistas were accused of mass executions.Moore, John Norton (1987) The Secret War in Central America. University Publications of America. p. 143. {{ISBN|978-0890939611}}Miranda, Roger and Ratliff, William (1993) The Civil War in Nicaragua. Transaction. p. 193. {{ISBN|978-1412819688}} The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights investigated abuses by Sandinista forces, including an execution of 35 to 40 Miskitos in December 1981,{{Cite news|title=OAS Study Says Miskito Indians Suffered Abuse From Sandinistas

|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/08/oas-study-says-miskito-indians-suffered-abuse-from-sandinistas/5a034db2-11ad-4142-80d8-2c4fe611c8a6/|access-date=2021-07-21|newspaper=The Washington Post|language=en}} and an execution of 75 people in November 1984.{{cite web|url=http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92eng/chap.4b.htm|title=Annual Report 1992–1993|date=1993-03-12|publisher=Inter-American Commission on Human Rights|access-date=2009-03-30}} The Los Angeles Times noted that "...the Miskitos began to actively oppose the Sandinistas in 1982 when authorities killed more than a dozen Indians, burned villages, forcibly recruited young men into the army and tried to relocate others. Thousands of Miskitos poured across the Coco into Honduras, and many took up arms to oppose the Nicaraguan government."{{cite news|first=Douglas|last=Farah|title=Miskito Indians Forced to Flee : Their Dreams of Returning to Nicaragua Fade |work=Los Angeles Times |date=2 August 1987 |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-08-02-mn-738-story.html#| access-date=2 December 2020}}

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative American think tank with close ties to the Ronald Reagan administration,{{Cite web|title = Reagan and Heritage: A Unique Partnership|url=http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2004/06/reagan-and-heritage-a-unique-partnership|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110805034448/http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2004/06/REAGAN-AND-HERITAGE-A-Unique-Partnership|url-status=unfit|archive-date=5 August 2011|website = The Heritage Foundation|access-date = January 29, 2016|language = en-US}}Arin, Kubilay Yado (2013): Think Tanks, the Brain Trusts of US Foreign Policy. Wiesbaden: VS Springer. charged the Sandinista government with human rights violations, including press censorship. It charged that the government censored the independent newspaper La Prensa.{{Cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/americas/report/the-sandinista-war-human-rights|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170410213848/http://www.heritage.org/americas/report/the-sandinista-war-human-rights|url-status=unfit|archive-date=10 April 2017|title=The Sandinista War on Human Rights|last=L.|first=Melanie|publisher=The Heritage Foundation|language=en-US|access-date=9 April 2017}} French journalist Viktor Dedaj, who lived in Managua in the 1980s, contended that La Prensa was generally sold freely and that the majority of radio stations were anti-Sandinista.Que faire si vous lisez le journal "Le Monde", Viktor Dedaj, 2004 The Heritage Foundation claimed that the Sandinistas instituted a "spy on your neighbor" system that encouraged citizens to report any activity deemed counter-revolutionary, with those reported facing harassment from security representatives, including the destruction of property. Heritage also criticized the government for its treatment of the Miskito people, stating that over 15,000 Miskitos were forced to relocate, that their villages were destroyed, and that their killers were promoted rather than punished.{{Cite magazine|url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952200-1,00.html|title=Nicaragua: Nothing Will Stop This Revolution|last=Russell |first=George|date=17 October 1983|magazine=Time|access-date=11 April 2017|issn=0040-781X}}{{Cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/americas/report/the-sandinista-war-human-rights|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170410213848/http://www.heritage.org/americas/report/the-sandinista-war-human-rights|url-status=unfit|archive-date=10 April 2017|title=The Sandinista War on Human Rights|last=L.|first=Melanie|website=The Heritage Foundation|language=en-US|access-date=11 April 2017}}

