al-Shabaab (militant group)

Al-Shabaab is also known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizb al-Shabaab ("Party of the Youth"),{{Sfn|Bryden|2006}} Al Osra Army in Somalia ({{langx|ar|جيش العسرة في الصومال|links=no}}).{{Citation |last=/القسم الإعلامي :: يقدم :: الإصدار المرئي الرائع [لبيكَ يـا أسَـامَة] |title=حركة الشباب المجاهدين |date=2009 |url=http://archive.org/details/AnsarOssama_013 |access-date=2024-03-21 |publisher=جيش العسرة في الصومال}}{{Citation |last=حركة الشباب المجاهدين " جيش العسرة في الصومال " نصرهم الله |title=حركة الشباب المجاهدين:القسم الإعلامي::يقدم::[بداية النهاية] كلمة للقائد أبي منصور الأمريكي .. رداً على خطاب باراك أوباما |date=2009 |url=http://archive.org/details/AboMasor |access-date=2024-03-21}} The term al-Shabaab means "the youth" in Arabic. It has also referred to itself as the Islamic Emirate of Somalia since 2011.{{Cite news |last1=Bruton |first1=Bronwyn |last2=Pham |first2=J. Peter |date=February 2, 2012 |title=The Splintering of Al Shabaab |work=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2012-02-02/splintering-al-shabaab |access-date=December 23, 2022 |archive-date=December 23, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221223233030/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2012-02-02/splintering-al-shabaab |url-status=live }}

{{Jihadism sidebar}}

Although it is unclear when al-Shabaab was formed, it is understood to have originated as a youth militia within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which provided de facto governance in much of Somalia until the country was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006.{{Cite journal |last=Cocodia |first=Jude |date=2021-04-03 |title=Rejecting African Solutions to African Problems: The African Union and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2021.1922026 |journal=African Security |language=en |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=110–131 |doi=10.1080/19392206.2021.1922026 |issn=1939-2206}}{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}}{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} From 2007 to 2008, al-Shabaab established itself as an independent actor, gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance against the Ethiopian military occupation.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}}{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic Courts Union but also to the older al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a group founded on the tenets of Salafism and opposition to clannism.{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}} Many early al-Shabaab leaders had also been trained as mujahideen in Afghanistan and Syria.

According to the International Crisis Group, Salafism has been a core unifying principle of al-Shabaab, although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} In particular, al-Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims, linking Somali nationalist and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} Academics have also noted the influence of non-Salafi Islamic movements in Somalia on al-Shabaab.{{Cite web |last=Marchal |first=Roland |date=March 2011 |title=The rise of a Jihadi movement in a country at war: Harkat al-Shabaab al Mujaheddin in Somalia |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/art_RM2.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140514085525/https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/art_RM2.pdf |archive-date=14 May 2014 |website=SciencesPo |pages=12}}

Following its pan-Islamist political outlook, incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed by al-Shabaab as part of a wider American-sponsored war against Islam.{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}}{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}} For instance, al-Shabaab denounced the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as a "Zionist-Crusader aggression",{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}} in which the United States "unleashed its 'hunting dogs' in Ethiopia and Kenya" by deploying "the world's crusader forces" to counter the rise of the Islamic Courts Union.{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010|p=222}} However, this globalist framework is not universal within the group,{{sfn|Schaefer|2011}}[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg49640/html/CHRG-111shrg49640.htm Senate Hearing 111–678: Violent Islamic Extremism—2009] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109060737/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg49640/html/CHRG-111shrg49640.htm |date=November 9, 2020 }}. Hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2009. an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fostered factionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base is fiercely nationalist, and sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia,{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}}{{sfn|Solomon|2014}} or, more ambitiously, inside so-called Greater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.{{sfn|Petrich|2022}} Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.{{cite web |title=Al-Shabaab |url=http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html |url-status=dead |access-date=28 March 2013 |publisher=National Counterterrorism Center |archive-date=May 24, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524014136/http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html }}

However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi-Qutbist terms;{{cite web |last=Joscelyn |first=Thomas |date=30 May 2017 |title=Shabaab claims US is 'Satan of our time,' praises al Qaeda's leadership |url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/shabaab-claims-us-is-satan-of-our-time-praises-al-qaedas-leadership.php |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220118055727/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/shabaab-claims-us-is-satan-of-our-time-praises-al-qaedas-leadership.php |archive-date=18 January 2022 |website=The Long War Journal}} and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government, which, lacking a basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a Takfiri interpretation of the principle of al-wala' wal-bara' ({{literal translation|loyalty and disavowal}}),{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}}{{sfn|Alkaff|2013}} insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived as apostates.

A major component of al-Shabaab's ideology is Somali religious nationalism which is incorporated into its Pan-Islamist cause. Patriotic themes warning Somalis of the plots from international NGOs, "Christian Crusaders" (United States, Ethiopia, AMISOM) and their collaborators are a regular feature of the movement's propaganda. During the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, al-Shabaab positioned itself as a staunch nationalist militia under the Islamic Muqawwama (resistance coalition) of the Islamic Courts Union, taking the most hardline stance against the invading "Christian crusaders". After the collapse of the ICU in 2007, al-Shabaab launched its own independent insurgency, gaining popular support from Somalis for defending the country from American imperialism and foreign occupation. Al-Qaeda began enhancing its co-operation and support to al-Shabaab during this period, which enabled the movement to establish itself as the strongest military power in Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab regards Somalia's Federal Government as an illegitimate "apostate" entity backed by foreign invaders.{{cite book |last1=Allen |first1=William |url=https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785 |title=Oxford Research Encyclopedias: African History |last2=Gakuo Mwangi |first2=Oscar |date=25 March 2021 |chapter=Al-Shabaab |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.785 |isbn=978-0-19-027773-4 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221229155041/https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785;jsessionid=8BDD05A94FB4CB9BB15D9428A61BB66C?rskey=cj1t0b&result=1 |archive-date=29 December 2022}}

The group has persecuted those individuals belonging to Somalia's small Christian minority; whom it accused of aiding the agenda of foreign "Crusaders" to "convert Somalis to Christianity".{{cite news |date=October 22, 2009 |title=Almost expunged: Somalia's embattled Christians |newspaper=The Economist |url=http://www.economist.com/world/middleeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14707279 |url-status=live |access-date=October 22, 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091025043912/http://www.economist.com/world/middleeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14707279 |archive-date=October 25, 2009}} In 2009, al-Shabaab destroyed a Sufi shrine and its associated graves; asserting that over-embellishing burial sites into shrines is incompatible with Sharia.{{cite web |date=October 19, 2009 |title=Shabaab rebels destroy grave and mosque in Somalia |url=http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LJ085722.htm |url-status=dead |access-date=March 17, 2010 |website=AlertNet |publisher= |archive-date=October 21, 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091021024203/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LJ085722.htm }}{{cite web |date=2009 |title=Grave sites destroyed in Somalia |url=http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/201032621225341415.html |url-status=dead |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=Al Jazeera |publisher= |archive-date=April 1, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100401035124/http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/201032621225341415.html }} Al-Shabaab has clashed with the pro-AMISOM Sufi militias of "Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a".{{cite news |last=Mohamed |first=Mohamed |date=June 8, 2009 |title=Somali rage at grave desecration |work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8077725.stm |access-date=2022-09-12 |archive-date=July 30, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170730020844/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8077725.stm |url-status=live }}{{cite web |author=Ryu |first=Alisha |date=September 15, 2010 |title=Sufi Militia Says Al-Shabab Planning to Attack Galgadud Region |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/sufi-militia-says-al-shabab-planning-to-attack-galgadud-102969249/155811.html |url-status=live |archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20120902113150/http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/155811.html |archive-date=September 2, 2012 |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=VOA |publisher=}} In addition, its statements have expressed anti-Zionist sentiments,{{Cite web |date=2009 |title=Somali group with al Qaeda ties threatens Israel |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/01/somalia.israel.threat/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=CNN |language=en |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130249/https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/01/somalia.israel.threat/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2017-12-07 |title=Al-Shabaab Response to U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel |url=https://vatescorp.com/index.php/blog/item/28-al-shabaab-initial-response-to-u-s-president-trump-s-announcement-recognising-the-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Vates |language=en-gb |archive-date=March 30, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220330034413/https://vatescorp.com/index.php/blog/item/28-al-shabaab-initial-response-to-u-s-president-trump-s-announcement-recognising-the-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel |url-status=dead }} and the group claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.{{Cite news |date=2019-01-16 |title=Somali Militants Say Deadly Kenya Attack Was Revenge for Trump's Jerusalem Move |language=en |work=Haaretz |url=https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/asia-and-australia/2019-01-16/ty-article/somali-militants-say-deadly-kenya-attack-was-revenge-for-trumps-jerusalem-move/0000017f-e55b-d62c-a1ff-fd7b84880000 |access-date=2022-09-09 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130243/https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/asia-and-australia/2019-01-16/ty-article/somali-militants-say-deadly-kenya-attack-was-revenge-for-trumps-jerusalem-move/0000017f-e55b-d62c-a1ff-fd7b84880000 |url-status=live }}

In 2017, observers estimated that al-Shabaab comprised between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.{{cite web |date=22 December 2017 |title=Who are Somalia's al-Shabab? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689 |access-date=2022-09-12 |website=BBC News |archive-date=April 3, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403052911/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689 |url-status=live }} In 2018, the Council of Foreign Relations and United States military revised this figure downwards, estimating 3,000 to 6,000 and 4,000 to 6,000 respectively.{{Cite journal |last=Warner |first=Jason |date=2018 |title=The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent |url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/ |journal=CTC Sentinel |volume=11 |issue=7 |access-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909152828/https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/ |url-status=live }} Reflecting an apparent al-Shabaab resurgence, the United States Africa Command estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters two years later, in 2020.{{Sfn|Harrington|2021}}{{cite web|url=https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab |title=Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab) |website=www.csis.org}} Most recently, an expert report submitted to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al-Shabaab's fighting force had grown to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters. In late 2022, President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohammed stated the faction had around 15,000 to 18,000 fighters.

The group is led by an executive tanfid council of 7 to 14 members - a configuration also seen in equivalent organisations such as al-Qaeda, supported by a consultative shura. It operates several internal departments known as "Makhtab", including Jabhat (military), Sanaaca (explosives), Da'wa (preaching), Zakat (taxation), Wilayah (local administration), Garsoor (Islamic courts) an intelligence agency known as the Amniyat, and a police force, Jaysh al-Hisbah.{{Sfn|Harrington|2021}}{{Cite book |last1=Maruf |first1=Harun |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv6mtfn2 |title=Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally |last2=Joseph |first2=Dan |date=2018 |publisher=Indiana University Press |jstor=j.ctv6mtfn2 |isbn=978-0-253-03748-0}} The organization appoints governors (waalis) of which there are ten, and who maintain and oversee all civil services in Shabaab-controlled areas (including welfare and road maintenance).{{Cite book |last1=Joseph |first1=Dan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5aBxDwAAQBAJ&dq=al+shabaab+wilayat&pg=PA93 |title=Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally |last2=Maruf |first2=Harun |date=2018-10-01 |publisher=Indiana University Press |isbn=978-0-253-03751-0 |language=en}}

Especially in its early years, al-Shabaab was sometimes characterised by Somali opponents as dominated by the Hawiye clan, which is one of the largest clans in Somalia.{{sfn|Schaefer|2011}} Hawiye remain influential in the group,{{Sfn|Bacon|2022}} and, according to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute, five of the ten members of the executive shura council were Hawiye, as were about 94 of the top 220 officials.{{Sfn|Mubarak|2018}} However, al-Shabaab is attached to an ethos of anti-clannism, and has therefore tried to appeal to minority groups and to ensure ethnic and clan diversity among its leadership.{{sfn|Chonka|2016b}} It incorporates a relatively large contingent of foreign fighters {{See below|{{section link|#Foreign recruitment}}}}. Rank-and-file members, though sometimes recruited by force, are also attracted by the regular pay that al-Shabaab offers and by its political propaganda.{{sfn|Chonka|2016b}} In the past, many young al-Shabaab recruits were drawn from marginalised southern clans, such as the Jareer.{{sfn|Chonka|2016b}}{{cite news |author=Abdul-Ahad |first=Ghaith |date=June 7, 2010 |title=How Somalia's civil war became new front in battle against al-Qaida |work=The Guardian |location= |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/07/somalia-civil-war-al-qaida |access-date=January 14, 2012 |archive-date=September 15, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130915013547/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/07/somalia-civil-war-al-qaida |url-status=live }} Many are children.{{Cite journal |last1=Regilme |first1=Salvador Santino Jr Fulo |last2=Spoldi |first2=Elisabetta |date=2021-07-01 |title=Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights Crisis in Somalia |journal=Global Jurist |language=en |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=365–402 |doi=10.1515/gj-2020-0083 |s2cid=232245779 |issn=1934-2640|doi-access=free |hdl=1887/3154491 |hdl-access=free }}

In February 2012, Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole, an al-Shabaab officer with responsibility for "awareness raising", encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fight jihad with al-Shabaab, which until then had used only male fighters.{{cite web |last=Khalif |first=Abdulkadir |date=2012-02-22 |title=Al-Shabaab Wants Girls to Join Warfront Against Govt |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201202220071.html |access-date=2022-09-12 |work=allAfrica |archive-date=February 26, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120226185357/http://allafrica.com/stories/201202220071.html |url-status=live }} However, according to International Crisis Group, women rarely participate directly in military decision-making or operations, though they do play important roles in recruitment, intelligence, and explosives smuggling.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2019}}

{{Campaignbox Somali Civil War (2009–present)}}

{{Main|Timeline of al-Shabaab-related events}}Al-Shabaab was founded in Las Anod in 2003.{{Cite book |last=Costantinos |first=Costantinos Berhutesfa |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QZ-zBgAAQBAJ&dq=al+shabaab+las+anod&pg=PA249 |title=Unleashing Africa's Resilience: Pan-Africanist Renaissance In a New African Century |date=2014-04-22 |publisher=Lulu.com |isbn=978-1-4834-1012-8 |language=en |quote=Al-Shabaab (Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahedeen) is an Islamic insurgency that came to being in 2003 at an Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia consultation in Los Anod, Somaliland [...] and then organized a parallel conference in Las Anod and launched al-Shabaab as a Salafi-jihadist movement}}{{Cite book |last1=Cigar |first1=Norman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fXiTYOM2BsgC&dq=al+shabaab+las+anod&pg=PA70 |title=Al-Qaida After Ten Years of War: A Global Perspective of Successes, Failures, and Prospects |last2=Kramer |first2=Stephanie E. |last3=Press |first3=Marine Corps University (U S. ) |date=2011 |publisher=Government Printing Office |isbn=978-0-16-090299-4 |language=en |quote=Al-Shabaab formally incorporated in 2003 at an AIAI alumni conference in Las Anod, Somaliland}} During that same year, the American Central Intelligence Agency began covert operations targeting the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by backing anti-ICU Somali warlords{{Cite journal |last=Cocodia |first=Jude |date=2021-04-03 |title=Rejecting African Solutions to African Problems: The African Union and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2021.1922026 |journal=African Security |language=en |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=110–131 |doi=10.1080/19392206.2021.1922026 |issn=1939-2206 |s2cid=236350899}} with the aim of preventing the formation of a 'Taliban like' state in Somalia that could provide haven to al-Qaeda.{{Cite web |last=Morgan |first=David |date=5 June 2006 |title=US funding Somali warlords-intelligence experts say - Somalia {{!}} ReliefWeb |url=https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/us-funding-somali-warlords-intelligence-experts-say |access-date=2024-06-30 |website=Reliefweb |language=en |agency=Reuters}} In 2005, Mogadishu was hit by a significant wave of unexplained assassinations and disappearances. The Islamic Courts claimed that covert US government operations and warlords were targeting high ranking ICU officials. According to C. Barnes & H. Hassan, "It was in this context that a military force known as al-Shabaab ('the Youth') emerged, related to but seemingly autonomous of the broad based Courts movement."{{Cite journal |last1=Barnes |first1=Cedric |last2=Hassan |first2=Harun |date=2007 |title=The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050701452382 |journal=Journal of Eastern African Studies |language=en |volume=1 |issue=2 |pages=151–160 |doi=10.1080/17531050701452382 |issn=1753-1055 |s2cid=154453168}} Contrary to many reports, al-Shabaab was neither the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union nor its most important military component. Al-Shabaab fighters operated as the youth wing of the Courts' militia and gained a fierce reputation during the war against the CIA-backed Somali warlord alliance in Mogadishu in early to mid-2006, distinguishing themselves within the ICU's military wing.{{Cite book |last=Hansen |first=Stig Jarle |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9NlMAgAAQBAJ |title=Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-932787-4 |pages=34–35 |language=en |quote=It is important to note that, contrary to many newspaper articles, Al Shabaab was not the armed wing of the Courts. In fact there were other groups under the Court umbrella that were more militarily important than Al-Shabaab.}}

