Coup d'état#Repression and counter-coups

The term comes from French {{lang|fr|coup d'État}}, literally meaning a 'stroke of state' or 'blow of state'.{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=Coup d'état |url=http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coup-d'%C3%A9tat |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151106083058/http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coup-d%27%C3%A9tat |archive-date=6 November 2015 |access-date=12 January 2019 |website=Oxford Dictionaries |df=dmy-all }}{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=Coup d'état |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup+d%27%C3%A9tat |website=Merriam Webster |archive-date=18 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170818174900/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup+d%27%C3%A9tat |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=July 15, 2016 |title=Turkey Coup |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/news-trend-watch/turkey-coup-20160715 |access-date=February 5, 2021 |website=Merriam Webster |archive-date=11 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210111113731/https://www.merriam-webster.com/news-trend-watch/turkey-coup-20160715 |url-status=live }} (In French, the word {{lang|fr|État}} ({{IPA|fr|eta|lang}}) is capitalized when it denotes a sovereign political entity.){{Cite web |title=Banque de dépannage linguistique – état |url=http://66.46.185.79/bdl/gabarit_bdl.asp?t1=1&id=1285&D=%C9tat |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120701102722/http://66.46.185.79/bdl/gabarit_bdl.asp?t1=1&id=1285&D=%C9tat |archive-date=1 July 2012 |access-date=12 December 2012 |publisher=Office québécois de la langue française |df=dmy-all}} Although the concept of a coup d'état has featured in politics since antiquity, the phrase is of relatively recent coinage.Julius Caesar's civil war, 5 January 49 BC. It did not appear within an English text before the 19th century except when used in the translation of a French source, there being no simple phrase in English to convey the contextualized idea of a 'knockout blow to the existing administration within a state'.

One early use within text translated from French was in 1785 in a printed translation of a letter from a French merchant, commenting on an arbitrary decree, or {{lang|fr|arrêt}}, issued by the French king restricting the import of British wool.Norfolk Chronicle, 13 August 1785: "It is thought here by some, that it is a Coup d'Etat played off as a prelude to a disagreeable after-piece. But I can confidently assure you, that the above-mentioned {{lang|fr|arrêt}} was promulgated in consequence of innumerable complaints and murmurs which have found their way to the ears of the Sovereign. Our merchants contend, that they experience the greatest difficulties in trading with the English". What may be its first published use within a text composed in English is an editor's note in the London Morning Chronicle,1804, reporting the arrest by Napoleon in France, of Moreau, Berthier, Masséna, and Bernadotte: "There was a report in circulation yesterday of a sort of coup d'état having taken place in France, in consequence of some formidable conspiracy against the existing government."

In the British press, the phrase came to be used to describe the various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police, the {{lang|fr|Gens d'Armes d'Elite|italic=no}}, who executed the Duke of Enghien: "the actors in torture, the distributors of the poisoning draughts, and the secret executioners of those unfortunate individuals or families, whom Bonaparte's measures of safety require to remove. In what revolutionary tyrants call grand[s] coups d'état, as butchering, or poisoning, or drowning, en masse, they are exclusively employed."{{Cite news |title=unk |newspaper=Kentish Gazette |location=Canterbury |date=16 October 1804 |page=2}}

{{Excerpt|Self coup}}

{{main|Soft coup|Nonviolent revolution}}

A soft coup, sometimes referred to as a silent coup or a bloodless coup, is an illegal overthrow of a government, but unlike a regular coup d'état it is achieved without the use of force or violence.{{Cite journal|last1=Marsteintredet|first1=Leiv|last2=Malamud|first2=Andrés|date=November 2020|title=Coup with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research?|url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032321719888857|journal=Political Studies|language=en|volume=68|issue=4|pages=1014–1035|doi=10.1177/0032321719888857|s2cid=210147416|issn=0032-3217|access-date=4 January 2023|archive-date=13 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221213023750/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032321719888857|url-status=live|hdl=10451/40441|hdl-access=free}}

A palace coup or palace revolution is a coup in which one faction within the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling group.{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351131759-16/recognition-governments-peterson|doi=10.4324/9781351131759-16|chapter=Recognition of governments|title=Routledge Handbook of State Recognition|year=2019|last1=Peterson|first1=M.J.|pages=205–219|isbn=978-1-351-13175-9|s2cid=243704806|access-date=4 July 2021|archive-date=4 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704194027/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351131759-16/recognition-governments-peterson|url-status=live}} Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.{{cite journal |author=Raphael Boleslavsky |author2=Mehdi Shadmehr |author3=Konstantin Sonin |date=June 2021 |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=1782–1815|title=Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association |doi=10.1093/jeea/jvaa040}} The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest attempts. Palace coups were common in Imperial China.Anita M. Andrew & John A. Rapp, Autocracy and China's Rebel Founding Emperors: Comparing Chairman Mao and Ming Taizu (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 324; Charles O. Hucker, China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture (Stanford University Press: 1975), p. 304. They have also occurred among the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,Patrick Milton, Michael Axworthy & Brendan Simms, Towards A Westphalia for the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 104. and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.Mats Lundahl, Politics Or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment (Routledge, 2002), p. 321. The majority of Russian tsars between 1725 and 1801 were either overthrown or usurped power in palace coups.{{Cite journal|last=Erren|first=Lorenz|date=2016|title=Feofan Prokopovich's Pravda voli monarshei as Fundamental Law of the Russian Empire|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/28/article/619459|journal=Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History|volume=17|issue=2|pages=333–360|doi=10.1353/kri.2016.0027|s2cid=159803557 |issn=1538-5000}}

