:Nihilism
{{Short description|Denial of certain aspects of existence}}
{{About|views rejecting certain aspects of existence}}
{{Redirect|Nihilist}}
Nihilism ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|n|aɪ|(|h|)|ᵻ|l|ɪ|z|əm|,_|ˈ|n|iː|-}}) encompasses various views that reject certain aspects of existence. There have been different nihilist positions, including the views that life is meaningless, that moral values are baseless, and that knowledge is impossible. These views span various branches of philosophy, including ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. Nihilism is often characterized as a broad cultural phenomenon or historical movement that pervades modernity in the Western world.
Existential nihilism asserts that life is inherently meaningless and lacks a higher purpose. By suggesting that all individual and societal achievements are ultimately pointless, it can lead to indifference, lack of motivation, and existential crises. In response, some philosophers propose detachment from worldly concerns while others seek to discover or create values. Moral nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that moral evaluations and practices rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to external reality.
In the field of epistemology, relativistic versions of nihilism assert that knowledge, truth, or meaning are relative to the perspectives of specific individuals or cultural contexts, implying that there is no independent framework to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. Skeptical interpretations go further by denying the existence of knowledge or truth altogether. In metaphysics, one form of nihilism states that the world could have been empty, meaning that it is a contingent fact that there is something rather than nothing. Mereological nihilism asserts that there are only simple objects, like elementary particles, but no composite objects, like tables. Cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is unintelligible and indifferent to human understanding. Other nihilist positions include political, semantic, logical, and therapeutic nihilism.
Some aspects of nihilism have their roots in ancient philosophy in the form of challenges to established beliefs, values, and practices. However, nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, evolving in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly in Germany and Russia. It took center stage in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, who understood nihilism as a pervasive cultural trend in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. In the 20th century, nihilist themes were explored by Dadaism, existentialism, and postmodern philosophy.
Ethics and value theory
File:Nietzsche1882.jpg described nihilism as the process in which "the highest values devaluate themselves".{{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}}]]
Various forms of nihilism belong to the fields of ethics and value theory, questioning the existence of values, morality, and the meaning of life.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}
= Existential nihilism =
{{main|Existential nihilism}}
Existential nihilism asserts that life is meaningless. It is not limited to the idea that some people fail to find meaning in their lives but makes the broader claim that human existence in general or the world as a whole lacks a higher purpose. This view suggests that it is not possible to live a genuinely meaningful life, that there is no higher reason to continue living, and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}
Existential nihilism has diverse practical implications since people usually act with a purpose in mind, sometimes with the explicit goal of making their lives meaningful. As a result, the belief that there is no higher meaning or purpose can bring about indifference, a lack of motivation, and anxiety. In extreme cases, this can result in depression and despair or trigger an existential crisis.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Sommers-Flanagan|Sommers-Flanagan|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RMclh6zR3LEC&pg=PA131 131]}} }} Some philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), highlight the connection to boredom, arguing that the lack of engagement and goals experienced in this mood makes life appear pointless.{{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}}
File:Flickr - Government Press Office (GPO) - Jean Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir welcomed by Avraham Shlonsky and Leah Goldberg (cropped).jpg proposed that people can make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=82–85}} }}]]
Various possible reactions to existential nihilism have been proposed.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA41 41–42]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} }} Inspired by Indian philosophy, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) suggested a pessimistic and ascetic response, advocating detachment from the world by renouncing desires and stopping to affirm life.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147 147]}} }} Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) proposed using the disruptive force of nihilism to re-interpret or re-evaluate all established ideals and values in an attempt to overcome nihilism and replace it with an affirmative attitude toward life.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=5, 31}} }}{{efn|In this context, Nietzsche contrasted passive with active nihilism. Passive nihilism is a form of resignation characterized by pessimism, hopelessness, and disengagement while refusing to acknowledge the absence of meaning. Active nihilism openly accepts meaninglessness and uses its negativity as a force to destroy established values and ideologies.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vattimo|1989|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=G-1YV3x6yakC&pg=PA15 15–17]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=r4Itb0Zc2hUC&pg=PA179 179–180]}} }}}} Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) suggested that people can create their own values through the free choices they make, despite the cosmic lack of meaning. After considering the possibility of committing suicide, Albert Camus (1913–1960) argued instead for a defiant attitude in which individuals rebel against meaninglessness.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }} Other responses include a destructive attitude aiming to violently tear down political authorities and social institutions, attempts to undermine nihilism by identifying genuine sources of meaning, and a passive resignation or quiet acceptance.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=3–4, 15–16, 28}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 48–49]}} }}