{{Main|War in Somalia (2006–2009)|l1 = Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia}}

File:Al-Shabaab military parade.png

Al-Shabaab rose to prominence and radicalized following the full scale Ethiopian invasion of Somalia during December 2006.{{Cite journal |last=Mueller |first=Jason C. |date=2018-01-02 |title=The Evolution of Political Violence: The Case of Somalia's Al-Shabaab |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213 |journal=Terrorism and Political Violence |language=en |volume=30 |issue=1 |pages=116–141 |doi=10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213 |s2cid=148494845 |issn=0954-6553 |access-date=December 28, 2023 |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203629/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213 |url-status=live }}{{Cite book |last=Celso |first=Anthony |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=13ehCgAAQBAJ |title=Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle Against the Near and Far Enemy |date=2015-08-27 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing USA |isbn=978-1-5013-1244-1 |pages=133 |language=en}} At the time, al-Shabaab was about six hundred fighters strong.{{Cite news |last=Plaut |first=Martin Plaut |author-link=Martin Plaut |date=2009-01-01 |title=US fails to break Somali Islamists |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7807291.stm |access-date=2024-03-09 |work=BBC News |language=en-GB |quote=When Ethiopia invaded, al-Shabaab had around 600 fighters.}} The invasion resulted in the deaths of many Islamic Courts Union affiliates, leaving a vacuum for the small group of several hundred youth that served as the ICU's Shabaab militia to gain prominence.{{Cite journal |last=Mueller |first=Jason C. |date=2019-07-03 |title=Political, Economic, and Ideological Warfare in Somalia |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2019.1735174 |journal=Peace Review |language=en |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=372–380 |doi=10.1080/10402659.2019.1735174 |issn=1040-2659 |s2cid=219267475 |quote=This invasion chased out or killed many affiliates of the UIC, leaving behind a battle-hardened small contingent of youth who made up a marginal faction of the UIC prior to the Ethiopian invasion. This group goes by the name of al-Shabaab.}} During the military occupation the group garnered popular support from across many segments of Somali society, as al-Shabaab was widely viewed as a genuine resistance movement against the Ethiopian military occupation; despite its inclinations towards hardline interpretations of Islam. Though the invasion had fractured the Islamic Courts Union, it galvanized nationalism on which al-Shabaab capitalized, especially for recruitment purposes, with thousands of new recruits drawn to the group.{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}}{{Cite journal |last=Hassan |first=Abdulahi |date=March 2008 |title=Inside Look at the Fighting Between Al-Shabab and Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama |url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss3-Art2.pdf |journal=CTC Sentinel |volume=2 |issue=3 |access-date=December 28, 2023 |archive-date=December 27, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231227063346/https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss3-Art2.pdf |url-status=live }}

During 2008, al-Shabaab began rapidly expanding and governing territory for the first time.{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D97AEAAAQBAJ |title=The Rule Is For None But Allah |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2023 |isbn=978-0-19-769039-0 |editor-last=Cook |editor-first=Joana |pages=111 |access-date=December 28, 2023 |editor-last2=Maher |editor-first2=Shiraz |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231228054306/https://books.google.com/books?id=D97AEAAAQBAJ |archive-date=December 28, 2023 |url-status=live}} According to Cocodia, "al-Shabaab from an objective standpoint is the response of an unlawfully deposed regime employing all means possible to reclaim the authority that was wrenched from it." In the initial years, many Somalis perceived al-Shabaab as disciplined, orderly, and fair, which earned the group significant legitimacy. However, this perception was later lost due to their arbitrary rulings. Heavy handed tactics by the Ethiopian military rallied many Somalis to support the organization, and over the following two years al-Shabaab became battle hardened as it participated in the insurgency. In this period, the group laid the foundation for an enduring insurgency in Somalia, establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in the rural south-central regions.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} The African Union reported al-Shabaab was about 2,000 fighters strong during 2008.{{Cite web |last=Hummel |first=Kristina |date=2024-04-30 |title=The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment |url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/ |access-date=2024-06-30 |website=Combating Terrorism Center at West Point |language=en-US}}

A critical juncture in transformation of al-Shabaab was the assassination of the groups military leader Aden Hashi Ayro in an American airstrike during May 2008. It resulted in several significant developments for al-Shabaab, most prominently the accession of Ahmed Godane to leadership of the organization. Godane moved al-Shabaab in a far more violent direction, alienating many fighters and civilian supporters. The assassination of Ayro did nothing to prevent the groups expansion. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 significantly diminished the public support that al-Shabaab had previously enjoyed as a resistance faction. However, this move came too late to have a substantial impact on the group's transformation into a formidable oppositional force.

{{See also|Somali Civil War (2009–present)}}Having made important territorial gains from mid-2008, al-Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on opposition to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, as the Ethiopian-led war segued into the next phase of the protracted Somali Civil War.{{Sfn|Elliot|Holzer|2009}} By 2009–10, al-Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia (south of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland), and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}}{{sfn|Anzalone|2013}}{{sfn|Bryden|2014}} It had particular success building relationships with local leaders in order to build cross-clan coalitions, combining its principled anti-clannism with a "pragmatic clannism": a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter-clan politics.{{sfn|Ingiriis|2018b}}{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}}{{sfn|Schaefer|2011}}{{sfn|Chonka|2016b}}

By 2009, al-Shabaab started drastically altering its choice of targets and frequency of attacks. The use of kidnappings and bombings in urban areas significantly grew in use. The groups significant support from the Somali diaspora dwindled in response to the usage of terror tactics.

File:Al Shabaab fighters disengage and lay down arms 03 (8019356109).jpg, September 2012.]]

File:Allied Forces in Kismayo.jpg, 2012.]]

In subsequent years, however, al-Shabaab's strong position was significantly weakened, as – in the context of a famine in the region and, simultaneously, a military offensive against the group – the group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military arena; an internal struggle over the group's direction and leadership; and, in response to both, a wave of high-profile defections.

The group's military fortunes turned with the failure of the August 2010 Ramadan offensive – the inauguration of the Battle of Mogadishu – which resulted in heavy al-Shabaab losses.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} By August 2011, al-Shabaab had announced a "strategic withdrawal" from Mogadishu, although, from outlying districts, it continued to exert influence in the city and to launch deadly guerrilla attacks against AMISOM and the TFG.{{sfn|Anzalone|2013}} In October and November 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia – partnering with local militias – launched offensives against al-Shabaab strongholds: Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi on the southern front, while Ethiopia approached from the west. The group lost territory to both armies, notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing the port city (and revenue hub) of Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012.{{sfn|Anzalone|2013}}{{cite news |author=Will Ross |date=2012-02-22 |title=Somalia al-Shabab militant base of Baidoa captured |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17127353 |access-date=2012-08-04 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130242/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17127353 |url-status=live }} Military pressures on the group were sustained into 2013.

File:MakkawiBayah.jpg

Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007.{{cite news |last=Guled |first=Abdi |date=September 2, 2014 |title=U.S. Strikes Al-Shabab In Somalia, 6 Militants Killed |work=Huffington Post |url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/02/us-strike-somalia_n_5751658.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140907005309/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/02/us-strike-somalia_n_5751658.html |archive-date=September 7, 2014}} As a severe drought afflicted the region, critics, generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow,{{sfn|Bryden|2014}}{{cite web |last=Abukar |first=Hassan M. |date=2 July 2013 |title=Somalia: The Godane coup and the unraveling of Al-Shabaab |url=http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/02/somalia-the-godane-coup-and-the-unraveling-of-al-shabaab-%E2%80%93-by-hassan-m-abukar/ |access-date=6 August 2014 |work=African Arguments |publisher=Royal African Society |archive-date=August 4, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140804012117/http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/02/somalia-the-godane-coup-and-the-unraveling-of-al-shabaab-%E2%80%93-by-hassan-m-abukar/ |url-status=live }} opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian aid to populations in its territories {{See below|below}}.{{cite news |last=Chothia |first=Farouk |date=August 9, 2011 |title=Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab? |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14373264 |access-date=January 14, 2012 |archive-date=April 10, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180410025812/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14373264 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |author= |date=8 December 2011 |title=Al-Shabaab Leader Admits Split |work=Somalia Report |url=http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1349/Al-Shabaab_Leader_Admits_Split |access-date=7 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121022222915/http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1349/Al-Shabaab_Leader_Admits_Split |archive-date=22 October 2012}}{{cite web |date=1 February 2012 |title=Where in the World is Sheikh Aweys? |url=http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525092847/http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys |archive-date=May 25, 2012 |access-date=2012-07-07 |website=Somalia Report |df=mdy-all}} More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}}

These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad.{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}}{{sfn|Solomon|2014}} Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al-Qaeda {{See below|{{section link|#Al-Qaeda}}}} thus also met opposition.{{cite news |last=Bruton |first=Bronwyn |date=February 21, 2012 |title=Divisive Alliance |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?_r=2&ref=alshabab |access-date=February 24, 2017 |archive-date=April 26, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230426131326/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?_r=2&ref=alshabab |url-status=live }}{{cite web |date=2012-02-23 |title=Daily Media Roundup |url=http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2896/23_February_2012_Daily_Media_Roundup |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120226221311/http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2896/23_February_2012_Daily_Media_Roundup |archive-date=February 26, 2012 |work=Somalia Report |df=mdy-all}} Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo,{{cite web |date=5 December 2011 |title=Al-Shabaab to Change Name to Imaarah Islamiyah |url=http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2212 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714150723/http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2212 |archive-date=July 14, 2014 |access-date=2012-07-07 |website=Somalia Report |df=mdy-all}} and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad. They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control.{{cite magazine |first1=Bronwyn |last1=Bruton |first2=J. Peter |last2=Pham |date=2012-02-02 |title=The Splintering of Al Shabaab |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab?page=show |magazine=Foreign Affairs |access-date=2012-07-07 |archive-date=February 8, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120208082445/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab?page=show |url-status=live }} Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that "al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."{{cite web |date=5 April 2012 |title=Somali observers: internal divisions widening within al-Shabaab |url=http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/04/05/feature-01 |access-date=2012-08-04 |website=Sabahi |archive-date=June 9, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120609031053/http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/04/05/feature-01 |url-status=live }}

File:Suspected al Shabab militants wait to be taken off for interogation during a joint night operation between the Somali security services and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, on May 4. AU UN IST (14114007504).jpg during a joint operation between Somali forces and AMISOM, May 2014.]]

In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his critics.{{sfn|Bryden|2014}} Among those killed were Ibrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in June;{{cite news |last=Mugisha |first=Richard |date=8 September 2013 |title=Uganda: Is Al-Shabab Disintegrating? |work=allAfrica |publisher= |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201309090073.html |access-date=23 September 2013 |archive-date=September 27, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927105640/http://allafrica.com/stories/201309090073.html |url-status=live }} and Omar Shafik Hammami, killed in September.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority.{{cite news |last=Tisdall |first=Simon |author-link=Simon Tisdall |date=22 September 2013 |title=Kenya attack is product of brutal power struggle within al-Shabaab |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/kenya-attack-power-struggle-al-shabaab |access-date=23 September 2013 |archive-date=March 5, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305021048/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/kenya-attack-power-struggle-al-shabaab |url-status=live }}

File:AlShabaabFightersInBarawe2013.jpg

From mid-to-late 2011, and into 2012, al-Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections.{{sfn|Anzalone|2013}} It was not the first such wave of defections: in particular, in late 2009, after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia, several leaders had defected to the Somali government, citing complaints about al-Shabaab's use of suicide attacks and executions;{{cite web |last=Maruf |first=Harun |date=November 9, 2009 |title=Somali Government Displays Defecting Al-Shabab Commander |url=http://www1.voanews.com/somali/news/news-makers-in-english/Top-Al-Shabab-Commander-Said-Defected-to-Government-Al-Shabab-Denies-News-69585817.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120515210236/http://www.voanews.com/somali/news/news-makers-in-english/Top-Al-Shabab-Commander-Said-Defected-to-Government-Al-Shabab-Denies-News-69585817.html |archive-date=May 15, 2012 |access-date=March 17, 2010 |website=VOA |publisher=}} its "false interpretations of Islam";{{cite web |date=November 24, 2009 |last=Bar |first=Herve |title=If you don't want to fight anymore, there's no point |url=http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-11-24-if-you-dont-want-to-fight-anymore-theres-no-point |access-date=March 17, 2010 |website=The Mail & Guardian |archive-date=June 15, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100615065158/http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-11-24-if-you-dont-want-to-fight-anymore-theres-no-point |url-status=live }} and its use of extortion and attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid.{{cite web |date=December 2, 2009 |title=Senior Al-Shabab Commander Defects to Govt |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/200912020945.html |access-date=March 17, 2010 |website=allAfrica |archive-date=December 3, 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091203002302/http://allafrica.com/stories/200912020945.html |url-status=live }} Such defections were viewed as strategically important to al-Shabaab's adversaries, not only for their propaganda use but because former militants could provide intelligence about al-Shabaab's combat strategy.{{cite news |last=Mayoyo |first=Patrick |date=5 September 2012 |title=Shabaab fighters surrender |newspaper=Daily Nation |url=http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Shabaab+fighters+surrender/-/1056/1497576/-/1d3c63z/-/index.html |access-date=6 September 2012 |archive-date=September 6, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120906085844/http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Shabaab+fighters+surrender/-/1056/1497576/-/1d3c63z/-/index.html |url-status=live }} However, according to AMISOM and the Somali government, the volume of defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented, and indicated that al-Shabaab's cohesion and authority were deteriorating: in June 2012, the government said that around 500 al-Shabaab militants had already defected to it, and that more were doing so every day.{{cite news |last=Guled |first=Abdi |date=15 June 2012 |title=Militants defecting to Somali side after losses |newspaper=The Washington Examiner |url=http://washingtonexaminer.com/news/world/2012/06/militants-defecting-somali-side-after-losses/733571}}{{dead link|date=September 2016|bot=medic}} Al-Shabaab brutalities, which alienated local populations, were again cited as central in motivating defections.{{cite news |date=8 June 2012 |title=Defections put militant al-Shabab on the run in Somalia |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18364762 |access-date=2022-09-12 |archive-date=August 21, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821043317/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18364762 |url-status=live }} On September 5 and September 22, 2012, two large contingents of al-Shabaab fighters – around 200 each time – surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale respectively.{{cite news |date=22 September 2012 |title=Al Shabaab suffer significant setback as over 200 militants disengage near Jowhar |newspaper=AMISOM |url=http://amisom-au.org/2012/09/al-shabaab-suffer-significant-setback-as-over-200-militants-disengage-near-jowhar/ |access-date=23 September 2012 |archive-date=October 5, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121005015041/http://amisom-au.org/2012/09/al-shabaab-suffer-significant-setback-as-over-200-militants-disengage-near-jowhar/ |url-status=live }} Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane's 2013 purges – Aweys, for example, fled the group in mid-2013.