The term putsch ([pʊtʃ], from Swiss German for 'knock'), denotes the political-military actions of a minority reactionary coup.{{Cite web|title=Putsch|url=https://www.dwds.de/wb/Putsch|access-date=2023-01-04|website=DWDS – Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache|date=31 August 2022|language=de|archive-date=4 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104050446/https://www.dwds.de/wb/Putsch|url-status=live}}{{Cite book |author=Pfeifer, Wolfgang |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen |trans-title=Etymological Dictionary of German |language=de |publisher=Akademie Verlag |location=Berlin |isbn=978-3-05-000626-0 |edition=second |date=1993|author-link=:de:Wolfgang Pfeifer (Etymologe) }} The term was initially coined for the {{lang|gsw|Züriputsch}} of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. It was also used for attempted coups in Weimar Germany, such as the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Küstrin Putsch, and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch.{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=Definition of putsch: Did you know? |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putsch |access-date=16 February 2021 |website=Merriam Webster |archive-date=10 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210210192054/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putsch |url-status=live }}

The 1934 Night of the Long Knives was Hitler's purge to eliminate opponents, particularly the paramilitary faction led by Ernst Röhm, but Nazi propaganda justified it as preventing a supposed putsch planned or attempted by Röhm. The Nazi term {{lang|de|Röhm-Putsch}} is still used by Germans to describe the event, often with quotation marks as the 'so-called Röhm Putsch'.{{Cite web |title=Röhm-Putsch |language=de |publisher=Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM), German Historical Museum |url=http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/roehm/ |access-date=26 March 2016 |archive-date=11 August 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140811150155/http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/roehm/ |url-status=live }}

The 1961 Algiers putsch and the 1991 August Putsch also use the term.

The 2023 Wagner Group rebellion has also been described as a putsch.{{cite web |last1=Cashman |first1=Richard |last2=Ogryzko |first2=Lesia |title=Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia's ongoing imperial decline |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/wagner-putsch-is-symptomatic-of-russias-ongoing-imperial-decline/ |website=Atlantic Council |date=6 July 2023 |access-date=29 January 2024}}{{cite web |title=Russia's aborted Wagner putsch: How it evolved |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russias-aborted-wagner-putsch-how-it-evolved/ |website=Euractiv |date=26 June 2023 |access-date=29 January 2024}}

{{Main|Pronunciamiento{{!}}Pronunciamiento}}

{{lang|es|Pronunciamiento}} ({{gloss|pronouncement}}) is a term of Spanish origin for a type of {{lang|fr|coup d'état}}. Specifically the {{lang|es|pronunciamiento}} is the formal declaration deposing the previous government and justifying the installation of the new government by the {{lang|es|golpe de estado}}. One author distinguishes a coup, in which a military or political faction takes power for itself, from a {{lang|es|pronunciamiento}}, in which the military deposes the existing government and hands over power to a new, ostensibly civilian government.{{Cite book |last=Luttwak |first=Edward |year=1979 |title=Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-17547-1}}

A "barracks revolt" or {{lang|es|cuartelazo}} is another type of military revolt, from the Spanish term {{lang|es|cuartel}} ('quarter' or 'barracks'), in which the mutiny of specific military garrisons sparks a larger military revolt against the government.Little-Siebold, Todd. "Cuartelazo" in Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture, vol. 2, p. 305. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1996.

Other types of actual or attempted seizures of power are sometimes called "coups with adjectives". The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, analytical, and political implications.

{{div col|colwidth=30em}}

• Civil society coup
• Constitutional coup, consistent with the constitution, often by exploiting loopholes or ambiguities
• Counter-coup, a coup to repeal the result of a previous coup
• Democratic coup
• Dissident coup, in which the culprits are nominally protestors without backing from any military or police units (e.g. sometimes used to describe the January 6 United States Capitol attack){{cite web |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/19/jan-6-coup-authoritarianism-expert-roundtable-00052281 |title=Ask the 'Coupologists': Just What Was Jan. 6 Anyway? |last1=Zeitz |first1=Joshua |last2=Althaus |first2=Scott |publisher=Politico |date=2022-08-19 |accessdate=2023-12-28 |quote=We have a set of categories including military coup, dissident coup, rebel coup, palace coup, foreign-backed coup, auto coup and others. So an attempted dissident coup is a coup initiated by a small group of discontents to include ex-military leaders, religious leaders, former government leaders, members of legislatures, parliament and civilians, but does not include security forces or police as they're organized arms of the government. And certainly by using that label, I am not trying to categorize in any sense the politics of people who are involved. }}{{Cite web|url=https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_jan.27.2021|title=It Was an Attempted Coup: The Cline Center's Coup D'état Project Categorizes the January 6, 2021 Assault on the US Capitol|publisher=Cline Center for Advanced Social Research|access-date=July 21, 2021|archive-date=February 4, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204105008/https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_jan.27.2021|url-status=live}}
• Electoral coup
• Judicial coup, a "legal" coup, utilizing the judiciary as the main instrument.
• Market coup
• Medical coup, having a leader declared incapacitated by doctors, such as in Tunisia in 1987
• Military coup
• Parliamentary coup
• Presidential coup
• Royal coup, in which a monarch dismisses democratically elected leaders and seizes all power (e.g. the 6 January Dictatorship by Alexander I of Yugoslavia){{Cite book |title=How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse |author1=Barbara Geddes |author2=Joseph George Wright |author3=Joseph Wright |author4=Erica Frantz |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-11582-8 |year=2018 |page=285 |quote=where a monarch who had not been directly running the country (in the sense that there was a prime minister and responsible government...) decides to assume all power. Yugoslavia in 1929 was an example of this.}}
• Slow-motion (or slow-moving or slow-rolling) coup{{div col end}}

While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started spontaneously by larger groups of uncoordinated people.{{Cite web|title=Coup D'etat|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat|access-date=2023-01-04|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en|archive-date=8 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211108070731/https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat|url-status=live}} The distinction between a revolution and a coup is not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by its plotters to feign democratic legitimacy.{{Cite web|title=Change Caused by Revolutions, Coups & Wars|author=Kevin Newton|url=https://study.com/academy/lesson/change-caused-by-of-revolutions-coups-wars.html|access-date=2023-01-04|website=study.com|language=en|archive-date=18 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221018191428/https://study.com/academy/lesson/change-caused-by-of-revolutions-coups-wars.html|url-status=live}}David Lane: 'The Orange Revolution: 'People's

Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup?', The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (BJPIR): 2008 Vol. 10, 525–549 [https://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4760/39746_174023.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221127042335/https://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4760/39746_174023.pdf|date=27 November 2022}}

{{further|List of coups and coup attempts|List of coups and coup attempts by country}}

According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful. They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%." Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia. Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.

