Operation Ichi-Go

By early 1944, Allied victories in the Pacific were eroding the Japanese defensive perimeter. Japan decided to attack in Burma and China to improve its position; these became Operation U-Go and Ichi-Go respectively.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=318}} Ichi-Go corresponded with a Imperial General Staff contingency plan to the loss of the Western Pacific; the plan was for securing an overland rail route through French Indochina and China for raw materials from south-east Asia, which would be used to develop offensives in 1946.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=181}} The objective for Ichi-Go approved by Emperor Hirohito on 24 January 1944 was the neutralization of USAF bases in China, particularly the XX Bomber Command bases near Chengdu, Sichuan.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=318-319}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=181}} China Expeditionary Army (CEA), commanded by General Shunroku Hata, expanded the objectives in its operational planning to include securing overland routes and neutralizing China by destroying Chinese forces.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=181}} Ichi-Go may also have been intended to force the Allies to open peace negotiations, and give Japan a better negotiating position.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=181-182}} General Yasuji Okamura was placed in charge of Ichi-Go.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=190}}

By early February, preparations along the Yangtze included repairs to a major bridge and air field maintenance.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=182}}

The IJA mobilized 500,000 troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 800 tanks, 15,000 mechanised vehicles,{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=179}} and 200 bombers for the offensive. They were supplied with eight months of fuel and two years of ammunition.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}} According to historian Hara Takeshi, it was "the largest military operation carried out in the history of the Japanese army".{{Rp|page=19}}

The Chinese economy started collapsing in 1941.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=183}} China entered the war in 1937 with a primarily agrarian economy and quickly lost much of its industrial capacity to the Japanese.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=182-183}} Maintaining the forces needed to stay in the war imposed an unsustainable burden on an economy further weakened by blockade, shortages of staple goods, poor weather, and inflation;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=265-267}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} there was widespread famine from 1942. The government responded to the economic pressure, reduced Japanese activity after December 1941, and the lack of offensive capability by encouraging the military to produce its own food. Some troops went further by entering industry and smuggling. The self-sufficiency drive and the lack of military action reduced military prepardness and increased corruption.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} By Ichi-Go, the effectiveness of the Chinese military had "plummeted".{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=185}}

Allied strategy affected Chinese preparations. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, China agreed to major combined operations in Burma on the condition that the Western Allies committed significant resources.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=308}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=171}} No such commitment occurred. A few days later at the Tehran Conference, the Western Allies and the Soviet Union agreed to prioritize the European theater.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=311-312}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=171-172}} In January 1944, Chiang warned US President Franklin D. Roosevelt that prioritizing Europe would encourage Japan to attack and knock China out of the war.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=314}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=172}} In late-March, China believed a Japanese offensive was "imminent"; the US received corroborating reports from Clarence E. Gauss, the American ambassador to China.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=316}} China sought to reinforce the defense with Yunnan-based Y Force, which was earmarked for Burma; Y Force was an American trained and equipped National Revolutionary Army (NRA) unit and some of the best troops available to China. In early April, the US threatened to halt Lend-Lease to China if Y Force was withheld from Stilwell in Burma. Ultimately, Y Force joined the Allied campaign in Burma in mid-May as Ichi-Go was underway.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=317}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=191}}

Chinese intelligence also misassessed indicators. It estimated that the Yangtze bridge would not be usable until May, and that Japanese troop movements in the north were a feint.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=183-184}} On 27 April, after the start of Ichi-Go, China received French intelligence from Indochina of the Japanese goal of securing the rail corridor.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=163}} The intelligence was disregarded as Japanese misinformation to draw forces away from Burma.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}} The Chinese could not independently verify significant Japanese movements in central and southern China. Only 30,000 Japanese troops were detected operating in the north, which suggested a localized effort.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=163}} The Chinese expected a larger attack in southern China,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}} a belief that persisted into May.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=319}}

