History of ASEAN

{{See also|History of Southeast Asia}}

File:Pacific Theater Areas;map1.JPG

During the formation of ASEAN, the definition of what constituted Southeast Asia was not yet firmly established. The phrase "Southeast Asia" had gained prominence during the Second World War, particularly through the creation of the Allied South East Asia Command (SEAC), which helped popularise the term.{{cite book |title=The Historical Construction of Southeast Asian Studies: Korea and Beyond |date=2013 |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |isbn=978-981-4414-58-6 |editor-last=Park |editor-first=King |location=Singapore |editor-last2=Seung-Woo |editor-first2=Victor T.}} However, SEAC's territorial scope was inconsistent, notably excluding the Philippines and large parts of Indonesia, while including Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).

By the late 1970s, a broadly accepted understanding of the geographic scope of Southeast Asia and the areas it encompassed had been established.{{Cite book |last=Severino |first=Rodolfo C. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/southeast-asia-in-search-of-an-asean-community/6865D4FCA43CB9861394739B8712AE6A |title=Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community |date=2006 |publisher=ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute |isbn=978-981-230-389-9 |series=Books and Monographs}} Though, during ASEAN's early years, it was ASEAN itself that determined which states qualified as part of Southeast Asia for the purpose of membership, effectively allowing the organisation to shape the region's political boundaries based on shared interests and strategic priorities rather than fixed geographic definitions.{{rp|42}}

In the late 1950s, Southeast Asian leaders began exploring a region-led framework for cooperation amid the Cold War and the newly-won independence of many states. Earlier attempts at regionalism, such as the 1950 Baguio Conference initiated by the Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954),{{Cite news |date=1950-05-26 |title=THE BAGUIO CONFERENCE |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1950/05/26/archives/the-baguio-conference.html |access-date=2025-03-27 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}} had either been limited or dominated by external powers. By 1959, leaders of Malaya (independent in 1957) and the Philippines saw the need for a purely Southeast Asian alliance. In January 1959, during Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's visit to Manila, Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia and he, together with Philippine Foreign Minister Felixberto M. Serrano, issued a joint communiqué proposing an "association of Southeast Asia" for economic and cultural cooperation. This was the first time the idea of a regional alliance led by Southeast Asian nations was formally put forward.{{cite web |title=ASA - The First Asian International |url=https://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/GDN-14.pdf |access-date=27 March 2025 |publisher=Institute of Current World Affairs}} The proposal reflected shared postcolonial interests: both Malaya and the Philippines were staunchly anti-communist (each had fought communist insurgencies at home) and sought a united front to preserve regional stability without overt reliance on Western military pacts. At the same time, they emphasised an Asian-led initiative, independent of the former colonial powers, to foster cooperation in the spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference's principles of Afro-Asian solidarity.{{cite journal |last=Karupiah |first=Rammani |date=August 2022 |title=The Impact of Regional Cooperation on the Development of Philippines-Malaysia Bilateral Relations, 1957-2010 |url=https://journalarticle.ukm.my/20305/1/57347-189461-1-SM.pdf |journal=Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies |publisher=Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia |volume=49 |issue=2 |pages=76–106 |access-date=27 March 2025}}{{rp|80}}

File:Aankomst van premier van Malakka Abdul Rahman, Bestanddeelnr 911-2803.jpg, the first prime Minister of malaysia, played a significant role in promoting regionalism in Southeast Asia.]]

The Malayan-Philippine proposal for an Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was thus met with cautious reactions. Serrano initially felt it would be "presumptuous" for only a few countries to form a regional body; he preferred including at least a fourth nation. This led to overtures to other Southeast Asian states in 1959–1960. Tunku Rahman and Garcia reached out to leaders in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, inviting them to join a broad regional grouping. A working committee outlined that the proposed association would prioritise cooperation in economic, social, technical, educational, and cultural fields, while remaining strictly non-political and neutral in ideology (explicitly upholding the Bandung principles).{{Cite book |last=Bhattacharjee |first=G. P. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1nN9QgAACAAJ |title=Southeast Asian Politics: Malaysia & Indonesia |date=1976 |publisher=Minerva Associates (Publications) |isbn=978-0-88386-841-6 |language=en}} Despite the inclusive invitations, many regional governments demurred. Burma's leaders agreed in principle but ultimately declined, citing a need to focus on domestic problems and a desire to maintain strict neutrality. Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk likewise refused to participate, wary that a joint regional organisation might divide the world into Cold War blocs and compromise Cambodia's non-aligned stance. Indonesia was openly skeptical from the start. President Sukarno felt a new alliance was unnecessary given the existing Bandung Pact; he argued that ASA's proposed goals were already covered by the 1955 Asian-African Conference solidarity, and he saw ASA as potentially "unrealistic and useless." Privately, Sukarno also perceived the move as a challenge to his leadership in regional politics. He resented that the initiative had come from Kuala Lumpur and Manila, suspecting it might erode his prominence as a champion of Asian nationalism. Indonesian officials feared ASA would "degenerate into a simple anti-Communist club" aligned with Western interests,{{Cite book |title=Philippine external relations: a centennial vista |date=1998 |publisher=Foreign Service Institute |isbn=978-971-552-059-1 |editor-last=Wadi |editor-first=Julkipli M. |location=Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines |editor-last2=Baviera |editor-first2=Aileen S. P. |editor-last3=Yu-Jose |editor-first3=Lydia N. |editor-last4=Foreign Service Institute (Philippines) |editor-last5=Philippines}} given that Malaya and the Philippines both had defence ties with the UK and US. These factors meant Indonesia (as well as other neutral states) pointedly stayed away, leaving the proponents to proceed largely on their own.{{Cite book |title=Malaysia's foreign relations: issues and challenges |date=2006 |publisher=University of Malaya Press |isbn=978-983-100-380-0 |editor-last=Ruhanas Harun |series=Special series in art and social science |location=Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia |editor-last2=Universiti Malaya}}{{rp|15}}

By 1960, it became clear that only Thailand was willing to join Malaya and the Philippines in the venture. Thailand's Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman were motivated to participate partly because of Thailand's frustration with SEATO's ineffectiveness (especially during the 1960–61 Laos crisis).{{Cite web |title=Historical Documents - Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d419#:~:text=Steeves,%20and%20other%20officials%20from,%E2%86%A9 |access-date=2025-03-28 |website=history.state.gov}} Thailand faced growing communist subversion in neighboring Indochina and saw a non-military regional pact as a useful "balance" to its SEATO commitments. Thus, Thailand quietly entered discussions in late 1959. In April 1960 Rahman sent a special envoy to Manila to work out concrete steps with Philippine officials. In February 1961, President Garcia paid a state visit to Malaya; during this visit the Philippine and Malayan leaders (with Thailand's Foreign Minister present) agreed on measures to increase trade and cultural links as a precursor to the new association. In a joint press conference in Kuala Lumpur, they announced that Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand would formally establish a regional organization within the year. A series of preparatory meetings followed, and a draft charter was prepared.{{Cite journal |last=Pollard |first=Vincent K. |date=1970 |title=ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642577 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=244–255 |doi=10.2307/2642577 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=2642577}}

{{Further information|Association of Southeast Asia}}{{Multiple image

| total_width = 320

| image1 = History picture 26 tanat.jpg

| image2 = Tunku abd rahman.jpg

| caption1 = Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand

| caption2 = Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime and Foreign Minister of Malaysia

| footer =

| footer_align = center

| align = right

| image3 = Hon. Felixberto M. Serrano (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) (cropped).jpg

| caption3 = Felixberto M. Serrano, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines

| header = Signatories of the First Bangkok Declaration

}}

On 31 July 1961, the foreign ministers of Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines met in Bangkok and signed what became known as the Bangkok Declaration, establishing the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).{{cite book |last1=Tarling |first1=Nicholas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U0trzUvic-8C&pg=PA287 |title=The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 2, Part 2, From World War II to the Present |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1999 |isbn=978-0-521-66372-4 |page=287 |access-date=7 January 2021}}{{cite book |last1=Ooi |first1=Keat Gin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QKgraWbb7yoC&pg=PA186 |title=Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor |publisher=ABC-CLIO |year=2004 |isbn=978-1-57607-770-2 |page=186 |access-date=7 January 2021}} This short document (essentially an executive agreement) declared the formation of "an association for economic and cultural cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia to be known as ASA – Association of Southeast Asia". The founding signatories were Thailand's Thanat Khoman, Malaya's Tunku Rahman (who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), and the Philippines' Felixberto Serrano. With that, ASA became the first regional organisation exclusively comprising Southeast Asian states. Notably, the name "ASA" was fitting – in Malay, Thai, and Tagalog asa means "hope," symbolising the aspirations pinned on the new alliance. The association was to promote regional cooperation in economic, social, cultural, scientific, and administrative fields, as well as to encourage mutual assistance for prosperity and security. In practice, however, all three founding members were strongly anti-communist and closely aligned with Western powers. This divergence between stated non-alignment and actual anti-communist solidarity made other regional players (especially Indonesia and Cambodia) skeptical of ASA's true intent. Some observers at the time noted that ASA's economic-cultural focus was something of a façade – the hope among its members was that closer cooperation would eventually spill over into the political and security realm.{{cite book |url=https://cicp.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/cicp-e-book-no-1.pdf |title=ASEAN Security and Its Relevancy |publisher=Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace |year=2021 |series=Cambodian Foreign Policy in Global and Regional Contexts |access-date=28 March 2025}}{{rp|13}}

Structurally, ASA was a relatively loose organisation, lacking a formal constitution or secretariat. The Bangkok Declaration was brief and did not establish a centralised bureaucracy; instead, coordination was to be managed through regular meetings and national focal points. In 1962 the ASA foreign ministers held a special meeting in the Cameron Highlands (Malaya) where they agreed on a basic institutional framework. They set up three standing committees, Economic, Social and Cultural, and Finance, to plan and implement cooperative projects in those spheres. A small ASA Fund was created to finance joint activities, with Malaysia (Malaya) and Thailand each initially contributing M$1 million (the Philippines was expected to match this). It was also decided that annual meetings of ASA foreign ministers would be held, rotating among the three member states. Following the inaugural 1961 Bangkok meeting, a second ASA ministerial meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur in 1962, and a third was anticipated in Manila in 1963.{{Cite book |last=Kaul |first=Man Mohini |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VGseAAAAMAAJ |title=The Philippines and Southeast Asia |date=1978 |publisher=Radiant |isbn=978-0-391-01010-9 |language=en}} Though ASA's membership was small, the three countries moved quickly to demonstrate tangible cooperation.

In the months following the Bangkok Declaration, several joint projects described as ASA's "first fruits" were launched. For example, in 1962 Malaya and Thailand linked their railway systems and inaugurated the "ASA Express" train service between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. The inaugural train ran in April 1962 amid much fanfare, carrying Thai officials to Malaya. Likewise, to improve regional communications, the members agreed to extend a microwave telecommunications network between Malaysia and Thailand and to include the Philippines in a high-frequency radio link – an early step toward better telephonic and broadcast connections across borders.{{rp|82}} Economic cooperation was pursued through plans for trade facilitation. The ASA foreign ministers approved the negotiation of trilateral agreements on trade and navigation, aiming to boost commerce among the three economies. They also agreed to promote Southeast Asian tourism jointly and even discussed the idea of an "ASA Airways" cooperative airline venture. In the social sphere, ASA initiated notable exchanges in healthcare and education. The trio also waived visa requirements and fees for each other's citizens (at least for officials and certain passport holders) to facilitate easier travel. Cultural and student exchange programs were set up, and efforts were made to recognize each other's university degrees to encourage educational cooperation. Linguistic and educational gaps impeded some exchanges (for instance, English was commonly used in Malaya and the Philippines, but much less so in Thailand, complicating academic cooperation).{{rp|83}} All three economies were agrarian and competitive more than complementary, so immediate economic gains from ASA were limited. Moreover, without Indonesia or Burma, the region's largest markets and resources were outside ASA's framework, meaning ASA could not tackle issues like the global rubber market or regional industrialization.

{{See also|Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation}}ASA's momentum proved difficult to sustain as political tensions in the region escalated in the early 1960s. Ironically, one of the first major strains came from within ASA's own ranks – a bilateral dispute between the Philippines and Malaya over North Borneo (Sabah). In May 1961 (just as ASA was taking shape), Tunku Rahman announced a grand plan to federate Malaya with the British territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei into a new nation to be called Malaysia. Initially, the Philippine government under President Garcia had not objected. But after Diosdado Macapagal assumed the Philippine presidency in late 1961, Manila's stance changed. Macapagal's administration revived a dormant Philippine claim to North Borneo, asserting historical sovereignty over Sabah. On 22 June 1962, the Philippines formally submitted this territorial claim,{{cite web |date=24 April 1962 |title=Cession and transfer of the territory of North Borneo by His Highness, Sultan Mohammad Esmail Kiram, Sultan of Sulu, acting with the consent and approval of the Ruma Bechara, in council assembled, to the Republic of the Philippines |url=https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1962/04/24/cession-and-transfer-of-the-territory-of-north-borneo-by-his-highness-sultan-mohammad-esmail-kiram-sultan-of-sulu-acting-with-the-consent-and-aprroval-of-the-ruma-bechara-in-council-assembled-to/ |access-date=7 February 2016 |website=gov.ph |publisher=Government of the Philippines}}{{PD-notice}} sparking a serious rift with Kuala Lumpur.{{cite web |year=1967 |title=PHILIPPINES and MALAYSIA |url=https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20608/volume-608-I-8809-English.pdf |access-date=24 February 2013 |website=UN.org |publisher=United Nations}} {{PD-notice}} Tunku Rahman viewed the claim as an affront to Malaya's territorial aspirations, and the issue quickly poisoned relations between the two ASA members. By the end of 1962, the Sabah dispute had paralysed ASA's activities. Joint projects were put on hold and trust between Malaya and the Philippines eroded. Tunku pointedly boycotted an ASA ministerial meeting scheduled in Manila for December 1962, making it impossible for the alliance to function.{{rp|83}} Filipino leaders, for their part, felt that Malaya's push for Malaysia (including Sabah) was subject to the outcome of the Philippine claim to North Borneo, and in late 1962 Manila began aligning its regional policy more closely with Indonesia, ASA's outsider.