A number of political science datasets document coup attempts around the world and over time, generally starting in the post-World War II period. Major examples include the Global Instances of Coups dataset, the Coups & Political Instability dataset by the Center of Systemic Peace, the Coup d'état Project by the Cline Center, the Colpus coup dataset, and the Coups and Agency Mechanism dataset. A 2023 study argued that major coup datasets tend to over-rely on international news sources to gather their information, potentially biasing the types of events included.{{Cite journal|last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah| last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan| last3=Sellers |first3=Bailey|title= Sourcing and Bias in the Study of Coups: Lessons from the Middle East|journal= International Studies Review|language=en|pages=1–22|doi=10.1093/isr/viad031|year=2023|volume=25 |issue=3 }} Its findings show that while such a strategy is sufficient for gathering information on successful and failed coups, attempts to gather data on coup plots and rumors require a greater consultation of regional and local-specific sources.

A 2003 review of the academic literature found that the following factors influenced coups:

{{div col}}

• officers' personal grievances
• military organizational grievances
• military popularity
• military attitudinal cohesiveness
• economic decline
• domestic political crisis
• contagion from other regional coups
• external threat
• participation in war
• collusion with a foreign military power
• military's national security doctrine
• officers' political culture
• noninclusive institutions
• colonial legacy
• economic development
• undiversified exports
• officers' class composition
• military size
• strength of civil society
• regime legitimacy and past coups.{{Cite journal |last1=Nordvik |first1=Frode Martin |title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes |journal=The Economic Journal |date=1 April 2019 |volume=129 |issue=619 |pages=1425–1456 |doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604|s2cid=158738285 |hdl=11250/2657360 |hdl-access=free }}

{{colend|2}}

The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.{{Cite journal |title=Coup d'État and Democracy |journal=Comparative Political Studies |volume=49 |issue=9 |date=17 February 2016 |issn=0010-4140 |page=0010414015621081 |doi=10.1177/0010414015621081 |first=Curtis |last=Bell|s2cid=155881388 }}

Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.

Oftentimes, military spending is an indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place. Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.

The accumulation of previous coups is a strong predictor of future coups,{{Cite journal |last1=Belkin |first1=Aaron |last2=Schofer |first2=Evan |date=2003 |title=Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=47 |issue=5 |pages=594–620 |doi=10.1177/0022002703258197 |issn=0022-0027 |s2cid=40848052}}{{Cite book | title = Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 | url = http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/democracy-and-development-political-institutions-and-well-being-world-19501990 | publisher = Cambridge University Press | last1 = Przeworski | first1 = Adam | last2 = Alvarez | first2 = Michael E. | last3 = Cheibub | first3 = Jose Antonio | last4 = Limongi | first4 = Fernando | date = 2000 | isbn = 978-0-521-79379-7 | series = Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy | access-date = 23 February 2016 | archive-date = 24 September 2018 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180924215833/https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/democracy-and-development-political-institutions-and-well-being-world-19501990 | url-status = live }} a phenomenon called the coup trap.{{Cite journal|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013488561|doi=10.1177/0010414013488561|title=Breaking Out of the Coup Trap|year=2014|last1=Lehoucq|first1=Fabrice|last2=Pérez-Liñán|first2=Aníbal|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=8|pages=1105–1129|s2cid=154707430|access-date=4 July 2021|archive-date=4 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704195236/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013488561|url-status=live}} A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the coup trap and reduces cycles of political instability.

Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than very authoritarian states or democratic states.{{Cite journal |title=Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis |journal=Politics & Policy |date=1 February 2013 |issn=1747-1346 |pages=39–64 |volume=41 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/polp.12001 |first1=Taeko |last1=Hiroi |first2=Sawa |last2=Omori |last5=Boehmer}} A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.{{Cite journal|last1=Kim|first1=Nam Kyu|last2=Sudduth|first2=Jun Koga|date=2021-03-03|title=Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=54|issue=9|pages=1597–1628|language=en|doi=10.1177/0010414021997161|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}} A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.{{Cite journal |title=Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators |journal=World Politics |date=1 July 2015 |issn= 1086-3338 |pages=423–468 |volume=67 |issue=3 |doi=10.1017/S0043887115000118 |first1=Deniz |last1=Aksoy |first2=David B. |last2=Carter |first3=Joseph |last3=Wright|s2cid=154292179 }} A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."{{Cite journal |last=Harkness |first=Kristen A. |date=1 June 2016 |title=The Ethnic Army and the State Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=587–616 |doi=10.1177/0022002714545332 |issn=0022-0027 |hdl=10023/9391|s2cid=54538341 |hdl-access=free }} Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.{{Cite journal |last1=Johnson |first1=Jaclyn |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton L. |date=26 June 2016|title=Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005 |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=3 |pages=597–625 |doi=10.1177/0022002716654742 |s2cid=147707842 |issn=0022-0027}} A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.{{Cite journal |last1=Wig |first1=Tore |last2=Rød |first2=Espen Geelmuyden |date=1 August 2016 |title=Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=60 |issue=5 |pages=787–812 |doi=10.1177/0022002714553106 |s2cid=17684023 |issn=0022-0027 |url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-359805 |access-date=12 March 2020 |archive-date=3 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230803203619/https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/35208 |url-status=live }} A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.{{Cite journal |last=Houle |first=Christian |date=1 September 2016 |title=Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=53 |issue=5 |pages=680–695 |doi=10.1177/0022343316652187 |s2cid=113899326 |issn=0022-3433}} A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.{{Cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael K. |last2=Joseph |first2=Michael |last3=Ohl |first3=Dorothy |date=26 May 2016 |title=Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=2 |pages=410–441 |doi=10.1177/0022002716649232 |s2cid=148514914 |issn=0022-0027}} One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.{{Cite journal |last1=Gassebner |first1=Martin |last2=Gutmann |first2=Jerg |last3=Voigt |first3=Stefan |date=1 December 2016 |title=When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |journal=Public Choice |volume=169 |issue=3–4 |pages=293–313 |doi=10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0 |issn=0048-5829 |hdl=10419/156099|s2cid=157580604 |hdl-access=free }}