File:Japanese mechanized forces marching towards Lo-yang.jpg

File:1944 Operation Ichigo IJA invaded Henan.jpg

The first phase of Ichi-Go, codenamed Kogo,{{sfn|Sherry|1996|p=17}} was for capturing the Beijing–Hankou railway in Henan and destroying the ROC's First War Zone.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}} Kogo involved 60,000–70,000 Japanese troops.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}} The First War Zone was commanded by General Jiang Dingwen with General Tang Enbo as deputy. It had only 6,000-7,000 troops, or 60% to 70% of its authorized strength. USAF General Claire Chennault described the troops as a "poorly disciplined mob".{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=182-183}} Overall, there were 400,000 Chinese troops in northern China.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}}

Kogo opened on 17 April, broke through the defenses by the end of the 18 April, and took Xuchang a week later.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Divisional commander Lu Gongliang (呂公良), deputy divisional commander Huang Yonghuai (黃永淮), and two regimental commanders were all killed the day Xuchang fell on 1 May and none of the officers of the divisional headquarters was found after the defenders broke out from the city.{{cite book |author=History and Political Compilation Department |title=抗日戰史: 豫中會戰(二) |trans-title=History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 2) |date=1981 |publisher=Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China) |page=121}} Tang's 31st Army Group reported the casualties of the New 29th Division - fighting in central Henan and Xuchang - as 4,092 killed, wounded, or missing.{{sfn|Records of the Third Front Army of the Chinese Army during the War of Resistance|1962|p=256}} Senshi Sōsho, the official Japanese military history, put Chinese losses at 2,432 killed and 858 captured and Japanese losses at 50 killed and 149 wounded.{{sfn|Senshi Sosho (vol. 4)|1966|p=262}}

Chinese communications was poor and the defense of Luoyang was uncoordinated.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=320}} Chiang intended to allow the Japanese to close around Luoyang - the city was fortified and contained provisions for weeks - and then attack the flanks once the Japanese became overextended; this tactic had been used successfully before to defend Changsha.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}} According to Jiang, he requested permission to attack as early as 23 and 24 April, but did not receive Chiang's permission until 1 May; by that time the Japanese had advanced too far. Poor communications also hampered the direction of reinforcements to Luoyang.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=320}} The Japanese encircled Luoyang on 14 May and captured the city on 25 May.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}} The Chinese lost more than 19,000 troops from the three divisions defending the city.{{sfn|History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 3)|1981|p=182}} On 26 May, the Japanese Army reported Chinese casualties as 4,386 killed and 6,230 captured, and Japanese casualties as 80 killed and 281 wounded.{{sfn|Senshi Sosho (vol. 4)|1966|p=510}}

At the same time as the battle of Luoyang, Chinese 36th Army Group retreated and its commander, Lieutenant general Li Jiayu, was killed.{{sfn|History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 3)|1981|p=213}} The Japanese pursued Tang's westward retreat as far as the Tong Pass.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}} Combined with an advance north from Wuhan, the Japanese captured the railway.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=184}}

Contemporary Chinese analysis identified additional factors for the collapse of the First War Zone, some of which were related to the general degeneration of the Chinese military. According to one critic, Tang's command and control was poor and he abandoned his army; Tang was generally seen to have been in effective control of the First War Zone.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=321}} The local population - alienated by wartime deprivation, state corruption, and the First War Zone's aggressive requisitions - also withheld support.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=322-323}} Incidents included civilians attacking Chinese troops, stealing abandoned weapons,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=320-321}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=183}} and refusing to obey orders to destroy highways.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=322}} According to American reports, Kogo met only "token resistance". Theodore H. White observed Chinese officers neglecting their duties and that within three weeks "a Chinese army of 300,000 men had ceased to exist".{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}}