At the same time, Sukarno's Indonesia vehemently opposed the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, which it denounced as a neo-colonial scheme.{{cite web |date=4 March 2021 |title=Juni 1964: Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia |url=https://asumsi.co/post/58218/juni-1964-peristiwa-konfrontasi-indonesia-malaysia/ |access-date=29 October 2024 |publisher=Asumsi.co}} In early 1963, Indonesia launched the Konfrontasi ("Confrontation") campaign, involving economic boycotts and armed incursions, to sabotage Malaysia's formation. Macapagal, despite ASA, felt compelled to cooperate with Indonesia against Malaysia. He saw common cause in preventing what he portrayed as British-imposed federation. Throughout 1963, the Philippines and Indonesia coordinated diplomatically in hopes of delaying or conditioning the birth of Malaysia.{{cite journal |last=Sussman |first=Gerald |year=1983 |title=Macapagal, the Sabah Claim and Maphilindo: The politics of penetration |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472338380000141 |journal=Journal of Contemporary Asia |volume=13 |issue=2 |pages=210–228 |doi=10.1080/00472338380000141 |access-date=1 December 2019|url-access=subscription }} Thus the dispute and start of the Konfrontasi had led to the destruction of ASA.

{{Main|Maphilindo}}

File:Diosdado Macapagal USS Oklahoma City 1962 cropped.jpg

In a final attempt to preserve regional cooperation amidst escalating tensions, Filipino president, Diosdado Macapagal, convened a summit in Manila during July–August 1963, bringing together Tunku Rahman and Sukarno. The summit produced the Manila Accord on 5 August 1963 and led to the formation of Maphilindo, a short-lived consultative grouping comprising Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Conceived as an "Association of Malay Peoples" or a loose confederation, Maphilindo aimed to resolve trilateral tensions through intra-regional dialogue and create unity among ethnically related nations, while minimizing external involvement. Despite its aspirational framework, Maphilindo's momentum was quickly undermined. When the Federation of Malaysia was officially established on 16 September 1963, both Indonesia and the Philippines severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia and withheld recognition of the new federation. Indonesia escalated its Konfrontasi campaign with military incursions into Borneo, peninsular Malaysia, and Singapore. The Philippines, while not directly involved militarily, aligned rhetorically with Indonesia. Consequently, Maphilindo, never institutionalized beyond the initial summit, disintegrated shortly after its creation, having failed to prevent the deepening regional conflict.

By 1965–1966, the situation began to shift. Sukarno was ousted from power in Indonesia and General Suharto's new regime moved to end Konfrontasi. In August 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace agreement, formally concluding Konfrontasi.{{Cite book |last1=Goldsworthy |first1=David |url=https://archive.org/details/facingnorthcentu00davi |title=Facing north : a century of Australian engagement with Asia |last2=Edwards |first2=Peter |last3=Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |date=2001 |publisher=[Canberra] : Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade ; Carlton South, Vic. : Melbourne University Press |others=Internet Archive |isbn=978-0-522-84953-0}}{{rp|342}}{{Cite book |title=Makers of modern strategy: from Machiavelli to the nuclear age |date=1986 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-09235-5 |editor-last=Paret |editor-first=Peter |series=Princeton paperbacks |location=Princeton, N.J |editor-last2=Craig |editor-first2=Gordon Alexander |editor-last3=Gilbert |editor-first3=Felix}}{{rp|806}} The Philippines, now under President Ferdinand Marcos (who succeeded Macapagal in 1965), also normalised relations with Malaysia around the same time (Marcos quietly shelved the Sabah issue to mend fences).{{Cite book |last=Weinstein |first=Franklin B. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4xz8zHFfnDwC&q=offer&pg=PA34 |title=Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry Into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy |date=2009 |publisher=Equinox Publishing |isbn=978-602-8397-45-2 |language=en}} These developments eliminated the principal obstacles to regional cooperation, leading to a revival of the idea of Southeast Asian solidarity. However, for the former member states, it became evident that the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) could no longer serve as a viable framework for such collaboration. Although ASA was never formally dissolved through a treaty, by 1966 it had become largely inactive. Nevertheless, its legacy proved instructive. The failure of both ASA and Malphilindo demonstrated to regional leaders the need for a new model, one that would incorporate all major Southeast Asian countries and establish stronger norms to mitigate the risk of internal disputes undermining the organisation. These insights directly influenced the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.{{rp|13}}

{{main|ASEAN Declaration|}}{{See also|Domino theory}}File:ST 20170326 STKISHOREBOOKOA4Q 3027316-2-640x480.jpg by five foreign ministers in Bangkok on 8 August 1967]]

ASEAN was created on 8 August 1967, when the foreign ministers of five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, signed the ASEAN Declaration.{{cite book |last1=Liow |first1=Joseph |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G5KLBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA82 |title=Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia |last2=Leifer |first2=Michael |date=20 November 2014 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-62233-8 |pages=82–85 |access-date=7 January 2021}} According to the declaration, ASEAN aimed to accelerate economic, social, and cultural development in the region, as well as promote regional peace, to collaborate on matters of shared interest, and to promote Southeast Asian studies and maintain close cooperation with existing international organisations.{{cite web |title=The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967 |url=http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150211121705/http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration |archive-date=11 February 2015 |access-date=17 June 2015 |publisher=ASEAN}}{{cite web |title=Overview |url=http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150217005044/http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview |archive-date=17 February 2015 |access-date=7 February 2015 |website=asean.org |publisher=ASEAN}} It is contended whether to whom the idea of ASEAN came about.{{Citation needed|date=April 2025}} In Anwar's analysis under the ISEAS institute, she denoted that the idea had strongly originated from Indonesia under the original Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) proposal.{{cite book |last=Anwar |first=Dewi Fortuna |url=https://archive.org/details/indonesiainasean00anwa/mode/2up |title=Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |year=1994 |isbn=9789813016521 |access-date=5 April 2025}}{{rp||pages=50}} However, most sources highlight the leading role of Khoman in drafting the initial proposals, indicating that Thailand played a central role in both the early conceptualization and negotiation of SEAARC.{{Cite web |last=Bongso-Seldrup |first=Ian |date=2021-09-13 |title=Insights into ASEAN: Tale of the Underdog |url=https://asiangeo.com/ag_xplorer/asean-here-and-beyond/ |access-date=2025-04-05 |website=Asian Geographic |language=en-US}} While Indonesia participated actively in the initiative, it consistently expressed a commitment to avoiding dominance or the imposition of a fixed framework. In this context, Khoman's role as an intermediary and facilitator was instrumental in creating dialogue and consensus among the prospective member states.{{rp||pages=12}}{{cite book |last=Jorgensen-Dahl |first=Arnfinn |url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-349-05789-4 |title=Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=1982 |isbn=978-1-349-05791-7 |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-05789-4 |access-date=28 March 2025}}{{rp||pages=36‒37}}{{cite book |last=Fifield |first=Russell H. |url=https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1091 |title=National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International Politics |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |year=1979 |isbn=9789814377324 |access-date=28 March 2025}}{{rp||pages=6‒9}}

The proposed name of the "Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation" was largely debated during the Bangkok meeting.{{cite news |date=8 August 1967 |title=Title of the Article |url=https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/article/straitstimes19670808-1.2.3 |access-date=28 March 2025 |newspaper=The Straits Times}} After the earlier proposed name was considered too lengthy and akward,{{rp||pages=163‒164|page=597}} particullarily the name had been troubling from the filipino delegation who repeatedly stumbled on its pronounciation.{{cite magazine |date=18 August 1967 |title=Asia: Sports‑Shirt Diplomacy |url=https://time.com/archive/6635055/asia-sports-shirt-diplomacy/ |access-date=8 June 2025 |magazine=Time}} The decision was made to retain "Association of Southeast Asia" (ASA), reflecting both continuity with the former organisation and Tunku Rahman's earlier ambition for regional cooperation. An alternative title, "Association of Southeast Asian States" (ASAS), was also used informally by the Thai secretariat, chosen for its regional resonance and Malay-inspired phrasing. Ultimately, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik proposed modifying the name to "Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN) to distinguish it more clearly from the previous ASA framework.{{cite book |last=Krishnamra |first=Nadhavathna |url=https://image.mfa.go.th/mfa/0/4OJCTby7gE/images/Thailand_and_ASEAN_1967-1979.pdf |title=Thailand and ASEAN 1967–1979: A Commitment to Regionalism or Complement to Alignment? |publisher=International Studies Center |year=2024 |access-date=28 March 2025}}{{rp||pages=163‒164|page=597}} In a conversation with British Ambassador John Addis, Philipine Foreign Secretary, Narciso Ramos, stated that the objective was to establish a new association, described as a merger of ASA and Maphilindo, that would incorporate the most effective elements of both initiatives under a different name.{{rp||pages=31}}

File:ST8August1967.jpg newspaper on 8 August 1967.]]

At the time, however, ASEAN's founding members did not envisage the creation of any form of regionalism. The creation of ASEAN was initially was motivated by the desire to contain communism,{{Cite web |title=What Is ASEAN? |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean |access-date=2023-05-22 |website=Council on Foreign Relations}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jfadt/asean/aseanch1.pdf|title=Historical Overview of ASEAN}} which had taken a foothold in mainland Asia after World War II, with the formation of communist governments in North Korea, China, and Vietnam, accompanied by the so-called communist "emergency" in British Malaya, and unrest in the recently decolonized Philippines. The five founding members form ASEAN in the context of the Vietnam War and regional communist insurgencies, seeking to strengthen mutual cooperation and present a united front against communist expansion (though the declaration itself does not explicitly mention this threat). According to S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign Minister at the time of ASEAN's founding, stated that "the motivation behind ASEAN was not belief in the merits of regionalism as such, but it was more a response ... to the Western abandonment of its role as a shield against communism."{{rp||pages=499}}

These events also encouraged the earlier formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), led by the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, with several Southeast Asian partners in 1954 as an extension of "containment" policy, seeking to create an Eastern version of NATO.{{cite book |author1=Bernard Eccleston |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l07ak-yd6DAC&q=%22Bangkok+Declaration%22+ASEAN&pg=RA1-PA311 |title=The Asia-Pacific Profile |author2=Michael Dawson |author3=Deborah J. McNamara |publisher=Routledge (UK) |year=1998 |isbn=978-0-415-17279-0 |access-date=3 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200930053135/https://books.google.com/books?id=l07ak-yd6DAC&pg=RA1-PA311&lpg=RA1-PA311&dq=%22Bangkok+Declaration%22+ASEAN |archive-date=30 September 2020 |url-status=live}} However, the local member states of ASEAN group achieved greater cohesion in the mid-1970s following a change in the balance of power after the Fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 and the decline of SEATO.{{Cite book |last=Beeson |first=Mark |title=Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and beyond |date=2009 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-46504-5 |series=Global institutions series |location=London |pages=65 |quote=Despite the previously discussed potential limitations of the ASEAN way and its preference for voluntarism and consensus, it was felt that this form of multilateralism had more chance of success than some of its institutional predecessors like SEATO, which was unable to demonstrate "either a viable political purpose or a military function."}}{{Cite book |title=The ASEAN: Thirty years and beyond |date=1997 |isbn=978-971-15-0360-4 |editor-last=Aranal-Sereno |editor-first=Maria Lourdes |location=Quezon City |pages=271, 460 |quote=Regional cooperation flourished when the smaller countries took the leadership in developing such organizations as ASEAN ... As the US forces moved on to strategic weakness and disengagement, heightened insecurity caught up with Southeast Asian countries and, ironically, gave ASEAN a sense of being. |editor-last2=Santiago |editor-first2=Joseph Sedfrey}}

In ASEAN's early years, member states prioritised the creation of cooperative mechanisms and the building of trust, following a regional history marked by inter-state tensions. The launch of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), an annual gathering of foreign ministers, provided a critical platform for dialogue and diplomacy. The second AMM meet was held in Jakarta, Indonesia (6-7 August 1968) and the third AMM meet in the Cameron Highlands, Malaysia (16-17 December 1969). Although few joint projects were initiated during this formative period, these regular consultations played a vital role in reducing bilateral frictions.{{Cite web |title=Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) |url=https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/#:~:text=,Free%20Zone,%20Bangkok |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=The Nuclear Threat Initiative |language=en}} Notably, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were able to set aside contentious issues in favour of promoting cohesion between the states. By the third AMM meet, member states laid the initial institutional foundations for ASEAN by establishing a formal financial mechanism through the Agreement for the establishment of a fund for ASEAN.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Southeast Asia was a focal point of Cold War tensions, with significant involvement from major powers like the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The Vietnam War, the spread of communism, and geopolitical rivalries heightened regional instability. Amid these challenges, ASEAN sought to assert its autonomy and prevent Southeast Asia from becoming a battleground for external powers. Malaysia proposed the concept of neutralising the whole region to safeguard its sovereignty and promote regional stability.{{Cite web |date=1 September 2019 |title=Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration |url=https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZOPFAN.pdf? |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210920110005/https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZOPFAN.pdf |archive-date=20 September 2021}} The proposal emerged in the context of significant geopolitical shifts, including the British military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore,{{Cite web |title=British Military Withdrawal: From Crisis to Catalyst for Growth |url=https://www.sg101.gov.sg/economy/digging-deeper-case-studies/withdrawal/ |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=www.sg101.gov.sg |language=en}} the U.S. enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, and the Soviet Union's proposal for a collective security arrangement in Southeast Asia under Leonid Brezhnev in June 1969.{{Cite journal |last=Ghebhardt |first=Alexander O. |date=1973 |title=The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642669 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=13 |issue=12 |pages=1075–1091 |doi=10.2307/2642669 |jstor=2642669 |issn=0004-4687}}

File:Tun Dr. Ismail.jpg proposed that the entirety of Southeast Asia become a neutral state.]]