The United Nations, the Organization of American States and Pax Christi disputed Heritage's allegations of anti-Semitism. According to them, individual Nicaraguan Jews had their property expropriated due to their connections with the Somoza regime, rather than because they were Jewish. They cited the fact that there were prominent Sandinistas officials of Jewish descent.{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/04/world/americas/herty-lewites-66-exsandinista-dies.html | title=Herty Lewites, 66, Ex-Sandinista, Dies | work=The New York Times | date=4 July 2006 | last1=Kinzer | first1=Stephen }} In contrast to these organizations, the Anti-Defamation League supported allegations of Sandinista antisemitism. It worked closely with Nicaraguan Jewish exiles to reclaim a synagogue that had been firebombed by Sandinista militants in 1978 and expropriated in 1979.{{cite web | url=https://www.commentary.org/articles/joshua-muravchik/sandinista-anti-semitism-and-its-apologists/ | title=Sandinista Anti-Semitism and Its Apologists | date=September 1986 }}

{{Main|Contras}}

File:Contra commandas 1987.jpg and ARDE Frente Sur in the Nueva Guinea area of Nicaragua in 1987]]

File:Smoke break el serrano 1987.jpg

The Carter Administration attempted to work with FSLN in 1979 and 1980, while the Reagan Administration supported an anti-communist strategy for dealing with Latin America, and attempted to isolate the Sandinista regime economically and politically.Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Nicaragua, State-based conflict, In depth, Contras/FDN, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas# {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194454/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=117®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas |date=31 March 2016 }} [link is not working] As early as 1980–1981, anti-Sandinista forces known as Contras began forming along the Nicaragua/Honduras border. Many of the initial Contras were former members of Somoza's National Guard and many were still loyal to Somoza, then in exile in Honduras.

In addition to Contra units loyal to Somoza, FSLN also began to face opposition from members of ethnic minority groups that inhabited Nicaragua's remote Mosquito Coast region along the Gulf of Mexico. These groups were demanding self-determination and/or autonomy, but the FSLN refused to grant this and began using forced relocations and armed force in response.

Upon taking office in January 1981, Reagan cancelled U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua,U.S. Department of Justice, Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/appa.htm and on 6 August 1981 he signed National Security Decision Directive 7, which authorized the production and shipment of arms to the region but not their deployment.University of Texas, National Security Decision Directive number 7, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD7.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121004030005/http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD7.pdf |date=4 October 2012 }} On 17 November 1981, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 17, authorizing covert support to anti-Sandinista forces.

Armed conflict soon erupted, further destabilizing the region upset by civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. The CIA-backed Contras secretly opened a "second front" on Nicaragua's eastern coast and Costa Rican border. {{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} As the civil war opened cracks in the national revolutionary project, FSLN's military budget grew to more than half of the government's annual budget. The Servicio Militar Patriótico (Patriotic Military Service), a compulsory draft, was also established.{{Cite web|url=http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/($All)/4316A8EDC3B3CC37062570D50076E915?OpenDocument|title=Ley del Servicio Militar Patriótico |website=legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni|access-date=20 May 2018}}

By 1982, Contra forces had begun carrying out assassinations of members of the Nicaraguan government, and by 1983 the Contras had launched a major offensive. The CIA was helping them to plant mines in Nicaragua harbors to inhibit foreign weapons shipments.{{cite news|newspaper=L.A. Times|title=Setback for Contras: CIA Mining of Harbors 'a Fiasco'", Last in a series|date=5 March 1985|first1=Doyle|last1=McManus|first2=Robert C.|last2=Toth|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-03-05-mn-12633-story.html}} The 1987 Iran–Contra affair placed the Reagan Administration again at the center of secret support for the Contras.