The First War Zone suffered heavy casualties in the battle for central Henan. Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group alone reported its losses as 58,036 killed, wounded, or missing.{{sfn|Records of the Third Front Army of the Chinese Army during the War of Resistance|1962|p=256}} Combined with the losses of other regular Chinese units in major battles in Henan, the total casualties of the First War Zone are as high as 100,000.{{sfn|History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 3)|1981|pages=145,164,182,214}} Senshi Sōsho put Chinese losses from the start of the operation until the capture of Luoyang at approximately 37,500 killed and approximately 15,000 captured and Japanese losses in the same period at approximately 850 killed and approximately 2,500 wounded.{{sfn|Senshi Sosho (vol. 4)|1966|p=515}}

{{main|Battle of Changsha (1944)|Battle of Hengyang}}

The next phase was Togo 1{{sfn|Sherry|1996|p=17}} with the objective of securing the Guangzhou–Hankou railway from Wuhan to Hengyang. Togo 1 started on 27 May and involved 200,000 Japanese troops advancing south from Wuhan to Changsha.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=185-186}} Central China was defended by another 400,000 troops.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=164}} The ROC's Ninth War Zone, commanded by General Xue Yue, defended Changsha; it had held the city against three Japanese campaigns from 1939 to 1942; as in those engagements, Ninth War Zone strategy was a fighting withdrawal to the city combined with scorched earth. Togo 1 was much larger than the previous campaigns, advancing in three - rather than one - columns over a 150 kilometer-wide front; it was also adequately supplied.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|pp=185-186}} On 29 May, the ROC Military Affairs Commission ordered Changsha to be held to defend USAF air bases and maintain American confidence; the option of abandoning railway and retreating south-east to Guilin was rejected.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=185}} Chiang refused to send supplies to Changsha because he believed Xue was disloyal.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}}

The Japanese reached Changsha in early June. The city was defended by three understrength Chinese divisions commanded by General Zhang Deneng; two of the divisions and the artillery were on Yuelu Mountain south of the city across the Xiang River.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Unlike the previous campaigns, it was the Chinese who were outnumbered with 10,000 troops against 30,000 Japanese.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=323}} One of the two attacking Japanese divisions had urban warfare training.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Japanese bombers attacked the artillery on Yuelu, while infantry moved around the city to attack from the south. Zhang's redeployment of troops from the city to reinforce Yuelu disorganized the defense; Chinese staff officers were unable to organize movement over the Xiang, leaving many units "stranded", and unclear orders made many troops believe that they were to retreat. The Japanese took Changsha on 18 June{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} after three days of fighting. The Chinese withdrew from Yuelu the same day leaving two companies in the city.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}}

Xue retreated south to Hengyang.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} The city was defended by 18,000 troops.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} USAF Fourteenth Air Force, commanded by Chennault, provided limited support;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} it was also tasked with protecting USAF XX Bomber Command's bases and supporting the Allied Burma offensive.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=187}} The defenses included concrete fortifications, and was well provisioned with artillery, anti-tank guns, and supplies. Two large reserve groups were placed to threaten the Japanese flanks.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} Chiang assigned General Fang Xianjue, whom he trusted, to command the city,{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=324}} A relief force from Guangdong was organized. On 25 June, the Japanese captured a major nearby US air base. Afterwards, the Japanese 68th and 116th Division attacked Hengyang from the west and south. The flooded paddy fields and canals to the west made the use of tanks difficult. To the south were hills. The attack was halted with heavy casualties on both sides. The Japanese paused to reinforce their air forces and resupply. On 11 July, after five days of heavy fighting, the Chinese fell back to another line.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=186}} The Japanese paused again to bring up reinforcements of one division and several brigades. The Japanese sought to destroy Chinese reserves to reduce the defenders' morale. Air attack destroyed much of the city. By the end of July, there was a food shortage in Hengyang.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=187}} Chiang did not resupply the city. Stilwell - who controlled Lend-Lease in the Chinese theater - refused Chennault's request to divert 1,000 tons of supplies to Hengyang;{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=324-325}} according to the United States Army's official history, Stilwell believed that Chinese politics would prevent the supplies from being used against the Japanese.{{cite book |last1=Romanus |first1=Charles F. |last2=Sunderland |first2=Riley |title=China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/009/9-2/index.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111017083735/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/009/9-2/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=October 17, 2011 |series=United States Army in World War II |publisher=United States Army Center of Military History |location=Washington D.C. |date=1956 |page=413}} Five Japanese divisions resumed the attack on 3 August, broke through the northern wall 7 August, and captured the city by the morning of 8 August.{{sfn|van de Ven|2018|p=187}}