Various arguments for and against existential nihilism are discussed in the academic discourse. Arguments from a cosmological perspective assert that human existence is a minor and insignificant aspect of the universe as a whole, which is indifferent to human concerns and aspirations. This outlook aligns with an atheistic view, stating that, without a God, there is no source of higher values that transcend the natural world. Another viewpoint highlights the pervasiveness of senseless suffering and violence while emphasizing the fleeting nature of happiness. Some theorists link this view to human mortality, suggesting that the inevitability of death renders all human accomplishments transient and ultimately futile.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA38 38–40, 46–47, 53, 55–58]}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–25]}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–4]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA81 81, 87]}} }} A different perspective from biology argues that life is driven by blind natural selection on a large scale and the satisfaction of innate needs on an individual scale, neither of which aims at a higher purpose.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–22]}} }} Subjectivists, by contrast, focus on the subjective nature of all value experiences, asserting that they lack any objective ground.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA41 41–42]}} }}
Opponents of existential nihilism have responded with counterarguments to these statements. For example, some reject the pessimistic outlook that life is primarily characterized by suffering, violence, and death, claiming instead that these negative phenomena are counterbalanced by positive phenomena such as happiness and love.{{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA352 352–357]}} Many non-nihilistic theories of the meaning of life are examined in the academic discourse. Supernaturalistic views focus on God or the soul as sources of meaning. Naturalistic views, by contrast, assert that subjective or objective values are inherent in the physical world. They include the discussion of fields where humans actively find meaning, such as exercising freedom, committing oneself to a cause, pursuing altruism, and engaging in positive social relationships.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA364 364–367, 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 2. Supernaturalism, § 3. Naturalism}} | {{harvnb|Seachris|loc=§ 3. Theories of Meaning in Life}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=431–435}} }}
= Moral nihilism =
{{main|Moral nihilism}}
Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the metaethical view that there are no moral facts. Also called amoralism and error theory, it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} }} On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, conclude from this observation that anything is permitted, suggesting that people are allowed to act however they want without any social restrictions, reflecting a form of anarchism. Other moral nihilists reject this conclusion and argue that the denial of morality affects not only moral obligations, or what people are required to do, but also moral permissions, or what people are allowed to do.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631529 75–90]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }} Axiological nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of values in general. This rejection is not limited to moral values and also concerns other types, like aesthetic and religious values.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mulligan|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 401–402]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} }}
One motivation for denying the existence of morality rests on the idea that moral properties are odd compared to other properties, like shape and size. This view is sometimes combined with the claim that scientific inquiry does not reveal objective moral facts or that humans lack a source of moral knowledge. A related argument for moral nihilism focuses on the conventional aspects of moral evaluations and the difficulties in resolving moral disagreements.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=242–249}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}} }} Another line of thought emphasizes the evolutionary origin of morality, viewing it as a mere product of natural selection without a deeper metaphysical foundation.{{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}}
Moral realists have raised various objections to moral nihilism. Naturalists argue that moral facts belong to the natural world and can be empirically observed. Non-naturalists assert that moral phenomena are different from natural phenomena, but are real nonetheless.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 2. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }} Another perspective highlights the deep gap between moral nihilism and the fields of common sense and moral experience. Some viewpoints emphasize the negative practical consequences of abandoning moral beliefs or assert that moral nihilism is incoherent because it rests on a misunderstanding of moral language.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&pg=PA59 53–59]}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=80–82}} }}
The term moral nihilism is sometimes used with a different meaning. In one sense, it is the same as moral subjectivism, arguing that moral evaluations are purely subjective and lack rational objective justification. As a result, moral judgments are seen as expressions of arbitrary individual preferences, which vary between individuals, making moral disagreements rationally unresolvable.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–14]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }} In another sense, moral nihilism refers to ethical egoism, the theory that morality is determined by self-interest. This view denies that the well-being of others has moral implications unless it has external consequences for one's own well-being.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11, 14–15]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}