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.{{Cite journal|last=Kurrild-Klitgaard|first=Peter|date=2000|title=The constitutional economics of autocratic succession|journal=Public Choice|volume=103|issue=1/2|pages=63–84|doi=10.1023/A:1005078532251|s2cid=154097838|issn=0048-5829}}{{Cite book|last=Kurrild-Klitgaard|first=Peter|title=The Encyclopedia of Public Choice |chapter=Autocratic Succession |date=2004|volume=103|pages=358–362|doi=10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39|isbn=978-0-306-47828-4}}{{Cite journal|last1=Escribà-Folch|first1=Abel|last2=Böhmelt|first2=Tobias|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=2019-04-09|title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=37|issue=5|language=en|pages=559–579|doi=10.1177/0738894219836285|s2cid=159416397|issn=0738-8942|hdl=10230/46774|hdl-access=free}}

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.

A 2019 study found that when a country's politics is polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.{{Cite journal|last1=Kinney |first1=Drew Holland|title=Politicians at Arms: Civilian recruitment of soldiers for Middle East Coups |journal=Armed Forces & Society|volume=45|issue=4|language=en|pages=681–701|doi=10.1177/0095327X18777983|s2cid=149675838|issn=1556-0848|year=2019}}

A 2023 study found that civilian elites are more likely to be associated with instigating military coups while civilians embedded in social networks are more likely to be associated with consolidating military coups.{{Cite journal |last=Ben Hammou |first=Salah |title=The Varieties of Civilian Praetorianism: Evidence From Sudan's Coup Politics |journal=Armed Forces & Society |language=en |pages=1096–1117 |doi=10.1177/0095327X231155667 |publication-date=October 2024 |volume=50 |issue=4 |s2cid=257268269 |publisher=SAGE |issn=0095-327X |eissn=1556-0848 |orig-date=Online February 28, 2023}}

A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the following logic for why this is:{{cquote|Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is most likely to threaten their own survival in office.{{cite journal |last=Florea |first=Adrian |title=Spatial Rivalry and Coups Against Dictators |journal=Security Studies |pages=1–26 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1360072 |issn=0963-6412 |url=http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/138702/7/138702.pdf |year=2018 |volume=27 |s2cid=157425839 |access-date=4 July 2019 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314201117/http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/138702/7/138702.pdf |url-status=live }}}}However, two 2016 studies found that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face a coup.{{Cite journal|last1=Piplani|first1=Varun|last2=Talmadge|first2=Caitlin|date=1 December 2016|title=When War Helps Civil–military Relations Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=60|issue=8|pages=1368–1394|doi=10.1177/0022002714567950|issn=0022-0027|s2cid=3627631}}{{Cite journal |title=External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts? |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=115–152 |doi=10.1177/0738894214545956 |year=2014 |last1=Arbatli |first1=Cemal Eren |last2=Arbatli |first2=Ekim|s2cid=156930338 }}

A 2019 study found that states that had recently signed civil war peace agreements were much more likely to experience coups, in particular when those agreements contained provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.{{Cite journal|last=White|first=Peter|title=The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=82|pages=104–118|doi=10.1086/705683|issn=0022-3816|year=2020|s2cid=201358683}}

Research suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the state apparatus to coordinate coups.{{Cite journal |title=Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'état |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=1 April 2014 |issn=0022-3816 |pages=548–564 |volume=76 |issue=2 |doi=10.1017/S0022381613001485 |first1=Brett Allen |last1=Casper |first2=Scott A. |last2=Tyson|s2cid=154715902 }}

A 2019 study found that regional rebellions made coups by the military more likely.{{Cite journal|last1=Eibl|first1=Ferdinand|last2=Hertog|first2=Steffen|last3=Slater|first3=Dan|title=War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|pages=1–22|doi=10.1017/S0007123419000528|issn=0007-1234|year=2019|volume=51|issue=3|doi-access=free}}

A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries".{{Cite journal |last=Nordvik |first=Frode Martin |title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? the Answer Is Yes |journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129 |issue=619 |pages=1425–1456 |doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604 |issn=1468-0297 |year=2019|s2cid=158738285 |hdl=11250/2657360 |hdl-access=free }} The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.

A 2020 study found that elections had a two-sided impact on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economic expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of coup attempts.{{Cite journal|last1=Krishnarajan|first1=Suthan|last2=Rørbæk|first2=Lasse Lykke|date=2020-01-21|title=The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=64|issue=7–8|language=en|pages=1279–1306|doi=10.1177/0022002719900001|s2cid=212902955|issn=0022-0027|url=https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/211334463/The_Two_Sided_Effect_of_Elections_on_Coup_Attempts_Accepted_manuscript_2020.pdf|access-date=28 November 2022|archive-date=11 June 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230611104008/https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/211334463/The_Two_Sided_Effect_of_Elections_on_Coup_Attempts_Accepted_manuscript_2020.pdf|url-status=live}}