Following its territorial losses, al-Shabaab reverted to the tactics of asymmetric warfare, launching guerrilla attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}}{{sfn|Anzalone|2013}} Southern commander Aweys had announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011.{{Cite web |date=2011-08-12 |title=Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Somalia |url=https://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/08/12/al-shabab-vows-to-use-guerilla-tactics-in-somalia/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=VOA News |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130252/https://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/08/12/al-shabab-vows-to-use-guerilla-tactics-in-somalia/ |url-status=dead }} Al-Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles, in favour of "dictat[ing] the conflict's pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing".{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} The group undertook high-profile attacks outside Somalia such as the Westgate shopping mall attack by four militants left 67 dead - the deadliest attack in Kenya since the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi.  That death-toll was exceeded two years later in the Garissa University College attack in which 148 people were killed in an attack targeting Christian students. Furthermore, two sophisticated attempts to target airliners were observed in 2016. In February a device in a laptop bag that had passed screening was detonated mid-flight, killing only the bomber, and in March another laptop bomb exploded during screening. Reacting to apparent advances in the group's bomb-making capabilities, the UN Security Council later prohibited the transfer of bomb components to Somalia. The group has also developed a strategy of maintaining a "semi-territorial presence" in key regions and parts of key cities: while it no longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and therefore significant influence, in many places.{{Cite web |last=Hansen |first=Stig Jarle |author-link=Stig Jarle Hansen |date=2016-10-17 |title=Has Shabaab been weakened for good? The answer is 'yes' and 'no' |url=http://theconversation.com/has-shabaab-been-weakened-for-good-the-answer-is-yes-and-no-67067 |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=The Conversation |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130248/https://theconversation.com/has-shabaab-been-weakened-for-good-the-answer-is-yes-and-no-67067 |url-status=live }}{{sfn|Doboš|2016}}

File:Somalia map states regions districts.png

Nonetheless, by 2016, al-Shabaab was viewed as significantly weakened by the military campaign against it, with earlier losses compounded in 2014–15 by Operation Indian Ocean, a joint endeavour by AMISOM, the Somali government, and the United States.{{sfn|Jones|Liepman|Chandler|2016}} The Somali government claimed in October 2014 that over 700 al-Shabaab militants had surrendered since September, when it had extended an amnesty offer to them.{{Cite web |date=2014-10-11 |title=At least 700 Al-shabab members surrenders to the government, PM Abdiweli |url=https://goobjoog.com/english/at-least-700-al-shabab-members-surrenders-to-the-governmentpm-abdiweli/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Goobjoog News |archive-date=September 1, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220901050604/https://goobjoog.com/english/at-least-700-al-shabab-members-surrenders-to-the-governmentpm-abdiweli/ |url-status=live }} Reports of further senior defections continued into 2015.{{cite news |date=27 December 2014 |title=Wanted Extremist Leader Surrenders in Somalia |newspaper=Associated Press |url=http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/wanted-islamic-extremist-leader-surrenders-somalia-27849563 |access-date=27 December 2014 |archive-date=January 9, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150109202120/http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/wanted-islamic-extremist-leader-surrenders-somalia-27849563 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |date=2015-01-17 |title=Weekly Press Conference on the Progress of the Government |url=https://goobjoog.com/english/weekly-press-conference-on-the-progress-of-the-government-9/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Goobjoog News |archive-date=April 16, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416002846/https://goobjoog.com/english/weekly-press-conference-on-the-progress-of-the-government-9/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |date=2015-03-07 |title=Administration of Dhusa-Mareeb Gives Details of Al-Shabab Fighter Who Surrendered |url=https://goobjoog.com/english/administration-of-dhusa-mareeb-gives-details-of-al-shabab-fighter-who-surrendered/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Goobjoog News English |archive-date=April 16, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416002911/https://goobjoog.com/english/administration-of-dhusa-mareeb-gives-details-of-al-shabab-fighter-who-surrendered/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |date=2015-03-30 |title=Senior Al-shabab officer surrenders to the federal government |url=https://goobjoog.com/english/senior-al-shabab-officer-surrenders-to-the-federal-government-2/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Goobjoog News |archive-date=April 16, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416002843/https://goobjoog.com/english/senior-al-shabab-officer-surrenders-to-the-federal-government-2/ |url-status=live }} Moreover, an American drone strike killed Godane on September 1, 2014;{{Cite web |last=Martinez |first=Michael |date=2014-09-05 |title=Top Somali militant killed in U.S. operation, Pentagon says |url=https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/africa/somali-militant-killed/index.html |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=CNN |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130242/https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/africa/somali-militant-killed/index.html |url-status=live }} he was succeeded as al-Shabaab leader by Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, who took office the same week.{{Cite news |date=2014-09-06 |title=Al-Shabab names new leader after Godane death in US strike |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29093200 |access-date=2022-09-09 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130242/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29093200 |url-status=live }} Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015.{{cite news |date=31 December 2014 |title=U.S. confirms drone strike killed al Shabaab leader in Somalia |newspaper=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia-airstrike-idUSKBN0K90YA20141231 |access-date=1 January 2015 |archive-date=May 16, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516225009/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia-airstrike-idUSKBN0K90YA20141231 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |date=6 February 2015 |title=Somali government welcomes the death of Al-Shabaab Leader, Yusuf Dheeg |work=Goobjoog News |url=http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=9860 |access-date=6 February 2015 |archive-date=February 6, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206212559/http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=9860 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |last=Alexander |first=David |date=13 March 2015 |title=U.S. carried out strike in Somalia targeting al Shabaab leader |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-attacks-usa-idUSKBN0MA01820150314 |access-date=14 March 2015 |archive-date=May 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517102942/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-attacks-usa-idUSKBN0MA01820150314 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |date=13 March 2015 |title=Col. Osman: 'The Government Forces in Gedo Killed Al-Shabab Ring Leader' |work=Goobjoog News |url=http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=11711 |access-date=13 March 2015 |archive-date=March 23, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150323222231/http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=11711 |url-status=live }} According to some reports, since Godane's death, the group has placed less weight on global jihad than on local grievances.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}}{{sfn|Bryden|2014}}{{sfn|Petrich|2022}}

In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed by a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu , including many children, provoking domestic and international outrage. Al-Shabaab did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement.{{Cite web |last=Burke |first=Jason |date=2017-10-17 |title=Somalia bombing may have been revenge for botched US-led operation |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/somalia-bomber-was-ex-solider-whose-town-was-raided-by-us-forces |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=The Guardian |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130249/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/somalia-bomber-was-ex-solider-whose-town-was-raided-by-us-forces |url-status=live }} In December 2019, another suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al-Shabaab attacks on the capital city, which continued into 2022.{{Cite web |last=Hared |first=Khadar |date=2020-09-18 |title=Somalia: Al-Shabab attacks intensify as election looms |url=https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-al-shabab-attacks-intensify-as-election-looms/a-54980396 |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Deutsche Welle |language=en-GB |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130246/https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-al-shabab-attacks-intensify-as-election-looms/a-54980396 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |date=2022-01-28 |title=Al Shabaab surges bombings amid Somali political crisis |url=https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-surges-bombings-amid-somali-political-crisis |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=Critical Threats |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130246/https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-surges-bombings-amid-somali-political-crisis |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last=Besheer |first=Margaret |date=2022-02-15 |title=Terror Attacks Surge as Elections Drag in Somalia |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/terror-attacks-surge-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/6442966.html |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=VOA |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909130242/https://www.voanews.com/a/terror-attacks-surge-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/6442966.html |url-status=live }} Al-Shabaab also targeted American military personnel in an attack on a Kenyan base in January 2020,{{Cite news |last=Demirjian |first=Karoun |date=2022-03-10 |title=U.S. military investigation finds extensive failures before deadly terror attack in Kenya |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/10/manda-bay-investigation/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=March 13, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313135104/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/10/manda-bay-investigation/ |url-status=live }} and in July 2022 launched an unusually bold, though short-lived, incursion into Ethiopian territory.{{Cite web |last=Faruk |first=Omar |date=2022-08-05 |title=In a first, Somalia-based al-Shabab is attacking in Ethiopia |url=https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/in-a-first-somalia-based-al-shabab-is-attacking-in-ethiopia-1.6015406 |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=CTVNews |archive-date=August 6, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220806082205/https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/in-a-first-somalia-based-al-shabab-is-attacking-in-ethiopia-1.6015406 |url-status=live }} By 2020, the group's strategy of semi-territorialism allowed it operate freely in much of rural Somalia, with its primary base in the Jubba River Valley,{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}} although air strikes against its leaders continued;{{cite web |last=Vandiver |first=John |date=2020-04-07 |title=AFRICOM kills senior terrorist leader in Somalia as airstrikes intensify |url=https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/africom-kills-senior-terrorist-leader-in-somalia-as-airstrikes-intensify-1.625125 |access-date=2022-09-12 |website=Stars and Stripes |archive-date=November 26, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211126145420/https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/africom-kills-senior-terrorist-leader-in-somalia-as-airstrikes-intensify-1.625125 |url-status=live }} and it has recently won military successes against the government.{{Cite news |last= |date=2021-08-24 |title=Al Shabaab attacks Somali military base, recaptures central town |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-shabaab-attacks-somali-military-base-captures-central-town-2021-08-24/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909152824/https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-shabaab-attacks-somali-military-base-captures-central-town-2021-08-24/ |url-status=live }} It had also expanded its operations in Puntland,{{Sfn|Horton|2017}}{{Sfn|Felbab-Brown|2017}} prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in 2021.{{Cite news |last= |date=2021-09-04 |title=Somalia's Puntland sends troops to fight al Shabaab in neighbouring state |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-puntland-sends-troops-fight-al-shabaab-neighbouring-state-2021-09-03/ |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141506/https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-puntland-sends-troops-fight-al-shabaab-neighbouring-state-2021-09-03/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite news |date=2021-06-27 |title=Somalia's Puntland region executes 21 al-Shabab fighters |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57630144 |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=May 2, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220502071822/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57630144 |url-status=live }} As of July 2022, al-Shabaab is generally considered to be "resurgent",{{Cite news |last=Raghavan |first=Sudarsan |date=2022-07-17 |title=An attack on a military base in Somalia shows al-Shabab's deadly power |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/17/somalia-al-shabab-us-troops/ |access-date=2022-09-09 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=August 13, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813155421/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/17/somalia-al-shabab-us-troops/ |url-status=live }} a situation partly enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes,{{Sfn|The Soufan Center|2022}} and possibly motivated by competition with Islamic State in Somalia, which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign.{{Sfn|Global Interagency Security Forum|2016}}

On 20 July 2022, al-Shabaab launched an invasion into Ethiopia's Somali Region.{{cite web |author1=Caleb Weiss |author2=Ryan O'Farrell |date=25 July 2022 |title=Analysis: Shabaab's multi-day incursion into Ethiopia |url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/07/analysis-shabaabs-multi-day-incursion-into-ethiopia.php |access-date=30 July 2022 |work=Long War Journal}} Taking advantage of the ongoing Tigray War, the goal of the operation was to establish a presence for the group within southern Ethiopia. The incursion began with over a thousand al-Shabaab fighters staging diversionary attacks on four Ethiopian-Somali border towns in order to allow a force of 500 to 800 fighters to penetrate the Ethiopian security zone and advance into the region, who then advanced 150 km into the region.{{Cite news |date=11 August 2022 |title=How al-Qaeda and Islamic State are digging into Africa |url=https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/11/how-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-are-digging-into-africa |access-date=2024-07-13 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |quote=In July a force of 500-800 al-Shabab fighters penetrated a security zone maintained by Ethiopia, then crossed 150km into that country with the aim of setting up a base in the Bale mountains.}} After two weeks of intense clashes and airstrikes, the ENDF and Somali Region security forces began to reassert control.{{Cite news |date=2022-09-14 |title=Al-Shabab seeks to 'put down roots' in Ethiopia |url=https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2022/09/14/al-shabaab-seeks-to-put-down-roots-in-ethiopia_5996884_124.html |access-date=2024-07-16 |work=Le Monde |language=en}} A battalion of around 500 al-Shabaab fighters succeeded in evading the Ethiopian army and reached its main target, the Bale Mountains.{{Cite book |last=Barnett |first=James |url=https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Faltering+Lion+-+James+Barnett+Sep+2023.pdf |title=Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia's War against al-Shabaab |date=September 2023 |publisher=Hudson Institute}}

In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared "total war" against Al Shabaab during a televised address after the group carried out a deadly hotel attack in Mogadishu and also announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state and Southwest state.{{cite web |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html |title=Somalia's President Vows 'Total War' Against al-Shabab |work=VOA |date=August 24, 2022 |first=Mohamed |last=Dhaysane |access-date=31 May 2023 |archive-date=May 11, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230511190141/https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html |url-status=live }} By September 2022 Somali and ATMIS offensive operations against al-Shabaab, with U.S. support, would escalate to the highest point in five years.{{cite news|url=https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34736/federal-government-of-somalia-engages-terrorists-with-support-from-us-forces|title=Federal Government of Somalia engages terrorists with support from U.S. forces|publisher=United States Africa Command|date=21 September 2022|access-date=21 September 2022|archive-date=September 21, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921172053/https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34736/federal-government-of-somalia-engages-terrorists-with-support-from-us-forces|url-status=live}} The operation, which is considered a combined Somali-ATMIS offensive, began in August 2022 and, with assistance from U.S. airstrikes, has been focused on disrupting al-Shabaab activity in Somalia's central Hiraan region.{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-kills-27-al-shabaab-militants-somalia-air-strike-2022-09-21/|title=U.S. says it kills 27 al Shabaab militants in Somalia air strike|website=Reuters|date=2022-09-21|access-date=2022-09-21|archive-date=September 21, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921195156/https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-kills-27-al-shabaab-militants-somalia-air-strike-2022-09-21/|url-status=live}} Other Al Shabaab-controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as well.{{cite news|url=https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-military-deals-major-blow-to-al-shabaab-in-south-100-fighters-killed|title=Somalia military deals major blow to Al Shabaab in south, 100 fighters killed|work=Garowe Online|date=12 September 2022|access-date=21 September 2022|archive-date=September 21, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921202313/https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-military-deals-major-blow-to-al-shabaab-in-south-100-fighters-killed|url-status=live}} On 20 September 2022, as the military operation progressed, a statement was released by the Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than surrender for al-Shabaab members.{{cite news|url=https://sonna.so/en/2022/09/20/no-other-door-open-but-to-surrender-govt-tells-youths-misled-by-al-shabab/|title=No other door open but to surrender, Govt tells Al-Shabab|agency=Somali National News Agency|date=20 September 2022|access-date=21 September 2022|archive-date=September 21, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921221654/https://sonna.so/en/2022/09/20/no-other-door-open-but-to-surrender-govt-tells-youths-misled-by-al-shabab/|url-status=dead}}