The idea was initially articulated by Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's then Minister of Home Affairs, during a 1968 defence debate in the Dewan Rakyat. He proposed a policy of neutralisation for Southeast Asia as a way to reduce defence expenditures and redirect funds toward social development. He also advocated for non-aggression treaties, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, and respect for each nation's chosen form of government. Although Prime Minister Tunku Rahman was initially hesitant to endorse the proposal, his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, viewed the concept as "wise, imaginative, and far-sighted." Following the 1969 Kuala Lumpur riots, Razak succeeded the Tunku Rahman as Prime Minister and took leadership in advancing the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) vision. In a July 1971 speech, Prime Minister Razak stated that great power involvement had long destabilised Southeast Asia, and peace could only be achieved through neutralisation. He argued that regional states must actively create the conditions necessary for such neutralisation, demonstrating that a neutral Southeast Asia could also align with the legitimate strategic interests of the major powers.{{Cite book |last=Tarling |first=Nicholas |title=Southeast Asian regionalism: New Zealand perspectives |date=2011 |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |isbn=978-981-4311-49-6 |location=Singapore}}{{rp||pages=37‒55}}

Consequently, the five ASEAN nations proclaimed the ZOPFAN under compromise. In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 27 November 1971, the five ASEAN foreign ministers declared Southeast Asia as a region free from any form of interference by outside powers. ZOPFAN reflects ASEAN's desire to insulate the region from Cold War conflicts and to prevent domination by any external power. Although largely aspirational, this declaration signals ASEAN's intent to pursue a neutral foreign policy stance collectively, even as the Vietnam War raged on the Indochinese peninsula. Despite its aspirational goals, the implementation of ZOPFAN faced challenges due to divergent threat perceptions among member states and their varying degrees of reliance on external powers for security and economic support;{{Cite journal |last=Wicks |first=Peter |date=1972 |title=Malaysia's Quest for Neutralisation: A Perspective |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20634524 |journal=The Australian Quarterly |volume=44 |issue=3 |pages=90–102 |doi=10.2307/20634524 |jstor=20634524 |issn=0005-0091|url-access=subscription }}{{rp||pages=101–102}} for instance, while Indonesia advocated for regional self-reliance, countries like Singapore sought external security assurances due to their strategic vulnerabilities.{{Cite journal |last1=Emmers |first1=Ralf |date=2018 |title=Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality: The Quest for Autonomy and Impartiality in Southeast Asia |url=https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/2361 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |language=en |volume=40 |issue=3 |pages=349–370 |doi=10.1355/cs40-3a |issn=0129-797X|url-access=subscription }} Additionally, the geopolitical complexities of the time, including the Vietnam War and the influence of major powers like the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, made the realisation of a truly neutral zone difficult. Consequently, ZOPFAN functioned more as a political declaration symbolising regional unity and the aspiration for autonomy rather than an actionable policy. Over time, the prominence of the ZOPFAN concept diminished, particularly around the turn of the millennium, as ASEAN adapted to new geopolitical realities and sought alternative frameworks to maintain regional autonomy and stability.{{Cite journal |last=Southgate |first=Laura |date=2021-01-02 |title=ASEAN: still the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality? |journal=Political Science |language=en |volume=73 |issue=1 |pages=31–47 |doi=10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762 |issn=0032-3187|doi-access=free }} ASEAN continued its trajectory of incremental cooperation, particularly in the economic and social sectors. Member states launched various joint initiatives, including efforts in food security and cultural exchanges, and explored preferential trade arrangements to enhance regional connectivity. A key institutional development was the establishment of the ASEAN Standing Committee in 1973, designed to coordinate activities between annual ministerial meetings and provide continuity in ASEAN's decision-making processes.{{cite web |date=13–15 March 1973 |title=Joint Communiqué of the Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1973-6th-AMMJC-1-1.pdf |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Centre for International Law |publisher=National University of Singapore}}

File:CH-53s evacuate people from LZ 39 in Saigon 1975.JPG and U.S. abandonment from Indochina catalyzed rapid reforms and development of ASEAN.]]

The rapid and unexpected collapse of the regimes in the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975, and saw communist regimes come to power in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, left the member states of ASEAN unprepared to the changing geopolitical landscape. As a grouping of anti-communist states, ASEAN did not initially admit these Indochinese countries, but it began to consider strategies for future engagement. With the shifting regional landscape following the collapse of regimes in Indochina, Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak offered a concilliatory stance, expressing his openness to the idea of incorporating Indochinese states into ASEAN.{{Citation |last=Irvine |first=Roger |title=The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967–1975 |date=1982 |work=Understanding ASEAN |pages= 8–36|editor-last=Broinowski |editor-first=Alison |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-81250-9_2 |access-date=2025-03-29 |place=London |publisher=Macmillan Education UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-81250-9_2 |isbn=978-1-349-81250-9|url-access=subscription }}{{rp||pages=32}} In contrast, Singapore's S. Rajaratnam urged ASEAN members to base their decisions on the assumption of a continued Western presence in Southeast Asia, reflecting a more cautious and pragmatic outlook.{{cite news |date=14 May 1975 |title=Financial Times Issue #26666 |url=https://archive.org/details/FinancialTimes1975UKEnglish/May%2014%201975%2C%20Financial%20Times%2C%20%2326666%2C%20UK%20%28en%29/page/n5/mode/2up |archive-url=https://archive.org/details/FinancialTimes1975UKEnglish |archive-date=28 March 2025 |access-date=28 March 2025 |work=Financial Times}}{{rp||pages=6}} Meanwhile, Indonesia's Adam Malik adopted a non-aligned stance, advocating that ASEAN's adjustment should not be driven by fear. He emphasized that the organization's policy should focus on peaceful coexistence with the newly communist states of Indochina, signaling a more accommodating and diplomatic approach as per the Bandung Conference.{{cite news |date=14 May 1975 |title=The Times Issue #59395 |url=https://archive.org/details/NewsUK1975UKEnglish/May%2014%201975%2C%20The%20Times%2C%20%2359395%2C%20UK%20%28en%29/page/n5/mode/2up |archive-url=https://archive.org/details/NewsUK1975UKEnglish |archive-date=28 March 2025 |access-date=28 March 2025 |work=The Times}}{{rp||pages=6}} The Thai Foreign Minister proposed the creation of "a forum of all Southeast Asian countries" aimed at creating dialogue and resolving tensions between the communist and non-communist states in the region. However, the momentum behind the proposal dissipated rapidly as regional tensions escalated. Skirmishes soon broke out along the Thai-Cambodian border and between Vietnam and Cambodia over contested islands in the Gulf of Thailand, undermining any immediate hopes for multilateral diplomacy and exposing deep-seated mistrust among neighbouring states.{{Cite book |last=Rahman |first=Abdul |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ra9uAAAAMAAJ |title=Looking Back: Monday Musings and Memories |date=1977 |publisher=Pustaka Antara |language=en}}{{rp||pages=161}}{{rp||pages=84}} However, in the end, without mentioning ASEAN expansion, most agreed to enter friendly relations with Indochina as a way to realize the ZOPFAN roadplan.{{rp||pages=39}}

Internally, ASEAN's commitment to non-interference was tested by events such as the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor. While the action was controversial internationally, ASEAN members tacitly accepted it, refraining from public criticism in line with the norm of non-interference. Though this act could also come from the organisation's attempt at avoiding open criticism of Indonesia,{{Cite journal |last=Seah |first=Sharon |date=2023 |title=Non-Interference versus Self-Determination: ASEAN's Cold War Normative Framework |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27278484 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |volume=45 |issue=3 |pages=494–519 |doi=10.1355/cs45-3e |jstor=27278484 |issn=0129-797X}} who used the invasion under the pretext of anti-communism and containment.{{cite book |author=Dennis B. Klein |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QvlVDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 |title=Societies Emerging from Conflict: The Aftermath of Atrocity |date=18 April 2018 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-5275-1041-8 |pages=156–}} As a way to unify ASEAN amidst growing uncertainties in the region, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik revived a proposal that had earlier been made by the Philippines: to convene a meeting of ASEAN heads of government. Recognising the potential of such a summit to solidify ASEAN's internal cohesion and collective identity, Malik began promoting the idea during regional consultations. His efforts coincided with a regional tour by Kukrit Pramoj, the newly appointed Prime Minister of Thailand, who successfully garnered the support of other ASEAN leaders for the proposal.{{rp||pages=84}}

{{Quote box

| quote = File:Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore Making a Toast at a State Dinner Held in His Honor, 1975.jpg Up till yesterday, a favorite question posed by ASEAN-watchers was: 'Has ASEAN a future?' When our officials follow up on the agreements we have reached at this meeting, their question will now be: 'What kind of future will it be for ASEAN?'

| author = —Lee Kuan Yew

| source = at the closing of the Meeting of the Heads of Government, 24 February 1976, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia

| align = right

| width = 30em

}}

The first ASEAN summit was convened in Bali, Indonesia, on 23–24 February 1976.{{Cite web |title=Economic Achievement |url=http://www.aseansec.org/11832.htm |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090508052125/http://www.aseansec.org/11832.htm |archive-date=8 May 2009 |access-date=12 April 2009 |publisher=ASEAN}} This landmark meeting of ASEAN heads of state/government resulted in major institutional and normative advances in ASEAN and Southeast Asian diplomacy. Convening at this summit were the leaders of the five founding members: President Suharto of Indonesia, Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn of Malaysia, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, and Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand. The summit was initiated as member states had expressed their readiness to "develop fruitful relations" and mutually beneficial co-operation with other countries of the region.{{Cite web |title=External Relations |url=http://www.aseansec.org/10370.htm |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211214321/http://www.aseansec.org/10370.htm |archive-date=11 December 2008 |access-date=12 April 2009 |publisher=ASEAN}}

At this summit, the leaders signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a peace treaty binding all members to fundamental principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, and renunciation of threat or use of force.{{cite web |title=Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia |url=https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational_1976Treaty-.pdf |access-date=27 March 2025 |publisher=International Center for Not-for-Profit Law}} They also signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I), outlining plans for intensified cooperation in politics, economics, and culture.{{cite web |title=1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/1976-Declaration-of-ASEAN-Concord.pdf |access-date=27 March 2025 |publisher=Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore}} Additionally, the ASEAN leaders agreed to establish a formal ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to coordinate the group's activities amidst the increasing importance of ASEAN.{{Cite web |title=Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat |url=https://sithi.org/en/laws/1976-02-24-agreement-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-secretariat#:~:text=Due%20to%20the%20increase%20of%20the%20need%20in,is%20to%20provide%20the%20establishment%20of%20ASEAN%20Secretariat. |access-date=2025-03-27 |website=sithi.org}} The 1976 summit thus provided the organisation with stronger institutional framework and a set of guiding principles that would govern inter-state relations in the region going forward.{{Cite journal |last=Caballero-Anthony |first=Mely |date=2022-06-11 |title=The ASEAN way and the changing security environment: navigating challenges to informality and centrality |journal=International Politics |pages=1–21 |language=en |doi=10.1057/s41311-022-00400-0 |pmid=40479375 |issn=1384-5748 |pmc=9187923}} These principles collectively formed as the "ASEAN Way."{{cite journal |last1=Masilamani |first1=Logan |last2=Peterson |first2=Jimmy |date=15 October 2014 |title=The "ASEAN Way": The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement |url=http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/10/15/the-asean-way-the-structural-underpinnings-of-constructive-engagement/ |url-status=live |journal=Foreign Policy Journal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150513043858/http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/10/15/the-asean-way-the-structural-underpinnings-of-constructive-engagement/ |archive-date=13 May 2015 |access-date=12 May 2015}}{{cite journal |last1=Leviter |first1=Lee |date=2010 |title=The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure? |journal=New York University Journal of International Law and Politics |volume=43 |pages=159–210}}{{RP|161–163}} Notably, the TAC's norms of amity and non-aggression were later opened for accession by countries outside the region, signalling ASEAN's hope that external powers will also respect these principles.{{Cite web |title=Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) |url=https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Amity%20and,by%20the%20following%20fundamental%20principles |access-date=2025-03-27 |website=The Nuclear Threat Initiative |language=en}}

The second ASEAN Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (4–5 August 1977), further solidifying high-level dialogue. One outcome was a push for greater economic cooperation to complement the political solidarity achieved in 1976. ASEAN leaders emphasised improving economic conditions and development at home by expanding relations with industrialised nations. Following the summit, ASEAN convened its first post-summit dialogues with key partners; meetings are held with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, indicating ASEAN's growing diplomatic outreach. These interactions marked the start of ASEAN's formal dialogue-partner system, integrating external powers into ASEAN-led cooperation frameworks. That year, ASEAN also launched a Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) to begin reducing intra-regional tariffs on certain products, an initial step (albeit a limited one) towards economic integration.{{cite web |title=Production and Trade Effects of an ASEAN Free Trade Area |url=https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/93_01_01.pdf |access-date=27 March 2025 |publisher=Institute of Developing Economies}}

File:ASEAN Press Briefing on Kampuchea Conference.jpg (middle) leads the ASEAN Coalition at a UN press conference after the Kampuchea conference, with envoys from Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, 20 July 1981.]]