A 2021 study found that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced risk of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.{{Cite journal|last1=Powell|first1=Jonathan|last2=Schiel|first2=Rebecca|last3=Ben Hammou|first3=Salah|title=Oil Wealth, Risk Acceptance, and the Seizure of Power|url=https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa053/6076802|journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|language=en|pages=1–8|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaa053|issn=2057-3189|year=2021|volume=6|issue=4|access-date=5 February 2021|archive-date=13 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210113183546/https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa053/6076802|url-status=live}}

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century study found that coup frequency does not vary with development levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.{{contradictory inline|reason=contradicts earlier "A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups"|date=December 2024}}

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.{{Cite journal|last=Quinlivan |first=James T. |date=1 January 2000|title=Coup-Proofing|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP844.html|access-date=20 January 2016|website=RAND Corporation |archive-date=21 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021225444/https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP844.html|url-status=live}} It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,{{Cite journal|last1=Sabaté|first1=Oriol|last2=Espuelas|first2=Sergio|last3=Herranz-Loncán|first3=Alfonso|date=2021|title=Military Wages and Coup d'État in Spain (1850–1915): the Use of Public Spending as a Coup-Proofing Strategy|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/revista-de-historia-economica-journal-of-iberian-and-latin-american-economic-history/article/abs/military-wages-and-coups-detat-in-spain-18501915-the-use-of-public-spending-as-a-coupproofing-strategy/468B0978B4A82B70B8F051B9F24A0E8E|journal=Revista de Historia Economica – Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History|volume=40|issue=2|pages=205–241|language=en|doi=10.1017/S0212610920000270|issn=0212-6109|s2cid=234382957|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=18 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218223649/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/revista-de-historia-economica-journal-of-iberian-and-latin-american-economic-history/article/abs/military-wages-and-coups-detat-in-spain-18501915-the-use-of-public-spending-as-a-coupproofing-strategy/468B0978B4A82B70B8F051B9F24A0E8E|url-status=live|hdl=2445/188798|hdl-access=free}} and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.{{Cite journal|last=Woldense|first=Josef|date=2022|title=What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=55|issue=7|pages=1236–1265|language=en|doi=10.1177/00104140211047402|s2cid=248921794|issn=0010-4140}} Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring.{{Cite journal|last=Powell|first=Jonathan|date=1 December 2012|title=Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=56|issue=6|pages=1017–1040|doi=10.1177/0022002712445732|issn=0022-0027|s2cid=54646102}}{{Cite journal|last1=Braithwaite|first1=Jessica Maves|last2=Sudduth|first2=Jun Koga|date=1 January 2016|title=Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict|journal=Research & Politics|volume=3|issue=1|page=2053168016630730|doi=10.1177/2053168016630730|issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free}} However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,{{Citation |last=Reiter |first=Dan |title=Coup-proofing and military effectiveness |date=2024 |work=Research Handbook on Civil–Military Relations |pages=155–170 |url=https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781800889842/book-part-9781800889842-20.xml?tab_body=abstract-copy1 |publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing |isbn=978-1-80088-984-2}}{{Cite book |last=Talmadge |first=Caitlin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRhJCgAAQBAJ |title=The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes |date=2015 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-0175-7 |language=en |access-date=27 May 2022 |archive-date=3 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230803203553/https://books.google.com/books?id=XRhJCgAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}{{Cite journal |last=Talmadge |first=Caitlin |date=2016 |title=Different Threats, Different Militaries:Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies |journal=Security Studies |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=111–141 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192 |issn=0963-6412 |s2cid=3655994}}{{Cite journal|last1=Narang|first1=Vipin|last2=Talmadge|first2=Caitlin|date=31 January 2017|title=Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=62|issue=7|pages=1379–1405|doi=10.1177/0022002716684627|s2cid=151897298}}{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Cameron S.|last2=Fariss|first2=Christopher J.|last3=McMahon|first3=R. Blake|date=1 January 2016|title=Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution|journal=International Interactions|volume=42|issue=1|pages=1–30|doi=10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598|issn=0305-0629|s2cid=214653333}}{{Cite journal|last=Bausch|first=Andrew W.|year=2018|title=Coup-proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment|journal=International Interactions|volume=44|issue=ja|pages=1–32|doi=10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938|issn=0305-0629|s2cid=157891333}}{{Cite journal|last1=Biddle|first1=Stephen|last2=Zirkle|first2=Robert|date=1996-06-01|title=Technology, civil-military relations, and warfare in the developing world|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/01402399608437634|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|volume=19|issue=2|pages=171–212|doi=10.1080/01402399608437634|issn=0140-2390|access-date=31 March 2021|archive-date=30 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200430002634/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/01402399608437634|url-status=live}} and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.{{Cite journal|last=Leon|first=Gabriel|date=1 April 2014|title=Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military's role in politics|journal=Oxford Economic Papers|volume=66|issue=2|pages=533–556|citeseerx=10.1.1.1000.7058|doi=10.1093/oep/gpt024|issn=0030-7653}} One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fear that their military will stage a coup or allow a domestic uprising to proceed uninterrupted – as a consequence, authoritarian rulers have incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the military.{{Cite journal |last=Paine |first=Jack |date=2022 |title=Reframing The Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/reframing-the-guardianship-dilemma-how-the-militarys-dual-disloyalty-options-imperil-dictators/FAB035DCE1D5EA6CE383D3A7DFB48062 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=116 |issue=4 |pages=1425–1442 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0003055422000089 |s2cid=247278896 |issn=0003-0554 |access-date=4 March 2022 |archive-date=5 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305000829/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/reframing-the-guardianship-dilemma-how-the-militarys-dual-disloyalty-options-imperil-dictators/FAB035DCE1D5EA6CE383D3A7DFB48062 |url-status=live }}

A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.{{Cite journal|last1=Frantz|first1=Erica|last2=Stein|first2=Elizabeth A.|date=4 July 2016|title=Countering Coups Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=50|issue=7|pages=935–962|doi=10.1177/0010414016655538|issn=0010-4140|s2cid=157014887}} Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.