On 29 October, 2022, al-Shabaab took responsibility for a twin car bombing that occurred in Mogadishu targeting the Ministry of Education. The attacks killed 121 people and injured 333, making it the deadliest at the time since 2017.{{Cite web |date=2022-11-01 |title=Death Toll Rises to 121 in Somalia Al-Shabab Attacks |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-rises-in-somalia-al-shabab-attacks/6815098.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221101154316/https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-rises-in-somalia-al-shabab-attacks/6815098.html |archive-date=November 1, 2022 |access-date=2024-09-08 |website=Voice of America |language=en}}

On 26 May, 2023, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack that reportedly killed 137 soldiers in the Buulo Mareer base, just {{convert|75|mi|km|abbr=on}} south-west of the capital Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni stated that the number is closer to 54 African Union peacekeepers stationed in Somalia.{{Cite news |date=2023-06-04 |title=Uganda says 54 African Union peacekeepers killed in Somalia by al-Shabaab militants |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/04/uganda-says-54-african-union-peacekeepers-killed-in-somalia-attack-al-shabaab |access-date=2023-06-07 |archive-date=June 7, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230607104827/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/04/uganda-says-54-african-union-peacekeepers-killed-in-somalia-attack-al-shabaab |url-status=live }}

Al-Shabaab launched an attack on El Dher district on 8 June, 2024. Militants attacked two military bases using car bombs and then overran at least one of them. The army then launched a counterattack with coordinated airstrikes, as well as an ambush on the militants from a neighbouring town, forcing them to retreat. The Somali government stated that they killed at least 47 militants and suffered 5 casualties, including two colonels, though al-Shabaab claimed to have killed 59 soldiers.{{Cite web |date=2024-06-09 |title=Al-Shabaab suffers heavy losses in Somalia |url=https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-suffers-heavy-losses-in-somalia |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240609174257/https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-suffers-heavy-losses-in-somalia |archive-date=2024-06-09 |access-date=2024-09-08 |website=Garowe Online |language=en}}{{Cite web |date=2024-06-08 |title=Faahfaahin: Dowladda iyo Al-Shabaab oo siyaabo kala duwan uga hadlay weerarkii Ceeldheer |trans-title=Details: The government and Al-Shabaab spoke in different ways about the Eldheer attack |url=https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cyddgm630p3o |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240609013950/https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cyddgm630p3o |archive-date=2024-06-09 |access-date=2024-09-08 |website=BBC News Somali |language=so}}

On 2 August, 2024, an attack carried out by al-Shabaab at a beach restaurant in Mogadishu killed at least 37 civilians and injured 212, with 11 in critical condition. Police spokesperson Abdifatah Aden reported that one soldier died in the assault, one attacker blew himself up, three were killed by security forces, and one was captured.{{cite news |date=3 August 2024 |title=At least 37 killed in terrorist attack on popular Mogadishu beach |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/03/terrorist-attack-mogadishu-beach-somalia |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240804011840/https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/03/terrorist-attack-mogadishu-beach-somalia |archive-date=4 August 2024 |access-date=9 September 2024 |work=The Guardian}} Later that August, more than 20 people were killed in a bombing in a Mogadishu tea shop.{{Cite web |date=2024-08-17 |title=More Than 20 Killed in Deadly Bombings in Mogadishu, Afgooye |url=https://hornobserver.com/articles/2905/More-Than-20-Killed-in-Deadly-Bombings-in-Mogadishu-Afgooye |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240818113116/https://hornobserver.com/articles/2905/More-Than-20-Killed-in-Deadly-Bombings-in-Mogadishu-Afgooye |archive-date=2024-08-18 |access-date=2024-09-08 |website=hornobserver.com |language=English}}

In December 2024, the UN Security Council approved a resolution to establish the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (Aussom), a streamlined successor to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis), which ends in 2024. Aussom will deploy up to 12,626 personnel to support Somalia's fight against the al-Shabaab insurgency.{{cite news|last=Ali |first=Faisal |title=UN authorises new mission against al-Shabaab in Somalia |date=28 December 2024 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/28/un-authorises-new-mission-against-al-shabaab-in-somalia |website=The Guardian |access-date=29 December 2024}}

On 26 December 2024, the militant group of al-Shabaab confirmed the death of Mohamed Mire Jama,{{Cite web |last=𝕯𝖗. 𝐗𝐈𝐃𝐃𝐈𝐆 |date=2024-12-26 |title=U.S. Drone Strike Kills Senior Al-Shabaab Commander in Kunyo Baroow, Lower Shabelle Somalia |url=https://www.idilnews.com/u-s-drone-strike-kills-senior-al-shabaab-commander-in-kunyo-baroow-lower-shabelle-somalia/ |access-date=2025-01-04 |website=Idil News |language=en-US}} a senior leader of the group, who had been designated as a terrorist by the United States,{{Cite web |last=Weiss |first=Caleb |date=2024-12-26 |title=Shabaab announces the death of senior official Mohamed Mire |url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/12/shabaab-announces-the-death-of-senior-official-mohamed-mire.php |access-date=2025-01-04 |website=FDD's Long War Journal |language=en-US}} in an American drone strike near Kunyo Barrow of the Lower Shabelle region in the South West State of Somalia.{{Cite web |date=2020-06-30 |title=Al-Shabaab Confirms Death of US-Designated Leader in Somalia Airstrike |url=https://garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-confirms-death-of-us-designated-leader-in-somalia-airstrike |access-date=2025-01-04 |website=Garowe Online |language=en}}

On 20 February 2025, al-Shabaab launched attacks on several villages and military bases in the Middle Shabelle and Hiran region causing the deaths of 130 al-Shabaab militants and dozens of Somali soldiers.{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2025-02-20 |title=الصومال يعلن صد هجمات لحركة الشباب وقتل أكثر من 130 |script-title=ar:الصومال يعلن صد هجمات لحركة الشباب وقتل أكثر من 130 |trans-title=Somalia announces repelling Al-Shabaab attacks, killing more than 130 |url=https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-130/88905479 |access-date=2025-02-21 |website=SWI swissinfo |language=ar}}

On 4 March 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu has warned of imminent attack threats from al-Shabaab in Mogadishu including at Aden Adde International Airport.{{Cite web |date=2025-03-05 |title=US warns of imminent Shabaab attack in Mogadishu |url=https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/us-warns-of-imminent-shabaab-attack-in-mogadishu-4952612 |access-date=2025-03-06 |website=The EastAfrican |language=en}} Embassy personnel movements are suspended. The embassy also warned that militant groups continue to plan kidnappings, bombings, and other attacks across the country.{{Cite web |title=US Embassy in Somalia warns of imminent terror threats - Africa - World |url=https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/10/541546/World/Africa/US-Embassy-in-Somalia-warns-of-imminent-terror-thr.aspx |access-date=2025-03-06 |website=Ahram Online}} Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways halted all flights to Mogadishu following security warnings from the U.S. Embassy about potential terrorist attacks targeting Mogadishu Airport.{{Cite web |last=Molyneaux |first=Ian |date=2025-03-06 |title=Major airlines cancel Mogadishu flights after US warning |url=https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/turkish-airlines-qatar-airways-somalia-mogadishu |access-date=2025-03-06 |website=www.aerotime.aero |language=en-US}}

File:2016 03 05 El Baraf-10 (25427124772).jpg. |left]]Although al-Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various media, the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is either face-to-face or by radio broadcast.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} Face-to-face, the group holds seminars on Islamic jurisprudence and community meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock distribution.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} It operates its own radio station, Radio Andalus, mainly operated using relay stations and other equipment seized from private radio stations, including the BBC.{{cite web |last=Hodge |first=Nel |date=5 June 2014 |title=How Somalia's al-Shabab militants hone their image |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367 |access-date=17 June 2014 |website=BBC News |publisher= |archive-date=June 22, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622035442/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367 |url-status=live }} Presenters broadcast in Somali, Arabic, Swahili and English. In April 2010, al-Shabaab banned BBC and Voice of America broadcasts on Somali radio, objecting to what they alleged was Christian propaganda.{{cite news |date=April 9, 2010 |title=Al-Shabaab Uses Terror to Stop Local Stations From Retransmitting BBC and VOA |work= |publisher=Statement of Reporters Without Borders |url=http://en.rsf.org/somalia-al-shabaab-uses-terror-to-stop-09-04-2010,36985 |url-status=dead |access-date=November 20, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111017113457/http://en.rsf.org/somalia-al-shabaab-uses-terror-to-stop-09-04-2010%2C36985 |archive-date=October 17, 2011}} Also in 2010, and prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu the following year, al-Shabaab launched a television news channel, al-Kataib News.{{cite web |date=February 5, 2011 |title=Somalia's al-Shabaab launch TV channel |url=http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-05-somalias-alshabaab-launch-tv-channel |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=The Mail & Guardian |publisher= |archive-date=November 21, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111121151751/http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-05-somalias-alshabaab-launch-tv-channel |url-status=live }} The group has also been known to conduct military parades in its territories, as a show of force.{{cite news |last=Ndegwa |first=Alex |date=November 17, 2011 |title=Al Shabaab's propaganda war |newspaper=The Standard |url=http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000046627&cid=4 |access-date=November 20, 2011 }}{{dead link|date=April 2025|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}

Al-Shabaab began creating propaganda films early in its campaign against Ethiopian forces,{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} produced by its dedicated media wing, al-Kataib Media Foundation.{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}}

Since 2009, al-Shabaab's films have become noticeably more "professional", both in their production quality and in their messaging, reportedly with direct support from al-Qaeda's as-Sahab Media Foundation.{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}} The early films were distributed primarily, and widely, online, and were primarily used as tools for recruitment, particularly among foreign jihadists.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} More recent films show al-Shabaab distributing humanitarian aid and participating in other community or religious activities – though others are much more gruesome, displaying the corpses of beheaded members alleged to have been spies.{{sfn|Chonka|2016a}} Propaganda films are also occasionally used to attempt to mobilise jihadi activity abroad: in October 2013, one film encouraged British jihadists to follow the example set by Lee Rigby's killers,{{cite web |author=Hooper |first=Simon |date=2013-10-26 |title=British Muslims defiant over al-Shabab threat |url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/british-muslims-defiant-over-al-shabab-threat-2013102591313719196.html |access-date=2013-11-06 |website=Al Jazeera |publisher= |archive-date=October 31, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131031172927/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/british-muslims-defiant-over-al-shabab-threat-2013102591313719196.html |url-status=live }} while a February 2015 film called (without effect) for attacks on shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, Canada, and the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota.{{cite news |date=22 February 2015 |title=No "imminent threat" to West Edmonton Mall visitors, RCMP says |work=Edmonton Journal |agency= |url=https://edmontonjournal.com/Terror+group+Shabaab+calls+attack+West+Edmonton+Mall/10833693/story.html |url-status=dead |access-date=22 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150224194018/http://www.edmontonjournal.com/Terror%2Bgroup%2BShabaab%2Bcalls%2Battack%2BWest%2BEdmonton%2BMall/10833693/story.html |archive-date=February 24, 2015}}{{cite news |date=22 February 2015 |title='Be particularly careful' today, U.S. homeland security chief tells MOA visitors |work=Star Tribune |agency= |url=http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=293319551 |access-date=22 February 2015 |archive-date=September 30, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180930165649/http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=293319551 |url-status=live }}

{{Quote box

| quote = Send me a cruise like Maa'lam Adam al Ansari

And send me a couple of tons like Zarqawi

And send me a drone like Abu Layth al Libi

And Special Forces like Saleh Ali Nabhan.

Send me all four and send me much much more

I pray for that on my way to heavens door

Send me four and send me more, that what I implore

An amazing martyrdom I strive for and adore.

| source = – Chorus to "Send Me a Cruise"
by Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki{{cite web|title=A Song by Omar Hammami: "Send Me A Cruise" |url=http://nefafoundation.org//file/HammammiSong0411.pdf |website=Terror Watch|publisher=NEFA Foundation |date=April 9, 2011 |access-date=November 18, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120519051920/http://nefafoundation.org//file/HammammiSong0411.pdf |archive-date=May 19, 2012 }}

| align = right

| width = 27%

}}

Al-Shabaab was an early adopter among African insurgents of the Internet, which it uses to distribute its propaganda videos and for various other propaganda functions.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} Especially in its early years, it used online chatrooms and discussion forums, encouraging foreign fighters and even military commanders to post updates and field public questions about the state of the jihad.{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}} Particularly prominent was American-born Omar Shafik Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, who for many years kept a video blog about his life in al-Shabaab and who, from 2009, also created and posted raps about jihad.{{cite book |last=Gartenstein-Ross |first=Daveed |title=Bin Laden's Legacy: Why We're Still Losing the War on Terror |publisher=Wiley |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-118-09494-5 |location=Hoboken, NJ |page=149}}{{sfn|Mair|2017}} Al-Shabaab also had an official website, which carried official statements and news – including sundry edicts and threats – and religious guidance. Since the site was closed in 2009, it has distributed its press releases and videos using other sympathetic websites, or, more commonly, using social media networks.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}}{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}}

Indeed, although al-Shabaab spokesmen occasionally grant interviews to "carefully selected" local and foreign journalists,{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}} social media networks have provided an important channel for interaction with the press, as well as for disseminating information and building support. Al-Shabaab has used Facebook, particularly to communicate with the Somali diaspora;{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}} and it has made prolific and innovative use of Twitter since late 2011,{{Cite web |last=Mohamed |first=Hamza |date=2013-12-16 |title=Al-Shabab say they are back on Twitter |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/16/al-shabab-say-they-are-back-on-twitter |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910165517/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/16/al-shabab-say-they-are-back-on-twitter |url-status=live }} although its first accounts were active as early as 2009.{{Sfn|Molony|2019}} Online engagement with al-Shabaab surged during Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan offensive of 2011–12, when al-Shabaab used Twitter, under the handle @HSMPress, to urge Somalis to take up arms against the Kenyan forces{{cite news |date=October 17, 2011 |title=Al-Shabaab threatens to attack Kenya |work=Al Jazeera |publisher= |url=http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/10/20111017171543493140.html |access-date=October 17, 2011 |archive-date=October 18, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111018005440/http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/10/20111017171543493140.html |url-status=live }} and to portray its own military losses as tactical retreats.{{cite news |last=Oloya |first=Opiyo |date=August 16, 2011 |title=Uganda: Al-Shabaab Progpaganda Can't Change the Truth On the Ground |newspaper=allAfrica.com |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201108170891.html |access-date=November 20, 2011}} In an extreme example of the latter in late 2011, al-Shabaab photos purportedly showed several dozen AMISOM casualties – but, according to an African Union spokesperson, in fact showed al-Shabaab's own casualties dressed in their adversaries' uniforms.{{Cite news |last1=Guled |first1=Abdi |last2=Houreld |first2=Katharine |date=2011-10-21 |title=AU: Somali militants 'dressed up' bodies for stunt |work=Boston.com |url=http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/10/21/au_10_soldiers_killed_2_missing_in_somalia_fight/ |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910165515/http://archive.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/10/21/au_10_soldiers_killed_2_missing_in_somalia_fight/ |url-status=live }}{{cite news |date=October 22, 2011 |title=Kenya: A Weakening Al Shabaab Escalates Its Propaganda |newspaper=allAfrica |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201110240870.html |access-date=November 20, 2011}} What received most attention, however, were tweets al-Shabaab posted mocking the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and sparring with Major Emmanuel Chirchir, then the KDF's official spokesman.{{Sfn|Molony|2019}}{{cite news |last=Gettleman |first=Jeffrey |date=December 15, 2011 |title=Somalia's Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-a-weapon.html |access-date=December 24, 2011 |archive-date=December 24, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111224060459/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-a-weapon.html |url-status=live }} Responding to Chirchir's claim that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF, al-Shabaab tweeted that the KDF "boys are a grotesque parody of an army! [al-Shabaab] can outpace ur world-class runners by far. Indeed, they 'Run like a Kenyan'".{{cite web |author=HSMPress |date=December 16, 2011 |title=Twitter / @MajorEChirchir Your boys are a ... |url=https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/147776993566535680 |access-date=December 24, 2011 |work=Twitter |archive-date=March 7, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307203229/https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/147776993566535680 |url-status=live }} Showing uncharacteristic levity, al-Shabaab also suggested by Tweet that it meet a UN official for "a caramel macchiato".{{cite web |author=HSMPress |date=December 15, 2011 |title=Twitter / @gerardvanmourik @JeromeTaylor A ... |url=https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/147279660135354368 |access-date=December 24, 2011 |work=Twitter |archive-date=March 7, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307230714/https://twitter.com/HSMPress/status/147279660135354368 |url-status=live }}