A major regional security crisis erupted when Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) in December 1978, toppling the Khmer Rouge regime. ASEAN, now firmly established as a diplomatic cohort, reacted in unison to this "Third Indochina War." According to Thanat Khoman, growing Vietnamese ambitions and developments within Indochina compelled ASEAN to shift its focus toward the Cambodian conflict. This realignment of priorities significantly altered the bloc's early agenda. As a result, economic cooperation, which had initially been a central objective, was almost entirely neglected and set aside. The urgency of regional security concerns, particularly the implications of Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia, pushed ASEAN to prioritize political solidarity and diplomacy over economic integration during this period.{{cite book |last=Khoman |first=Thanat |title=ASEAN: The Way Forward |publisher=ISEAS Publishing |year=2015 |isbn=9789814620628 |editor1-last=Ooi |editor1-first=Kee Beng |pages=13–18 |chapter=ASEAN: Conception and Evolution |doi=10.1355/9789814620628-002 |access-date=5 April 2025 |editor2-last=Basu Das |editor2-first=Sanchita |editor3-last=Chong |editor3-first=Terence |editor4-last=Cook |editor4-first=Malcolm |editor5-last=Lee |editor5-first=Cassey |editor6-last=Yeo |editor6-first=Michael Chai Ming |chapter-url=https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1355/9789814620628-002/html}}{{rp||pages=13–15}} Singapore played a prominent role in advocating the Kampuchean issue at the United Nations, with Rajaratnam serving as a key spokesperson.Chong Guan Kwa, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, S Rajaratnam on Singapore: from ideas to reality. World Scientific, 2006, p.9. [https://books.google.com/books?id=RCL3tyhdw0wC text online]

In 1979, ASEAN's foreign ministers coordinated a diplomatic campaign calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign (Vietnamese) forces from Cambodia and the restoration of a neutral Cambodia. At the United Nations, ASEAN sponsored Resolution 34/22 in the UN General Assembly, which was adopted on 14 November 1979. It demanded Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea. Backed by many countries (including China and the United States), ASEAN succeeded in denying international recognition to Vietnam's client regime in Phnom Penh and instead ensured that the ousted Khmer Rouge-led coalition retains Cambodia's UN seat.{{cite news |last=Hoffman |first=David |title=U.N. Assembly Bids Vietnamese Forces Evacuate Cambodia; Vote, 91-21 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/15/archives/un-assembly-bids-vietnamese-forces-evacuate-cambodia-vote-to.html |work=The New York Times |date=15 November 1979 |access-date=28 March 2025}} Through the 1980s, ASEAN annually mobilised UN support for a resolution on Cambodia and served as the diplomatic voice of the anti-Vietnamese Cambodian coalition, exemplifying ASEAN's growing role in regional conflict management.{{Cite book |last=Swann |first=Wim |title=21st-century Cambodia: view and vision |date=2009 |publisher=Global Vision Publ. House |isbn=978-81-8220-278-8 |edition=1. |location=New Delhi}}{{rp||pages=98}}

File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F066049-0032, Thailand, Konferenz EG-Ministerrat und ASEAN.jpg

In 1980, ASEAN and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed a Cooperation Agreement, the first between ASEAN and a regional economic bloc. It covered trade, economic, and development cooperation.{{cite web |title=The European Union and ASEAN |url=https://www.eeas.europa.eu/asean/european-union-and-asean_en |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=European External Action Service |publisher=European Union}}{{cite web |date=7 March 1980 |title=Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – member countries of ASEAN |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1980-ASEAN-EEC-Coop-Agt.pdf |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Centre for International Law |publisher=National University of Singapore}} The United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had earlier become ASEAN dialogue partners (formal relations established in the late 1970s),{{Cite web |title=ASEAN Grants United Kingdom 'Dialogue Partner' Status |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/asean-grants-united-kingdom-dialogue-partner-status/ |access-date=2025-04-06 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}} and regular ASEAN-Post Ministerial conferences begin to be held, in which ASEAN foreign ministers met their counterparts from these major powers.{{cite web |date=11 September 2017 |title='Partners' For Change: Understanding External Relations Of ASEAN – Analysis |url=https://en.aecvcci.vn/tin-tuc-n2705/%E2%80%98partners%E2%80%99-for-change-understanding-external-relations-of-asean--analysis.htm |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry}} Meanwhile, ASEAN kept a hard line on Cambodia as it formed the "ASEAN Coalition" with Western and Chinese backing to diplomatically isolate Vietnam. ASEAN also engaged China, despite wariness of Chinese influence, due to being an ally in opposing Vietnam in Cambodia.{{cite web |last=Nair |first=Deepak |date=22 March 2021 |title=ASEAN on Myanmar's coup: revisiting Cold War diplomacy on Cambodia |url=https://www.newmandala.org/asean-on-myanmars-coup-revisiting-cold-war-diplomacy-on-cambodia/ |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=New Mandala}} Economic cooperation remains limited but gains some momentum with the 1981 ASEAN Industrial Cooperation scheme (to spur joint industrial projects among members).{{cite journal |last=Yoshimatsu |first=Hidetaka |date=October 2000 |title=Preferences, Interest, and Regional Integration: The Development of the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Arrangement |url=https://en.agi.or.jp/media/publications/workingpaper/WP2000-19.pdf |journal=ICSEAD Working Paper Series |volume=2000 |issue=19 |access-date=28 March 2025}}{{cite web |date=18 June 1981 |title=1981 Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/1981-Basic-Agreement-on-ASEAN-Industrial-Complementation-1-1.pdf |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore}} In 1981–82, ASEAN and its international partners also address the Indochinese refugee crisis, co-hosting an international conference to resolve the plight of refugees fleeing Vietnam and Laos.

File:Stamp of Indonesia - 1984 - Colnect 256044 - Association of South East Asian Nations Meeting.jpeg

Brunei joined ASEAN on 7 January 1984, becoming the sixth member of the Association. Brunei had gained full independence from the United Kingdom only a week earlier (1 January 1984) and quickly moved to align with its Southeast Asian neighbours. ASEAN's expansion to Brunei demonstrated the organisation's appeal to newly independent states in the region.{{cite web |title=Background Note:Brunei Darussalam/Profile:/Foreign Relations |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190604183451/https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm |archive-date=4 June 2019 |access-date=6 March 2007 |publisher=US State Department}}{{failed verification|date=June 2025}} With Brunei's entry, ASEAN comprised all the Southeast Asian countries except the socialist states of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) and Myanmar.

Throughout the mid-1980s, ASEAN continued its diplomatic efforts on the Cambodia conflict. It also collectively condemned the Soviet Union's military presence in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and the general expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, consistent with ASEAN's anti-communist stance during late Cold War.{{cite book |last=Brown |first=M. Leann |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-70533-0_3 |chapter=The 1978–1991 Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Vietnam Standoff |publisher=Palgrave Pivot |year=2018 |isbn=978-3-319-70532-3 |pages=35–51 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-70533-0_3 |access-date=28 March 2025 |title=Regional Economic Organizations and Conventional Security Challenges}} Economically, member states in 1985 agreed to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area in principle, but concrete steps were delayed due to differing levels of development and concerns over competition.{{Cite journal |last=Crone |first=Donald |date=1988 |title=THE ASEAN SUMMIT OF 1987: Searching for New Dynamism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27911946 |journal=Southeast Asian Affairs |volume=1988 |pages=32–50 |issn=0377-5437 |jstor=27911946}} This hesitation persisted until the 1990s.{{Cite journal |last=Akrasanee |first=Narongchai |title=ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: A Major Milestone in the 50 Years of ASEAN |url=https://www.eria.org/asean50-vol.1-26.narongchai-akrasanee.pdf |url-status=live |journal=The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials |volume=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121225415/https://www.eria.org/asean50-vol.1-26.narongchai-akrasanee.pdf |archive-date=21 January 2021}}

File:3rd ASEAN Summit, Manila 14-15 Dec 1987 (3).jpg

On 14–15 December 1987, the third ASEAN Summit was held in Manila. The summit, coming a decade after the last formal heads-of-state meeting, was convened to reinvigorate ASEAN. The leaders discussed speeding up economic cooperation and expressed a united stance on political-security issues, particularly Cambodia. It underscored the need for ASEAN to adapt to a changing regional environment as the Cold War neared its end. The summit also coincides with internal changes: the original generation of ASEAN leaders (such as Suharto, Mahathir Mohamad, Lee Kuan Yew) reinforced their commitment to ASEAN as part of their legacy. At this time, ASEAN began planning for the eventual settlement of the Cambodian conflict – Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas initiated informal peace talks known as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) in 1988–1989, bringing together Vietnam and Cambodian factions in a neutral setting. These quiet ASEAN-led mediations laid groundwork for the comprehensive peace process that followed.{{Cite book |last=Prasad |first=M. Nagendra |year=2001 |title=Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem|chapter=Jakarta Informal Meetings, 1988–1989 |chapter-url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781315192994-4/jakarta-informal-meetings-1988%E2%80%931989-nagendra-prasad |publisher=Taylor & Francis |pages=99–132 |language=en |edition=First |doi=10.4324/9781315192994-4 |isbn=9781315192994 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240723022709/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781315192994-4/jakarta-informal-meetings-1988%E2%80%931989-nagendra-prasad |archive-date=2024-07-23}}{{rp||pages=99‒132}}

{{See also|ASEAN Free Trade Area|ASEAN Regional Forum}}

The Cold War wound down, bringing significant shifts to Southeast Asia. In 1989, Vietnam announced its complete withdrawal of troops from Cambodia, a move ASEAN had long demanded. ASEAN actively participated in the international negotiations that followed: notably, ASEAN members co-chaired the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia. A breakthrough was achieved with the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, ending the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN's diplomatic solidarity and engagement were critical in this outcome – ASEAN is credited with keeping the Cambodia issue in the world's attention and facilitating a solution. In 1990, ASEAN made another notable decision: it agreed to admit Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in principal as members in the future, shedding its Cold War reluctance.

File:Mahathir bin Mohamad in Brussels - 1988 (P0018020110H) (cropped 2).jpg briefly proposed an East Asian economic bloc, comparable to that of the European Union.]]

In 1990, Malaysia's then Prime Minister and Pan-Asianist,{{Cite book |last=Schottmann |first=Sven |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvvn4z8 |title=Mahathir's Islam: Mahathir Mohamad on Religion and Modernity in Malaysia |date=2018 |publisher=University of Hawai'i Press |isbn=978-0-8248-4674-9 |jstor=j.ctvvn4z8 |access-date=15 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221115163815/https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvvn4z8 |archive-date=15 November 2022 |url-status=live}} Mahathir Mohamad, proposed an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), a regional-economic bloc that would include ASEAN and its East Asian neighbors. Mahathir envisioned the EAEG as a platform for these countries to coordinate economic policies, foster closer trade relations, and collectively strengthen their economic standing in response to the formation of other regional economic blocs, such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).{{cite journal |last=Mohamad |first=Mahathir |date=September 2006 |title=Let Asians Build Their Own Future Regionalism |url=https://www.globalasia.org/v1no1/cover/let-asians-build-their-own-future-regionalism_mahathir-mohamad |journal=Global Asia |volume=1 |issue=1 |access-date=28 March 2025}} In response to the challenges faced by the EAEG proposal, Mahathir rebranded the initiative as the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which aimed to be a consultative forum within the broader framework of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), focusing on the specific interests of East Asian nations. Despite this adjustment, the EAEC still faced resistance and did not materialize as an official entity.{{cite web |last1=Kuik |first1=Cheng-Chwee |last2=Liew |first2=Chin Tong |date=20 August 2018 |title=Decoding the Mahathir Doctrine |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/decoding-mahathir-doctrine |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=The Interpreter |publisher=Lowy Institute}}

File:Anan Panyarachun 1995 cropped.jpg, who proposed the ASEAN Free Trade Area initiative]]

In July 1991, during the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun proposed the creation of a free trade area among ASEAN countries to Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. This initiative aimed to liberalize intra-ASEAN trade and strengthen the region's economic competitiveness. By September 1991, the proposal for a regional trade arrangement gained support from key ASEAN leaders, including Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.{{cite web |date=20 July 1991 |title=1991 Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1991-24th-AMMJC-1.pdf |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore}} Initially, Indonesian Minister of Industry Hartarto Sastrosoenarto expressed reservations about the proposal, favoring the use of a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme over any explicit reference to "free trade." However, continued advocacy from the Thai Prime Minister, combined with the absence of objections from other member states, led Hartarto to concede. The agreement on the name was finalized during the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 7–8 October 1991.