Epistemology
{{Anchor|Epistemological|Epistemological nihilism}}
= Relativism =
{{main|Relativism}}
Epistemological or epistemic nihilism is a family of views that challenge the existence or universal nature of knowledge. Some versions embrace relativism, denying that objectivity is possible. For example, truth-relativism asserts that truth is relative to the perspectives of specific individuals, groups, historical epochs, or cultural contexts.{{efn|Related forms of epistemological relativism target the standards of knowledge, justification, or rationality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}}} According to this view, statements like "the sun rises in the east" and "killing is wrong" are true in some perspectives and false in others. This theory not only claims that different people have different opinions but additionally asserts that no independent framework exists to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. As a result, there is no absolute truth on which observers from different perspectives can agree.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 35}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Hautamäki|2022|p=534}} }}
A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on meaning rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible conceptual schemes{{efn|A conceptual scheme is a system of categories, concepts, or beliefs through which people organize their ideas, understand their experiences, and interpret reality.{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}}}} to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and shared understanding are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these incommensurable belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 23–26, 35}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} }}
File:Jean-Francois Lyotard cropped.jpg, Jean-Francois Lyotard challenged metanarratives that aim to provide universal frameworks of rational understanding.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=90–93}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}]]
One argument for relativism emphasizes the diversity of human viewpoints and the frequent inability to resolve disagreements and reach a shared understanding.{{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2. Why Relativism?}} Another argument asserts that theories are usually underdetermined by the data supporting them. As a result, there are different equally valid interpretations without an objective standard to resolve their differences.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2.4 Underdetermination of theory by data}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} }} An influential criticism argues that relativism undermines itself: if all truths are relative to a viewpoint, then relativism itself is only true for some viewpoints and false for others.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} | {{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=207–208}} }} Another objection suggests that the absence of absolute epistemic standards has odd consequences, for example, that people should not argue if they disagree or that they should generally suspend their judgments.{{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=211–212, 221–222}}
Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as expressions of the will to power, intended to assert dominance rather than represent reality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–21}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }} In postmodern philosophy, epistemological nihilism is associated with antifoundationalism, arguing that there is no ultimate rational ground of knowledge or action. It challenges universal frameworks, termed grand metanarratives, that claim to provide such a ground.{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}
= Skepticism =
{{main|Philosophical skepticism#Epistemological skepticism}}
While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.{{efn|Some philosophers, such as Karen L. Carr, distinguish epistemological nihilism from skepticism and relativism. According to this interpretation, skepticism and relativism imply uncertainty about the existence of knowledge and objectivity, recommending the suspension of judgment. Epistemological nihilism, by contrast, firmly asserts that knowledge or objectivity do not exist.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA20 20–21]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}}} Also called radical skepticism, this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=472}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }} A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called alethiological nihilism, centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=5}} }}
One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that doubt can never be fully expelled.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "Fallibilism"|ref=Hetherington, "Fallibilism"|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }} For example, the dream argument points out that, while dreaming, people usually cannot distinguish between the illusionary dream and factual reality. Based on this observation, it argues that there is no knowledge since an individual can never be certain that they are not currently dreaming.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "Knowledge"|ref=Hetherington, "Knowledge"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }} A related approach assumes that a criterion is required to validate knowledge claims. Asserting that one cannot discern this criterion without already assuming some form of knowledge, it infers that knowledge is impossible.{{harvnb|McCain|loc=§ 1. The Problem}}{{efn|Agrippa's trilemma present a similar conundrum for the existence of knowledge.{{harvnb|Klein|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA484 484–485]}}}}
Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by various criticisms. Its main influence stems from attempts by non-skeptical philosophers to prove that their theories overcome the challenge of skepticism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }} Some objections state that radical skepticism is incoherent or self-refuting. For example, if there is no knowledge then skeptics cannot know that there is no knowledge, making it questionable why anyone should believe their theories.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Huemer|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 27]}} }} Another counterargument asserts that the support for the existence of knowledge provided by common sense is more convincing than the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}
Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} Moral skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|pp=618–619}} | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} }}
Metaphysics
{{main|Metaphysical nihilism}}
Metaphysical or ontological nihilism encompasses various views about the fundamental nature of reality. One version addresses the question of why there is anything at all. It suggests that, at least in principle, an empty world is possible. While this view acknowledges that the world contains concrete objects, it asserts that this is a contingent fact, meaning that there could have been nothing. In such a scenario, the universe would be entirely empty, without any people, animals, planets, and no other forms of matter or energy.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coggins|2005|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=673–674}} | {{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} }}
The subtraction argument is an influential argument for metaphysical nihilism. It proceeds from the premise that the world does not depend on the existence of any individual concrete object. For example, the world could still exist if a specific rock was removed. The argument concludes that an empty world is possible since it is the result of continuously reapplying this idea, subtracting objects at each step until an empty universe remains.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coggins|2005|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=673–674}} | {{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}} }}{{efn|Some forms of the subtraction argument include the assumption that the world is finite to ensure that this endpoint is reached.{{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}}}} Opponents of metaphysical nihilism assert that an empty world is impossible, meaning that something must exist. For example, one view suggests that there are necessary objects, possibly God, that are present even if nothing else is.{{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4]}}
A more radical and controversial form of metaphysical nihilism denies the actual existence of objects. It states that there is no world, arguing that the experience of the universe is a mere illusion without an underlying reality. As a result, nothing at all is real. This view is sometimes interpreted as a form of solipsism, proposing that only the self exists and that the external world is merely an idea held by the self without a substantial reality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=4, 6}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA17 17–18, 149]}} }}
= Mereological nihilism =
{{main|Mereological nihilism}}
Mereological or compositional nihilism is the view that complex or composite objects do not exist. Composite objects are objects made up of proper parts. For example, a house is a composite object made up of parts like walls, windows, doors, etc. Each of these parts is itself a composite object made up of smaller parts, such as molecules and atoms. Mereological nihilists argue that only non-composite or simple objects exist, such as elementary particles. As a result, composite objects are understood as mere collections of simple objects. According to this view, there are no houses or tables, there are only elementary particles arranged house-wise or table-wise.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} }}
Mereological nihilism is sometimes proposed as a solution to avoid metaphysical paradoxes, like the Ship of Theseus or Sorites paradox.{{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} Another argument in favor of mereological nihilism comes from Ockham's Razor, emphasizing the parsimony and simplicity of a minimal ontology that excludes everything except simple objects.{{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}} Opponents of mereological nihilism highlight the counterintuitive consequences of denying the existence of ordinary objects, which contradict common sense.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }} Other criticisms assert that mereological nihilism is unable to provide a coherent framework for how to understand collections of elementary particles or fails to explain phenomena like emergent properties.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2014|pp=1511–1512, 1526}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|2017|pp=77–78}} }}
= Cosmic nihilism =
Cosmic or cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is unintelligible and lacks inherent meaning. Closely related to epistemological and existential nihilism, it asserts that the world is blank, featureless, or chaotic, making it indifferent to human attempts to understand it. Cosmic nihilists often emphasize the vastness of the universe, arguing that it shows the insignificance of humans and their endeavors.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Cosmic nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=26–27, 30}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} }}
A broad form of cosmic nihilism states that reality as a whole is unintelligible. According to this view, the chaotic nature of the world makes it impossible to comprehend the universe on any level or find meaningful patterns in it, leading to a complete alienation of human understanding. For example, Max Stirner characterized the world as a "metaphysical chaos" without "a comprehensive structure of objective meanings". In response to arguments stating that it is possible in certain cases to discern patterns and predict outcomes, some cosmic nihilists have proposed more narrow versions. One version acknowledges that humans can understand some aspects of reality, for example, through rigorous scientific study. Nonetheless, this view maintains that the universe remains impenetrable to comprehension and indifferent to human aspirations on other levels, lacking intelligible structures that correspond to objective values, moral principles, and a higher purpose.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=26–27}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Cosmic nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} }}
Other forms