Most of al-Shabaab's Tweets are in English, suggesting that they are intended for a foreign audience.{{Sfn|Roble|2011}} In 2011, officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, said they were considering having the account closed, but had legal and free speech concerns.{{cite news |last=Gettleman |first=Jeffrey |date=December 20, 2011 |title=U.S. Considers Combating Somali Militants' Twitter Use |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/africa/us-considers-combating-shabab-militants-twitter-use.html |access-date=December 24, 2011 |archive-date=December 24, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111224061646/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/africa/us-considers-combating-shabab-militants-twitter-use.html |url-status=live }} Chirchir himself tweeted that such a move would be counterproductive, as "al-Shabaab needs to be engaged positively, and Twitter is the only avenue."{{cite web |author=HSMPress |date=December 15, 2011 |title=Twitter / @alykhansatchu @HSMPress The US is ... |url=https://twitter.com/MajorEChirchir/status/149057952999940096 |access-date=December 24, 2011 |work=Twitter |archive-date=March 8, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308074312/https://twitter.com/MajorEChirchir/status/149057952999940096 |url-status=live }} Nonetheless, in January 2013, Twitter suspended al-Shabaab's English-language account. Observers guessed that the suspension was a response to the account having issued death threats against Kenyan hostages and against French spy Denis Allex, followed in the latter case by confirmation that the execution had taken place.{{cite news |date=25 January 2013 |title=Somalia's al-Shabab Twitter account suspended |newspaper=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21196279 |access-date=25 January 2013 |archive-date=November 19, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181119113631/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21196279 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2013-09-06 |title=Al-Shabaab Twitter account shut down for second time |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/06/al-shabaab-twitter-shut-down |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=the Guardian |language=en |archive-date=August 12, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812142249/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/06/al-shabaab-twitter-shut-down |url-status=live }} A new English-language account, opened in February 2013,{{cite news |date=4 February 2013 |title=Al Qaeda Group Is Back on Twitter After Ban |newspaper=ABC News |url=http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-group-back-twitter-ban/story?id=18400844 |access-date=February 5, 2013 |archive-date=February 5, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130205172613/http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-group-back-twitter-ban/story?id=18400844 |url-status=live }} was closed in September. This suspension also followed an apparent violation of Twitter's rules: al-Shabaab had recently used the account to claim responsibility for an unsuccessful ambush of a convoy carrying Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and to warn that, "next time, you won't be as lucky".{{cite news |date=6 September 2013 |title=Somalia's al-Shabab Twitter account stopped again |newspaper=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23987802 |access-date=2022-09-12 |archive-date=November 22, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181122152950/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23987802 |url-status=live }}

Al-Shabaab relaunched its English-language Twitter account once again on September 11, 2013.{{cite news |date=11 September 2013 |title=Somalia's al-Shabaab back on Twitter after suspension |newspaper=ANI |url=http://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/somalias-al-shabaab-back-twitter-074833819.html |access-date=12 September 2013 |archive-date=September 24, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130924023823/http://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/somalias-al-shabaab-back-twitter-074833819.html |url-status=live }} Two weeks later, the group gained notoriety for live-tweeting the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack, "justifying the attack, creating fictional threats, providing news on hostages and mocking the police and military response".{{sfn|Mair|2017}} The account, which then had 15,000 or more followers, was retweeted several million times before it was shut down by Twitter.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}}{{sfn|Menkhaus|2014}} And after @HSMPress was deleted, the live updates continued from other, new accounts: over the course of the attack, which lasted several days, at least eight different al-Shabaab-affiliated Twitter accounts were active.{{sfn|Grobbelaar|2022}} Al-Shabaab had opened a new Twitter account by December that year, with an official telling Al Jazeera that, "The aim is to vigorously challenge defamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in Somalia and countering Western, state-sponsored propaganda machines". It has since tweeted, from various accounts, during other attacks;{{Cite web |last=Mair |first=David |date=2016-02-03 |title=Al-Shabaab Returns to Twitter |url=https://www.voxpol.eu/al-shabaab-returns-to-twitter/ |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=VOX Pol |language=en-US |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910165517/https://www.voxpol.eu/al-shabaab-returns-to-twitter/ |url-status=live }} Facebook, too, has had difficulty expeditiously removing graphic al-Shabaab content when it appears on newly created accounts.{{Cite web |date=2022-06-15 |title=Facebook Fails to Catch East Africa Extremist Content |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/study-facebook-fails-to-catch-east-africa-extremist-content/6618196.html |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=VOA |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910165517/https://www.voanews.com/a/study-facebook-fails-to-catch-east-africa-extremist-content/6618196.html |url-status=live }} The group is adept in using intricately-structured networks of amplifier accounts, leveraging algorithms and emerging technologies, to disseminate its messages.

File:2015 06 22 Torotorow-6 (19078648775).jpg governor Abdulkadir Mohamed Sidi after the town's liberation from al-Shabaab, June 2015.]]

In territories it holds, al-Shabaab typically maintains "limited but effective" administrative control over resident populations,{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}} providing services – such as dispute resolution through Sharia-based courts – which are sometimes compared favourably to those offered in government-held territories.{{Sfn|Barnett|2020}}{{sfn|Skjelderup|2020}} Somalis have been observed to travel out of government-controlled areas into al-Shabaab territory to settle disputes, particularly involving clan dynamics, lacking trust in official institutions.{{Cite web |date=2023-03-27 |title=No Justice, No Peace: Al-Shabaab's Court System |url=https://hir.harvard.edu/no-justice-no-peace-al-shabaabs-court-system/ |access-date=2024-10-04 |website=Harvard International Review |language=en}} Al-Shabaab claimed some credit for Somalia's excellent crop yield in early 2010, saying that Somali grain production had flourished due to al-Shabaab's reduction of food imports, and that the policy had redistributed income to poor, rural Somali farmers.{{Cite web |date=2010-03-24 |title=Shabab credit for Somali food boom |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/3/24/shabab-credit-for-somali-food-boom |access-date=2022-09-11 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en |archive-date=September 11, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220911121145/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/3/24/shabab-credit-for-somali-food-boom |url-status=live }} However, the group has also allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses against populations in its territories, including through a brutal interpretation and application of Islamic jurisprudence on hudud.{{sfn|Skjelderup|2014}}{{sfn|Human Rights Watch|2010}}

Despite routinely expelling, attacking, and harassing aid workers, al-Shabaab permits some agencies to work in areas under its control. At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency regulation, taxation and surveillance. Where agencies are allowed to operate, this is often due to the desire of al-Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services.{{Sfn|Jackson|Aynte|2013}} Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al-Shabaab, while aid workers working in al-Shabaab-controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out of necessity.{{Sfn|Jackson|2014}} Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers. According to journalist Jon Lee Anderson:

The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia, because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non-governmental organizations. International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack and murder them, too; forty-two have been killed in the past two years alone.{{cite magazine|first=Jon Lee|last=Anderson|title=Letter from Mogadishu: The Most Failed State|magazine=The New Yorker|date=December 14, 2009|page=64|url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state|access-date=September 12, 2022|archive-date=February 27, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230227203612/http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state|url-status=live}}

In July 2018, al-Shabaab announced a complete ban on single-use plastic bags within its territory in a broadcast in which it stated that they "pose a serious threat to the well-being of humans and animals alike", and in the same announcement, it also imposed a complete ban on the logging of several species of rare trees.{{Cite news |date=2018-07-04 |title=Al-Shabab terrorists ban plastic bags in Somalia for posing 'threat to humans and animals' |work=Daily Sabah |url=https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2018/07/04/al-shabab-terrorists-ban-plastic-bags-in-somalia-for-posing-threat-to-humans-and-animals |access-date=2018-07-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706095558/https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2018/07/04/al-shabab-terrorists-ban-plastic-bags-in-somalia-for-posing-threat-to-humans-and-animals |archive-date=2018-07-06}} Some have argued that, whilst these environmentally-conscious advances are welcome, they are overshadowed by the group's terrorist activities, whilst others have mocked the United States and other countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group.{{Cite news |last=Richardson |first=Davis |date=2018-07-03 |title=This Terrorist Group Cares More About the Environment Than Donald Trump |language=en-US |work=Observer |url=http://observer.com/2018/07/this-terrorist-group-cares-more-about-the-environment-than-donald-trump/ |access-date=2018-07-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706101336/http://observer.com/2018/07/this-terrorist-group-cares-more-about-the-environment-than-donald-trump/ |archive-date=2018-07-06}}

Al-Shabaab acknowledged the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic and announced the formation of a coronavirus prevention and treatment committee.{{cite web |date=3 April 2020 |title=How Extremist Groups Are Reacting to COVID-19 |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_how-extremist-groups-are-reacting-covid-19/6192151.html |access-date=22 November 2020 |work=VOA |archive-date=October 28, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201028012612/https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/how-extremist-groups-are-reacting-covid-19 |url-status=live }} In mid-June 2020, the group announced that it had set up a coronavirus treatment centre in Jilib, about {{convert|380|km|0|abbr=on}} south of the capital, Mogadishu.{{cite web |date=2020-06-14 |title=Al-Shabab sets up coronavirus treatment centre in Somalia |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/al-shabab-sets-coronavirus-treatment-centre-somalia-200614053031413.html |access-date=2020-06-15 |website=Al Jazeera |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203234/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/14/al-shabab-sets-up-coronavirus-treatment-centre-in-somalia |url-status=live }}

Al-Shabaab is noteworthy in the region for its extensive recruitment of foreign fighters {{See below|list below}}.{{cite news |date=2008-12-18 |title=The rise of the Shabab |newspaper=The Economist |url=http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12815670 |access-date=March 17, 2010 |archive-date=January 5, 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090105052442/http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12815670 |url-status=live }}{{cite news |last=Maclean |first=William |date=30 May 2012 |title=In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal |newspaper=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530 |access-date=July 5, 2021 |archive-date=November 3, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221103103309/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530 |url-status=live }} These foreign recruits include members of the Somali diaspora or ethnic Somalis overseas; citizens of other East African countries; and citizens of countries further afield, including in the Middle East and the West.{{Cite web |last=Doctor |first=Austin C. |date=2020-08-18 |title=The Looming Influx of Foreign Fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa |url=https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-looming-influx-of-foreign-fighters-in-sub-saharan-africa/ |access-date=2022-09-08 |website=War on the Rocks |language=en-US |archive-date=September 8, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908225748/https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-looming-influx-of-foreign-fighters-in-sub-saharan-africa/ |url-status=live }}{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}} Non-Somali fighters have occasionally orchestrated high-profile al-Shabaab attacks, notably the 2010 Kampala bombings and 2019 DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi.{{Sfn|Bacon|Ellis|Milton|2021}} However, of greater importance to al-Shabaab are the combat experience and specialised skills of some, usually Arab, foreign fighters,{{Sfn|Shinn|2010}} which have been linked to al-Shabaab's increased sophistication in producing explosives,{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} improved sniper capability, and increased propensity to use suicide attacks.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} Foreign fighters may also have access to networks which improve al-Shabaab's capacity to recruit and operate in the region, and have made useful contributions to al-Shabaab's propaganda campaign: early Western recruits helped produce al-Shabaab's first English-language propaganda, and, thanks to its East African membership, Swahili remains the second most common language in al-Shabaab publications.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}}{{cite web |date=2011-07-27 |title=Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the American Homeland |url=http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalization-within-muslim-american-community-and-threat |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111017144022/http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalization-within-muslim-american-community-and-threat |archive-date=October 17, 2011 |access-date=October 28, 2011 |website= |publisher=Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives}} Foreign fighters also have symbolic importance for al-Shabaab propaganda: al-Shabaab has intentionally played up the diversity of its recruits as a paean to its pan-Islamism – that is, to demonstrate that it transcends clannism and nationalism, embodying a united transnational ummah.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}}

File:Jehad Serwan Mostafa.jpg is a senior al-Shabaab commander.]]Foreign recruitment peaked in the period between 2011 and 2013,{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} which was also the period in which the phenomenon received the most attention. The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia attracted foreign volunteers to al-Shabaab's cause,{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}} and, as of 2010, al-Shabaab included an estimated 200–300 foreign fighters, not including a further 1,000 ethnic Somalis from the diaspora.{{Sfn|Shinn|2010}} In subsequent years, al-Shabaab recruitment became a concern for the governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States. At a security conference in London in 2010, the former head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, said that "a significant number of U.K. residents" were training with al-Shabaab;{{Cite web |last=Evans |first=Jonathan |date=2010-09-17 |title=Terrorism speech |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008252/Jonathan-Evans-terrorism-speech.html |access-date=2022-09-08 |website=The Telegraph |archive-date=March 1, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180301164542/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008252/Jonathan-Evans-terrorism-speech.html |url-status=live }} the precise number of British recruits was estimated at between 50{{cite news |last=Gadher |first=Dipesh |date=January 8, 2012 |title=Britons 'spearhead Kenya terror wave' |newspaper=The Sunday Times |url=https://www.thetimes.com/article/britons-spearhead-kenya-terror-wave-bm98rsnl5zx |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=August 17, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210725233705/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britons-spearhead-kenya-terror-wave-bm98rsnl5zx |archive-date=2021-07-25}} and 100{{cite news |last=Gardham |first=Duncan |date=16 September 2010 |title=Britain facing a new wave of terrorist attacks, MI5 warns |newspaper=The Telegraph |location=London |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008033/Britain-facing-a-new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-MI5-warns.html |access-date=17 August 2013 |archive-date=March 1, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180301235038/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8008033/Britain-facing-a-new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-MI5-warns.html |url-status=live }} persons. There was also evidence that the group had received funding from Somali residents in Britain.{{cite news |last=Burleigh |first=Michael |date=March 3, 2012 |title=The 7/7 widow and a boom in British jihad |newspaper=The Telegraph |location= |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9118784/The-77-widow-and-a-boom-in-British-jihad.html |access-date=August 27, 2013 |archive-date=September 1, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130901122832/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9118784/The-77-widow-and-a-boom-in-British-jihad.html |url-status=live }} Between 2012 and 2013, several British citizens faced control orders or even criminal charges related to association with al-Shabaab.{{cite web|last=Anderson|first=David|author-link=David Anderson, Baron Anderson of Ipswich|title=Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2012|publisher=First Report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The Stationery Office|date=2013|url=https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/first-report-tpims.pdf|access-date=13 November 2013|archive-date=November 13, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131113135248/https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/first-report-tpims.pdf|url-status=live}}{{cite news |last=Dodd |first=Vikkram |date=November 8, 2013 |title=Burqa fugitive Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed 'faced 20 charges' |newspaper=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/08/burqa-fugitive-mohammed-ahmed-mohamed-20-charges |access-date=13 November 2013 |archive-date=March 5, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305021118/https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/08/burqa-fugitive-mohammed-ahmed-mohamed-20-charges |url-status=live }}

Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the United States similarly encountered evidence of citizens' affiliation with al-Shabaab.{{sfn|Vidino|Pantucci|Kohlmann|2010}} In the United States, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee heard as early as 2009 – from Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center – that American and other foreign fighters were being recruited and trained by al-Shabaab. In 2011, the House Committee on Homeland Security reported that more than 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians had fought with al-Shabaab, and that at least 15 of those volunteers had been killed in Somalia.{{Cite news |last=Pelofsky |first=Jeremy |date=2011-07-27 |title=Al Shabaab recruited dozens of Americans: U.S. report |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-somalia-idUSTRE76Q58M20110727 |access-date=2022-09-08 |archive-date=September 8, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908225743/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-somalia-idUSTRE76Q58M20110727 |url-status=live }} Later that year, a U.S. military official told the New York Times that about 30 U.S. citizens were al-Shabaab fighters.{{cite news |last=Kron |first=Josh |date=October 21, 2011 |title=African Union Peacekeepers Killed in Somalia Battle |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/african-union-takes-casualties-in-somalia-but-numbers-vary.html |access-date=November 10, 2011 |archive-date=October 29, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111029054618/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/african-union-takes-casualties-in-somalia-but-numbers-vary.html |url-status=live }} This was a resumption of an earlier trend of al-Shabaab recruitment among Americans, which previously had peaked in 2007–08.{{cite news |last=Schmitt |first=Eric |date=June 6, 2010 |title=Al Shabab Recruits Americans for Somali Civil War |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html?src=mv |access-date=June 9, 2010 |archive-date=March 8, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308155403/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html?src=mv |url-status=live }} Also in 2011, two Somali Americans in Minnesota were convicted of illegally financing al-Shabaab. By mid-2013, observers believed that recruitment of U.S. citizens had subsided.{{cite news |date=10 April 2013 |title=Militant Recruitment Of Somali-American Youth Appears Halted, Says US Congressman |newspaper=VOA |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/congressman-ellison-militant-recruitment-somali-american-youth-halted/1638722.html |access-date=12 August 2013 |archive-date=September 27, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927093219/http://www.voanews.com/content/congressman-ellison-militant-recruitment-somali-american-youth-halted/1638722.html |url-status=live }}

In general, foreign activity in al-Shabaab has decreased, first, and perhaps most importantly, because the Syrian civil war became the focal point for foreign jihadist recruitment networks.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} Other factors, however, are more specific to al-Shabaab. One factor was the group's internal struggle of 2011–2013: as tensions between Somali and non-Somali members increased, Godane scapegoated the foreigners as the cause of the group's disunity and, during his 2013 purge, executed various foreign recruits {{See above|above}}.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}}{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} In addition to serving as a disincentive to foreign fighters, this shift reduced the influence of the group's remaining foreign leaders.{{sfn|Bryden|2014}} Moreover, whereas the ascendancy of Godane and his faction had partly internationalized al-Shabaab, in subsequent years, al-Shabaab became (re-)"domesticated": as it made territorial gains, its attention was increasingly consumed by local governance and the management of clan dynamics, activities in which foreign fighters – frequently mistrusted by local populations – lacked utility and influence.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} As the conflict, and al-Shabaab's priorities, became more localized and clan-based, they also held less appeal for foreign fighters themselves.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} Foreign fighters also attracted the counterterrorism efforts of foreign countries, and were sometimes suspected of disloyalty and spying by their Somali peers.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}}

As of 2020, estimates of the number of foreign recruits still active in al-Shabaab ranged from 450 to 2,000. Most of those recruits are from East Africa – primarily Kenya,{{cite news |last=Burridge |first=Tom |date=11 December 2014 |title=Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash lures in young Kenyans |work=BBC News |agency= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true |access-date=18 January 2015 |archive-date=June 22, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622035300/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true |url-status=live }} but also Tanzania and Uganda, all countries in which al-Shabaab recruitment networks are well entrenched.{{Sfn|International Crisis Group|2022}}{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} The flow of recruits from Arab countries and the West has diminished substantially since 2014, except for in the case of Yemen.{{Sfn|Bacon|Ellis|Milton|2021}}{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}} Moreover, few foreign fighters hold strategically important roles in the group. Many are among the rank-and-file of the military wing.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019a}}{{cite news |last=Fred |first=Fred |date=28 October 2011 |title=A new breed of terrorist is born |newspaper=Daily Nation |url=http://www.nation.co.ke/News/The-new-face-of-Al-Shabaab--/-/1056/1263654/-/nttm5xz/-/index.html |access-date=29 March 2013 |archive-date=September 28, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130928162704/http://www.nation.co.ke/News/The-new-face-of-Al-Shabaab--/-/1056/1263654/-/nttm5xz/-/index.html |url-status=live }} Those in leadership positions tend to have prominent, but strategically marginal or mid-level, roles – for example, in managing the group's public relations or external relations, or in supervising and training other foreign recruits.{{Sfn|Bacon|Muibu|2019b}} (Godane's nationalist critics, however, argue that earlier, under his leadership, foreign fighters did in fact gain significant influence over the group.{{sfn|Solomon|2014}}) Since 2013, al-Shabaab has also established two external military units, on Godane's initiative: one, in Ethiopia, has struggled, but the other, in the Great Lakes region, has carried out several attacks in Kenya.{{Sfn|Bacon|Ellis|Milton|2021}}

Between 2010 and 2012, Hizbul Islam, a smaller group of Somali militants,{{Cite web |date=2009-10-19 |title=Somali clan disputes giving boost to al-Shabab |url=https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somali-clan-disputes-giving-boost-al-shabab |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=Voice of America |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somali-clan-disputes-giving-boost-al-shabab |url-status=live }} was merged with al-Shabaab: after suffering military defeats against al-Shabaab in southern towns, Hizbul Islam was officially absorbed by its former rival in December 2010.{{Cite news |last=Mohamed |first=Ibrahim |date=2010-12-23 |title=Somalia's Shabaab threatens Uganda, Burundi attacks |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-idUSTRE6BM3AG20101223 |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=August 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810213501/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-idUSTRE6BM3AG20101223 |url-status=live }}{{Sfn|Center for International Security and Cooperation|2022}} However, on September 24, 2012, Hizbul Islam announced that it would split from al-Shabaab, claiming the union had only ever been nominal and that the factions' political philosophies had differed irreconcilably. Hizbul Islam said that it welcomed "negotiations with all groups for the interest of Somalia", and added that al-Shabaab had been considerably "weakened" in recent years.{{cite news |date=25 September 2012 |title=Somalia: Hizbul Islam group withdraws allegiance, says 'Al Shabaab is weakened' |newspaper=Garowe Online |url=http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Hizbul_Islam_group_withdraws_allegiance_says_Al_Shabaab_is_weakened.shtml |url-status=dead |access-date=26 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120927054741/http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Hizbul_Islam_group_withdraws_allegiance_says_Al_Shabaab_is_weakened.shtml |archive-date=September 27, 2012}}{{cite news |date=24 September 2012 |title=Hizbul Islam splits with al-Shabaab |newspaper=Sabahi |url=http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/09/24/newsbrief-01 |access-date=26 September 2012 |archive-date=September 26, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120926080708/http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/09/24/newsbrief-01 |url-status=live }}

Al-Shabaab has Kenya-based affiliates, with al-Hijra as its official Kenyan wing from 2012, then with a unit established in 2013 known as Jaysh Ayman, based primarily in the Boni Forest. While the former group was used to carry out minor attacks within Kenya, the al-Shabaab leadership later switched its focus to Jaysh Ayman which proved more effective. Jaysh Ayman comprises both Somali and Kenyan fighters as well as fighters from overseas.

Before 2012, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab had what academic Daniel Byman calls an "on-again, off-again" relationship, though both groups praised each other online in 2008.{{Sfn|Byman|2012}}{{Cite web |last=Aynte |first=Abdi |date=2012-03-19 |title=Understanding the al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda 'merger' |url=https://africanarguments.org/2012/03/understanding-the-al-shabaabal-qaeda-merger-by-abdi-aynte/ |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=African Arguments |language=en-GB |archive-date=September 1, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220901041906/https://africanarguments.org/2012/03/understanding-the-al-shabaabal-qaeda-merger-by-abdi-aynte/ |url-status=live }} During this early period, al-Shabaab occasionally harboured al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia, in exchange for their technical assistance.{{Sfn|Byman|2012}}{{Cite web |last=Kahan |first=Adam |date=2011-08-09 |title=Al Shabaab's Rise in the al Qaeda Network |url=https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-rise-in-the-al-qaeda-network |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=Critical Threats |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-rise-in-the-al-qaeda-network |url-status=live }} In September 2009, in a video entitled "At Your Service Osama", al-Shabaab publicly declared allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden – but this reflected an "unrequited courtship", largely ignored by al-Qaeda.{{Sfn|Lahoud|2012}} However, after bin Laden's death and replacement by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate in February 2012. In a fifteen-minute video message released on February 9, al-Shabaab leader Godane pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri on behalf of al-Shabaab.{{cite news |date=February 9, 2012 |title=Al-Shabaab joining al Qaeda, monitor group says |work=CNN |publisher= |url=https://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/index.html |access-date=February 8, 2021 |archive-date=January 23, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210123103009/https://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/index.html |url-status=live }}{{sfn|Thomas|2013}} Al-Zawahiri confirmed the alliance,{{Sfn|Lahoud|2012}} which he said would "please the believers and disturb the disbelievers" and "support the jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers."{{cite web|last=McConnell|first=Tristan|url=http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/africa/al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-post-joint-video|title=Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda co-produce video|date=February 10, 2012|work=Global Post|access-date=February 10, 2012|archive-date=February 10, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210204428/http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/africa/al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-post-joint-video|url-status=live}} The announcement was met with internal opposition among some factions of al-Shabaab {{See above|{{section link|#Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle}}}}.

By late 2012, the groups cooperated closely in various arenas, especially indoctrination and training, both in basic infantry skills and in advanced explosives and assassination – after the merger, a corps of al-Qaeda-trained militants moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabaab.{{Sfn|Byman|2012}} However, al-Shabaab remained "largely independent".{{Sfn|Byman|2012}} Similarly, although al-Shabaab has publicly exploited the al-Qaeda "brand", echoing al-Qaeda ideology in its recruitment videos,{{Sfn|Byman|2012}} it is unclear whether the alliance has affected al-Shabaab's behaviour and aims on the ground.{{Sfn|Harrington|2021}} A 2021 statistical analysis suggests that it has not significantly affected al-Shabaab's military strategy.{{Sfn|Onat|Guler|Hsu|Reyes|2021}} While an al-Shabaab commander has claimed that the group will bring jihad first to East Africa "and afterward, with God's will, to America",{{cite news |date=January 8, 2015 |title=Somali extremist leader threatens US, Kenya, Uganda with more attacks |work=Fox News |publisher= |agency=Associated Press |url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/somali-extremist-leader-threatens-us-kenya-uganda-with-more-attacks/ |access-date=July 6, 2014 |archive-date=September 24, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924185655/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/22/somali-extremist-leader-threatens-us-kenya-uganda-with-more-attacks/ |url-status=live }} an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the group is far more interested in establishing Islamic State inside Somalia than in carrying out attacks in the West.

In June 2012, General Carter Ham of the U.S. Army said that al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Nigeria-based Boko Haram were attempting to coordinate their activities, including in funding, training, and explosives.{{cite news|title=African Terrorist Groups Starting to Cooperate, U.S. Says |url=http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says |newspaper=Bloomberg |date=25 June 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141111084441/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says |archive-date=November 11, 2014 }} In 2011, Boko Haram's first suicide bomb attack had been preceded by a public statement warning that "our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable", which analysts understood as an allusion to cooperation with al-Shabaab.{{Sfn|Lulie|2013}} However, in the view of some observers, most consequential are al-Shabaab's links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).{{Sfn|Muibu|2017}}{{Cite news |last=Maclean |first=William |date=2010-01-18 |title=Somali-Yemeni militant ties in the spotlight |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-yemen-somalia-qa-idUSTRE60H34S20100118 |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-yemen-somalia-qa-idUSTRE60H34S20100118 |url-status=live }} AQAP is based in Yemen, which has longstanding ties to Somalia, and analyst Katherine Zimmerman told the U.S. Congress that AQAP "almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise" for al-Shabaab's 2016 laptop bomb.{{Sfn|Muibu|2017}}

{{Quote box

| quote = A so-called Islamic State has emerged in our land and stated to attempt to divide our Mujahidin, weaken our strength and carry out assassinations against our own. We have been ignoring their wicked behaviors for some time to give them a chance to change, but they have continued their wrongheadedness. Our senior command has ordered our fighters to attack and eliminate the 'disease' of IS and uproot the tree that would be used to undermine the fruits of the Jihad.

| source = – Al-Shabaab announces Operation Disease Eradication, December 2018{{sfn|Weiss|2019}}

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In early 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) published online the first of a series of videos aimed at al-Shabaab, calling on the group to switch allegiances from al-Qaeda to ISIL and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.{{cite magazine |last1=Meleagrou-Hitchens |first1=Alexander |date=September 3, 2019 |title=ISIS and al Qaeda Struggle for al Shabab's Soul |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/kenya/2015-10-08/terrorist-tug-war |magazine=Foreign Affairs |url-access=subscription |access-date=December 7, 2015 |archive-date=December 11, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151211013454/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/kenya/2015-10-08/terrorist-tug-war |url-status=live }} These public appeals had reportedly been preceded by informal ISIL attempts to establish a relationship with al-Shabaab.{{sfn|Warner|Weiss|2017}} Yet al-Shabaab publicly ignored the overtures.{{sfn|Warner|Weiss|2017}} By September 2015, it had issued an internal memo, directed at pro-ISIL elements in its ranks, reaffirming the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda and banning any discussion about ISIL. The group also detained several fighters who had voiced support for ISIL.{{cite web |last=Maruf |first=Harun |date=2015-09-30 |title=Al-Qaida or Islamic State? Issue Simmers Within Al-Shabab |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/africa-al-shabab-decides-al-qaida-or-islamic-state/2986035.html |access-date=December 7, 2015 |work=VOA |archive-date=January 18, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160118225304/http://www.voanews.com/content/africa-al-shabab-decides-al-qaida-or-islamic-state/2986035.html |url-status=live }}