Subsequently, during the fourth ASEAN Summit, held in Singapore on 27–29 January 1992, the leaders signed the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, which led to the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The AFTA agreement (signed 28 January 1992) commited the six members at the time to reduce tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade to 0–5% by 2008, using a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme. This move was driven by the desire to increase ASEAN's attractiveness as a production base and to compete for foreign direct investment by integrating their economies. The summit also agreed on measures to promote the freer flow of services and investment.{{Cite journal |last1=Hapsari |first1=Indira M. |last2=Mangunsong |first2=Carlos |title=Determinants of AFTA Members' Trade Flows and Potential for Trade Diversion |url=https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/AWP%20No.%2021.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade Working Paper Series |volume=21 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141222132246/https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/AWP%20No.%2021.pdf |archive-date=22 December 2014}} In the political realm, ASEAN foreign ministers met in Manila in July 1992 and issued the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea – the first joint statement on the South China Sea disputes. In this declaration, ASEAN called for all claimants to exercise restraint and peacefully resolve territorial disputes, and it expressed ASEAN's wish to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea.{{Cite journal |last=Buszynski |first=Leszek |date=2003 |title=ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798652 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=343–362 |article-number=CS25-3a |jstor=25798652 |issn=0129-797X}}

In 1993, ASEAN began to institutionalize its post-Cold War regional role. Building on the previous year's initiatives, officials worked on implementing AFTA's tariff cuts (the CEPT scheme started in 1993, gradually lowering tariffs among members). Politically, ASEAN intensified engagement with outside powers about regional security arrangements. In July 1993, during the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference held in Singapore, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This decision was part of ASEAN's efforts to engage external partners in discussions on regional security arrangements, aiming to create constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues in the Asia–Pacific region.{{Cite web |title=ASEAN Regional Forum |url=https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/? |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=Asean Regional Forum |language=en-US}}{{cite book |last=Wortzel |first=Larry M. |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/202/ |title=Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies: The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security without an American Umbrella |work=Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies |date=December 1996 |publisher=U.S. Army War College Press |access-date=28 March 2025}} At the same time, ASEAN prepared for enlargement: Vietnam began attending some ASEAN meetings as an observer in anticipation of membership, participating in regular consultations during the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meetings, and engaging in various ASEAN cooperation programs across multiple sectors.{{cite web |date=29 July 2023 |title=Highlights of Vietnam's 28 years as ASEAN member |url=https://en.vietnamplus.vn/highlights-of-vietnams-28-years-as-asean-member-post265999.vnp |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=VietnamPlus}} Notably, ASEAN countries contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping force in Cambodia, under the UNTAC mission, until Cambodia's UN-sponsored elections were held on 23‒28 May 1993. Though less enthusiastic in nation building, ASEAN was keen on ensuring lasting peace in Cambodia for its eventual inclusion to the organization under the "One Southeast Asia" vision.{{cite journal |last=Peou |first=Sorpong |date=November 1998 |title=Diplomatic Pragmatism: ASEAN's Response to the July 1997 Coup |url=https://www.c-r.org/accord/cambodia/diplomatic-pragmatism-aseans-response-july-1997-coup |journal=Accord |publisher=Conciliation Resources |issue=5 |access-date=28 March 2025}}

In July 1994, Thailand hosted the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), marking a significant development in Asia-Pacific security diplomacy. Established through ASEAN's initiative, the ARF became the first multilateral security forum in the region to bring together both ASEAN member states and major external powers such as the United States, China, Japan, Russia, India, Australia, Canada, and the European Union. The forum provided a platform for dialogue and confidence-building among former Cold War adversaries under ASEAN's leadership. In 1994, Vietnam also joined the ARF as a founding member, even as it prepared for ASEAN membership. Economically, AFTA came into force the same year, and initial tariff reductions took effect; intra-ASEAN trade began to grow under these preferential rates. ASEAN foreign ministers endorsed the ARF's concept of "confidence-building measures" and envisioned it evolving towards preventive diplomacy, guided by ASEAN's principles such as those in the TAC. The year also saw ASEAN address non-traditional security issues: ministers agreed to cooperate on fighting drug trafficking, and discussed the emerging issue of maritime piracy in regional waters.

{{Main|Enlargement of ASEAN}}

File:ASEAN Enlargement 1967-1999.svg

ASEAN underwent its first post-Cold War enlargement and achieved a major security milestone. Vietnam officially joined ASEAN on 28 July 1995 as the association's seventh member.{{cite web |year=2007 |title=Vietnam in ASEAN: Toward Cooperation for Mutual Benefits |url=http://www.asean.org/10098.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511153326/http://www.asean.org/10098.htm |archive-date=11 May 2011 |access-date=28 August 2009 |work=ASEAN Secretariat}} Vietnam's accession to ASEAN was widely regarded as a symbolic act of reconciliation. A decade after ASEAN had opposed Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia, Hanoi's entry into the organization in 1995 marked a turning point toward regional inclusivity and cooperation. For Vietnam, then emerging from a period of international isolation and domestic upheaval following the Third Indochina War, ASEAN was seen as a crucial diplomatic gateway to reintegration into the international community and a platform to normalize its foreign relations.{{cite journal |last=Nguyen |first=Vu Tung |year=2003 |title=Vietnam—ASEAN Cooperation in Southeast Asia |journal=Southeast Asian Affairs |volume=24 |issue=1 |publisher=ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute |pages=295–306 |jstor=44471437 }} Later that year, ASEAN convened its fifth summit in Bangkok, Thailand (14–15 December 1995). There, the leaders signed the Treaty of Bangkok, formally known as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ Treaty commited ASEAN members to not develop or station nuclear weapons, extending the denuclearized status of the region – an idea first mooted under ZOPFAN – and invited nuclear-weapon states to respect the zone. The treaty took effect on 28 March 1997, after all but one of the member states had ratified it. It became fully effective on 21 June 2001 after the Philippines ratified it, effectively banning all nuclear weapons in the region.[http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/Bangkok%20Treaty%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView Bangkok Treaty (in alphabetical order) At UNODA] United Nations. Retrieved 4 September 2008. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728143121/http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/Bangkok%20Treaty%20%28in%20alphabetical%20order%29?OpenView|date=28 July 2011}}{{Cite web |title=Bangkok Treaty |url=https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/? |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=The Nuclear Threat Initiative |language=en}} Economically, with Vietnam on board, ASEAN adjusted AFTA timelines by giving new members a grace period; Vietnam signed on to AFTA, but was allowed a longer schedule to reduce its tariffs.{{cite web |date=15 December 1995 |title=Protocol for the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area |url=https://asean.org/protocol-for-the-accession-of-the-socialist-republic-of-vietnam-to-the-agreement-on-the-common-effective-preferential-tariff-scheme-for-the-asean-free-trade-area/ |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=ASEAN.org}} ASEAN's economic ministers also agreed on an ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) to begin liberalizing trade in services.{{cite web |date=17 September 2018 |title=ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) |url=https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/10303 |access-date=28 March 2025 |website=Global Forum on Migration and Development}} In the South China Sea, tensions spiked when China occupies Mischief Reef (claimed by the Philippines) in 1995, prompting ASEAN to express concern; China agreed to informal talks with ASEAN, which would continue sporadically in coming years.{{cite web |title=China's Maritime Disputes |url=https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes |access-date=13 April 2025 |website=Council on Foreign Relations}}{{cite web |last=Naval |first=Jaime |date=21 November 2024 |title=ASEAN's elusive code of conduct for the South China Sea |url=https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/11/21/aseans-elusive-code-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea/ |access-date=13 April 2025 |website=East Asia Forum}}{{cite report |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14484.6 |title=China occupies Mischief Reef |year=2014 |publisher=German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) |access-date=13 April 2025 |work=Facing China: Crises or Peaceful Coexistence in the South China Sea}}

In 1996, ASEAN's focus was on laying groundwork for further expansion and strengthening external partnerships. Negotiations accelerated with Laos and Burma (now Myanmar), which were slated to join ASEAN the next year.{{cite web |date=20–21 July 1996 |title=Joint Communiqué of the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/29th-ASEAN-Ministerial-Meeting.pdf |access-date=13 April 2025 |publisher=Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore}} Both countries attended ASEAN meetings as observers and aligned their policies with ASEAN norms (Burma, under an isolated military regime, saw ASEAN membership as a means to gain legitimacy and economic links – ASEAN pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with Yangon despite Western criticism of Myanmar's human rights record).{{cite thesis |last=Cheak |first=Paul Seck Fai |title=ASEAN's Constructive Engagement Policy Toward Myanmar (Burma) |date=2008 |access-date=13 April 2025 |publisher=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37166221 |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas}}{{Cite web |date=1997-02-12 |title=Myanmar: 1996 worst year for human rights this decade |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA16/003/1997/en/ |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=Amnesty International |language=en}} Malaysia staunchly pushed for the inclusion of Burma under the consideration of a strong organization and promises of reform, then backed by the New Order government in Indonesia led by Suharto.{{Cite journal |last=Katanyuu |first=Ruukun |date=2006 |title=Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in Myanmar's National Reconciliation and Democratization |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2006.46.6.825 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=46 |issue=6 |pages=825–845 |doi=10.1525/as.2006.46.6.825 |jstor=10.1525/as.2006.46.6.825 |issn=0004-4687}}{{rp||pages=835‒836}}

In July 1996, at the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta, India and Pakistan were accepted as ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partners, reflecting ASEAN's outreach to South Asia.{{cite news |last=Chongkittavorn |first=Kavi |date=16 December 2012 |title=Asean welcomes rising India as it looks east |url=https://www.nationthailand.com/perspective/30196223 |access-date=13 April 2025 |newspaper=The Nation Thailand}}{{Cite web |title=ASEAN-India Partnership at 25 |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/asean-india-partnership-at-25/ |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}} In the same month, Russia was admitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), having not participated in the forum's inaugural session in 1994. Russia's inclusion marked a further expansion of the ARF's geographic and strategic reach.{{cite web |date=23 July 1996 |title=Third ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/4375.htm |access-date=13 April 2025 |publisher=U.S. Department of State}} In response to its growing membership, the ARF adopted new criteria to manage participation, including the affirmation that all members must respect and adhere to the forum's decisions and principles. These measures aimed to preserve the ARF's cohesion and effectiveness as a multilateral security dialogue platform. In March 1996, the first Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit was held in Bangkok,{{Cite web |title=1st ASEM Summit (ASEM1) |url=https://aseminfoboard.org/asem_events/1st-asem-summit-asem1/ |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=ASEM InfoBoard |language=en-US}} bringing together leaders of ASEAN (plus other East Asian countries) and the European Union for dialogue. ASEAN played a central role in ASEM's initiation, acting as the core of the Asian representation.{{cite book |author=Lay Hwee Yeo |title=Asia and Europe: the development and different dimensions of ASEM |publisher=Routledge (UK) |year=2003 |isbn=0-415-30697-3}} Economically, ASEAN celebrated significant growth – by 1996, intra-ASEAN trade and investment were rising under AFTA, and discussions began on deeper integration measures (customs harmonization, standards).{{cite web |date=2002 |title=Southeast Asia, A Free Trade Area |url=https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/pdf/AFTA.pdf |access-date=13 April 2025 |publisher=ASEAN Secretariat}} Culturally, ASEAN inaugurated the ASEAN Foundation in 1996 to promote people-to-people interaction and scholarships, recognizing the need to build an ASEAN identity beyond official circles.{{Cite web |last=Akihiko |first=Tanaka |date=30 November 1996 |title=Press Statement, The First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting - "The World and Japan" Database |url=https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/asean/19961130.O1E.html |access-date=2025-04-13 |website=worldjpn.net}}

File:Stamp of Indonesia - 1997 - Colnect 254180 - Association of South East Asian Nations.jpeg

In 1997, the association expanded to include Laos and Myanmar, which both joined ASEAN on 23 July 1997.{{cite book |author1=Carolyn L. Gates |title=ASEAN Enlargement: impacts and implications |author2=Mya Than |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |year=2001 |isbn=978-981-230-081-2}} Cambodia was to join at the same time as Laos and Myanmar, but a Cambodian coup in 1997 and other internal instability delayed its entry.{{Cite web |title=Diplomatic pragmatism: ASEAN's response to the July 1997 coup {{!}} Conciliation Resources |url=https://www.c-r.org/accord/cambodia/diplomatic-pragmatism-aseans-response-july-1997-coup |access-date=2021-02-27 |website=c-r.org}} To mark ASEAN's 30th anniversary, the leaders held an Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur. There, they adopted ASEAN Vision 2020 on 15 December 1997. The ASEAN Foundation had also been expanded to include the goal of promoting the ASEAN identity and address issues such as poverty and socio-economic disparities among member states.{{cite web |date=15 December 1997 |title=Press Statement of the Second ASEAN Informal Summit |url=https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1997-Press-Statement-of-the-2nd-ASEAN-Informal-Meeting-of-Heads-of-State.pdf |access-date=13 April 2025 |publisher=Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore}}