In addition to the main nihilistic theories discussed in ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, other types of nihilism are considered in the academic discourse. Some versions focus on cultural, political, or social phenomena, such as {{Anchor|Political|Political nihilism}}political nihilism, which is a negative outlook on existing political and social structures, similar to anarchism. It is historically associated with the Russian nihilist movement and advocates the destruction of political institutions, targeting also the traditional beliefs and social practices upholding them. Its revolutionary aim is to dismantle these established forms of order without proposing alternative structures to replace them.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA9 9–11, 35]}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} }} Similarly, national nihilism is a negative attitude towards one's own country.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nairn|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vQDfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA380 380]}} | {{harvnb|Marples|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=evVZCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} }}{{efn|In China, the term historical nihilism is used by the Chinese Communist Party to describe historical views that challenge the party's official account of the past.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cadell|2021}} | {{harvnb|Peng|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gRLREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1597 1597]}} }}}} In the field of law, legal nihilists assert that laws lack an inherent meaning or a moral foundation, viewing them as unjust or arbitrary constructs used to maintain control and exercise power.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Walicki|2002}} | {{harvnb|Buchanan|2003|pp=20, 45–46}} | {{harvnb|Sapio|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-955DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33–34]}} }} Religious or theological nihilism is associated with atheism and denies the existence of God. Some theorists identify this view as the root of other nihilist outlooks, such as existential and moral nihilism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=7}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|p=618}} }}
In the philosophy of language, semantic nihilism denies that linguistic meaning is possible, arguing that there is no genuine communication since language fails to describe reality.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=7, 100}} | {{harvnb|Alvarez|1994|pp=354–357}} }} Logical nihilism is a theory about the relation between formal logic and natural language inference. It asserts that the logical consequence relation studied by logicians is unable to accurately reflect inferential practices in natural language.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cotnoir|2018|pp=301–303}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}
{{Anchor|Medical|Medical nihilism}}Therapeutic or medical nihilism is the position that medical interventions are largely ineffective. Against the advances of modern medicine, it argues that the methodology of medical research is fundamentally flawed and further distorted by financial incentives, resulting in a systematic overestimation of the benefits of treatments.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stegenga|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tT5MDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Devanesan|2020|pp=1–2}}}}
File:Marcel Duchamp, 1917, Fountain, photograph by Alfred Stieglitz.jpg expresses nihilistic themes in art by challenging artistic standards, for example, by presenting a readymade urinal at an art exhibition.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=i, 18}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} }}]]
Various expressions of nihilism are found in literature and art, portraying characters or attitudes that reject established norms, exhibit disillusionment with life, or struggle with existential despair. Bazarov, the protagonist of Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons, is an early and influential example. Driven by a deep distrust of established authorities, Bazarov follows a cold scientific rationalism. He openly expresses his hate toward conventional beliefs, societal norms, and sentimentality, aiming to dismantle them without a vision of what should replace them.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xix, 145–148}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=85–86}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} }} Many of Fyodor Dostoevsky's works explore the problem of nihilism, particularly the idea that without God, there is no moral basis for right or wrong.{{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix, 195]}} Nothingness is a central concern for many characters in the works of Samuel Beckett, either as the object of desire or fear.{{harvnb|Weller|2008|pp=321–322}} Nihilist themes are also present in the literary works of Franz Kafka, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=164, 178}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=86–88, 90–93}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }}
In the field of art, Dadaism emerged during the First World War as a nihilistic rejection of established moral, societal, and artistic standards. Dadaists embraced chaos, spontaneity, and irrationality, infusing their art with irreverence, nonsense, and humor to provoke and challenge traditional conceptions of art. For example, Marcel Duchamp presented a readymade urinal at an art exhibition, which became one of the most iconic pieces of the movement.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=i, 18}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} }} In cinema, elements of nihilism are found in movies such as Taxi Driver,{{harvnb|Smith|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-1mUcGRpt0EC&pg=PA350 350]}} A Clockwork Orange,{{harvnb|Abrams|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QbJo2oiFFoUC&pg=PA6 6]}} Fight Club,{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kavadlo|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lXwvBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 14]}} | {{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} }} The Big Lebowski,{{harvnb|Gaughran|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-OV50oVxKyoC&pg=PA231 231]}} and American Psycho.{{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}}
History
{{main|History of nihilism}}