According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.{{Cite news|title=Will Turkey's coup attempt prompt others nearby?|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/|access-date=30 July 2016|newspaper=Washington Post|archive-date=21 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021225446/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/|url-status=live}} A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.{{Cite journal|last1=Böhmelt|first1=Tobias|last2=Ruggeri|first2=Andrea|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=1 April 2017|title=Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects*|url=http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15571/1/Counterbalancing_Spatial_Dependence_and.pdf|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|volume=5|issue=2|pages=221–239|doi=10.1017/psrm.2015.55|hdl=20.500.11850/130560 |s2cid=56130442|issn=2049-8470|access-date=4 July 2019|archive-date=22 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170922003642/http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15571/1/Counterbalancing_Spatial_Dependence_and.pdf|url-status=live}} Coup-proofing is more likely in former French colonies.{{Cite journal|last1=Mehrl|first1=Marius|last2=Choulis|first2=Ioannis|date=2021-03-28|title=The colonial roots of structural coup-proofing|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958|journal=International Interactions|volume=47|issue=4|pages=750–776|language=en|doi=10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958|s2cid=233642733|issn=0305-0629|access-date=29 March 2021|archive-date=4 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104045943/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958|url-status=live}}

A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.{{Cite journal|last1=Easton|first1=Malcolm R.|last2=Siverson|first2=Randolph M.|date=2018|title=Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=55|issue=5|pages=596–608|doi=10.1177/0022343318763713|s2cid=117585945}} A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".{{Cite journal|last1=Escribà-Folch|first1=Abel|last2=Böhmelt|first2=Tobias|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=2020-09-01|title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|language=en|volume=37|issue=5|pages=559–579|doi=10.1177/0738894219836285|s2cid=159416397|issn=0738-8942|hdl=10230/46774|hdl-access=free}}

In their 2022 book Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found that political-military fusion, where the ruling party is highly interlinked with the military and created the administrative structures of the military from its inception, is extremely effective at preventing military coups. For example, the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, and never instigated a military coup even after large-scale policy failures (i.e. the Great Leap Forward) or the extreme political instability of the Cultural Revolution.{{cite book |first1=Steven|last1=Levitsky|last2=Way|first2=Lucan|date=September 13, 2022 |title=Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism |publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0691169521}}

Some scholars have posited that the recruitment of foreign legionnaires into national armies can reduce the probability of military coups.{{Cite journal |last=Escribà-Folch |first=Abel |last2=Faulkner |first2=Christopher |last3=Mehrl |first3=Marius |date=2025 |title=Foreign Legionnaires and Military Mutinies |url=https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/10/2/ogaf001/8010887 |journal=Journal of Global Security Studies |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=ogaf001 |doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaf001 |issn=2057-3170|doi-access=free }}

Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.{{Cite magazine |title=Orderly transfers of power occur less often than you might think |url=https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/16/orderly-transfers-of-power-occur-less-often-than-you-might-think |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |access-date=29 June 2022 |archive-date=12 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220112021331/https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/16/orderly-transfers-of-power-occur-less-often-than-you-might-think |url-status=live }}{{Cite journal |last=Przeworski |first=Adam |date=January 2015 |title=Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414014543614 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=101–129 |doi=10.1177/0010414014543614 |s2cid=154441890 |issn=0010-4140 |quote=an entire sequence of elections may occur peacefully, with or without alternations, and then some exogenous event may lead to a coup, usurpation of power by the current incumbent, civil war, or some other constitutional irregularity. |access-date=29 June 2022 |archive-date=19 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210819162554/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414014543614 |url-status=live }}

A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:

• Failed coup
• No regime change, as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the ruling group or the type of government
• Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship
• Ousting of the dictatorship followed by democratization (also called "democratic coups"){{Cite book|last=Varol|first=Ozan O.|url=https://smile.amazon.com/Democratic-Coup-d%C3%89tat-Ozan-Varol/dp/019062602X|title=The Democratic Coup d'État|date=20 May 2021|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-062602-0|via=Amazon.com|access-date=24 October 2017|archive-date=20 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210520160457/https://www.amazon.com/Democratic-Coup-d%C3%89tat-Ozan-Varol/dp/019062602X?pldnSite=1|url-status=live}}

The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes. New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year after the coup than existed in the year before the coup. One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership. Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.

Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,{{Cite journal |last1=Marinov |first1=Nikolay |last2=Goemans |first2=Hein |date=2014 |title=Coups and Democracy |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=799–825 |doi=10.1017/S0007123413000264 |issn=1469-2112 |s2cid=55915744}}{{Cite journal |last1=Derpanopoulos |first1=George |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |author-link3=Barbara Geddes (academic) |last4=Wright |first4=Joseph |date=2016 |title=Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |volume=3 |issue=1 |page=2053168016630837 |doi=10.1177/2053168016630837 |issn=2053-1680 |doi-access=free}}{{Cite journal |last=Miller |first=Michael K. |date=2016 |title=Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |volume=3 |issue=4 |page=2053168016681908 |doi=10.1177/2053168016681908 |issn=2053-1680 |doi-access=free}} though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.{{Cite journal |last=Brooks |first=Risa A. |date=2019 |title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=22 |issue=1 |pages=379–398 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407 |issn=1094-2939 |doi-access=free}} Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.{{Cite journal |title=The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |volume=34 |issue=3 |date=25 March 2015 |issn=0738-8942 |page=0738894215570431 |doi=10.1177/0738894215570431|first=Clayton |last=Thyne|s2cid=19036952 }}