{{Further|1997 Asian financial crisis}}

File:Asienkrise.svg

However, 1997 was also marked by the Asian financial crisis, which began in Thailand in July and rapidly spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and beyond. The financial crisis severely impacted ASEAN economies – currencies crashed, GDPs contracted, and social unrest erupted (notably, Indonesia underwent a political upheaval in 1998). Regionally, the crisis tested ASEAN's cohesion and spurred the bloc to take unprecedented collective action. Initially, ASEAN had few instruments to deal with a financial meltdown – economic cooperation was limited and ASEAN's norms stressed non-interference in domestic affairs. However, as the crisis deepened, ASEAN members increasingly sought a coordinated response. Finance ministers began holding emergency consultations outside the regular schedule. Notably, a special ASEAN Finance Ministers' meeting was convened in Manila in November 1997, where for the first time the idea of a regional surveillance mechanism was raised.{{cite book |last=Narine |first=Shaun |title=Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia |publisher=Lynne Rienner Publishers |year=2002 |location=Boulder, CO |pages=161–192 |chapter=7. Responding to the Crisis |doi=10.1515/9781626373440-010 |isbn=978-1-62637-344-0 |access-date=13 April 2025 |chapter-url=https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781626373440-010/pdf?licenseType=restricted&srsltid=AfmBOopODFOTrBewOXeArf_rmXNSET58fde5tIZy8XWhUBzEyxHtUBBF#:~:text=Responding%20to%20the%20Crisis%20,The%20meeting%20also}}

A follow-up ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 1 December 1997 discussed the causes of the crisis and joint policy responses.{{cite book |last=Soesastro |first=Hadi |title=The 2nd ASEAN Reader|url=https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1355/9789812305299-013/html |publisher=ISEAS Publishing |year=2003 |location=Singapore |pages=40–44 |chapter=9. ASEAN During the Crisis |doi=10.1355/9789812305299-013 |isbn=978-981-230-529-9 |access-date=13 April 2025}} In this meeting, ASEAN, together with China, Japan, and South Korea, convened the first ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) Summit. China, South Korea, and Japan spurred the meeting as it was largely prompted by the need to coordinate a response to the financial crisis. The Kuala Lumpur gathering (and subsequent meetings in 1998–99) laid the groundwork for institutionalizing ASEAN+3 cooperation by 1999.{{Cite web |title=Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3) cooperation on energy, transport, and information & communications technology Initiative |url=https://aric.adb.org/initiative/association-of-southeast-asian-nations-plus-three-cooperation-on-energy-transport-and-information-communications-technology#:~:text=ASEAN+3%20cooperation%20began%20in%20December,development,%20oil%20market%20studies,%20oil |access-date=2025-04-14 |website=aric.adb.org}} One bold proposal that emerged in this period was the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Japan, frustrated with the slow international response, floated the AMF concept to the summit from another unrelated joint G7-IMF meetings in Hong Kong during September 20–25, 1997.{{cite journal |last1=Amyx |first1=Jennifer Ann |date=September 2002 |title=Moving Beyond Bilateralism? Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund |url=https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40431/3/pep-331.pdf |journal=Asia Pacific Economic Papers}} As proposed in August/September 1997 as a $100 billion regional fund that Asian nations could draw on for crisis lending.{{clarify|reason=Incomplete sentence.|date=June 2025}} This proposal was driven by Asian leaders' dissatisfaction with having to rely solely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where they had little influence. An AMF, funded and led by Asians, could in theory respond more quickly and tailor conditions to Asian realities.{{cite web |last1=Liu |first1=Henry C K |title=The case for an Asian Monetary Fund |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/DG12Dk01.html |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20021008102851/http://atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/DG12Dk01.html |archive-date=2002-10-08 |website=Asia Times |publisher=Asia Times Online}} South Korea and several ASEAN countries found the idea attractive as they struggled with IMF programs. However, the AMF never materialized due to strong opposition from the United States and concerns in some quarters (including, initially, China) about duplication of the IMF.{{cite news |date=June 22, 2017 |title=Looking back at the 'Asian IMF' concept |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Looking-back-at-the-Asian-IMF-concept |publisher=Nikkei Asian Review}} Seeing the opposition faced, Japan redirected its efforts into bilateral aid (such as the "Miyazawa Initiative" loans totaling $30 billion) and support via existing institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB).{{Cite journal |last=Hamada |first=Koichi |date=1999 |title=From the Amf to the Miyazawa Initiative: Observations on Japan's Currency Diplomacy |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23257214 |journal=The Journal of East Asian Affairs |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=33–50 |jstor=23257214 |issn=1010-1608}}{{Cite web |title=MOFA: Asian Economic Crisis and Japan's Contribution |url=https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240713184804/https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html |archive-date=2024-07-13 |access-date=2025-04-14 |website=www.mofa.go.jp |language=en}} Fallout from the AMF concept led to a less radical solution under the "Manila Framework" which reafirms the central role of the IMF and continued regional-financial cooperation.{{cite report |url=https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156085/adbi-wp230.pdf |title=The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development and Outlook |last=Sussangkarn |first=Chalongphob |date=July 2010 |publisher=Asian Development Bank Institute |access-date=1 May 2025}}

In February 1998, the ASEAN Finance Ministers met again in Jakarta and formally agreed to establish the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). The ASP created a "peer review" system in which ASEAN finance ministries and central banks would regularly share financial data, monitor economic risks, and coordinate policies to prevent future crises. Though in practice this surveillance mechanism had limitations, it was a significant institutional reform – a first step toward mutual oversight of economic health within ASEAN.{{Cite web |title=ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) Initiative |url=https://aric.adb.org/initiative/asean-surveillance-process#:~:text=finalized%20in%20August%201998%20and,1999,%20it%20began%20to |access-date=2025-04-14 |website=aric.adb.org}} Another regional safety net was the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA), a short-term liquidity fund that had existed since the 1970s among five original members. In the wake of the crisis, ASEAN moved to expand the ASA. They agreed to increase its resources and include all member states in the scheme.{{Cite web |title=ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) Initiative |url=https://aric.adb.org/initiative/asean-swap-arrangement#:~:text=The%20duration,%20coverage,%20and%20amount,further%20doubled%20to%20US$2%20billion |access-date=2025-04-14 |website=aric.adb.org}} While tiny relative to the IMF packages, this swap facility symbolized ASEAN's resolve to help one another with emergency currency support.

File:B. J. Habibie bersamaa Kepala Negara & Pemerintahan negara ASEAN (1998-12-15).png, 15 December 1998.]]

In 1998, ASEAN reeled back from the ongoing economic crisis and maintained momentum toward its Vision 2020. In December 1998, the Sixth ASEAN Summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam (15–16 December), notably Vietnam's first time hosting a summit since joining. Despite the economic hardships, this summit issued the Hanoi Declaration and adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA). The HPA was ASEAN's first five-year action plan (1999–2004) to implement ASEAN Vision 2020, with measures to strengthen economic recovery, financial stability, and integration. This plan outlined measures to rebuild financial systems, strengthen banking supervision, and accelerate regional economic integration. ASEAN collectively reaffirmed its commitment to free-market principles and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) even amid the downturn. It included initiatives for enhancing the ASEAN Free Trade Area's implementation, starting liberalization of services, and improving ASEAN investment climate.{{Cite web |last=Lamb |first=David |date=1998-12-17 |title=Leaders of Southeast Asia Announce a Recovery Plan |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-dec-17-mn-55006-story.html#:~:text=HANOI%C2%A0%E2%80%94%C2%A0Southeast%20Asian%20leaders%20Wednesday%20unveiled,two%20decades%20of%20stunning%20growth |access-date=2025-04-14 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}} The Hanoi Summit also addressed ASEAN's expansion: Cambodia's admission to ASEAN was announced "in principle", pending resolution of its internal political situation (Cambodia had been set to join in July 1997 alongside Laos and Myanmar, but a coup in Phnom Penh in July 1997 delayed its entry). Politically during 1998, ASEAN members supported Indonesia's transition after President Suharto's resignation in 1998, and ASEAN affirmed non-interference regarding the fall of the New Order regime, while quietly encouraging stability in Indonesia.

In 1999, ASEAN achievds the goal of encompassing all ten countries in Southeast Asia. Following the stabilization of its government, Cambodia joined ASEAN on 30 April 1999, becoming the association's tenth member.{{cite web |year=2008 |title=Statement by the Secretary-General of ASEAN Welcoming the Kingdom of Cambodia as the Tenth Member State of ASEAN: 30 April 1999, ASEAN Secretariat |url=http://www.asean.org/3338.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511153639/http://www.asean.org/3338.htm |archive-date=11 May 2011 |access-date=28 August 2009 |work=ASEAN Secretariat}} To accommodate the less-developed new members (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, collectively often called the CLMV countries), ASEAN launched the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 1999, aimed at narrowing the development gap. This included special assistance and extended timelines for CLMV to implement ASEAN agreements.{{cite report |url=https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mekong/vtt.pdf |title=Can the CLV Effectively Engage in the ASEAN Integration? |last=Thanh |first=Vo Tri |date=June 2006 |publisher=International Monetary Fund |access-date=1 May 2025}}{{Cite journal |last1=Narjoko |first1=Dionisius A. |last2=Amri |first2=Puspa Delima |date=2007 |title=The Developmental Gap between the ASEAN Member Countries: The Perspective of Indonesia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45275810 |journal=ASEAN Economic Bulletin |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=45–71 |jstor=45275810 |issn=0217-4472}}{{cite report |url=https://www.eria.org/RPR-2007-4.pdf |title=Development Strategy for CLMV in the Age of Economic Integration |last=Sotharith |first=Chap |date=2009 |publisher=Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia |access-date=1 May 2025}} Regionally, 1999 was marked by the crisis in East Timor: after East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia, violence erupted. ASEAN, adhering to non-interference, did not act as a group to intervene in what was then an Indonesian internal issue, but individually, ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore) contributed troops to the Australian-led UN-backed INTERFET peacekeeping force in East Timor in September 1999.{{Cite web |date=2019-01-16 |title=The Association Of Southeast Nations And Efforts To Address Mass Atrocities: An Historical Analysis - The Yale Review Of International Studies |url=https://yris.yira.org/column/the-association-of-southeast-nations-and-efforts-to-address-mass-atrocities-an-historical-analysis/ |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=yris.yira.org |language=en-US}} Diplomatically, ASEAN and China in 1999 began talks to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea, building on the 1992 ASEAN declaration.{{Cite web |last=Simões |first=Leticia |date=2022-06-23 |title=The Role of ASEAN in the South China Sea Disputes |url=https://www.e-ir.info/2022/06/23/the-role-of-asean-in-the-south-china-sea-disputes/? |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=E-International Relations |language=en-US}} Meanwhile in Manila, the ASEAN+3 process was consolidated with a second leaders' meeting and agreement to hold regular annual ASEAN+3 summits. In November 1999, the first ASEAN Plus One summit with China was held, at which China proposed a free trade area with ASEAN (this idea would later materialize as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in the 2000s). Economically, by the end of 1999, most ASEAN economies had rebounded from the crisis (with the notable exception of Indonesia, which was still recovering), and ASEAN collectively looked ahead to restoring high growth.

In 2006, ASEAN was given observer status at the United Nations General Assembly.[http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view_article.php?article_id=28822 RP resolution for observer status in UN assembly OK'd], Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 March 2007. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100826051047/http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/news/view_article.php?article_id=28822|date=26 August 2010}} In response, the organization awarded the status of "dialogue partner" to the UN.{{cite news |date=7 March 2007 |title=Philippines to Represent ASEAN in UN Meetings in NY, Geneva |url=http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070307/4/2ykdn.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070312113724/http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070307/4/2ykdn.html |archive-date=12 March 2007 |access-date=13 March 2007 |work=Yahoo! News}} The UK and ASEAN were also considering a dialogue partnership.{{Cite web |title=You are being redirected... |url=https://asean.org/asean-uk-joint-ministerial-statement-enhancing-connectivity-for-a-prosperous-and-sustainable-future/ |access-date=2025-03-08 |website=asean.org}}

{{main|ASEAN Charter|}}

File:SBY during KTT Asean.jpg, a firm believer of SEA unity, delivers remarks at the ASEAN Security Community Council Summit, 6 January 2005.]]

On 15 December 2008, the member states met in Jakarta to launch the charter signed in November 2007, to move closer to "an EU-style community".{{cite news |date=15 December 2008 |title='Momentous' day for ASEAN as charter comes into force |url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/momentous-day-for-asean-as-charter-comes-into-force-20081215-6yx4.html |access-date=16 December 2008 |website=The Sydney Morning Herald}} The charter formally established ASEAN as a legal entity, aiming to create a single trade bloc for a region encompassing 500 million people. Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated: "This is a momentous development when ASEAN is consolidating, integrating, and transforming itself into a community. It is achieved while ASEAN seeks a more vigorous role in Asian and global affairs at a time when the international system is experiencing a seismic shift". Referring to climate change and economic upheaval, he concluded: "Southeast Asia is no longer the bitterly divided, war-torn region it was in the 1960s and 1970s".