Although nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, some of its origins trace back to ancient philosophy.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=13}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }} Socrates's ({{circa|470–399 BCE}}) method of radical questioning is a precursor that challenges established beliefs, values, and practices, often with the goal of exposing their lack of a solid foundation.{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=13–17}}{{efn|For example, he suggested in the Allegory of the cave that commonly held beliefs about reality are just a shadow of a higher unperceived reality.{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=14–15}}}} Some Sophists, like Protagoras ({{circa|490–420 BCE}}), disputed the existence of objective truth, arguing for a relativistic nihilism according to which "man is the measure of all things".{{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=235}} Pyrrho ({{circa|360–270 BCE}}) formulated a broad version of epistemological nihilism in his attempt to show that knowledge is impossible.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=496}} }}
Various negative attitudes towards objective knowledge and the world are also found in ancient Indian philosophy. However, it is controversial to what extent they constitute forms of nihilism in a strict sense and some interpreters limit nihilism to the Western tradition.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200}} | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=3–6, 34, 50}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} }} In the 6th century BCE, the school of Ajñana developed a radical skepticism, questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fountoulakis|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 23]}} | {{harvnb|Warder|1998|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Fletcher|Romero|Talbot|Warburton|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} }} Buddhist thought, starting in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, focuses on the pervasiveness of suffering, identifying it as a fundamental aspect of existence. It teaches renunciation of worldly desires to achieve liberation from suffering in the state of nirvana.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=24–25, 31–34}} | {{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=192, 208, 226, 289}} | {{harvnb|Braak|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oVFuqMvr7D4C&pg=PA38 38–39]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=72}} }} According to a common interpretation, the school of Mādhyamaka, which emerged in the 2nd century CE, defends a type of metaphysical nihilism, rejecting the existence of an ultimate foundation or absolute reality underlying the multiplicity of experienced phenomena.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frazier|2024|loc=§ 3. The Critique of 'Things': Madhyamaka Metaphysical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Arnold|loc=§ 1. Nāgārjuna and the Paradoxical “Perfection of Wisdom” Literature, § 2c. Ethics and the Charge of Nihilism}} }}
In the early modern period, secularization and the scientific revolution undermined established religious beliefs and values prevalent in the Western world during the medieval period, preparing the emergence of nihilism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=38–39, 200–203}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xxii}} }} René Descartes (1596–1650) considered an extreme form of epistemological nihilism in his quest for absolute certainty. He suggested that humans cannot trust even their most fundamental beliefs unless they can rule out that a malevolent God-like being is constantly deceiving them.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=18–22}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=206–207, 209–210, 217}} }} Another skeptical outlook was considered by David Hume (1711–1776), whose radical empiricism challenged the concept of causality and with it the possibility of knowledge.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=28–29}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=246–247}} }} Influenced by Hume, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) drew a sharp distinction between appearances and things underlying those appearances. By limiting knowledge to the sphere of appearances, he prepared a type of existential nihilism, making the deeper meaning of things in themselves inaccessible.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=28–34}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=248–249}} }} In criticizing the rationalism of the Kantian philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819) was the first to coin the philosophical concept of nihilism to describe a tendency in philosophical thought that leads to a denial of existence and meaning.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=32}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} | {{harvnb|Crowe|2021|pp=157–158, 167–168}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1200–1201}} }}
File:Turgenev by Repin.jpg was responsible for popularizing the term nihilism.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}]]
In Russia, the term nihilism gained popularity through Ivan Turgenev's (1818–1883) portrayal of a nihilist character in his novel Fathers and Sons.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }} Starting in the second half of the 19th century, the Russian nihilist movement was a form of political nihilism, characterized by a radical rejection of traditional social, political, and aesthetic norms.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }} Meanwhile in Western Europe, the nihilistic egoism of Max Stirner (1806–1856) reduced other people to their usefulness without respect for their personhood. Stirner also formulated a cosmic nihilism that sees the universe as an unintelligible, metaphysical chaos.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=15, 27}} | {{harvnb|Holbrook|1977|pp=382–383}} }} Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) explored different lifestyles or "spheres of existence" through which people seek meaning in their lives. He warned against an aesthetic lifestyle of pursuing sensory pleasures without ulterior goals, arguing that it leads to a nihilistic outlook marked by meaninglessness. Instead, he recommended a leap of faith that trusts in God as a higher source of meaning.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lippitt|Evans|2024|loc=§ 3. The 'Spheres of Existence' or 'Stages on Life's Way'}} | {{harvnb|Carlisle|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lxQLlAM_vrkC&pg=PA21 21–22]}} | {{harvnb|Schulz|2014|pp=135–138}} }}