In October 2015, senior al-Shabaab commander Abdul Qadir Mumin and approximately 20 of his followers in Puntland pledged allegiance to ISIL,{{cite news |date=23 October 2015 |title=Small group of Somali al Shabaab swear allegiance to Islamic State |work=Reuters |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-somalia-idUSKCN0SH1BF20151023#cqAHxcITW5g9Hw95.97 |access-date=7 December 2015 |archive-date=April 29, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230429175728/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-somalia-idUSKCN0SH1BF20151023#cqAHxcITW5g9Hw95.97 |url-status=live }} establishing what became Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS).{{sfn|Weiss|2019}} Further defections in al-Shabaab ranks occurred in the border region between Somalia and northern Kenya,{{cite news |date=24 December 2015 |title=Official: 200 al-Shabab fighters pledge allegiance to IS |agency=Associated Press |url=https://news.yahoo.com/official-200-al-shabab-fighters-pledge-allegiance-152642307.html |url-status=dead |access-date=27 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151227161237/https://news.yahoo.com/official-200-al-shabab-fighters-pledge-allegiance-152642307.html |archive-date=27 December 2015}} leading the head of al-Shabaab in the Lower Shabelle region, Abu Abdalla, to announce that all pro-ISIL members should leave the group or be killed.{{cite web |last=Maruf |first=Harun |date=2015-11-24 |title=Al-Shabab Official Threatens Pro-Islamic State Fighters |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-official-threatens-pro-islamic-state-fighters/3071926.html |access-date=December 7, 2015 |work=VOA |archive-date=January 18, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160118225304/http://m.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-official-threatens-pro-islamic-state-fighters/3071926.html |url-status=live }} The groups clashed violently on several occasions, most fiercely during 2015, and al-Shabaab's internal security service continued to arrest, and sometimes execute, suspected ISIS supporters within al-Shabaab's ranks.{{sfn|Weiss|2019}}

Violent conflict between the groups was reinvigorated in 2018 by ISIS provocation, and, in December, al-Shabaab's spokesman announced an offensive – code-named Operation Disease Eradication – against ISIS.{{Cite web |last=Hassan |first=Mohamed Olad |date=2018-12-21 |title=Somalia's Al-Shabab Declares War on Pro-Islamic State Group |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-islamic-state-group/4711075.html |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=VOA |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-islamic-state-group/4711075.html |url-status=live }} The same week, al-Shabaab's general command released an 8-page treatise rebuking ISIS's ideology and listing crimes it had committed under the Quran.{{sfn|Weiss|2019}}

In 2020, the Hiraal Institute estimated that al-Shabaab collected at least $15 million in revenue every month, implying revenue on a similar scale to the government's;{{Cite news |last=Harper |first=Mary |date=2020-10-26 |title=Somalia conflict: Al-Shabab 'collects more revenue than government' |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561 |access-date=2022-09-09 |archive-date=September 28, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220928121250/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561 |url-status=live }} and the UN estimates that the group's military budget was approximately $21 million in 2019.{{Sfn|Harrington|2021}} In the period after 2014, al-Shabaab established its own Ministry of Finance,{{Sfn|Dathan|2017}} and it has cultivated various revenue streams, among which it switches as its military position or political circumstances change.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}}

File:Horn of Africa map.png (though excluding Somaliland).]]

During its early years, al-Shabaab received substantial external support in donations from the Somali diaspora or interested international jihadists,{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} enabled by the weakness of the Somalian government's financial regulation framework and the ubiquitous use of the hawala system for receipt of remittances.{{Cite web |last=Dhaysane |first=Mohamed |date=2022-07-08 |title=Somalia Experts: Ending al-Shabab's Funding a Major Challenge |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-experts-ending-al-shabab-s-funding-a-major-challenge/6650517.html |access-date=2022-09-09 |website=VOA |language=en |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203127/https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-experts-ending-al-shabab-s-funding-a-major-challenge/6650517.html |url-status=live }} Although al-Shabaab initially appeared a promising alternative to the Islamic Courts Union, its popularity with diaspora donors declined after the Ethiopian withdrawal and as the group gained a reputation for brutality.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} Concurrently, however, al-Shabaab increased its ties to other jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, which have extensive capacity to generate income in the Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} For example, years before al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate, bin Laden publicly called on Muslims to send money to al-Shabaab.{{Sfn|Byman|2012}} However, over the past decade, the counterterrorism efforts of foreign governments have obstructed international funding sources.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}}

According to authorities, the Somali state of Puntland is a key transit point for weapons shipments into Somalia from foreign countries – particularly frequent shipments of small arms and ammunition from Yemen, typically transported across the Gulf of Aden in skiffs, and occasionally larger shipments from the Makran coast of Iran.{{clarify|Essential is not what port, but what political body. Is it the I.R. of Iran? |date= January 2024}}{{Sfn|Bahadur|2020}}{{Sfn|United Nations|2017}}{{Sfn|United Nations|2019}} Puntland authorities have also seized Yemeni explosives shipments, which they suspect are the result of cooperation between al-Shabaab and Yemen-based AQAP.{{Cite news |date=2012-11-18 |title=Puntland says arrests al Shabaab members, seizes explosives |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-puntland-idUSBRE8AH0DJ20121118 |access-date=2022-09-10 |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-puntland-idUSBRE8AH0DJ20121118 |url-status=live }}

In December 2009, adopting Resolution 1907, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea, accusing the country of arming and financing militia groups, including al-Shabaab, in southern Somalia's conflict zones.{{cite news |date=March 16, 2010 |title=Eritrea rejects U.N. report it backs Somali rebels |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE62F297 |access-date=February 9, 2011 |archive-date=February 6, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170206073041/http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE62F297 |url-status=live }} Reports in 2010 and 2011 by a UN International Monitoring Group alleged continuing Eritrean support to Somali rebels – including, in the latter year, about $80,000 in monthly financial support and two air deliveries of weapons – but the Eritrean government emphatically denied the accusations, describing them as "concocted, baseless and unfounded".{{Cite web |date=2011-11-02 |title=Eritrea denies sending arms to al-Shabab |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/11/2/eritrea-denies-sending-arms-to-al-shabab |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141506/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/11/2/eritrea-denies-sending-arms-to-al-shabab |url-status=live }} The International Crisis Group added some credence to Eritrea's denials, suggesting that historical Eritrean support to Somali militants had been aimed at undermining Ethiopia during its 2006–9 invasion, and that Hizbul Islam was more likely a recipient than al-Shabaab.{{Cite web |last=Michael |first=Onyiego |date=2010-07-20 |title=Analysts say Eritrea is Not Supporting al-Shabab |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/article--analysts-say-eritrea-is-not-supporting-al-shabab--98924444/122377.html |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=VOA |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141506/https://www.voanews.com/a/article--analysts-say-eritrea-is-not-supporting-al-shabab--98924444/122377.html |url-status=live }}

On July 5, 2012, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Eritrea's intelligence chief and a high-ranking military officer, who allegedly facilitated support to al-Shabaab.{{cite news |date=2012-07-05 |title=US hits 2 Eritrean army officers with sanctions for supporting radical Somali Islamists |newspaper=The Washington Post |agency=Associated Press |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-hits-2-eritrean-army-officers-with-sanctions-for-supporting-radical-somali-islamists/2012/07/05/gJQAL2ckPW_story.html |url-status=dead |access-date=July 6, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160822030507/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-hits-2-eritrean-army-officers-with-sanctions-for-supporting-radical-somali-islamists/2012/07/05/gJQAL2ckPW_story.html |archive-date=2016-08-22}} However, later that year, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that it had found no evidence of direct Eritrean support to al-Shabaab in the preceding year.{{cite news |last=Maasho |first=Aaron |date=July 16, 2012 |title=Eritrea reduces support for al Shabaab – U.N. report |work=Reuters |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eritrea-somalia-un-idUKBRE86F0AI20120716 |access-date=July 16, 2012 |archive-date=July 14, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714212709/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/uk-eritrea-somalia-un-idUKBRE86F0AI20120716 |url-status=live }} Between then and 2017, successive annual reports of the Monitoring Group found no evidence for Eritrean involvement, while noting that Eritrea had not provided full access to investigators;{{Cite web |last=Shaban |first=Abdur Rahman Alfa |date=2017-11-10 |title=Eritrean 'support' for Al-Shabaab baseless, U.N. experts want sanctions lifted |url=https://www.africanews.com/2017/11/10/eritrea-support-for-al-shabaab-unprovable-un-experts-want-sanctions-lifted/ |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=AfricaNews |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141504/https://www.africanews.com/2017/11/10/eritrea-support-for-al-shabaab-unprovable-un-experts-want-sanctions-lifted/ |url-status=live }}{{Sfn|United Nations Security Council|2017}} nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not enact the group's recommendation to lift its sanctions on Eritrea until November 2018.{{Cite web |last=Plaut |first=Martin |date=2018-11-14 |title=Sanctions are being lifted against Eritrea. Here's why |url=http://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-being-lifted-against-eritrea-heres-why-106881 |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=The Conversation |language=en |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141538/https://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-being-lifted-against-eritrea-heres-why-106881 |url-status=live }}

File:Kismayo, Somalia.jpg, held by al-Shabaab between 2009 and 2012, is a charcoal smuggling hub. ]]As al-Shabaab expanded its territorial control, it was able to augment its internal funding through illicit markets and local populations. The smuggling of charcoal has been an important source of income for the group since it first gained control of Somali port cities, especially Kismayo.{{sfn|Petrich|2022}} Calculating that al-Shabaab was earning between $15 million and $50 million annually from illegal trade, the UN banned Somali charcoal imports.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} The group also profits from involvement in – or taxation of – the smuggling and sale of ivory, sugar, and, reportedly, heroin;{{Sfn|Dathan|2017}}{{sfn|Petrich|2022}} and it has been implicated in illegal mining and minerals exports in East Africa.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} There is some evidence that al-Shabaab has profited from piracy. In 2011, the head of the UN's counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, warned that there was circumstantial evidence that al-Shabaab increasingly sought to cooperate with pirate gangs and other criminal organizations.{{cite news |date=October 20, 2011 |title=Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN adviser |work=Reuters |url=https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=true |url-status=dead |access-date=February 12, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111223205734/http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=true |archive-date=December 23, 2011}} Further reports suggested that al-Shabaab members had extorted pirates, demanding protection money equivalent to 20% of the pirates' ransom proceeds, but did not provide evidence that al-Shabaab was itself involved in piracy.{{cite news |last=Lough |first=Richard |date=July 6, 2011 |title=Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE7650U320110706 |access-date=February 12, 2012 |archive-date=December 19, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151219172447/http://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE7650U320110706 |url-status=live }}

Also in the 2008–2011 period, al-Shabaab established a sophisticated taxation system, framed as a form of zakat, in line with sharia, but often resembling extortion. Al-Shabaab taxes may apply to clans, traders, corporations, farmers, or livestock herders – in fact, livestock are sometimes stolen outright by al-Shabaab militants, with the theft framed as a kind of pre-emptive in-kind taxation.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} Humanitarian aid agencies are also taxed or extorted, in exchange for permission to operate inside certain territories {{See below|{{section link|#Humanitarian access}}}};{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} and al-Shabaab has been known to execute kidnappings for ransom.{{Sfn|Felter|Masters|Sergie|2020}} In recent years, facing territorial losses in urban areas, al-Shabaab has had less recourse to previous revenue streams – notably the charcoal trade, through Kismayo, and the remittance economy – and therefore has relied more heavily on extracting zakat.{{sfn|Chonka|2016b}} The development of its security and intelligence services has allowed it to expand its tax base by imposing taxes even in areas outside its territorial control:{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}} according to the Hiraal Institute, more than half of al-Shabaab's revenue in 2019–20 came from Mogadishu, whose major companies are taxed at 2.5% of their annual profits. Indeed, a commander in the Somali army confessed to paying tax to al-Shabaab despite being at war with it. The group has been known to punish non-payment severely, including by blockading villages under threat of starvation.{{sfn|Levy|Yusuf|2021}}

Either directly or indirectly through black markets, al-Shabaab has access to arms intended for the Somali government. In 2018 and 2019, expert reports to the UN Security Council found that government military equipment enters the black market, where some of it is sold to al-Shabaab militants. In some cases, senior government officials orchestrate large-scale diversions of government arms and ammunition; in others, low-ranking members of the security forces sell their weapons for subsistence.{{Sfn|United Nations|2019}}{{Sfn|United Nations|2018}} An earlier report in 2014 had alleged that government officials were actively involved in the direct supply of governments arms to al-Shabaab.{{Cite news |date=February 14, 2014 |title=Somalia diverting arms to al-Shabab, UN report claims |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26200015 |access-date=April 12, 2020 |archive-date=March 8, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308195349/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26200015 |url-status=live }} The group has also been known to infiltrate government institutions, as became clear when regional government employees carried out al-Shabaab's 24 July 2019 Mogadishu bombing, which killed Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahmean Omar Osman.{{Sfn|United Nations|2019}}

The following countries have officially listed al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization:

{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}

• {{flagcountry|Australia}} (since 22 August 2009){{cite news |date=March 1, 2010 |title=Alan Johnson bans Somali 'terrorist' group Al-Shabaab |work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8543347.stm |url-status=live |access-date=March 17, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100304035628/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8543347.stm |archive-date=March 4, 2010}}{{cite web |title=Listed terrorist organisations |url=http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx |access-date=8 April 2015 |url-status=dead |publisher=Australian National Security |archive-date=October 25, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161025195553/https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx }}
• {{flagcountry|Canada}} (since 5 March 2010){{cite news |author=Althia Raj |date=March 7, 2010 |title=Al-Shabaab listed as terrorist group |newspaper=Toronto Sun |url=http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/03/07/13145681.html |access-date=March 17, 2010 |archive-date=March 11, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100311191245/http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/03/07/13145681.html |url-status=live }}
• {{flagcountry|Malaysia}}{{Cite web|last=|date=31 May 2019|title=Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001: List of Individuals, Entities and Other Groups and Undertakings Declared by the Minister of Home Affairs as Specified Entity Under Section 66B(1)|url=https://www.moha.gov.my/images/maklumat_bahagian/KK/kdndomestic.pdf|publisher=Malaysian Ministry of Home Affairs|access-date=September 12, 2022|archive-date=November 5, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221105031442/https://www.moha.gov.my/images/maklumat_bahagian/KK/kdndomestic.pdf|url-status=live}}
• {{flagcountry|New Zealand}} (since 10 February 2010){{cite news |last=Bye Skille |first=Øyvind |date=March 8, 2008 |title=Hold dere unna Al-Shabaab |trans-title=Stay away from Al-Shabaab |language=no |publisher=Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation |url=http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.5046460 |url-status=live |access-date=March 18, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080313164009/http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.5046460 |archive-date=March 13, 2008}}
• {{flagcountry|Singapore}} (since 18 March 2016){{cite web |last1=Shanmugam |first1=K |title=The Home Team Leaders' Forum – Keynote Address by Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister For Law |url=https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/speeches/Pages/The-Home-Team-Leaders%E2%80%99-Forum-Keynote-Address-By-Mr-K-Shanmugam,-Minister-for-Home-Affairs-and-Minister-For-Law.aspx |access-date=16 May 2016 |publisher=Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs |url-status=dead |archive-date=August 9, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160809010300/https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/speeches/Pages/The-Home-Team-Leaders%E2%80%99-Forum-Keynote-Address-By-Mr-K-Shanmugam,-Minister-for-Home-Affairs-and-Minister-For-Law.aspx }}
• {{flagcountry|United Arab Emirates}} (since 15 November 2014){{cite web |date=November 15, 2014|title=UAE cabinet endorses new list of terrorist groups |url=https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2408700&Language=en |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150401213747/http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2408700&language=en |archive-date=April 1, 2015 |access-date=8 April 2015 |website=Gulf News|publisher=Kuwait News Agency}}
• {{flagcountry|United Kingdom}} (since March 2010){{cite web |title=Proscribed Terrorist Organisations |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150411175510/https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf |archive-date=April 11, 2015 |access-date=26 November 2014 |publisher=United Kingdom Home Office|date=March 27, 2015|df=mdy}}
• {{flagcountry|United States}} (since 29 February 2008){{cite press release |title=Designation of Al-Shabaab |publisher=United States Department of State |date=March 18, 2008 |url=https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102338.htm |access-date=March 18, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080319184009/http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102338.htm |archive-date=March 19, 2008 |url-status=dead |df=mdy}}