The financial crisis of 2007–2008 was seen as a threat to the charter's goals,{{cite news |author1=Olivia Rondon |author2=Suhartono, Harry |date=15 December 2008 |title=ASEAN launches charter under shadow of crisis |url=http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-37031520081215 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220192555/http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-37031520081215 |archive-date=20 December 2008 |access-date=16 December 2008 |work=Reuters}} and also set forth the idea of a proposed human rights body to be discussed at a future summit in February 2009. This proposition caused controversy, although the body would not have the power to impose sanctions or punish countries which violated citizens' rights and would, therefore, be limited in effectiveness.{{cite news |date=15 December 2008 |title=ASEAN charter comes into force |url=http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/15/asia/AS-ASEAN-Charter.php |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090210032138/http://iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/15/asia/AS-ASEAN-Charter.php |archive-date=10 February 2009 |access-date=12 May 2015 |work=International Herald Tribune |via=Associated Press}} The body was established later in 2009 as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).

File:Jakarta Welcome ASEAN Delegates Billboard.jpg

In November 2012, the commission adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.{{cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Chun Han |date=18 November 2012 |title=Asean Human-Rights Pledge Leaves Critics Cool |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323353204578126803863141948 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200930053136/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323353204578126803863141948 |archive-date=30 September 2020 |access-date=8 February 2015 |work=The Wall Street Journal Asia}} However, their human rights declaration has been critiqued widely by the international community, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stating that the declaration was worded in problematic ways that do not easily align with international norms. Likewise, the Human Rights Watch in the United States of America noted several important fundamental rights were omitted or not clearly established.{{Cite web |title=The ASEAN Political-Security Community and Its Dilemmas {{!}} The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy – Credo Reference |url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/sageukasian/the_asean_political_security_community_and_its_dilemmas/0 |access-date=2023-05-22 |website=search.credoreference.com}}

{{main|Accession of Timor-Leste to ASEAN|}}

File:José Ramos-Horta, USAID 2009.jpg hoped East Timor could join ASEAN before 2012.]]

Timor-Leste was part of Indonesia during the early years of ASEAN.

Upon becoming independent in 2002, Timor-Leste immediately began to seek ASEAN membership, seeing it as crucial to securing economic stability. However, its progress was slowed due to a lack of capacity and its much smaller economy.

In 2022 the ASEAN member states agreed to the ascension of Timor-Leste "in principle", although without a fixed timeline.

Since 2017, political, military and ethnic affairs in Myanmar have posed unusual challenges for ASEAN, creating precedent-breaking situations and threatening the traditions and unity of the group, and its global standing.[https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-coup-asean-ties/a-57042503 "Myanmar coup: ASEAN split over the way forward,"] 29 March 2021, Deutsche Welle, ([https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4163647 same article] at Taiwan News) retrieved 7 November 2021Laksmana, Evan A. (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, National University of Singapore): [https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/21/asean-myanmar-brunei-southeast-asia-special-envoy-junta-humanitarian-aid-aha-center/ "ASEAN's Future Will Be Decided in Myanmar,"] date, Foreign Policy, retrieved 7 November 2021Williams, Nicola: [https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-pushes-asean-brink "Myanmar pushes ASEAN to the brink,"] 10 June 2021, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, retrieved 8 November 2021 ("The Myanmar coup presents to ASEAN the most serious threat to the importance of its regional diplomacy since the Cold War.")[https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/27/myanmars-crisis-tests-asean/ "Myanmar's crisis tests ASEAN,"] 27 August 2021, Southeast Asia Insights, Brookings Institution, retrieved 7 November 2021Bowie, Nile [https://asiatimes.com/2021/03/myanmar-crisis-now-or-never-moment-for-asean/ "Myanmar crisis now or never moment for ASEAN,"] 4 March 2021, Asia Times, retrieved 7 November 2021 ASEAN responses indicated possible fundamental change in the nature of the organisation.[https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-11-08/rohingya-crisis-suu-kyi-under-the-microscope-at-southeast-asia-summit "Rohingya Crisis, Suu Kyi Under the Microscope at Southeast Asia Summit"] 8 November 2018, Reuters News Service in U.S. News, (same article at New York Times [https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2018/11/08/world/asia/08reuters-asean-summit.html]), retrieved November 2018Wisnu, Dinna (Indonesian representative to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights): [http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/12/06/breaking-resistance-to-human-rights-democracies-and-rohingya.html "Breaking resistance to human rights: Democracies and Rohingya,"] 6 December 2018, Jakarta Post retrieved December 2018{{Cite news |last1=Wongcha-um |first1=Panu |last2=Johnson |first2=Kay |date=2021-04-26 |title=Analysis: On Myanmar, ASEAN pushes boundaries of "non-interference" |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-asean-pushes-boundaries-non-interference-2021-04-26/ |access-date=2023-05-22 |work=Reuters}}[https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/10/why-aseans-rebuke-of-myanmars-top-general-matters Analysis: "Why ASEAN's rebuke of Myanmar's top general matters,"] 21 October 2021, International Institute for Strategic Studies, retrieved November, 2021Coppel, Nicholas (Monash University, former Australian Ambassador to Myanmar): [https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/aseans-snub-to-myanmar-junta-a-sign-of-change "ASEAN's snub to Myanmar junta a sign of change,"] 20 October 2021, Asialink Insights, Asialink, University of Melbourne, retrieved 8 November 2021

The Rohingya genocide erupted in Myanmar in August 2017, killing thousands of Rohingya people in Myanmar,[http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42348214 "MSF estimates more than 6,700 Rohingya killed in Myanmar,"] 13 December 2017, BBC News, retrieved December 2017 (same topic at CBS News[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rohingya-myanmar-thousands-killed-2-months-doctors-without-borders-msf-says/], The Independent[http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-crisis-latest-6700-muslims-killed-two-months-burma-doctors-without-borders-persecution-a8109131.html], Toronto Star[https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/12/14/at-least-6700-rohingya-killed-in-myanmar-between-august-and-september-aid-group-says.html], and Australian Broadcasting Corporation[http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-14/rohingya-death-toll-in-the-thousands-says-msf/9260552])[https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-genocide.html "'Kill All You See': In a First, Myanmar Soldiers Tell of Rohingya Slaughter,"] 8 September 2020, New York Times, retrieved 7 November 2021[https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2018/08/17/study-claims-an-estimated-24-000-rohingya-murdered-in-myanmar "Study claims an estimated 24,000 Rohingyas murdered in Myanmar"] 17 August 2018, Dhaka Tribune retrieved 7 November 2021 driving most into neighbouring Bangladesh, and continuing for months.[https://www.nbcnews.com/slideshow/rohingya-muslims-flee-myanmar-trudging-through-treacherous-terrain-n798896 "Over 123,000 Rohingya Refugees Flee Violence in Myanmar,"], 5 September 2017, Reuters News Service / NBC retrieved September 2017{{Cite news |last=Gowen |first=Annie |date=2017-09-12 |title='Textbook example of ethnic cleansing': 370,000 Rohingyas flood Bangladesh as crisis worsens |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing--370000-rohingyas-flood-bangladesh-as-crisis-worsens/2017/09/12/24bf290e-8792-41e9-a769-c79d7326bed0_story.html |access-date=2025-06-15 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}[https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-planned-rohingya-attacks-possibly-genocide-un-rights-9508588 "Myanmar 'planned' Rohingya attacks, possibly 'genocide': UN rights chief,"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171223043844/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-planned-rohingya-attacks-possibly-genocide-un-rights-9508588|date=23 December 2017}} 19 December 2017, Agence France-Presse in Channel NewsAsia, (also at SBS Newshttps://www.sbs.com.au/news/myanmar-planned-rohingya-attacks-possibly-genocide-un-rights-chief retrieved December 2017{{Cite web |last=Murdoch |first=Lindsay |title=Rohingya crisis: "I couldn't save my children." |url=http://www.smh.com.au/interactive/2017/Rohingya-crisis-lives-in-limbo/ |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=Sydney Morning Herald}} This created a global outcry demanding ASEAN take action against the civilian-military coalition government of Myanmar, which had long discriminated against the Rohingya.[https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/aseans-limited-role-in-solving-the-rohingya-crisis/ "ASEAN's Limited Role in Solving the Rohingya Crisis,"] 12 October 2018, The Diplomat, retrieved 7 November 2021[https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-rohingya-crisis-u-s-response-to-the-tragedy-in-burma/index.html " The Rohingya Crisis: U.S. Response to the Tragedy in Burma,"] testimony, 5 October 2017, U.S. State Department, retrieved 7 November 2021Septiari, Dian: [https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/26/totally-shameful-outrage-as-asean-nations-abandon-rohingya-boat-people.html "'Totally shameful': Outrage as ASEAN nations abandon Rohingya boat people,"] 26 June 2020, Jakarta Post, retrieved 7 November 2021{{Cite web |last=Daily |first=The ASEAN |date=2023-08-08 |title=United Nations Investigators Uncover Escalating War Crimes In Myanmar Amid Alarming Surge In Atrocities |url=https://theaseandaily.com/united-nations-investigators-uncover-escalating-war-crimes-in-myanmar-amid-alarming-surge-in-atrocities/ |access-date=2024-06-17 |website=THE ASEAN DAILY}}

As the Rohingya were predominantly Muslim (in Buddhist-dominated Myanmar), and the ethnic cleansing was framed in religious terms, other largely-Muslim ASEAN nations (particularly Malaysia,Muslimin, Anis Shakirah Mohd: [https://www.forbes.com/sites/anismuslimin/2017/12/17/aseans-rohingya-response-barely-a-peep-outside-of-malaysia/ "ASEAN's Rohingya Response: Barely a Peep Outside of Malaysia"] December 17, 2017, Forbes retrieved December 2017[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/aung-san-suu-kyi-asks-australia-and-asean-for-help-with-rohingya-crisis "Aung San Suu Kyi asks Australia and ASEAN for help with Rohingya crisis,"] March 18, 2018, The Guardian, retrieved March 2018[https://www.foxnews.com/world/mahathir-slams-myanmars-suu-kyi-for-handling-of-rohingya "Mahathir slams Myanmar's Suu Kyi for handling of Rohingya"] November 13, 2018, Associated Press in Fox News, retrieved November 6, 2021 Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei) objected, some strongly,[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/islamic-countries-call-rohingya-crisis-ethnic-cleansing/articleshow/64063168.cms "Islamic countries call Rohingya crisis 'ethnic cleansing',"] May 7, 2018, Times of India retrieved May 2018 and also objected to the burden of Rohingya refugees arriving on their shores (as did ASEAN neighbors Buddhist-dominated Thailand[https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2018/12/17/asean-must-pressure-myanmar-and-suu-kyi-on-rohingya-issue/ "ASEAN must pressure Myanmar and Suu Kyi on Rohingya issue, says Dr M.,"] December 17, 2018, The Star (Malaysia) retrieved December 2018 and Muslim-dominated observer-nation Bangladesh.[http://unb.com.bd/category/Bangladesh/bd-wants-myanmar-to-create-safe-zone-for-rohingyas-under-supervision-of-asean/11615 "BD wants Myanmar to create safe zone for Rohingyas under supervision of ASEAN,"] January 29, 2019, United News of Bangladesh, retrieved February 2019[https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/myanmar-rohingya-crisis-dhaka-seeks-nam-asean-member-states-role-1775227 "Dhaka seeks NAM, ASEAN member states' role,"] July 22, 2019, Daily Star (Bangladesh), retrieved November 6, 2021[https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/20/bangladesh-calls-on-asean-to-pressure-myanmar-to-take-rohingya-refugees-.html "Bangladesh calls on ASEAN to pressure Myanmar to take Rohingya refugees,"] April 20, 2021, CNBC, retrieved November 7, 2021) Myanmar's civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, also reportedly asked ASEAN for help with the Rohingya crisis, in March 2018, but was rebuffed by ASEAN's chair, who said it was an "internal matter." ASEAN had a longstanding firm policy of "non-interference in the internal affairs of member nations," and was reluctant, as an organization, to take sides in the conflict, or act materially.[http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-myanmar/southeast-asia-summit-draft-statement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis-idUSKBN1DD0CP?il=0 "Southeast Asia summit draft statement skips over Rohingya crisis,"] November 12, 2017, Reuters News Service (also at Bangkok Post [https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1359704/asean-summit-draft-statement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis]), retrieved November 6, 2021[https://www.cbsnews.com/news/asean-summit-aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-crisis-myanmar/ "Suu Kyi benefits from neighbors' silence on Rohingya,"] November 13, 2017, CBS News, retrieved November 6, 2021 Internal[https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/asean-mps-lawmakers-welcome-icc-jurisdiction-over-crimes-against-rohingya-myanmar-1630597 "Asean MPs welcome ICC jurisdiction over crimes against Rohingya,"] September 8, 2018, United News of Bangladesh in The Daily Star, retrieved November 6, 2021 and international[https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/06/19/human-rights-organizations-call-on-asean-to-prioritize-rohingya-rights "Asean: Prioritize Rohingya rights, safety; The organizations highlighted this as Southeast Asian leaders prepare to meet in Bangkok,"] June 19, 2019, Dhaka Tribune, retrieved November 7, 2021 pressure mounted for ASEAN to take a firmer stance on the Rohingya crisis, and by late 2018, the group's global credibility was threatened by its inaction.Ghosh, Nirmal: [https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/asean-will-help-but-myanmar-has-to-exercise-responsibility-on-rohingya-issue Singapore's Foreign Minister: "Asean will help, but Myanmar has to exercise responsibility on Rohingya issue,"] September 30, 2018, Straits Times (Singapore), retrieved October 2018 In response, ASEAN began to put pressure on Myanmar to be less hostile to the Rohingya, and to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities against them.