{{Main|1984 Nicaraguan general election}}

The 1984 Nicaraguan general election took place on 4 November. Of the 1,551,597 citizens registered in July, 1,170,142 voted (75.4%). Null votes were 6% of the total. International observers declared the elections free and fair,{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/5/newsid_2538000/2538379.stm|title=BBC on This Day-5-1984: Sandinistas claim election victory|date=5 November 1984|access-date=10 April 2015}} although the Reagan administration denounced it as a "Soviet style sham". The national share of valid votes for president were:

• Daniel Ortega, Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) – 67.0%
• Clemente Guido, Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) – 14.0%
• Virgilio Godoy, Independent Liberal Party (PLI) – 9.6%
• Mauricio Diaz, Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) – 5.6%
• Allan Zambrana, Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCdeN) – 1.5%
• Domingo Sánchez Sancho, Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) – 1.3%
• Isidro Téllez, Marxist–Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML) – 1.0%

{{Main|Esquipulas Peace Agreement}}

The Esquipulas Peace Agreement was a mid-1980s initiative to settle the military conflicts that had plagued Central America for many years, and in some cases (notably Guatemala) for decades. It built upon groundwork laid by the Contadora Group from 1983 to 1985. The agreement was named for Esquipulas, Guatemala, where the initial meetings took place. US Congress efforts were helped by Capitol Hill lobbyist William C. Chasey.

In May 1986, summit meeting Esquipulas I took place, attended by the five Central American presidents. On 15 February 1987, Costa Rican President Óscar Arias submitted a Peace Plan that evolved{{Clarify|date=August 2009}} from this meeting. During 1986 and 1987, the Esquipulas Process was established, in which the Central American heads of state agreed on economic cooperation and a framework for peaceful conflict resolution. The Esquipulas II Accord emerged from this and was signed in Guatemala City by the five presidents on 7 August 1987.

Esquipulas II defined measures to promote national reconciliation, an end to hostilities, democratization, free elections, the termination of all assistance to irregular forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees. It laid the ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for implementation.

The Sapoá Accords at March 23, 1988 represented the beginning of a peace process in Nicaragua. The name of the accords comes from Sapoá, a Nicaraguan town near the border with Costa Rica. Sandinismo in 1988 was coming to an end as the Soviet Union began limiting its support. This in turn limited Sandinista government options to continue the conflict, forcing them to negotiate for peace. The accord was mediated by João Clemente Baena Soares at the time as Secretary General of the Organization of American States and then Archbishop of Managua Miguel Obando y Bravo{{Cite web|url=https://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3135|title = Revista Envío – Sapoá – A New Benchmark}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.enriquebolanos.org/articulo/acuerdo-sapoa|title = Acuerdos de Sapoá – 23 de marzo de 1988}} Since Nicaraguan conflict was a proxy war between the USSR and the US. Peace process management relied on then Soviet ambassador Vaino Väljas' mediation depending on recent US-Soviet agreements since US did not have an Ambassador to Nicaragua from July 1, 1987 till May 4, 1988.{{cite web |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z2642p3/revision/3 |title = Proxy wars in Nicaragua and Angola – The Cold War, 1972–1991 – OCR A – GCSE History Revision – OCR A – BBC Bitesize}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.err.ee/1608156826/toomas-alatalu-vaino-valjas-eestlane-kes-alustas-kulma-soja-lopetamist|title = Toomas Alatalu: Vaino Väljas – eestlane, kes alustas külma sõja lõpetamist|date = 28 March 2021}}{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/index.htm|title = The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later}}

{{Main|National Opposition Union (Nicaragua, 1990)}}

{{blockquote|Since the very moment of inception, under the political guidance and technical and financial support from the government of the U.S., the existence of UNO was marked by grave structural deformations, derived from its own nature. In its conformation concurred the most diverse currents of the Nicaraguan political and ideological range: from the liberal-conservative -traditionally anticommunist and pro-U.S., to Marxist-Leninists from moscovian lineage, openly declared supporters of class struggle and enemies of capitalism in its superior development stage."Paradoxes from an heterogeneous and fragile electoral Alliance", CAJINA, Roberto, Pag. 44 and ss.|Roberto J. Cajina }}

In the 1990 Nicaraguan general election, the UNO Coalition included:

• 3 Liberal factions: PLI, PLC and PALI
• 3 Conservative: ANC, PNC and APC
• 3 Social-Christians: PPSC, PDCN and PAN
• 2 Social democrats: PSD and MDN
• 2 Communists: PSN (pro-Moscow) and PC de Nicaragua (pro-Albania)
• 1 Central American Unionist: PIAC

{{Portal|Nicaragua}}

• Dirty War
• Iran–Contra affair
• Anastasio Somoza García
• Anastasio Somoza Debayle
• Somoza family
• CIA activities in Nicaragua
• Cuban assistance to the Sandinista National Liberation Front
• La Penca bombing
• Murals of revolutionary Nicaragua
• National Guard (Nicaragua)
• Nicaragua v. United States
• Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign
• Role of women in the Nicaraguan Revolution
• Under Fire (film)
• United States embargo against Nicaragua

{{Reflist}}

• Emily L Andrews, Active Marianismo: Women's social and political action in Nicaraguan Christian base communities and the Sandinista revolution. [https://web.archive.org/web/20070206200536/http://web.grinnell.edu/LatinAmericanStudies/this.html The Marianismo Ideal] Grinnell College research project, 1997. Retrieved November 2009.
• Enrique Bermudez (with Michael Johns), "The Contras' Valley Forge: How I View the Nicaragua Crisis", Policy Review magazine, Summer 1988.
• David Close, Salvador Marti Puig & Shelley McConnell (2010) "The Sandinistas and Nicaragua, 1979–2009" NY: Lynne Rienner. {{ISBN?}}
• Dodson, Michael, and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy (1990). Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. {{ISBN|0-8078-4266-4}}
• {{cite journal|last1=Head|first1=Michael|last2=Viglietti|first2=Brian|year=2012 |title=Question 35/48: Nicaraguan 'Contra' Mining Campaign|journal=Warship International|volume=LXIX |issue=4 |pages=299–301 |issn=0043-0374|name-list-style=amp}}
• Schmidli, William Michael, "'The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen': The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979," Diplomacy and Statecraft, (2012) 23#1 pp 66–86.
• Sierakowski, Robert. Sandinistas: A Moral History. University of Notre Dame Press, 2019.

• Katherine Hoyt, Memories of the 1979 Final Offensive, Nicanet, Retrieved November 2009. This is a first-hand account from Matagalpa; also contains some information on the general situation. Has photographs showing considerable damage to Matagalpa. [http://www.nicanet.org/?p=734 News and Information]
• Salvador Martí Puig, "Nicaragua. La revolución enredada", Libros de la Catarata: Madrid. {{ISBN?}}
• Oleg Ignatiev, "The Storm of Tiscapa", in Borovik and Ignatiev, {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20120710213607/http://www.leninist.biz/en/1980/AD158/index.html#00-Memo.to.the.Reader The Agony of a Dictatorship]}}. Progress Publishers, 1979; English translation, 1980.

• Meiselas, Susan. Nicaragua: June 1978 – July 1979. Pantheon Books (New York), 1981. 1st ed. {{ISBN?}}
• "Nicaragua: A People Aflame." GEO (Volume 1 charter issue), 1979.
• Teixera, Ib. "Nicarágua: A Norte de um pais." Manchete (Rio de Janeiro). 7 July 1979.

• Library of Congress (United States), [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/nitoc.html#ni0023 Country Study: Nicaragua], especially Chapter 1, which is by Marisabel Brás. Retrieved November 2009.
• Louis Proyect, [http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mydocs/state_and_revolution/nicaragua.htm Nicaragua]. Retrieved November 2009.
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20120728041441/http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552661 Nicaragua : Whose Side Are We On?] from the [https://web.archive.org/web/20160115205405/https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552494 Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives]

{{Nicaragua topics}}

{{Cold War}}

{{Cuban conflicts}}

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Category:20th century in Nicaragua

Category:20th-century revolutions

Category:Cold War conflicts

Category:Communist revolutions

Category:Revolution-based civil wars

Category:Proxy wars

Category:Cold War in Latin America

Category:Military history of Nicaragua