File:Situation at the End of World War Two.PNG

Japanese forces entered Guangxi in early September 1944 and quickly captured US air bases at Guilin, Liuzhou, and Nanning.{{Rp|page=20}} The 170,000 Nationalist troops defending northern Guangxi were largely unwilling to fight and units disintegrated.{{Rp|page=21}} Leaders of the Guangxi Clique like General Bai Chongxi decided that neither Guilin nor Liuzhou could be successfully defended and Chinese forces abandoned those cities.{{Rp|page=21}}

In late November 1944, the Japanese advance slowed approximately {{convert|300|mi}} from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers and materiel.{{Rp|page=21}} Although Operation Ichi-Go achieved its goals of seizing US air bases and establishing a potential railway corridor from Manchukuo to Hanoi, it did so too late to impact the result of the broader war.{{Rp|page=21}} American bombers in Chengdu were moved to the Mariana Islands where, along with bombers from bases in Saipan and Tinian, they could still bomb the Japanese home islands.{{Rp|page=22}} The Japanese also failed to destroy the British and Australian Commando operation, 'Mission 204' which had been working with the Chinese. Before the US bases were overrun, the mission had left China and returned to Burma. {{cite journal |last=Stevens |first=Keith |year=2005 |title=A Token Operation: 204 Military Mission to China, 1941–1945 |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=36 |issue=1 |page=71 |publisher=Risk Management Reference Center, EBSCOhost |doi= 10.1080/03068370500039151|s2cid=161326427 }}

Toward the end of Ichi-Go, ROC 8th War Zone in Guizhou − with five armies and used to contain the Chinese Communists − was redeployed to fight the Japanese. Overextended supply lines and mounting casualties caused the Japanese to end Ichi-Go.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=165}}

According to Cox, China suffered 750,000 casualties, including soldiers who simply "melted away" and those rendered combat ineffective besides being killed or captured.{{cite thesis |last1=Cox |first1=Samuel J. |title=The China Theater, 1944 - 1945: A Failure of Joint and Combined Operations Strategy |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272727.pdf |degree=Master of Military Art and Science |publisher=United States Naval Academy |date=1980 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190428141801/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272727.pdf |archive-date=28 April 2019 |page=2 |url-status=dead}}

After the battle of central Henan, Chiang convened with his generals in a series of meetings starting from the 21st of July that would be known as the Huangshan Conference (黃山整軍會議). In the meetings, Chiang gave several speeches regarding the performance of the First Military Front in the battle.{{cite book |title=陳誠先生回憶錄: 抗日戰爭〈上〉|trans-title=Memoirs of Mr. Chen Cheng: The Anti-Japanese War (Part 1) |last=Cheng |first=Chen |date=2004 |pages=94-97| publisher=National Museum of History}} He assessed that there were too many vacancies in each unit in the army, reducing their fighting capabilities and requiring the Chinese army to outnumber the Japanese army by 6 or 7 to 1. He ordered He Yingqin to verify that each division was at full strength and that the sick and wounded should be eliminated, reducing the army from 6.5 million in 321 divisions to 5 million in 200 divisions.{{sfn|The Reorganization of the Nationalist Army and the Resettlement of Redundant Soldiers (1945-1947)|2014|pp=14-18}}