However, ASEAN's positions on the issue largely split on religious lines, with Muslim nations siding more with the Rohingya, while Buddhist nations initially sided more with Myanmar's government, threatening a sectarian division of ASEAN. Authoritarian ASEAN nations, too (mostly Buddhist), were less enthusiastic than democratic ASEAN nations (mostly Muslim), about holding Myanmar officials accountable for crimes against their Rohingya minority. However, by late 2018, most ASEAN nations had begun to advocate for a more forceful ASEAN response to the Rohingya crisis, and a harder line against Myanmar, breaking with the group's traditional policy of "non-interference" in members' "internal affairs", a break emphasized by the Rohingya crisis being formally placed on the December 2018 ASEAN summit agenda.[http://www.aseannews.net/rohingya-asean-meeting-message/ "On the Rohingya, the ASEAN Meeting was the Message,"] December 27, 2018, ASEAN News (also at Bangkok Post [http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1169161/rohingya-plight-now-an-asean-issue]) retrieved November 6, 2021

In early 2019, Bangladesh suggested that Myanmar create a safe haven for the Rohingya within its borders, under ASEAN supervision (later expanding that idea to include India, China and Japan among the supervisors).[https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-should-monitor-safety-of-rohingya/article26231318.ece "'India should monitor safety of Rohingya': Bangladesh,"] February 10, 2019, The Hindu (India), retrieved February 2019[https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-asean-team-visit-rohingyas-camp.html "Myanmar, ASEAN Team to Visit Rohingyas Camp,"] July 26, 2019, The Irrawaddy, retrieved November 6, 2021 In mid-2019, ASEAN was heavily criticized by human rights organizations for a report, which ASEAN commissioned, which turned out to praise Myanmar's work on Rohingya repatriation, while glossing over atrocities and abuses against the Rohingya.[https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/06/08/outcry-as-asean-predicts-smooth-rohingya-return-to-myanmar "Outcry as ASEAN report predicts 'smooth' return of Rohingya to Myanmar,"] June 8, 2019, Dhaka Tribune (Bangladesh), retrieved June 2019 (same topic at Straits Times [https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/outcry-as-an-asean-report-predicts-smooth-return-of-rohingya-to-myanmar] and Jakarta Post [https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2019/06/08/outcry-over-leaked-rohingya-report.html])[https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/aaha-centre-defends-leaked-report-on-rohingya-refugees-11613142 "AHA Centre defends leaked report on Rohingya refugees,"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210509110301/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/aaha-centre-defends-leaked-report-on-rohingya-refugees-11613142|date=9 May 2021}} June 10, 2019, Channel NewsAsia (Singapore), retrieved June 2019[https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/06/498302/malaysia-rattles-asean-summit-demands-justice-rohingya "Malaysia rattles ASEAN summit, demands 'justice' for Rohingya,"] June 22, 2019, Agence France-Presse in New Straits Times (Singapore), (same article at Daily Star (Bangladesh) [https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/malaysia-calls-justice-and-citizenship-rohingya-muslims-1760779] ), retrieved June 2019[https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/19/asean-dont-whitewash-atrocities-against-rohingya "ASEAN: Don't Whitewash Atrocities Against Rohingya; Repatriation Report Ignores Dire Situation in Myanmar,"] June 26, 2020, Human Rights Watch, retrieved November 7, 2021 The June 2019 ASEAN summit was shaken by the Malaysian foreign minister's declaration that persons responsible for the abuses of the Rohingya be prosecuted and punished, conduct unusually undiplomatic at ASEAN summits. ASEAN pressed Myanmar for a firm timeline for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees who fled Myanmar,[https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/cbf10cb092e6-update1-asean-foreign-ministers-seek-time-frame-for-return-of-rohingya.html "ASEAN foreign ministers seek time frame for return of Rohingya,"] June 22, 2019, Kyodo News (Japan), retrieved November 6, 2021 pressuring Myanmar to provide "safety and security for all communities in Rakhine State as effectively as possible and facilitate the voluntary return of displaced persons in a safe, secure and dignified manner."[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-23/asean-leaders-hold-off-from-demanding-citizenship-for-rohingyas "ASEAN Leaders Hold Off From Demanding Citizenship for Rohingyas,"] June 23, 2019, Bloomberg News retrieved June 2019 In August 2019, the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting concluded with a joint communique calling on Myanmar's government to guarantee the safety of all Rohingya, both in Myanmar and in exile, and pushed for more dialogue with the refugees about their repatriation to Myanmar. But later that month ASEAN's Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) supported Myanmar's "efforts" on repatriation, with aid, restraining some members' desire for more intrusive proposals.[https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/08/05/asean-calls-safety-rohingya.html "ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting: ASEAN calls for safety of Rohingya,"] August 5, 2019, Jakarta Post retrieved August 2019[https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/asean-members-back-myanmars-repatriation-aid-efforts-rakhine.html "Most ASEAN Members Back Myanmar's Repatriation, Aid Efforts in Rakhine,"] August 28, 2019, The Irrawaddy retrieved August 2018

By January 2020, ASEAN had made little progress to prepare safe conditions for the Rohingya's return to Myanmar.[https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/safe-01212021153814.html "Indonesia Urges Myanmar to Create Safe Conditions for Rohingya Repatriation,"] January 22, 2021, Jakarta Post retrieved November 6, 2021

On 1 February 2021, the day before a newly elected slate of civilian leaders was to take office in Myanmar, a military junta overthrew Myanmar's civilian government in a coup d'etat, declaring a national state of emergency, imposing martial law, arresting elected civilian leaders, violently clamping down on dissent, and replacing civilian government with the military's appointees.{{Cite news |last= |first= |date=2021-04-25 |title=Asean leaders agree 5-point plan for Myanmar |url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2104915/asean-leaders-agree-5-point-plan-for-myanmar |access-date=2025-06-15 |work=Bangkok Post |language=en}}{{Cite web |date=2021-06-15 |title=Myanmar: As Aung San Suu Kyi goes on trial, ASEAN's indecision is enabling military rampage |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/06/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-goes-on-trial-asean-indecision-enabling-military-rampage/ |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=Amnesty International |language=en}}{{Cite news |last1=Latiff |first1=Rozanna |last2=Allard |first2=Tom |last3=Mcpherson |first3=Poppy |date=2021-10-19 |title=Tradition vs credibility: Inside the SE Asian meet that snubbed Myanmar |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tradition-vs-credibility-inside-se-asian-meet-that-snubbed-myanmar-2021-10-19/ |access-date=2025-06-15 |work=Reuters |language=en}} Widespread protests and resistance erupted, and elements of the civilian leadership formed an underground "National Unity Government" (NUG). Global opposition to the coup emerged, and global pressure was brought on ASEAN to take action.[https://apnews.com/article/aung-san-suu-kyi-asia-pacific-myanmar-united-nations-4d0b4e78b8b740784c7ed5adb0aec3b4 "UN calls for reversal of Myanmar coup and condemns violence,"] 10 March 2021, Associated Press, (same article at: U.S. News [https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-03-10/diplomats-un-to-condemn-violence-against-myanmar-protesters] and CTV News (Canada) [https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/un-calls-for-reversal-of-myanmar-coup-and-condemns-violence-1.5342124]), retrieved March 2021[https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-urges-council-press-myanmar-return-democracy-79153798 "US urges UN Council to press Myanmar to return to democracy.,"] 29 July 2021, Associated Press, retrieved July 2021{{Cite web |title=Commentary: Is ASEAN's snub to Myanmar military the start of a new approach? |url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/asean-myanmar-protest-military-government-nug-sac-min-aung-hlaing-un-2254311 |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=CNA |language=en}}Durst, Charles (Eurasia Group): [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2747515/the-myanmar-coup-as-an-asean-inflection-point/ "The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN Inflection Point"] August 2021 (Special Issue), Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University, (also print edition PDF at: [https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/26/2002840264/-1/-1/1/DUNST.PDF]), retrieved 9 November 2021 Initially, ASEAN remained detached from the controversy, though Muslim-dominated members (mostly democracies, already vocal against the Rohingya genocide) expressed strong objection to the coup, while the mostly-Buddhist authoritarian members of ASEAN remained quiet.File:ASEAN leaders facing Myanmar Junta delegate.jpg, during the Special ASEAN Summit on the 2021 Myanmar coup d'etat]]In April 2021 in the first-ever ASEAN summit called to deal primarily with a domestic crisis in a member state, ASEAN leaders met with Myanmar's coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and agreed to a five-point consensus solution to the crisis in Myanmar:[https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-on-the-asean-leaders-meeting-24-april-2021-and-five-point-consensus-2/ "Chairman's Statement on the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting "] (and appendix: "Five-Point Consensus"), April 24, 2021, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia, retrieved November 6, 2021

• The immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar;
• Constructive dialogue among all parties concerned... to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people;
• Mediation facilitated by an envoy of ASEAN's Chair, with the assistance of ASEAN's Secretary-General;
• Humanitarian assistance provided by ASEAN through its AHA Centre; and
• A visit to Myanmar, by the special envoy and delegation, to meet with all parties concerned.

File:Myanmar_empty_chair_at_the_42nd_ASEAN_Summit_2023.jpg

The ASEAN agreement with Myanmar drew strong criticism from over 150 human rights organizations for its lax approach.[https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/05/global-civil-society-statement-myanmar "Global Civil Society Statement on Myanmar; Call for Arms Embargo on Myanmar,"], May 5, 2021, Human Rights Watch and 150 other organizations, jointly, including: Amnesty International, Fortify Rights, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, International Council of Jurists, and the World Council of Churches, retrieved November 6, 2021 Yet, the Myanmar junta did not comply with any of the points of the plan.{{Cite news |date=2021-10-16 |title=Myanmar army general Min Aung Hlaing excluded from leaders' summit |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58938489 |access-date=2025-06-15 |work=BBC |language=en-GB}} On 18 June 2021, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), in a rare move, with a nearly unanimous resolution, condemned Myanmar's coup, and called for an arms embargo on the country. The UNGA consulted with ASEAN and integrated most of ASEAN's five-point consensus into the resolution (adding the demand that the junta release all political prisoners). However, while Communist Vietnam voted "yes," along with the ASEAN democracies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines), most authoritarian ASEAN states (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei) abstained.[https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-general-assembly-united-nations-myanmar-business-global-trade-72dbb95927b735de2b83dc1a85abdd72 "UN assembly condemns Myanmar coup, calls for arms embargo,"] June 18, 2021, Associated Press retrieved June 2021[https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/287 "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 June 2021: 75/287. The situation in Myanmar"], June 18, 2021, United Nations General Assembly retrieved June 2021 An outlier, Timor-Leste voted abstention alongside ASEAN authoritarians. East Timorese officials later expressed their regret, with Ramos-Horta calling the vote a "vote of shame" and stated that the country may have isolated itself from the other members of the association.{{cite web |last=Hunt |first=Luke |date=June 29, 2021 |title=Timor-Leste's Bid for ASEAN Membership Tarnished by Myanmar Vote |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/timor-lestes-bid-for-asean-membership-tarnished-by-myanmar-vote/ |website=The Diplomat}}

In October 2021, despite its consensus agreement with ASEAN, Myanmar's junta refused to allow ASEAN representatives to speak with Myanmar's deposed and imprisoned civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi.[https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-rebuffs-asean-request-to-meet-suu-kyi.html "Myanmar Junta Rebuffs ASEAN Request to Meet Suu Kyi,"], October 4, 2021, The Irrawaddy retrieved November 6, 2021 Following lobbying by the United Nations, United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and other nations, ASEAN declined to invite Hlaing to represent Myanmar at ASEAN's October 2021 summit, the first time in ASEAN's history that it did not invite a political leader from a member nation to one of its summits. Nor did ASEAN invite a representative of Myanmar's underground National Unity Government, saying it would consider inviting a non-political representative of the country, instead (though none was actually invited).[https://apnews.com/article/business-asia-myanmar-global-trade-southeast-asia-020da6ef264d3a95c1cbffaa020cda59 "ASEAN to exclude Myanmar's leader from summit in key rebuke,"], October 15, 2021, Associated Press (same article at Globe and Mail (Canada) [https://apnews.com/article/business-asia-myanmar-global-trade-southeast-asia-020da6ef264d3a95c1cbffaa020cda59]), retrieved October 2021Robinson, Gwen: [https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Can-ASEAN-overcome-the-Myanmar-curse "Can ASEAN overcome the 'Myanmar curse'?: Regional grouping struggles with changing dynamics due to 'pariah' member,"] November 1, 2021, Nikkei Asia, retrieved November 7, 2021 The unusual ASEAN action was widely seen as a major setback for the Myanmar junta's attempt to achieve global recognition as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and a sign of broader change in the behaviour and role of ASEAN.

• Enlargement of ASEAN
• Accession of Timor-Leste to ASEAN
• Accession of Papua New Guinea to ASEAN
• Accession of Sri Lanka to ASEAN
• Secretary-General of ASEAN

Wider Southeast Asian history between World War II and the end of the Cold War in Asia 1945–1992

• End of World War II in Asia
• Bandung Conference
• Konfrontasi
• Domino theory
• Vietnam War

• Asian Financial Crisis

Wider Southeast Asian history after the end of the Cold War

• 1999 East Timorese independence referendum
• Myanmar conflict
• 2020–2021 Thai protests

{{reflist}}

Category:Southeast Asia

Category:History of Southeast Asia

Category:ASEAN

Category:Pan-Asianism

{{Improve categories|date=June 2025}}