Since the end of the Cold War, coups have become rarer, and more likely to be followed by democratization. Coups still often simply replace one autocracy with another one (with the new autocratic regime usually more repressive, in an attempt to prevent another coup) or have no effect on regime type.{{Cite journal |title=Coup d'état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008 |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |date=1 April 2014 |issn=1743-8594 |doi=10.1111/fpa.12046 |first1=Clayton L. |last1=Thyne |first2=Jonathan M. |last2=Powell|pages=n/a }}{{Cite journal |title=An assessment of the 'democratic' coup theory |journal=African Security Review |date=3 July 2014 |issn=1024-6029 |pages=213–224 |volume=23 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/10246029.2014.926949 |first=Jonathan M. |last=Powell|s2cid=58937153 }}{{Cite journal |last1=Derpanopoulos |first1=George |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |last4=Wright |first4=Joseph |date=1 April 2017 |title=Are coups good for democracy? A response to Miller (2016) |journal=Research & Politics|volume=4 |issue=2 |page=2053168017707355 |doi=10.1177/2053168017707355 |issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free }}

{{as of|lc=no|2017}}, there was debate about whether coups in autocracies should now be considered to promote democratization, on average, or if countries' chances of democratization are still unchanged or worsened by coups (since democratization can take place without a coup). One reason for the increase in the chance of democratization is that a higher proportion of coups (half of post-Cold-War coups) now take place in democracies (a higher percentage of countries are also now democracies). Democratic countries often rebound from coups quickly, restoring democracy, but coups in a democracy are a sign of poor political health, and increase the risk of future coups and loss of democracy. The dataset is small, so statistical significance varies depending on the model used, {{as of|lc=yes|2017}}; debate will end if data on more coups makes the pattern clear.

The post-Cold-War increase in the chances of post-coup democratization may partly be due to the incentives created by international pressure and financing. US law, for instance, automatically cuts off all aid to a country if there is a military coup.{{cite news |last1=Baker |first1=Peter |title=A Coup? Or Something Else? $1.5 Billion in U.S. Aid Is on the Line |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/middleeast/egypts-arrests-of-islamists-pose-test-to-us-over-military-aid.html |access-date=7 December 2024 |work=Ne York Times |date=July 4, 2013}} According to a 2020 study, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival.{{Cite journal|last1=Thyne|first1=Clayton|last2=Hitch|first2=Kendall|date=2020|title=Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups: The Influence of External Actors on States' Postcoup Political Trajectories|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=64|issue=10|pages=1857–1884|doi=10.1177/0022002720935956|s2cid=222111312|issn=0022-0027|doi-access=free}}

But coup conspirators also increasingly say that they chose a coup to save their country from the autocratic incumbents. Successful conspirators may hold free and fair elections simply because they think it is a good idea. A desire for economic growth and legitimacy have also been cited as motivations for democratization.

Legal scholar Ilya Somin believes that a coup to forcibly overthrow a democratic government might sometimes be justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined,

{{Blockquote|There should be a strong presumption against forcibly removing a democratic regime. But that presumption might be overcome if the government in question poses a grave threat to human rights, or is likely to destroy democracy itself by shutting down future political competition.{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/18/is-the-overthrow-of-a-democratically-elected-government-ever-justified/|title=Is the overthrow of a democratically elected government ever justified?|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=6 December 2019|archive-date=9 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230209063447/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/18/is-the-overthrow-of-a-democratically-elected-government-ever-justified/|url-status=live}}}}

It has been argued that failed coups might motivate a regime to reform and reduce repression. Such reforms are not obvious in the data, {{as of|lc=yes|2017}}. Coups that fail, or merely shuffle the leadership without changing the system, generally don't change the amount of repression (measured in government-sanctioned and pro-government killings).

2016 research suggests that increased repression and violence typically follow both successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/|title=Are coups good for democracy?|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=17 July 2016|archive-date=22 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160822064522/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/|url-status=live}} However, some tentative analysis by political scientist Jay Ulfelder finds no clear pattern of deterioration in human rights practices in wake of failed coups in post-Cold War era.{{Cite web|url=https://twitter.com/dtchimp/status/754304414182019072|title=Jay Ulfelder on Twitter|access-date=17 July 2016|date=2016-07-16|archive-date=29 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170129080257/https://twitter.com/dtchimp/status/754304414182019072|url-status=live}}{{better source needed|date=December 2024}} According to a 2019 study, coup attempts lead to a reduction in physical integrity rights.{{Cite journal|last1=Curtice|first1=Travis B|last2=Arnon|first2=Daniel|date=2019-05-14|title=Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=37|issue=6|language=en|pages=655–673|doi=10.1177/0738894219843240|s2cid=182783295|issn=0738-8942}}

Coups that lead to democratization unsurprisingly reduce repression, and coups that bring in a new autocratic regime increase it. Post-Cold-War, post-coup autocracies seem to have become more repressive and post-coup democracies less repressive; the gap between them is therefore larger than it was during the Cold War.{{cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael K. |title=Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |date=1 October 2016 |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=2053168016681908 |doi=10.1177/2053168016681908 |language=en |issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free }}

Averaging across democratic and non-democratic outcomes, most coups seem to tend to increase state repression, even coups against autocrats who were already quite repressive. The time interval in which violence is measured matters. The months after a bloodless coup can be bloody. The small sample size and high variability means that this conclusion again does not reach statistical significance, and a firm conclusion cannot be drawn.{{Cite journal|last=Lachapelle|first=Jean|date=2019-11-21|title=No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=82|issue=4|pages=1354–1372|doi=10.1086/707309|s2cid=222428308|issn=0022-3816}}

According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the incumbent government to violently purge the army after a failed coup. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-coup" by soldiers who are afraid they will be next. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial attempt, governments usually resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.{{Cite news |url=https://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why |title=Why Turkey's coup failed, according to an expert |author=Zack Beauchamp |work=Vox |date=16 July 2016 |access-date=16 July 2016 |archive-date=17 July 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160717152808/http://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why |url-status=live }}

Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the Coup d'état of December Twelfth in South Korea.