{{div col end}}

In 2012, with the support of the Somali government,{{cite news |last=Khalif |first=Abdulkadir |date=11 June 2012 |title=Somalia's Al-Shabaab offer 10 camels for Obama's 'capture' |newspaper=Africa Review |url=http://www.africareview.com/News/Somalia+Al+Shabaab+puts+bounty+on+Obama/-/979180/1423690/-/15sgcrk/-/index.html |access-date=12 June 2012 |archive-date=June 11, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120611185335/http://www.africareview.com/News/Somalia+Al+Shabaab+puts+bounty+on+Obama/-/979180/1423690/-/15sgcrk/-/index.html |url-status=dead }} the United States began issuing bounties for al-Shabaab members under its Rewards for Justice Program. On June 7, the U.S. Department of State offered a total of $33 million in bounties for information leading to the capture of any of seven senior commanders, including $7 million for Godane, then the group's emir, and $5 million for Robow, then his deputy. In response, al-Shabaab's Fu'ad Qalaf issued a mock bounty of his own, promising ten camels to anyone possessing information on U.S. President Barack Obama, and a further, less valuable, reward of ten cocks and ten hens for information on Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State. On an official state visit to Mogadishu, top U.S. envoy Johnnie Carson dismissed the counter-offer as "absurd". He also announced that the U.S. would impose sanctions, including visa and travel bans and asset freezes, on anyone attempting to thwart the ongoing political transition in Somalia.{{cite web |date=2012 |title=Somali Al Shabaab camel reward for Barack Obama 'absurd' |url=http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000059651&story_title=Somali-Al-Shabaab-camel-reward-for-Barack-Obama-%27absurd%27 |access-date=12 June 2012 |website=Kenyan Standard |publisher= |agency=BBC |archive-date=June 12, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120612021631/http://standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000059651&story_title=Somali-Al-Shabaab-camel-reward-for-Barack-Obama-%27absurd%27 |url-status=live }}

On March 21, 2013, the U.S. Department of State offered $5 million apiece for information on two American senior al-Shabaab commanders, Omar Shafik Hammami and Jehad Serwan Mostafa.{{cite news |last=Joselow |first=Gabe |date=21 March 2013 |title=US Posts Bounty on American Militants in Somalia |newspaper=VOA |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/us-posts-bounty-on-american-militants-in-somalia/1625905.html |access-date=22 March 2013 |archive-date=March 22, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130322193158/http://www.voanews.com/content/us-posts-bounty-on-american-militants-in-somalia/1625905.html |url-status=live }} On March 15, 2014, it issued three further bounties, including one on Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, who it said coordinated al-Shabaab's recruitment activities in Kenya.{{cite news |date=15 March 2014 |title=US offers $3 million bounties for 3 Somali extremists linked to al-Qaida |newspaper=Garowe Online |url=http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/US-offers-3-million-bounties-for-3-Somali-extremists-linked-to-al-Qaida_printer.shtml |url-status=dead |access-date=16 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140316170312/http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/US-offers-3-million-bounties-for-3-Somali-extremists-linked-to-al-Qaida_printer.shtml |archive-date=March 16, 2014}} On September 27, 2014, after Godane's death, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency announced its own bounty, offering $2 million for information leading to the arrest of the new emir, Umar, and a separate $1 million reward for information leading to his killing.{{cite news |date=27 September 2014 |title=Somali government puts bounty on Al Shabaab leader |work=SomaliCurrent |agency= |url=http://www.somalicurrent.com/2014/09/27/somali-government-puts-bounty-on-al-shabaab-leader/ |url-status=dead |access-date=27 September 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141019215542/http://www.somalicurrent.com/2014/09/27/somali-government-puts-bounty-on-al-shabaab-leader/ |archive-date=October 19, 2014 |df=mdy}} Several further Somali bounties were issued on April 10, 2015, with rewards ranging between $100,000 and $250,000.{{cite news |date=10 April 2015 |title=Somali Government puts Bounty on Al-Shabab leaders |work=Goobjoog News |url=http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=12721 |access-date=10 April 2015 |archive-date=April 16, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150416141725/http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=12721 |url-status=live }} In a separate programme, on April 3, 2015, the Kenyan government offered KSh. 20 million ($215,000) for information leading to the arrest of Mohamed Mohamud, a commander of al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya.{{cite news |date=4 April 2015 |title=Somalia's Shebab warn Kenyan public of 'long, gruesome war' |work=The Sunday Times |agency=AFP |url=http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2015/04/04/somalia-s-shebab-warn-kenyan-public-of-long-gruesome-war |url-status=dead |access-date=4 April 2015 |archive-date=April 4, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150404234651/http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2015/04/04/somalia-s-shebab-warn-kenyan-public-of-long-gruesome-war }}

File:Muktar robow.jpg, also known as Abu Mansur, denounced al-Shabaab in 2017. ]]

• Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah (2014–present){{cite news |date=6 September 2014 |title=Somalia Extremist Group Names New Leader |work=The New York Times |agency= |url=https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/09/06/world/africa/ap-af-somalia-us-attack.html |url-status=dead |access-date=23 July 2015 |archive-date=April 23, 2015 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20150423065433/http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/09/06/world/africa/ap-af-somalia-us-attack.html?_r=0 }}
• Ahmed Godane{{KIA}} (2008–2014){{cite news |author=Nor |first=Mohamed Sheikh |date=September 2, 2014 |title=U.S. Targets Al-Shabaab Leader in Somalia in Air Attack |work=Bloomberg |publisher= |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-02/somali-governor-says-al-shabaab-leader-targeted-in-u-s-raid.html |access-date=March 5, 2017 |archive-date=December 9, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141209182617/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-02/somali-governor-says-al-shabaab-leader-targeted-in-u-s-raid.html |url-status=live }}
• Aden Hashi Farah Ayro{{KIA}} (2005–2008)

Former leading members of al-Shabaab include:

• Hassan Dahir Aweys.{{cite web |last1=Leftie |first1=Peter |last2=Khalif |first2=Abdulkadir |date=November 17, 2011 |title=Nation's army in new battles as advance resumes |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201111180120.html |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=allAfrica |publisher= |archive-date=September 27, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927142632/http://allafrica.com/stories/201111180120.html |url-status=live }}
• Mohamed Said Atom.{{cite news |last=Ibrahim |first=Mohammed |date=August 9, 2010 |title=Government forces fight militants in northeast Somalia |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/world/africa/10somalia.html |url-status=live |access-date=August 10, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100809190910/http://www.nytimes.com//2010//08//10//world//africa//10somalia.html |archive-date=August 9, 2010}}
• Mukhtar Robow.{{cite web |date=December 18, 2010 |title=Somalia: Al Shabaab leaders condemn each other publicly |url=http://allafrica.com/stories/201012180008.html |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=allAfrica |publisher= |archive-date=June 29, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110629182506/http://allafrica.com/stories/201012180008.html |url-status=live }}
• Abdul Qadir Mumin
• Ibrahim al-Afghani{{KIA}}{{cite web |date=2010 |title=Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia |url=http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf |access-date=January 14, 2012 |publisher=United Nations Report S/2010/91 |page=14 |archive-date=April 28, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428065632/http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf |url-status=live }}
• Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki{{KIA}}{{cite news |last=Nor |first=Mohamed Sheikh |date=May 28, 2015 |title=Al-Shabaab Leader Linked to al-Qaeda Dies in South Somalia |work=Bloomberg |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/al-shabaab-leader-linked-to-al-qaeda-dies-in-southern-somalia |access-date=2022-09-12 |archive-date=October 4, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004103913/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/al-shabaab-leader-linked-to-al-qaeda-dies-in-southern-somalia |url-status=live }}
• Omar Mohamed "Abu Ayan".{{Cite web |date=2022-07-26 |title=Why Did Al-Shabab Attack Inside Ethiopia? |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/why-did-al-shabab-attack-inside-ethiopia/6674783.html |access-date=2024-10-26 |website=Voice of America |language=en}}

Prominent foreign al-Shabaab members have included:{{cite web |first=Bill |last=Roggio |date=August 1, 2010 |title=Al Qaeda leaders play significant role in Shabaab |url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_leaders_pla.php |access-date=January 14, 2012 |website=The Long War Journal |archive-date=January 17, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120117083742/http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_leaders_pla.php |url-status=live }}

• Jehad Serwan Mostafa (United States){{cite web |title=Jehad Serwan Mostafa |url=https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/jehad_mostafa.html |access-date=10 May 2015 |website=Rewards for Justice |publisher=U.S. Department of State |archive-date=May 18, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150518195528/https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/jehad_mostafa.html |url-status=live }}
• Abu Musa Mombasa (Pakistan)
• Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole (Sweden)
• Samantha Lewthwaite (Britain) (unconfirmed){{cite news |last=Clark Scott |first=David |date=23 September 2013 |title=Samantha Lewthwaite: Is 'White Widow' behind Kenya mall attack? |newspaper=The Christian Science Monitor |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2013/0923/Samantha-Lewthwaite-Is-White-Widow-behind-Kenya-mall-attack |url-status=live |access-date=23 September 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130925024957/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2013/0923/Samantha-Lewthwaite-Is-White-Widow-behind-Kenya-mall-attack |archive-date=25 September 2013 |df=dmy-all}}
• Fazul Abdullah Mohammed{{KIA}} (Kenya){{cite news |last=Peter |first=Tom A. |date=8 June 2011 |title=Somalia kills Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, widening Al Qaeda power vacuum |newspaper=The Christian Science Monitor |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0612/Somalia-kills-Fazul-Abdullah-Mohammed-widening-Al-Qaeda-power-vacuum |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-date=February 10, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130210010302/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0612/Somalia-kills-Fazul-Abdullah-Mohammed-widening-Al-Qaeda-power-vacuum |url-status=live }}
• Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir (Kenya){{cite news |date=6 October 2013 |title=U.S. raid in Somalia targeted al Shabaab commander Ikrima |newspaper=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/security-africa-raids-target-idUSL1N0HW0NR20131006 |access-date=8 October 2013 |archive-date=May 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517064732/https://www.reuters.com/article/security-africa-raids-target-idUSL1N0HW0NR20131006 |url-status=live }}
• Omar Shafik Hammami{{KIA}} (United States){{cite news |date=12 September 2013 |title=Rapping American jihadi killed: reports |newspaper=Sydney Morning Herald |url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/rapping-american-jihadi-killed-reports-20130912-2tnsd.html |url-status=dead |access-date=12 September 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131231034815/http://www.smh.com.au/world/rapping-american-jihadi-killed-reports-20130912-2tnsd.html |archive-date=December 31, 2013}}
• Mujahid Miski (United States){{Cite web |last=Ibrahim |first=Mukhtar M. |date=2015-12-07 |title=Minn. al-Shabab fighter surrenders in Somalia |url=https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/07/mohamed-abdullahi-hassan |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141504/https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/07/mohamed-abdullahi-hassan |archive-date=September 10, 2022 |access-date=2022-09-10 |website=MPR News |language=en}}

{{Portal|Somalia}}

• Child soldiers in Somalia
• Drone strikes in Somalia
• Human rights in Somalia
• Islam in Somalia
• Religion in Somalia
• Freedom of religion in Somalia

{{reflist|group=note}}

{{Reflist}}

{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}

• {{Cite book |last1=Bacon |first1=Tricia |title=War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab |last2=Muibu |first2=Daisy |date=2019a |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |chapter=Foreign Fighter Influence in Al-Shabaab: Limitations and Future Prospects |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0037 |chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299150884 |access-date=September 8, 2022 |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203153/https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299150884?redirectedFrom=fulltext |url-status=live }}
• {{Cite book |last=Hansen |first=Stig Jarle |author-link=Stig Jarle Hansen |title=Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9NlMAgAAQBAJ |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2013 |isbn=978-0-19-932787-4 }}
• {{Cite book |last=Hansen |first=Stig Jarle |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/965781617 |title=Africa's Insurgents: Navigating An Evolving Landscape |date=2017 |publisher=Lynne Riener Publishers |isbn=978-1-62637-652-6 |location= |pages=181–196 |chapter=Al-Shabaab and the Accidental Jihadists |oclc=965781617 |chapter-url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/965781617 |access-date=September 11, 2022 |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203242/https://search.worldcat.org/title/965781617 |url-status=live }}
• {{Cite book |last=Harper |first=Mary |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sverDwAAQBAJ |title=Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al Shabaab |date=2019 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-1-78738-290-9 |language=en |access-date=September 22, 2022 |archive-date=May 8, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230508204634/https://books.google.com/books?id=sverDwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}
• {{Cite book |editor-last=Keating |editor-first=Michael |editor-link=Michael Keating (UN official) |editor-last2=Waldman |editor-first2=Matt |title=War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab |date=2019 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190947910.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-094791-0 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/35091 }}
• {{Cite book |last1=Maruf |first1=Harun |last2=Joseph |first2=Dan |author-link=Harun Maruf |title=Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5aBxDwAAQBAJ |date=2018 |isbn=978-0-253-03749-7 |publisher=Indiana University Press |access-date=September 22, 2022 |archive-date=April 16, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416002842/https://books.google.com/books?id=5aBxDwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}
• {{Cite book |last=Woldemariam |first=Michael |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/insurgent-fragmentation-in-the-horn-of-africa/long-war-in-somalia/9081AACE1849B3DAFBC4F711D11547C0 |title=Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents |date=2018 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-42325-0 |pages=211–281 |language=en |chapter=The Long War in Somalia: The Somali National Movement, Islamic Courts Union, and Al-Shabaab, 1981–2013 |chapter-url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/insurgent-fragmentation-in-the-horn-of-africa/long-war-in-somalia/9081AACE1849B3DAFBC4F711D11547C0 |access-date=September 11, 2022 |archive-date=January 5, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105203130/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/insurgent-fragmentation-in-the-horn-of-africa/long-war-in-somalia/9081AACE1849B3DAFBC4F711D11547C0 |url-status=live }}

{{refend}}

{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}

• {{Cite journal |last=Kheyre |first=Zakarie Ahmed nor |date=2022-11-10 |title=The evolution of the Al-Shabaab jihadist intelligence structure |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2022.2095599 |journal=Intelligence and National Security |language=en |volume=37 |issue=7 |pages=1061–1082 |doi=10.1080/02684527.2022.2095599 |issn=0268-4527}}
• {{Cite web |last1=Klobucista |first1=Claire |last2=Jonathan |first2=Masters |last3=Aly Sergie |first3=Mohammed |date=December 6, 2022 |title=Al-Shababb |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab |website=Council on Foreign Relations}}
• {{Cite journal |last=Alkaff |first=Syed Huzaifah |date=2013 |title=Al-Shabaab: A New Phase? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351183 |journal=Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses |volume=5 |issue=9 |pages=12–15 |jstor=26351183 |issn=2382-6444 |access-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-date=September 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220909152842/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351183 |url-status=live }}
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{{refend}}

{{refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}

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{{refend}}

{{Commons category}}

{{Wikiquote}}

• [http://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-shabab Al-Shabab], Counter Extremism Project profile
• [https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo45559 Al-Shabaab: How Great a Threat?: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, October 3, 2013]
• [https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000005-Trans.pdf August 2010 letter from Osama bin Laden to Ahmed Godane] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220910141505/https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000005-Trans.pdf |date=September 10, 2022 }}

{{Al-Qaeda}}

{{US War on Terror}}

{{War in Somalia (2006–09)}}

{{War in Somalia (2009–)}}

{{Militant Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa}}

{{Authority control}}

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