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) developed a pessimistic philosophy, characterizing the world as a place of suffering, brought into being by a blind, irrational will.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9, 129–132]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xx}} }} Influenced by Schopenhauer, the problem of nihilism took center stage in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). He understood it as a broad cultural phenomenon in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. He explored the causes and consequences of this shift in evaluative outlook, examining reactions to it and ways of overcoming it.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–40}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }} According to Nietzsche, nihilism often manifests in a distorted form as passive nihilism, masking its life-denying nature behind religious dogmas, conventional morality, and societal norms. Against this tendency, Nietzsche recommended active nihilism, which openly acknowledges the lack of meaning and uses its negative force to dismantle established values.{{efn|This includes his pronouncement that "God is dead".{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} }}}} He saw this as a transitional phase to overcome nihilism in general, leading to a vital affirmation of life through a revaluation of all values.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=672–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}
File:Heidegger 2 (1960).jpg conceived nihilism as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 4. Critical Comment}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 5. The History of Being}} }}]]
Many subsequent developments in the 20th-century history of nihilism were responses to Nietzsche's philosophy.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 5. Conclusion}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }} Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) agreed with Nietzsche's description of the pervasive and corrosive nature of nihilism, seeing it as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought reaching back to the ancient period. Interpreting Nietsche's concept of the will to power and modern technological developments, Heidegger came to the conclusion that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism fails and leads to an even more complete nihilism. As an alternative, Heidegger turned to early Presocratic philosophy to recover a non-nihilistic understanding of being.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 4. Critical Comment}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 5. The History of Being}} }}
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) proposed a version of cosmic nihilism, characterizing humanity as an accidental and insignificant byproduct of cosmic forces that are alien and indifferent to human concerns.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=27}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|p=88}} }} Against the backdrop of World War I, Dadaists expressed aspects of nihilism through art, seeking to undermine established norms and values while embracing nonsense and absurdity.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }} The question of nihilism and its denial of the meaning of life played a central role for existentialist philosophers.{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=81–85}} Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) asserted that humans have no inborn essence defining who they are or what their purpose is. He argued that they can overcome this lack of predefined meaning through freedom, proposing that people make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=82–85}} }} In his absurdist philosophy, Albert Camus (1913–1960) explored the psychological paradox that arises from the inherent drive to seek meaning in an objectively meaningless world. He termed this condition "the absurd" and advocated for a defiant stance or rebellion against the lack of meaning.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=32–33}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}
In the second half of the 20th century, various aspects of nihilism emerged in postmodern philosophy, often in response to Nietzsche and Heidegger.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi–xiii, 77, 79, 86}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–89}} }} Jacques Derrida's (1930–2004) philosophy of deconstruction challenged the existence of absolute truth and stable meaning in its attempt to expose the hidden assumptions and biases on which this viewpoint rests.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=78–79}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }} Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–1998) argued for antifoundationalism, rejecting the existence of universal frameworks of understanding, termed metanarratives. He aimed to undermine their validity as standards of truth claims, proposing instead that they are merely different language games people play without a clear hierarchy prioritizing one language game over the others.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=90–93}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }} Similarly, Richard Rorty (1931–2007) dismissed the notion of objective truths, suggesting that people rely on their own judgment and creativity instead of privileging established perspectives, like the scientific worldview.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2020|p=87}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }} Against Nietzsche's and Heidegger's attempts to overcome nihilism, Gianni Vattimo (1936–2023) embraced it, viewing nihilism as the only viable alternative in the postmodern era.{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2000|p=184}} | {{harvnb|Harris|loc=Lead section, § 3. Hermeneutical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi, 91}} }}
See also
{{Columns-list|colwidth=15em|
- Acosmism
- Anatta
- Anomie
- Antinatalism
- Cynicism (philosophy)
- Dysteleology
- Fatalism
- Legal nihilism
- Misanthropy
- Paradox of nihilism
- Post-modernism
- Post-structuralism
- Subversion
}}
References
= Notes =
{{notelist|30em}}
= Citations =
{{Reflist|30em}}
= Sources =
{{Refbegin|30em}}
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