In November 1944, He Yingqin resigned as the Ministry of Military Affairs and Chen Cheng took over his position. There were still 5.9 million troops by then, with a reduction of 600,000 personnel. Since the goal of reducing the army to 5 million men had not been achieved, Chen Cheng pushed for further reforms in the army. From January until March 1945, Chen Cheng worked to eliminate the unneeded and reduce the amount of vacancies in the army, removing 1 million from the establishment and reducing the army to 4.9 million military personnel.{{sfn|The Reorganization of the Nationalist Army and the Resettlement of Redundant Soldiers (1945-1947)|2014|pp=18-21}}國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統, 全國陸軍各部隊軍事機關學校原有裁減新增現有單位及編制人數對照總表,.. 典藏號: 002-080200-00301-034 [https://ahonline.drnh.gov.tw/index.php?act=Display/image/5268147EBl=8n4#9e7] By the end of the war, Chen Cheng had reduced the army to 4.3 million personnel, but further reorganization was interrupted due to Chiang's insistence on incorporating the surrendered puppet soldiers into the National Revolutionary Army.{{cite book |title=黄埔名将陳诚| trans-title=Famous Whampoa General Chen Cheng | date=1993 |last=Zhijin |first=Fang| publisher=Writers Publishing House |page=283}}

The poor performance of Chiang's forces in opposing the Japanese advance became widely viewed as demonstrating Chiang's incompetence.{{Rp|page=3}} The campaign further weakened the Nationalist economy and government revenues.{{Rp|pages=22-24}} Throughout the war, but especially after the Ichi-Go campaign, the Nationalist government could not pay its bills.{{Rp|page=204}} Because of the Nationalists' increasing inability to fund the military, Nationalist authorities overlooked military corruption and smuggling.{{Rp|page=|pages=24-25}} The Nationalist army increasingly turned to raiding villages to press-gang peasants into service and force marching them to assigned units.{{Rp|page=25}}

With the rapid deterioration of the Nationalist forces, Stilwell saw Operation Ichi-Go as an opportunity to win his political struggle against Chiang and gain full command of all Chinese armed forces. He was able to convince General George Marshall to have President Roosevelt send an ultimatum to Chiang threatening to end all American aid unless Chiang "at once" placed Stilwell "in unrestricted command of all your forces".Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.446–447

Stilwell immediately delivered this letter to Chiang despite pleas from Patrick Hurley, Roosevelt's special envoy in China, to delay delivering the message and work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell's aim in a manner more acceptable to Chiang.Lohbeck, Hurley, p.292 {{full citation|date=May 2024}} Seeing this act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China, a defiant Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and he would welcome any other qualified US general to fill Stilwell's position.Lohbeck, Hurley, p.298Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, p.452

In Chiang's view, Stillwell had moved too many Chinese forces into the Burma campaign, leaving China insufficiently protected.{{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |date=2023 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5 |location=Cambridge New York, NY |author-link=Parks M. Coble}}{{Rp|page=3}} Stilwell was replaced as Chief of Staff to Chiang and commander of the US Forces, China Theater (USFCT) by Major general Albert Wedemeyer. Stilwell's other command responsibilities in the China Burma India Theater were divided up and allocated to other officers.

Although Chiang was successful in removing Stilwell, the public relations damage suffered by his Nationalist regime was irreparable. Right before Stilwell's departure, New York Times war correspondent Brooks Atkinson interviewed him in Chongqing and wrote:

The decision to relieve General Stilwell represents the political triumph of a moribund, anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. The Chinese Communists... have good armies that they are claiming to be fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in North China—actually they are covertly or even overtly building themselves up to fight Generalissimo's government forces... The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] naturally regards these armies as the chief threat to the country and his supremacy... has seen no need to make sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war... No diplomatic genius could have overcome the Generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese.{{cite magazine

| title = Crisis

| url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html

| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071120121411/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html

| url-status = dead

| archive-date = November 20, 2007

| magazine = Time

| date = 1944-11-13

| access-date = 2007-03-02}} quoting The New York Times

{{Unreferenced section|date=May 2024}}

The 1958 novel The Mountain Road, by Theodore White, a Time magazine correspondent in China at the time of the offensive, was based on an interview with former OSS Major Frank Gleason, who led a demolition group of American soldiers during the offensive that were charged with blowing up anything left behind in the retreat that might be of use to Japan. His group ultimately destroyed over 150 bridges and 50,000 tons of munitions, helping slow the Japanese advance. In 1960, it was adapted into a film by the same name starring James Stewart and Lisa Lu, noteworthy for being one of Stewart's few war films and the only one in which he plays a soldier, as he opposed war films because of their inaccuracy. It is generally believed he made an exception for this film because it was antiwar.

{{Reflist|2}}

{{refbegin}}

• {{cite book |author=History and Political Compilation Department |title=抗日戰史: 豫中會戰(三) |trans-title=History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 3) |date=1981 |publisher=Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China) |ref={{harvid|History of the Anti-Japanese War: Battle of Central Henan (Part 3)|1981}}}}
• {{cite book |title=中國陸軍第三方面軍抗戰紀實 |trans-title=Records of the Third Front Army of the Chinese Army during the War of Resistance |publisher=Wenxing Bookstore |date=1962| last=Jitang| first=Gou |ref={{harvid|Records of the Third Front Army of the Chinese Army during the War of Resistance|1962}}}}
• {{cite thesis |title= 國軍正規陸軍整編與編餘官兵之安置(1945-1947)|trans-title=The Reorganization of the Nationalist Army and the Resettlement of Redundant Soldiers (1945-1947) |date=2014 |author=Han-Chang Chen |publisher=National Taiwan University|ref={{harvid|The Reorganization of the Nationalist Army and the Resettlement of Redundant Soldiers (1945-1947)|2014}}}}
• {{cite book |editor1-last=Hsiung |editor1-first=James C. |editor2-last=Levine |editor2-first=Steven I. |title=China's Bitter Victory: The war with Japan, 1937-1945 |year=1992 |publisher=East Gate Book |location=Armonk, New York |isbn=0-87332-708-X}}
• {{cite book |last1=Mitter |first1=Rana |title=Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945 |year=2013 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt |location=New York |isbn=978-0-618-89425-3}}
• {{cite book |last1=Sherry |first1=Mark D. |title=China Defensive |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-38/CMH_Pub_72-38.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140223080921/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-38/CMH_Pub_72-38.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 23, 2014 |year=1996 |publisher=United States Army Center of Military History |series=The Campaigns of World War II |id=CMH Pub 72-38}}
• {{cite book |last1=van de Ven |first1=Hans | author-link = Hans van der Ven |title=China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China |year=2018 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |isbn=978-0-674-98350-2}}
• {{cite book |author=War History Office of the National Defence College of Japan |title=一号作戦(1)河南の会戦 |trans-title=Operation Number One (1) The Battle of Henan |series=Senshi Sōsho |volume=4 |date=1966 |publisher=Asagumo Shimbunsha |lang=ja |ref={{harvid|Senshi Sosho (vol. 4)|1966}}}}

{{refend}}

• {{Cite book | last = Paine| first = Sarah| title = The Wars for Asia 1911–1949 | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | publisher = Cambridge University Press | pages=201 |year = 2012| isbn = 978-1107020696}}

{{coord missing|China}}

{{World War II}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Ichi-Go 1944}}

Category:1944 in China

Category:1944 in Japan

Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the United States

Category:Campaigns of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Category:Military campaigns involving the United States

Ichi-Go

Category:Changsha in World War II

Category:History of Hengyang

Category:Military history of Guangxi

Category:Military history of Henan

Category:Military history of Hunan