A 2017 study finds that the use of state broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali's 2012 coup did not elevate explicit approval for the regime.{{Cite journal |last1=Bleck |first1=Jaimie |last2=Michelitch |first2=Kristin |date=9 May 2017 |title=Capturing the Airwaves, Capturing the Nation? A Field Experiment on State-Run Media Effects in the Wake of a Coup |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=79 |issue=3 |pages=873–889 |doi=10.1086/690616 |s2cid=157667393 |issn=0022-3816}}

The international community tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 study finds that "coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."{{Cite journal |title=The International Community's Reaction to Coups |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |date=1 October 2015 |issn=1743-8594 |pages=363–376 |volume=11 |issue=4 |doi=10.1111/fpa.12043 |first1=Megan |last1=Shannon |first2=Clayton |last2=Thyne |first3=Sarah |last3=Hayden |first4=Amanda |last4=Dugan}} Another 2015 study shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.{{Cite journal |title=Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=1 January 2015 |issn=0022-3433 |pages=17–31 |volume=52 |issue=1 |doi=10.1177/0022343314551081 |first1=Christian von |last1=Soest |first2=Michael |last2=Wahman |s2cid=26945588 |url=http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/42736 |access-date=12 March 2020 |archive-date=4 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104045951/https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/42736 |url-status=live }} A third 2015 study finds that Western states react strongest against coups of possible democratic and human rights abuses. A 2016 study shows that the international donor community in the post-Cold War period penalizes coups by reducing foreign aid.{{Cite journal |title=Coups d'État and Foreign Aid |journal=World Development |date=1 March 2016 |pages=51–68 |volume=79 |doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.004 |first=Takaaki |last=Masaki}} The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.

Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 study finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.{{Cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan |last2=Lasley |first2=Trace |last3=Schiel |first3=Rebecca |date=7 January 2016 |title=Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014 |journal=Studies in Comparative International Development |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=482–502 |doi=10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6 |s2cid=155591291 |issn=0039-3606}}

A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a significant effect in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.{{Cite journal |last1=Thyne |first1=Clayton |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |last3=Parrott |first3=Sarah |last4=VanMeter |first4=Emily |date=15 January 2017 |title=Even Generals Need Friends |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=7 |pages=1406–1432 |doi=10.1177/0022002716685611|s2cid=151393698 }}

According to a 2020 study, coups increase the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.{{Cite journal|last=Balima|first=Hippolyte Weneyam|date=2020|title=Coups d'état and the cost of debt|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596720300159|journal=Journal of Comparative Economics|language=en|volume=48|issue=3|pages=509–528|doi=10.1016/j.jce.2020.04.001|s2cid=219428475|issn=0147-5967|access-date=18 May 2020|archive-date=4 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104045950/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596720300159|url-status=live}}

Leaders are arranged in chronological order by the dates they assumed power, and categorized by the continents their countries are in.

{{See also|Coup Belt}}

{{Reflist|group=n}}

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}

• Assassination
• Civilian-based defense
• Civil-military relations
• Civilian control of the military
• Constitutional crisis
• Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook
• Coup de main
• Kleptocracy
• Leadership spill
• List of protective service agencies
• Military dictatorship
• Mutiny
• Political corruption
• Political warfare
• Sabotage
• Seven Days in May
• Soft coup
• State collapse
• Succession crisis
• List of coups and coup attempts by country
• List of coups and coup attempts
• List of coups and coup attempts since 2010
• January 6 United States Capitol attack

{{div col end}}

{{Reflist}}

{{refbegin|30em}}

• {{Cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X07303607 |title=Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=474–490 |year=2008 |last1=Beeson |first1=Mark|s2cid=144520194 }}
• {{Cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X231155667 |title=The Varieties of Civilian Praetorianism: Evidence from Sudan's Coup Politics |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=50 |issue=4 |pages=1096–1117 |year=2024 |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah}}
• {{Cite book |first1=Ken |last1=Connor |first2=David |last2=Hebditch |title=How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution |publisher=Pen and Sword Books Ltd |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-84832-503-6}}
• De Bruin, Erica (2020) How to Prevent Coups d'État. Cornell University Press.
• {{Cite book |first=S.E. |last=Finer |title=The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics |publisher=Pall Mall Press |location=London |year=1962 |page=98}}
• {{Cite book |first=D. J. |last=Goodspeed |title=Six Coups d'État |publisher=Viking Press Inc. |location=New-York |year=1962}}
• Luttwak, Edward (1979) Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-674-17547-1}}.
• {{Cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277885 |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955–2004 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=32 |pages=5–23 |year=2016 |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J.|s2cid=144318327 }}
• {{Cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277886 |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955–2004 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=234–253 |year=2016 |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J.|s2cid=144602647 }}
• {{Cite book |last=Malaparte |first=Curzio |author-link=Curzio Malaparte |title=Technique du Coup d'État |language=fr |location=Paris |publisher=Éditions Grasset |year=1931}}
• {{Cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X0202800406 |title=How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964–1997 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=619–640 |year=2016 |last1=n'Diaye |first1=Boubacar|s2cid=145783304 }}
• Powell, Jonathan M., et al. "A Coup At the Capitol? Conceptualizing Coups and Other Antidemocratic Actions." International Studies Review 24.1 (2022) [https://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/156919961/ISR_Conceptualizing_Coups_Forum.pdf online]; scholars say coup is the ouster of the current government.
• Schiel, R., Powell, J., & Faulkner, C. (2020). "Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018". Conflict Management and Peace Science.
• Singh, Naunihal. (2014) Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups. Johns Hopkins University Press.

{{refend}}

• {{Commons category-inline|Coups d'état}}
• {{Wikiquote-inline}}
• {{Wiktionary inline}}
• [https://www.johnjchin.com/colpus John J. Chin, David B. Carter & Joseph G. Wright. Dataset on all military and non-military coup attempts in the world since 1946.]
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20210107034216/https://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html Powell, Jonathan & Clayton Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950–Present] via Archive.org.

{{Coup d'état}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Coup Detat}}

Category:Changes in political power

Category:Civil–military relations